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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the international mobility of productive capital 
creates strategic tax setting behaviour in corporate taxation and to investigate whether the 
central propositions of tax competition theory conform with empirical evidence. The analysis 
starts from a symmetric two countries model in which countries compete to attract each 
other's capital by manipulating corporation tax rate. This thesis shows that tax competition 
leads to a unique and stable Nash equilibrium. Numerical calibration suggests that non- 
cooperative tax rates are 40-50% below the optimal level. 
The basic model is extended to analyse three asymmetric forms of tax competition: 
different country size, different per capita capital endowment, and different preference for 
public goods. This thesis suggests that smaller countries and countries with a weak 
preference for public goods tend to undercut larger countries and countries with a strong 
preference for public goods. However, difference in per capita capital endowment does not 
make any difference between countries not only in the level of tax rates but also in the size 
of tax cutting. 
The structure of the tax competition game is modified into a two-stage game. Firstly, 
when countries use not only tax rates but also tax rules as a strategic variable, a 
source-based tax (the exemption rule) is not compatible with the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium, and therefore, tax competition does not take place. Secondly, when tax 
competition is followed by subsidy competition, tax cutting happens even with a 
residence-based tax (the credit rule and the deduction rule). 
The assumption of perfect capital mobility is then replaced by the assumption of 
imperfect capital mobility. The introduction of imperfect capital mobility leads to the 
non-existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Both countries randomly select their tax 
rates from among those below the optimal level. As transaction costs decrease, tax rates 
decrease and the expected tax differential between them also decreases. 
Testable propositions are derived and tested with the marginal effective corporate tax 
rates of OECD member countries for the period 1960-1998. The four propositions tested 
are: (1) corporation tax rates should show a decreasing trend; (2) more-open countries 
should decrease tax rates more than less-open countries; (3) smaller countries should 
decrease tax rates more than larger countries; (4) countries with a strong preference for 
public goods should decrease tax rates more than those with a weak preference. The data 
supports all four of those propositions and thus suggests that tax competition has led to 
lower corporate tax rates. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
One of the most remarkable changes in the world economy during this century is 
worldwide economic integration'. The speed and the degree of economic integration 
are rarely recognized within a single generation. However, if we compare the eco- 
nomic life of the current generation with that of three generations ago, the change 
is remarkable. Two snap shots taken between different generations may be a more 
appropriate means of illustrating these changes than a motion picture covering these 
generations. The following are fictitious descriptions of an eight year old school boy 
from different generations: 
'The term `international economic integration' has been used to refer to the integration of different 
nations into a regional block and implies specific forms of integration such as free trade, customs 
union, economic union, etc. I do not confine `worldwide economic integration' to these specific forms. 
11 
A country boy in York in 1900 would go to school by a carter drawn by horses 
bred in Naburn, a small village in the south of York. He would have worn 
clothes made of domestic wool and might have put on school shoes made by 
`Churches', whose factory was in Leeds. His big lunch box would probably 
have been made of tin processed in Liverpool and would be full of vegetables 
and fruits cultivated in his village. After school, he might have played with a 
kite which his father had made for him. The dinner menu was probably his 
favourite, `Yorkshire Pudding', made of beef and flour purchased at his local 
butchers in the village. After dinner, he probably listened to the radio made 
by a manufacturer in Bristol. 
Suppose his counterpart was a boy living in 1999. He goes to school in a'Rover' 
car made in the UK but financed by German capital. His shoes are `Nike', made 
in China and his bag bears an American `Disney' logo but is made in Indonesia. 
His lunch box bears a picture of `Star Wars' and is made in Turkey. It contains 
fish fingers, which are processed in Birmingham but made of cod imported from 
Norway, and yogurt, which is a product of the Swiss chocolate giant `Nestle', 
but is produced by its UK branch in York. After school, he plays with a `Sony 
Playstation' which his father bought on their last summer holiday in the USA. 
He is taken out for dinner to `McDonalds'. Returning home, he watches the 
European Cup Final between `Real Madrid' and `Chelsea'. Over half of the 
players of both teams are from other countries such as Brazil, France, Italy and 
Nigeria. 
How could a school boy of three generations ago have imagined what the life of his 
great grandson would be? It is difficult to deny that the current level of affluence of 
material life is sustained by products and services which are provided worldwide. 2 The 
trend of economic integration cannot be reversed and, just like our great grandparents, 
we cannot imagine how the economic life of the next generations will change. 3 
2In 1997 in OECD countries, traded goods and services totalled on average 41% of the GDP. 
This contrasts with a rate of only 22% in 1960. The volumes of imports and exports in 1997 are 8.8 
and 9.1 times those of 1960 respectively while the volume of GDP in 1997 is 3.4 times that of 1960. 
3Kevin H. O'Rourke claims that globalization was further advanced along some dimensions in the 
late nineteenth century than it is today and that globalization was reversed by losers of globalization 
if they were not adequately compensated but were sufficiently powerful politically. He interpretes 
the First World War in this context. For detail, see Globalization in Historical Perspective(1999). 
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Worldwide economic integration has provided many issues for the discipline of 
Economics. Trade, exchange rates, foreign direct investment, economic union and 
international capital markets are just a few of these issues. Public Finance, however, 
has been influenced relatively little by economic integration. Until recently, it was 
believed that taxation could be used to solve domestic problems, independently of 
international considerations. Of course there have been considerations of international 
issues in the realm of Public Economics. Trade has been the major mode of economic 
integration in this century and thus export and import tax have been in the centre of 
economic debates. However, the tax system, as a whole, does not seem to be affected 
by such international considerations. 
However, economic integration itself has become much more diversified. Recently, 
due to the rapid technological development of telecommunication and transportation 
industries, consumers and firms are able to move more easily. Eventually, these are 
likely to erode the base of the tax system. Even if the movement of tax bases does 
not constitute a real threat to the existence of tax system as a whole at present, a 
specific tax may be much more distorted than other forms of taxation. 
Within the deeply integrated world economy, some production factors appear to 
move across borders easily whilst others do not. The asymmetry in the international 
mobility of production factors provides motivation for governments to attract mobile 
factors by taxing them slightly, whereas immobile factors are taxed heavily to make up 
for this loss of revenue. This strategic taxation behaviour leads to lower tax rates on 
13 
mobile factors and thus lower levels in the supply of public goods than the optimal 
level'. Typically, the higher mobility of capital and the lower mobility of labour 
implies that labour income tends to be more heavily taxed than capital income. This 
is an unwanted result which is generally thought to be unfair. 
From the economists' point of view, tax competition implies an inefficient allo- 
cation of resources. From the politicians' point of view, tax competition implies 
an unequal burden of tax for immobile factors, mostly for labours. From the gov- 
ernments' point of view, tax competition implies limits in using taxation to finance 
expenditure. These concerns tend to increase as the world economy becomes more 
integrated and thus the tax base moves by huge amounts. 
The abundant theoretical literature on tax competition reflects the magnitude 
of the concerns shared by economists and policy makers alike. The main outcome 
of this theoretical literature is the belief that tax competition will result in lower 
tax on capital income and the under-supply of public goods. This also implies that 
international tax coordination is beneficial to worldwide welfare. International tax 
harmonization is one of policies suggested by this school of thought. ' OECD, EU, 
and US-Canada have all been taking the issue seriously. 
On the other hand, there are many economists and policy makers who are suspi- 
cious of the harmful effect of tax competition. McLure (1986) is a typical example of 
41f there are unlimited alternative taxes, public goods is not necessarily under-provided. 
'Tax harmonization is not always feasible. Instead, mininum tax rate, enforcement of residence- 
based tax, restricting capital mobility, infromation sharing among tax authoritie, etc. are other 
policies recommeded by various studies. 
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those who believe that the harmful effect of tax competition is exaggerated: 
In the extreme case this amounts to asking whether spending on school lunches 
in Gloucester, Massachusetts, would be optimal if financed by a property tax 
on the fishing fleet docked there. ..... one would expect that 
boats would be 
docked elsewhere, little revenue would be collected by Gloucester, the burden 
of the tax would be borne by owners of the least mobile factors in Gloucester, 
and school lunches would be supplied at suboptimal levels in Gloucester. ...... 
Most of us would not, however, conclude from this simple example that tax 
competition was the basic cause of suboptimal spending ...... Rather we would 
conclude that policies such as this would, at best, be second-best responses 
forced on us by the adoption of a patently idiotic scheme for the finance of 
school lunches. 
There are three possible explanations for why some economists are suspicious of 
the claims of tax competition theory. The first comes from not recognizing the dif- 
ference between international tax competition and regional tax competition. The 
existence of central government as a final coordinator makes a considerable difference 
between them. The distortion caused by tax competition among regional govern- 
ments can be lessened by the intervention of central government while there is no 
international organization which is able to cope with the distortion from interna- 
tional tax competition. Secondly, tax competition theories have focused on analysing 
the direction of change in welfare between pre- and post-tax competition. However, 
what is important in the real world is not only the direction but also the magnitude 
of change. Tax competition theory still needs to provide an answer to those who say 
"Well, I agree with you that there might be a distortion caused by tax competition. 
But, is that distortion serious enough to make a difference in my life? ". Thirdly, it is 
not conclusive whether the main propositions of tax competition are consistent with 
15 
the empirical data. Some empirical studies have found some signs which support tax 
competition theory but they are not strong. 
The aim of this thesis is to deepen our understanding in the three areas mentioned 
above. I have sought to do this in three ways. Firstly, I construct a microfounded 
model which shows how much tax cutting will result from tax competition. For this 
purpose stylized model is adopted. Numerical calibration is carried out to show the 
size of tax cutting in various cases. Secondly, tax competition game is set up in a 
more international context. The standard model is modified to consider three asym- 
metrical tax competition cases, relationship between tax rules and tax competition, 
interdependence between tax competition and subsidy competition, and imperfection 
in the international capital mobility. Thirdly, empirical evidence is investigated by 
testing main propositions of tax competition theory against empirical data. Testable 
propositions are drawn in a close connection with theoretical analyses and then tested 
against the data. 
1.2 Contribution 
The basic idea of the model built up in this thesis is that countries, like players in 
a game, compete to attract foreign capital by manipulating source-based corporation 
tax rates. Capital is modelled to contribute to an increase in social welfare via higher 
productivity of immobile factors (labour) and via a larger tax revenue. Countries are 
assumed to have fixed endowment of labour and capital. Capital is internationally 
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mobile as in MacDougall-Kemp model (see Ruffin [1988]). One goods is produced 
by use of labour and capital, under the conditions of perfect competition. Each gov- 
ernment maximises social welfare, which is a function of both private and public 
consumption. Private consumption is equal to the national income net of corpora- 
tion tax revenue, and public consumption is equal to corporation tax revenue. Using 
a symmetric-two-countries model and Cobb-Douglas specification for both produc- 
tion and social welfare functions, it is shown that tax competition leads to a unique 
and stable non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, where tax rates are 40-50% below the 
optimal level. 
Although symmetric tax competition has an advantage in showing the distortion 
which arises purely from strategic tax setting behaviour, it is less realistic in the sense 
that it does not allow for movement of capital at the equilibrium. Therefore, the basic 
tax competition model is extended to three asymmetric cases: different country size, 
different per capita capital endowment and different preference for public goods. At 
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the smaller country (the country with a weak 
preference for public goods) is found to undercut the larger country (the country with 
a strong preference for public goods). However, the asymmetry of per capita capital 
endowment is found to lead to the same size of tax cutting in both countries. 
This thesis investigates a simple form of tax coordination such that both countries 
raise their tax rates by the same amount. 6 In contrast to popular coordinations 
6This tax coordination is suggested by Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990). 
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such as tax harmonization and the imposition of minimum tax rate7, this simple tax 
coordination does not change the allocation of capital because the tax differential at 
the non-cooperative equilibrium is maintained. ' The smaller country (the country 
with smaller per capita capital endowment and the country with a weak preference 
for public goods) always prefers this cooperative outcome to the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. However, the larger country (the country with larger per capita capital 
endowment and the country with a strong preference for public goods) consents to this 
coordination only when the positive effect of an increase in public goods outweighs 
the negative effect of a decrease in the income from foreign investment. Numerical 
calibration shows that this tax coordination is feasible in all three cases. 
In an international context, governments can cope with the pressure from tax 
competition by changing their tax rules. This thesis modifies the basic model into 
a dynamic tax competition game in which governments decide tax rules at the first 
stage of the game and tax rates at the second stage of the game. The structure of the 
game is an extension of Janeba (1995) but my model differs from his in three ways. 
Firstly, in his model, one country is assumed to be potential exporter of capital and 
the other an importer of capital. In contrast, I present a game between two identical 
economies, which produces a variety of strategic behaviour. Either country can be a 
capital exporter and the tax rules of both countries are therefore relevant to the result. 
7Tax harmonization and the imposition of minimum tax rate are irrelevant in the case of tax 
competition between countries with different per capita capital endowments because tax rates at 
the non-cooperative equilibrium are the same. 
8This tax coordination, however, does not improve efficiency in worldwide capital allocation. It 
only reduces the distortion of the under-supply of public goods in both countries. 
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Secondly, in this study, each government is assumed to maximize its social welfare 
as a function of private consumption and of public consumption. This social welfare 
function contrasts with Janeba (1995) who assumes that governments optimize their 
national income as the sum of domestic output and net factor payments to the other 
country. Lastly, Janeba (1995) analyses only the game in which governments choose 
their method of double taxation relief among exemption, credit, and deduction. In 
addition to these, I also analyse the game in which governments choose between the 
residence principle9 and the source principle. 
This thesis shows that both countries adopt one of four variations of the residence 
principle: no adjustment, deduction, credit with limitation and exemption (deduction 
and credit method under the world income taxation) at the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. A simple intuitive explanation for the result is that these tax rules never 
treat the income from capital located abroad preferentially to that from capital at 
home and can protect the country from capital flight. Because both countries do 
not choose the exemption method (the source principle), tax competition does not 
occur at all. This implies that international tax coordination (harmonization) is not 
9When one country applies the residence principle and the other applies the source principle, 
the income from the capital invested abroad is taxed not only by the host country but also by the 
home country. The home country which applies the residence principle has five options through 
which to relieve the burden from double taxation. Firstly, the government ignores the problem of 
double taxation (No adjustment). Secondly, the government can tax the income net of tax paid to 
the foreign government (Deduction). Thirdly, the government can give full credit for the tax paid 
to the foreign government (Full credit). If the tax credit is greater than the tax payable to the 
government, the government may repay the money. Fourthly, the government can give the credit 
with limitation up to the amount of the tax payable to the government (Credit with limitation). 
Finally, the government may tax only the income earned domestically, exempting the income earned 
abroad from calculating the tax base income (Exemption). 
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necessary when countries are free to choose their tax rules. 
Tax competition is also analysed in relation to subsidy competition. There are 
three reasons why subsidies are not incorporated into effective tax rates and are 
analysed separately from tax rates. Firstly, while tax rates are applied equally to all 
the capital income in a country, subsidies tend to be granted either to all investors or 
exclusively to foreign investors. Secondly, subsidies are usually granted according to 
the source principle, even when taxation follows the residence principle. Thirdly, the 
decisions made in relation to subsidies are different from those made on tax rates, in 
the sense that tax rates fall under the stricter control of the assembly and are changed 
less frequently than subsidies. 
The modified structure of the game is that governments decide tax rates at the first 
stage and then the amounts of subsidies at the second stage. Two different subsidies 
are explored: a preferential subsidy (granted exclusively to foreign capital) and a 
universal subsidy (granted to all capital in its territory). The availability of subsidy 
is found to cause strategic behaviour with regard to tax rates in the first stage even 
when both countries apply the credit method (the residence principle). Regardless of 
the method of double taxation relief (the taxation principle), the effective tax rates 
are the same at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
The result has implications for the validity of those anti-tax competition policies 
suggested by previous studies. International tax harmonization and the imposition of 
minimum tax rate fail to achieve their objectives of enhancing efficiency in worldwide 
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capital allocation and of alleviating the distortion of the under-supply of public goods 
if governments use subsidies to attract foreign capital. Rather, they may lead to bigger 
governments which lavish subsidies and tax heavily. 
The assumption of perfect capital mobility is replaced by that of imperfect capital 
mobility. In this thesis, the marginal transaction cost for the first unit of capital 
movement is specified not to be zero. Therefore, tax differential does not necessarily 
cause movement of capital. This specification of transaction costs differs from previ- 
ous studies (Persson and Tabellini [1992] and Haufler [1996b]). With a symmetric two 
countries model, it is found that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium no longer exists 
under imperfect capital mobility. If the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, both 
countries randomly select their tax rates from those below the optimal level. As a 
result of randomization, the tax rates differ between the identical countries. As trans- 
action costs decrease, the tax rates and the expected tax differential also decrease. 
With a small-open-economy model, it is found that a small country always sets its 
tax rate below the world tax rate under imperfect capital mobility. Furthermore, as 
transaction costs become smaller, tax undercutting of the small open country becomes 
greater. 
Compared to abundant theoretical studies on tax competition, the number of 
empirical studies is relatively small due to difficulties in collecting data and in defining 
testable propositions. This thesis suggests five testable propositions. (1) Corporation 
tax rates should show a decreasing trend. (2) More-open countries should decrease 
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tax rates more than less-open countries. (3) Smaller countries should decrease tax 
rates more than larger countries. (4) Countries with a strong preference for public 
goods should decrease tax rates more than those with a weak preference for public 
goods. (5) Tax competition theory is significant in explaining tax differentials across 
countries. These propositions are then tested with the marginal effective corporate 
tax rates of 24 OECD member countries between 1960-1998. In addition to the 
analysis using cross section data, I use time series data in testing these propositions. 
The result of the tests suggests evidence in favour of tax competition theory. 
1.3 Composition of chapters 
Chapter 2 provides a literature survey on the subject of tax competition. This 
chapter is categorized into four sections: (1) regional tax competition, (2) interna- 
tional tax competition, (3) empirical tests of tax competition theory, and (4) new 
approaches. It is intended to draw a line between regional tax competition and in- 
ternational tax competition. This is in order to emphasize that the accumulated 
literature on regional tax competition contributes greatly to a basic understanding 
of international tax competition but, on the other hand, results in international tax 
competition theory missing several important features in an international context. 
Chapter 3 provides a model which is stylized for the analysis of international 
tax competition on corporation tax. The model is used repeatedly in later chapters 
with appropriate modifications where necessary. With a symmetric-two-countries 
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model, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be unique and stable with Cobb-Douglas 
specification for both production and social welfare functions. The model is explored 
to find the Nash equilibrium when the objective function of governments is modified 
in various ways. Numerical calibrations show the size of tax cutting caused by tax 
competition. 
Chapter 4 analyses three asymmetric cases of tax competition: different size of 
countries, different per capita capital endowments and difference in preference for 
public goods. Numerical calibrations show tax rates at the Nash equilibrium. Fur- 
thermore, a simple and feasible tax coordination is discussed. 
Chapter 5 analyses the relationship between tax competition and tax rule by a 
two-stage game. Firstly, it is assumed that each government choose tax principle 
between the residence principle and the source principle. Secondly, each government 
is assumed to choose the method of double taxation relief under the world income 
taxation: deduction, credit and exemption method. The subgame perfect Nash equi- 
librium is sought as a solution to the game. 
Chapter 6 analyses a game where subsidies are manipulated to attract foreign 
capital along with tax cutting. The game is dynamic in the sense that tax rate is 
decided and announced at the first stage, and then subsidy is decided at the second 
stage. Preferential subsidies and universal subsidies are analysed separately. The 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is sought by backward induction. 
Chapter 7 analyses tax competition when the mobility of capital is imperfect. 
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The imperfection of capital mobility is assumed to derive from transaction costs. The 
analysis is carried out not only with a symmetric two countries model but also with 
a small-open-economy model. The analysis is focused on the existence of the Nash 
equilibrium and the relationship between the size of transaction costs and the degree 
of tax cutting. 
Chapter 8 defines testable propositions which are generated by tax competition 
models. This is necessary for the empirical tests which are carried out in chapter 9. 
The propositions are derived in a close connection with theoretical analyses and their 
testing is discussed. 
Chapter 9 presents the results of empirical analysis. I define five main propositions 
and test them separately with the marginal effective corporate tax rates of 24 OECD 
member countries between 1960-1998, which are computed by the method suggested 
by King and Fullerton (1984). The five propositions are as follows. (1) Corporation 
tax rates should show a decreasing trend; (2) More-open countries should decrease 
tax rates more than less-open countries. (3) Smaller countries should decrease tax 
rates more than larger countries. (4) Countries with a strong preference for public 
goods should decrease tax rates more than those with a weak preference for public 
goods (5) Tax competition theory is significant in explaining tax differentials across 
countries. 
The last chapter summarizes the results of previous chapters, synthesizes them 
into a conclusion, makes the limitations of the analysis explicit, and finally suggests 
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future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature survey 
2.1 Regional tax competition in a federal govern- 
ment 
Fiscal federalism has long been one of the controversial issues in Public Economics 
because it creates interdependency among local governments. In earlier works, fiscal 
federalism is thought to contribute to increasing economic efficiency. Tiebout (1956), 
for example, contends that fiscal federalism can solve the problem of the non-existence 
of market solution in determining the level of expenditure on public goods. Free 
migration implies that firms and individuals will locate themselves among different 
jurisdictions to obtain their most preferred `tax-expenditure package', in the same 
way that individuals buy goods in the private market. The fundamental difference 
between his model and recent tax competition models is that he assumes that the 
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revenue-expenditure pattern of each local government is fixed and set differently. 
Oates (1972) reveals the idea that the process of tax competition will result in a 
tendency towards less than efficient output in local public services. Local officials, 
in an attempt to attract new investment to stimulate local employment and income, 
compete with neighbouring jurisdictions by holding down local tax rates. However, 
he acknowledges this to be an oversimplified view of the problem. The benefits, as 
well as the costs, are of importance in location decision of firms and the location 
decision, therefore, is likely to be insensitive to local fiscal programs. 
Boskin (1973) argues that the Tiebout's conclusion does not apply to the situation 
in which local governments, by their tax rates and expenditure policies, compete each 
other. In contrast to Tiebout, the mobility of consumer is the cause of an inefficient 
allocation of resources. The redistributive services are under-provided and tax rates 
are too low. 
Gordon (1983) provides a formal characterization of the reasons why decentralized 
decision-making can lead to a less efficient and equitable outcome. This arises because 
one community's decisions affect the utility of residents of other communities, but 
these effects are ignored when separate decisions are made. 
Wilson (1986) shows that the use of distorting property tax on mobile capital can 
either increases or decreases the level of public service. However, he predicts that the 
over-supply of public goods is not likely to occur with high substitutability between 
capital and the immobile input, labour. His study is distinguished in that inefficiency 
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in production of public goods by governments is analysed. He differentiates public 
goods with private goods and defines production technology for public goods. He finds 
that the public production techniques chosen by local governments differ from those 
which minimize costs at private producer prices. The chosen capital-labour ratios 
in public production are inefficiently high. This is different from subsequent studies 
which assume that single output is either used for private or public consumption. 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) consider the case of a large number of identical 
jurisdictions and show that the use of distorting property tax on mobile capital de- 
creases the level of public service. Wildasin (1988) compares the Nash equilibrium 
where the level of expenditure is the strategic variable with the standard Nash equilib- 
rium where the tax rate is the strategic variable. He shows that the Nash equilibrium 
in expenditure competition is more intensive than that of tax competition. 
Mintz and Tulkens (1986) set up a general model where two economies levy an 
origin-based commodity tax on private goods to finance a local public goods. They 
provide four main results which have been in the centre of disputes by subsequent 
studies. (1) A non-cooperative equilibrium may not always exist due to the occurrence 
of a jump in the tax reaction. (2) At a non-cooperative equilibrium, tax rates and 
sizes of public sector of identical regions differ due to strategic behaviour. (3) The 
inefficiency of a non-cooperative equilibrium arises from two types of externalities: 
private consumption effect and public consumption effect. ' (4) Pareto improving tax 
1The changes in tax rate of one region have two counterbalancing externalities for the other 
region. An increase in the tax rate of region i increases tax revenue of region j by increasing tax 
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changes are always tax increases for the tax importing region but are ambiguous for 
the tax exporting region. 
Crombrugghe and T ilkens (1990) obtain a strong result that the public consump- 
tion effect always dominates the private consumption effect and that Pareto improving 
tax changes are always tax increases both for the tax importing region and for the tax 
exporting region. As Haufler (1996) argues, their result depends on the assumption 
that welfare in the tax importing country is concave with respect to the tax rate of 
the tax exporting country and this assumption cannot be met for elastic transaction 
cost schedule. Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Haufler (1996b) show that there exists 
a unique non-cooperative Nash equilibrium when transaction costs are identical for 
both countries and the marginal costs of purchasing the first unit abroad are zero. 
It has been generally stressed that tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax 
rates and the under-supply of local public goods. The essential force of this distortion 
is that higher tax rates cause a flight of resources, which implies erosion of tax base. 
This pressure forces jurisdictions to set their tax rates below the optimal level and thus 
causes the under-supply of public services. These results are derived because most 
analyses have been focused on symmetric equilibrium. When asymmetries between 
base (consumption) of region j. This is the `public consumption effect'. On the other hand, an 
increase in the tax rate of region i reduces income of consumers of region j by taking away more 
tax from consumption in region i. This is the `private consumption effect'. When these effects are 
evaluated for region i, they may be called as `tax base effect' and `terms of trade effect' (Haufler 
[19961). As for capital income taxation, Persson and Tabellini (1992) call them as the `tax-the- 
foreigner effect' and `tax-competition effect'. `Tax-competition effect' is usually termed as `capital 
flight effect'. 
29 
countries are introduced, higher tax rates and over-supply of public goods are also 
predicted. 
There have also been more complicated studies which accommodate more realistic 
assumptions. One of these is concerned with the fact that jurisdictions differ in size. 
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) show that a small jurisdiction will choose a 
lower tax than the large one because it faces a more elastic supply of tax base. As a 
result, the smaller jurisdiction will be better off than the large one and, if it is small 
enough, it will be better off than under Pareto efficient tax rate. This argument has 
been used as a theoretical explanation for why tax coordination is difficult to achieve 
between different jurisdictions. 
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) analyse tax competition in which two tax instru- 
ments are used. With a two-period economy model in which decisions on labour 
supply and savings are endogenous, they show that tax competition does not lead to 
inefficiently low level of public goods when both a source-based tax and a residence- 
based tax are available. However, when a source-based tax and wage tax are available, 
tax competition leads to an inefficient outcome. 
The analyses in the regional tax competition can be extended to the international 
ones. Most of earlier works on regional tax competition have been interpreted in the 
international context by subsequent studies. However, their policy recommendations 
are not applied to international coordinations. Boskin (1973), for example, suggests 
that a social optimum can be achieved by the provision of public goods directly by 
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higher government and tax-subsidy scheme, which are irrelevant in an international 
context. 
2.2 International tax competition 
Direct foreign investment has been of increasing importance with regard to the 
economic growth and the issue of how to treat its income has been studied in In- 
ternational Economics. Ramada (1966) sets up a model where the international 
investment situation between two countries can be interpreted as bilateral monopoly 
and the `prisoner's dilemma'. He shows that international tax treaties (the credit 
rule) which relieve double taxation can help to achieve joint-product-maximization. 
Feldstein and Hartman (1979) derive the optimal tax rate for a capital-exporting 
country, like the USA, when other countries adjust their tax rates in response to its 
own. They conclude that the capital-exporting country should tax foreign source 
profits, net of foreign tax, at the same rate that it taxes domestic profits, provided 
that its tax rate does not cause a change in the tax rate of the host country and that 
foreign investment accounts for only a very small fraction of production in the host 
country. This is termed `full taxation after deduction'. Otherwise, it is optimal for 
the home country to tax more heavily than the `full taxation after deduction'. 
In contrast to Hamada (1966), Bond and Samuelson (1989) compare tax rates and 
capital allocation under the credit rule and the deduction rule. Their analysis shows 
that tax credit, rather than deduction, produces an anti-trade bias and that capital 
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exporters as well as importers prefer deduction to credit. 
The earlier literature differs from current literature in two ways. Firstly, it was as- 
sumed that different tax rates could be applied to domestic capital and foreign capital. 
Therefore, the tax rate for foreign investment income could be manipulated, leaving 
the tax rate for domestic capital unchanged. This goes against casual observations. 
Equal treatment of capital income regardless of its nationality has been a common 
practice among developed countries. Moreover, the international investment conven- 
tion agreed in the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibits differential treatment. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the change in tax revenue was not considered in re- 
lation to the supply of public goods. The close connection between them was adopted 
from regional tax competition theory in Public Economics. 
Razin and Sadka (1991) show that, with the deduction method for the relief of 
double taxation, each country employs the residence principle. This means that each 
country should not tax foreigners on their income from capital within its border and 
should tax its residents uniformly on their income from all sources, domestic as well 
as foreign. It is also claimed that there is no gain from tax harmonization in this 
instance. 
Gordon (1992) starts from a question about why countries continue to tax capital 
income whereas optimal-tax theory forecasts that small-open economies should not 
tax capital income. He explains that this inconsistency results from the convention 
of double taxation, whereby governments credit taxes paid abroad against domestic 
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taxes. Capital income is taxed if a dominant capital exporter acts as a Stackelberg 
leader when setting its tax rate. Due to this convention, other countries will then tax 
income from imported capital, making it attractive for the dominant capital exporter 
to tax capital income. Without a dominant capital exporter, however, the model still 
forecasts no capital income tax. 
Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency 
from non-cooperative behaviour, damaging both countries. At the non-cooperative 
equilibrium, the smaller country undercuts the larger country and capital moves from 
the latter to the former. The smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax 
rate between those set in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Both countries, how- 
ever, gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range. However, 
Pareto-welfare improvement of the imposition of minimum tax rate derives from the 
assumption that governments behave as revenue-maximizers. It is not clear that 
their result continues to hold under more general government objectives (see Haufler 
[1996b]). 
Janeba (1995) sets tax competition as multiple stage game. He models tax com- 
petition as a non-cooperative game with respect to both corporate tax rates and 
forms of double taxation relief. He concludes that the subgame perfect equilibrium 
is independent of tax rules because the capital exporting country prefers less capital 
outflow and thus set its tax rate at zero. When the tax rate of the capital exporting 
country is zero, double taxation does not happen at all and therefore the form of 
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double taxation relief becomes irrelevant. He shows that the credit method requires 
neither compensatory payment nor fully harmonized tax rates. For this reason, he 
asserts that the credit method is widely adopted. 
Yang (1996) models tax competition in capital income tax for individuals. He 
shows that tax distortions can result from the mere threat of capital flight and the 
ensuing tax competition, even though inefficient allocation of the world capital re- 
sources may no longer be a problem. Given the recognition that governments cannot 
enforce taxation on foreign source capital income owing to a lack of information, he 
assumes that each government is restricted to using the source-based principle only. 
Each government is assumed to optimize the utility of domestic individual through the 
taxation of income and provision of public goods. Under the threat of capital flight, 
each government chooses to tax capital income at a lower rate than the optimum. 
Furthermore, he claims that as the number of countries involved in tax competition 
increases, tax competition will be intensified. As the number of competing countries 
increases to the infinity, each country becomes a small-open economy and it is forced 
to choose a zero tax rate on capital income. 
Most studies on international tax competition focus on one of two taxes, either 
capital income tax or consumption tax. This tendency derives from the higher mo- 
bility of capital and consumers. Recently, there have been some studies which have 
analysed these two taxes simultaneously in order to establish the optimal mix of both 
taxes. Gordon and Nielson (1997) analyse the use of income tax and VAT, given that 
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cross-shopping undermines VAT and that shifting taxable income abroad undermines 
income tax. They conclude that a country would make use of both taxes in order to 
minimize the efficiency costs of evasion activity, relying relatively more on whichever 
tax is harder to evade. 
It is important to note that there are differences between regional tax competi- 
tion and international tax competition. First of all, regional tax competition occurs 
under the umbrella of central government. The extent to which regional governments 
change their tax bases and tax rates is restricted by central government. Therefore, 
tax competition occurs within a limited range. As far as international tax competi- 
tion is concerned, there are no rules and no institutions which restrict the range of 
competition. The major taxes such as VAT and capital income tax are not damaged 
seriously by regional tax competition but they are vulnerable to international tax 
competition. 
The lower level of tax rates caused by tax competition results in the under-supply 
of public goods below the optimal level. The distortion from the under-supply of 
public goods, however, can be mitigated by central government. Central government's 
tax transfer can weaken the incentive for regional governments to compete in order 
to attract mobile factors. At the same time, the central government's supply of 
public goods can alleviate the distortion from the under-supply of public goods. In 
this context, international tax competition is more harmful because there are no 
international bodies to put limits on tax competition by making money transfer or 
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to cure the distortion by supplying public goods. 
The higher mobility of resources across regions in a country may make regional 
tax competition more intensive than international tax competition. However, it is not 
the mobility itself which ignites the strategic tax setting behaviour of governments, 
but rather the asymmetry of mobility amongst resources. Within a country, labour 
can move across regions more easily than across countries. Therefore, regional gov- 
ernments become less concerned with unemployment because labours moves from the 
regions of high unemployment to regions of low unemployment. However, labour is 
less mobile internationally partly due to restrictive immigration policies and partly 
due to cultural differences such as different language, food, religion, etc. Therefore, 
much larger asymmetry in mobility between capital and labour may drive countries 
into more intensive tax competition. 
International tax competition theory borrows much from regional tax competi- 
tion theory. However, this borrowing also imposes unintentional restrictions on the 
development of international tax competition theory. For example, the production 
technology, the preference for public goods and productivity in producing public goods 
do not differ widely across regions in a federal country. Therefore, in regional tax 
competition theory, asymmetry is mostly assumed to stem from the different size of 
jurisdictions. However, in an international context, it is more likely that there are 
considerable differences between individual countries with respect to the factors cited 
above. 
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In addition, international tax competition is more multidimensional than regional 
tax competition. Several strategic variables other than tax rates are available to 
governments when they fight against capital flight and erosion of tax revenue. Tax 
rules, exchange rates, subsidies for foreign capital and restriction on capital movement 
are some of the many factors which governments can resort to under the pressure 
from tax competition. Imperfection in international capital mobility, which has been 
identified by large number of empirical works, is to be fully considered. Some of these 
are analysed in the following chapters but others must remain the subject of future 
study. 
2.3 Empirical tests of tax competition theory 
A balance between theoretical studies and empirical studies is essential for every 
economic theory because the latter enables the former to keep up with the experience 
of the real world. However, in tax competition theory, the number of empirical studies 
is relatively small compared with large number of theoretical studies. 
Not being directly related with tax competition theory, many empirical works 
have examined the effect of capital income taxes on the distribution of foreign di- 
rect investment across countries or across regions in a federal country (see Ruding 
Committee [1992], Hines [1996] and Devereux and Griffith [1998]). Altshuler, Gru- 
bert and Newlon (1998), for example, provide evidence that the foreign investment of 
US manufacturing firms is sensitive to differences in host country tax rates and that 
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the sensitivity has been increased between 1984 and 1992. One example of empirical 
research carried out with respect to income taxation is that of Kirchgassner and Pom- 
merehne (1996). They seek empirical evidence of individual income tax competition 
among Cantons in Switzerland. They conclude that tax competition has some influ- 
ence on the spread of people within a high income bracket over Cantons. However, 
they also note that tax competition leads neither to a collapse of the supply of public 
goods nor does it make redistribution by fiscal authorities impossible. 
However, those empirical works mentioned above are not focused on the strate- 
gic tax setting behaviours of governments which tax competition theory suggests. 
Devereux (1995) is the first to try to find empirical evidence of the validity of tax 
competition theory. He is concerned with two propositions. (1) Have corporation tax 
reforms been induced by tax competition? (2) Are capital income tax rates higher in 
large and closed countries? For the first question, he reserves the judgement, referring 
to the fact that 1980s' corporation tax reforms of `rate-cutting and base-broadening' 
may not necessarily be indicative of tax competition; rather, it may have been due to 
`the fashion of the decade'. For the second question, he finds a mixed result. There 
is little difference on average between the marginal effective tax rates 2 (average effec- 
tive tax rates) for large and small countries but open countries tend to have a lower 
marginal effective tax rates (average effective tax rates) than closed countries. He 
suggests an explanation for this inconsistency by referring to the inelastic response of 
2He uses the marginal effective tax wedge. 
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investment to the tax reforms. 
Chennells and Griffith (1997) measure three different effective tax rates on capital 
income in ten countries, the G7 countries, Australia, Ireland and Sweden, between 
1979-1994. The first effective tax rate is the marginal effective tax rate (METR), 
which is applied to marginal investment projects. The second is the average effective 
tax rate (AETR), which is applied to investment projects that earn some economic 
rent. ' The third is the average tax rate (ATR), which is constructed from firm-level 
accounting data. These three effective tax rates are calculated for three different types 
of investments: domestic investment, inward investment and outward investment. 
They find that the effective tax rates, whichever effective tax rates are considered, 
have not fallen between 1979-1984. The only systematic change is a convergence 
in statutory tax rates and METR for domestic investment even if it is not strong. 
They seek to establish whether the data conform with the predictions of theoretical 
tax competition models: (1) smaller and more-open economies should have lower tax 
rates than larger and less-open economies; (2) capital importing countries should set 
their tax rates on inward investment at the same rate as the dominant exporting 
country. ' No clear empirical evidence to support any of those predictions is found. 
'Their AETR is different from average effective tax rates generally used in other studies. Average 
effective tax rates are generally calculated by the total tax revenue as a fraction of the total profits. 
The AETR in Chennells and Griffith (1997) is similar to marginal effective tax rates in the case of 
fixed pre-tax rate of return in King and Fullerton (1984). 
41n addition to these two propositions, they discussed two more propositions. They are (1) 
whether imperfection in the product market leads to an increase in tax rates and (2) whether capital 
taxes are used as an anti-avoidance measure of labour taxes. They discuss these two propositions 
but do not test them with empirical data. 
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They conclude that tax competition is not driving tax rates to zero and that there 
has been no significant erosion of the capital tax base. 
They attempt to reconcile this lack of empirical evidence through three specu- 
lative hypotheses: (1) if the degree of competition is not strong; (2) if effective tax 
rates do not reflect important changes in the tax treatment of capital income; (3) if 
international coordination is already achieved. 
Grubert (1999) uses US Treasury corporate tax files of large US multinational 
companies. He computes the average effective tax rates of 60 countries using the data 
on reported amount of tax paid to foreign countries and their reported net income. 
This firm-level data have advantages over the METR because the METR reflects only 
a few basic features of business taxation, namely nominal tax rates, tax depreciation 
rates, investment incentives, stock valuation and because the METR is computed 
for a hypothetical investment project. However, one of the fundamental problems of 
the average effective tax rate calculated by firm-level data is that the change in the 
effective tax rates is derived not only by firms' tax sparing behaviour but also by 
governments' tax change. Therefore, we cannot tell how much of change is derived 
from which. 
Grubert (1999) find inconsistent evidence of tax competition. Effective tax rates 
fell on average but there was a wide diversity of behaviour among different countries. 
More mobile manufacturing industries such as electronics did not enjoy greater tax 
reductions. Tax rates did not fall more in homogeneous areas with low trade barriers 
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such as EU. However, lie also has result which supports tax competition theory. The 
smaller, poorer and more open countries lowered their tax rates the most. 5 He sug- 
gests two possible explanations for these mixed evidence. Firstly, globalization has 
not been occurring as fast as supposed. Secondly and more importantly, governments 
have successfully responded with capital flight with new measures. He stressed re- 
cent introduction of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules and reinforcement of 
transfer price rules. 
As Devereux (1995) recognizes, there seem to be two difficulties in undertaking 
empirical work. Firstly, most of the propositions which theoretical literature puts 
forward are difficult to test. ' Secondly, collecting and interpreting the empirical tax 
data is far from straightforward. This is the case, for example, if one attempts to 
test the proposition that tax competition leads to lower tax on capital income than 
the optimal level. The fact that optimal tax rates are not empirically observable is 
problematic. At the same time, there are many alternatives to measure tax burden 
on capital income and they differ significantly. These problems must be discussed 
prior to carrying out tests if they are to be plausible and persuasive. It is therefore a 
starting point of empirical work to define testable propositions. 
5I have not found studies which suggest that a poor country tends to undercut rich one. Instead, 
the analysis in chapter 4 implies that there is no difference in tax rates between poor and rich country 
at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
6Devereux (1995) provides a table which summarizes the main propositions concerning tax rates 
and tax rules. This is reprinted in Chennells and Griffith (1997). 
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2.4 New approaches 
The ultimate issue with which economists are concerned is not whether tax com- 
petition leads to lower or higher tax rates but whether tax competition is a good 
thing or a bad thing. The evaluation of tax competition mainly depends on which 
economic perspective is adopted. According to neo-classical economic analysis, tax 
competition leads to an inefficient outcome. This perspective is the main stream of 
research on tax competition as the preceding sections have revealed. 
However, an alternative and radically different view also exists. This view regards 
tax competition as valuable force which imposes a limitation on policy-makers' expan- 
sionary tendency. Whereas neo-classical economists stress the economic distortions 
induced by differential taxation and therefore favour a policy of tax harmonization, 
political economists focus on the political distortions and therefore reject harmoniza- 
tion. For the political economists, competing governments are able to reduce political 
distortions and shift the possibility frontiers (see Brennan and Buchanan [1977]). 
The political economists, however, do not deny the economic distortions which 
may arise through the mechanism of tax competition. Rather, they place more stress 
on political distortion. Political distortion arises because politicians pursue their own 
goals which often deviate from the preference of citizens. Frey and Eicenberger (1996) 
claim that policy choices on the possibility frontier between economic and political 
distortions tend to be biased in favour of harmonization because economic advisors, 
politicians and interest groups typically favour harmonization. They therefore rec- 
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ommend popular referenda and `functional-overlapping-competing' jurisdictions. 
From the perspective of neo-classical Public Finance, the appropriate forms of 
policy coordination are tax harmonization, the imposition of minimum tax rates, the 
use of corrective subsidies and the enforcement of resident-based taxation. Inman and 
Rubinfeld (1996), however, claim that these recommendations do not work from the 
perspective of Political Economics. They argue that the states will retain source-based 
taxation and central government grants will be over-used. Rather, they recommend 
institutional reforms such as strong political parties, veto rights of nationally elected 
executives, and constitutional strategies to assign only residence-based taxation to 
state governments and to limit the number of states in the federal hierarchy. 
There have been a few trials which consider both views jointly. Persson and 
Tabellini (1992) is an excellent example of this type of study. They consider the 
taxation of capital in a two-country model, where a democratically-chosen government 
in each country chooses tax policy. They find that higher capital mobility changes the 
politico-economic equilibrium in two ways. On the one hand, it leads to greater tax 
competition and, as a result, to lower tax rates in both countries. On the other hand, 
it alters voters' preferences and makes them elect a more `left-wing '7 government. 
This political effect offsets the distortion caused by tax competition, although not 
completely. Their prediction that `left-wing' parties would come into power in EU 
countries conforms with the present political situation where Labour parties dominate 
'This refers the government who cares much more about the redistribution of income by heavier 
taxation. 
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in many EU members. 
Edwards and Keen (1996) attempt to synthesise these two extremes: the view of 
government as a Leviathan and the view of government as a benevolent maximizer of 
citizens' welfare. They conclude that the issue of whether international tax coordina- 
tion tends to increase or reduce the welfare of citizens depends on two counteracting 
effects. Some degree of coordination is desirable if the gain in efficiency is sufficient 
to outweigh the policy-maker's tendency to waste. 
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Chapter 3 
International corporation tax 
competition model 
3.1 Introduction 
An increasing international mobility of capital means an increasing mobility of 
tax bases across countries. As countries attempt to attract tax base by offering more 
favourable tax rates than are available elsewhere, taxes on capital income appear 
vulnerable to fierce international tax competition. Abundant research on capital in- 
come taxation in open economies reflects academic and political concerns that capital 
income taxes cannot survive in an open economy. 
Some theoretical studies have predicted that capital income tax rates would fall to 
zero (see Giovannini [1989], Gordon [1992], Tanzi [1995] and Yang [1996]). However, 
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others have predicted that tax competition leads to lower tax rates than the optimal 
level, but still positive tax rates (see Boskin [1973] and Crombrugghe and Tulkens 
[1990]). Gordon (1992) suggests a number of simple explanations for why capital 
income tax rates have not fallen to zero: (1) if countries are not small; (2) if pure 
profits exist; (3) if countries close their borders to capital flows; (4) if governments' 
expenditure has an effect on firms' productivity. Haufler (1996b) asserts that tax 
rates drop to zero only when either there is no public goods in the model or there are 
more efficient taxes other than capital income tax in the model. 
Even if whether tax competition leads to zero tax rate or not is no longer of great 
concern, we may still have questions; "Which capital income tax is vulnerable to tax 
competition? " and "How much do countries decrease tax rates lower than the efficient 
level? " The first question arises because in reality there is no `the capital income tax' 
characterised in theoretical models. Instead, various different capital income taxes 
exist. Corporation tax seems to be close to `the capital income tax' modelled in 
theoretical studies because it has two properties. The theoretic models assume that 
`the capital income tax' is a source-based tax' and has an effect on the allocation of 
capital. Corporation tax can be manipulated to attract productive capital which can 
'Corporation income is taxed in the host country as well as in the home country where it receives 
double taxation relief. There are four circumstances in which corporation tax can be considered as a 
source-based tax. Firstly, if a home country applies the exemption rule to relieve international double 
taxation, only host country's tax matters. Secondly, if tax authorities have a lack of information on 
foreign income, only domestic income of residents and non-residents is taxed. Third, if corporation 
income is not repatriated or repatriated after a long time later, the tax of home country matters 
little. Fourth, if the tax rate of the host country is higher than that of the home country, only the 
tax rate of the host country matters. 
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benefit the economy by increasing the marginal products of labour and by enlarging 
the capital income tax base. 
In this chapter, a game-theoretic model is stylized to analyse international tax 
competition with source-based corporation tax. Countries are assumed to have fixed 
endowment of labour and capital. Capital is internationally mobile as in MacDougall- 
Kemp model (see Ruffin [1988]). One goods is produced by use of labour and capi- 
tal, under the conditions of perfect competition. Each government maximises social 
welfare, which is a function of both private and public consumption. Private con- 
sumption is equal to the national income net of corporation tax revenue, and public 
consumption is equal to corporation tax revenue. 
The result of the analysis finds that tax competition leads to lower tax rates 
(under-supply of public goods) below the optimum level even though misallocation of 
the world capital is no longer a problem. Using Cobb-Douglas specification for both 
production and social welfare functions, this chapter shows that tax competition leads 
to a unique and stable non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, where tax rates are 40-50% 
below the optimal level. 
The basic model is extended in three ways by changing the objective function 
of the government. Firstly, when the government is assumed to be Leviathan, tax 
competition is shown to be a desirable pressure to place a limit on its expansion. 
Tax competition between Leviathan governments leads to either higher or lower tax 
rates than socially optimal tax rates. Secondly, when the government is to maximise 
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domestic products rather than national products, tax competition is more intensive 
and tax rate is set at the lower level. Lastly, as more countries are involved in tax 
competition, tax cutting becomes larger. However, even if an infinite number of 
countries become involved in tax competition, their tax rates do not fall to zero but 
rather remain a positive value. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, a game theo- 
retical two-identical economy model is presented. In section 3, the Nash equilibrium 
is examined and the under-supply of public goods (the lower tax rate than the opti- 
mal level) is demonstrated. Three extensions are explored in section 4 and numerical 
results are given in section 5. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
3.2 The model 
3.2.1 Setting 
We assume that there are two countries, domestic (country 1) and foreign (country 
2). All domestic variables are indexed with subscript 1 and all foreign variables are in- 
dexed with subscript 2. In both countries, one goods is produced by use of two factors, 
capital, K, and labour, L, under the conditions of perfect competition in all markets. 
The production function, F, is homogeneous of degree one, is strictly quasi-concave 
and satisfies the standard Inada conditions'. Each country has strictly positive en- 
'These conditions are FL(0, K) = FK(L, 0) = oo and FL(L, 0) = FK(L, 0) = 0. 
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dowment of capital and of labour, which are inelastically supplied. However, capital 
is internationally mobile whereas labour is not. Because labour is inelastically sup- 
plied and internationally immobile, it may be omitted in the production function for 
notational convenience. This makes it possible to write F(K, L) =f (K). 3 
Each government maximises the social welfare, which is a function of consumption 
of private goods, C, and of public goods, G. The one goods, which is produced in 
both countries, is consumed either as private goods or as public goods. The social 
welfare function is denoted by W(C, G); it is assumed to be strictly increasing in 
C and G, and to be strictly quasi-concave. National income, defined as the sum of 
domestic output and net of factors payments to the other country, is divided into 
private consumption and public consumption. Private consumption is equal to the 
national income net of corporation tax revenue and public consumption is equal to 
3Derivatives of first-order and second-order are symbolized as f (. )' and f (. )" instead of f'(. ) and 
f 11 (). 
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corporation tax revenue. 45 
The owners of capital can locate their capital in their own country or abroad. It 
is assumed that only the after-tax rate of return is a criterion in deciding the location 
of capital and that corporation tax is the only tax which creates a wedge between 
after-tax rate of return and before-tax rate of return. ' It is also assumed that when 
firms are indifferent to the location of capital, they invest their capital domestically. 
Each country seeks to maximise its social welfare through corporation tax rate and 
through provision of public goods. Two governments set their corporation tax rates 
independently. Then, the owners of capital in the two countries decide how much 
41n a single goods economy model, it is impossible to differentiate the public goods from the 
private goods. At best, the public goods is thought to be publicly provided private goods. Therefore, 
it is not clear why individuals should benefit from the public provision of private goods over and 
above the private provision of private goods. There might be three ways by which public goods could 
be introduced into the existing model. Firstly, it is assumed that two different types of goods - one 
private goods and one public goods - are produced by exactly the same form of production technology. 
In this case, we can treat two different types of goods as a single goods. When, for example, the same 
car is used either for personal use (private goods) or for police patrol (public goods), we may treat 
them as a single product as presented in this thesis. Secondly, it is assumed that governments can 
improve income distribution by redistributing private goods and that individuals then benefit from 
this income redistribution. The introduction of governments' role as the redistributer of income, 
however, requires additional consideration in relation to the asymmetric distribution of capital and 
labour among residents. Lastly, governments are assumed to convert private goods (tax revenue) 
into public goods. The private goods allocated to the pubilc sector is presumed to be used to produce 
the public goods. The government has a production technology such that G= g{tK f (K)'}. In this 
case, the social welfare function is TV (C, G) = 147[f(K) -Kf (K)', g{tK f (K)'}]. The new social 
welfare function have an advantage in that each government can be assumed to have different levels 
of productivity in providing public goods. However, governments' production of public goods is 
exogenous to the model because we have assumed that there are two production resources and they 
are fully employed in producing private goods. We must further elaborate with the model in order 
to incorporate governments' role of producing public goods. 
'My model is different from previous ones. Janeba (1995) assumes that governments maximize 
national income, defined as the sum of domestic output and net factor payments to the other country. 
He does not divide national income into private consumption and public consumption. Yang (1996) 
assumes that all rent, which is the income of labour, is taxed fully. Thus, an increase of foreign 
capital contributes only to an increase in tax revenue. In our model, it contributes both to pulic 
consumption and private consumption by increasing the marginal productivity of labour. 
6The model is known as MacDougall-Kemp model (Ruffin [1988]), which is used for analysing 
international capital movements. 
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capital to locate at home and abroad, after taking into account the two corporation 
tax rates, domestic and foreign. The owners of capital in the two countries are given 
full information about the corporation tax rates of the two countries which are known 
and fixed.? Each government takes the other's corporation tax rate as given and fixed. 
A non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is reached when the owners of capital maximize 
their capital incomes, given the two corporation tax rates, and each government has 
no incentive to alter its corporation tax rate, given the tax rate of the other govern- 
ment. The equilibrium in this game can be sought by maximizing each government's 
objective function subject to the conditions which satisfy the maximization of capital 
income. 
3.2.2 Effect of corporation tax 
Who bears the burden of corporation tax has been a long-lasting dispute. When 
markets for goods and production inputs are perfectly competitive and production 
function has property of constant returns to scale, firms have zero profit. In this 
setting, corporation tax, as a tax on the profits of firms, cannot collect tax revenue 
simply because there is no profit in the economy. Let 7t, P, K, L, r and w denote 
respectively profit, price of product, capital, labour, rental cost of capital and wage. 
The profit of a firm is defined as 
7r = PF(K, L) - rK - wL. (3.1) 
71t is assumed that there is no problem of time-inconsistency in committing tax rates. 
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When P is normalized to 1, a firm, maximizing its profit, produces at the quantity 
where the marginal productivity of capital is equal to rental cost of capital and 
marginal productivity of labour is equal to wage, i. e. 
FI{(K, L) =r (3.2) 
and 
FL (K, L) = w. (3.3) 
By Euler's theorem, the total product of the firm is equal to the sum of the compen- 
sation for labour and capital when labour and capital are rewarded according to their 
marginal productivity. Therefore, there is no profit on which to impose corporation 
tax. 
The result of non-profit of firms in the perfect competitive economy derives from 
the assumption that compensation for rented capital is deducted from the income 
of firms. If all capital of firms is not rented but owned by firms, the tax base of 
corporation tax is defined as KFK (K, L). Therefore, it is necessary to assume that 
individuals have shares of firms and that all capital is owned by firms if corporation 
tax is modelled to have an effect on firms' production decisions. If corporation tax 
is the only capital income tax in the economy, individuals are indifferent to whether 
the profits of firms are distributed as dividends or retained by firms. Individuals can 
receive increased income as a form of dividends if the firm's income is distributed, 
or as rising price of shares if the income is retained. In any case, the income of 
individuals rise by the same amount of capital income net of the corporation tax. 
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The incidence of the corporation tax depends on elasticities of demand and supply, 
the structure of markets, and the time period allowed for adjustments. If firms 
operate as retained monopolists, if sales rather than profits are maximized, or if 
other pricing rules apply, firms may well attempt to pass on the tax through higher 
prices. Therefore, consumers will bear the burden of the tax. Moreover, if labour 
markets are imperfect, higher taxes may be reflected in more limited demands in 
collective bargaining and thus be passed on to labour. With a model in which capital 
can move across frontiers but labour is immobile, the burden of the corporation tax 
can be partly passed to labour because the outflow of capital due to tax will lower 
wage. This is because less capital per worker results in lower marginal productivity. 
Capital will bear some part of burden in a two-country model whilst capital bears no 
burden when the economy is small. 
3.2.3 Residence principle vs. source principle 
There are two polar principles of capital income taxation; the residence and the 
source principle. According to the residence principle, residents are taxed on their 
worldwide income equally, regardless of whether the source of the income is domes- 
tic or foreign, but non-residents are not taxed on domestic income. According to 
the source principle, residents and non-residents are taxed on their domestic income 
equally but residents are not taxed on their income from foreign sources. These two 
principles result in different allocation of saving and investment worldwide. The resi- 
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dence principle results in efficient allocation of investment but inefficient allocation of 
saving while the source principle results in efficient allocation of saving but inefficient 
allocation of investment. 
They also make difference in governments' tax revenue. According to the residence 
principle, the government of the home country (the country where the investor resides) 
can collect tax revenue from the capital income from abroad but the host country 
(the country where the investment is realized) cannot collect any tax revenue from 
the income of foreign capital. In contrast, according to the source principle, the 
home country cannot collect any tax revenue from capital income generated from 
investment abroad, but the host country can. 
Let Zl be the amount of country 1's capital moving to country 2, and Z2 be the 
amount of country 2's capital moving to country 1. The capital moved to the foreign 
country cannot exceed its endowment. Therefore, Z2 E [0, K1], i=1 and 2. When 
the residence principle is applied, the budget constraints of private consumption and 
public consumption for country i are 
Ci = f(xi-zi+z; )- fi(xz-zi+z; )I(Kq-zi+z; ) 
+(1 - ti)fi(K; - Zi + Zj)'(Ki - Z2) 
+(1 - ti) f; (Ki + Zz - Z; ) 'ZZ (3.4) 
and 
Gi = tifi(K, - Zz + Zj)'(Kc - Zz) 
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+tif; (KK + Zz - Z3)'ZZ. (3.5) 
In (3.4), the first line is the income of labour, the second line is the income of capital 
located in country i and the third line is the income of capital moved to country j. 
In (3.5), the first line is the tax revenue from the income of capital located in country 
i and the second line is the tax revenue from the income of capital moved to country 
3" 
When the source principle is applied, the budget constraints of private consump- 
tion and public consumption for country i are 
Ci =f 
(Ki 
- 
Zi + Z; ) - 
fi(Ki 
- 
Zz + Z; )'(K$ - Zi + Z; 
) 
-{-(1 - ti)fi(Ki - 
Zi + Z3)'(Ki - 
Zi) 
+(1 
- 
t3)f, (K2 + Z2 
- 
Z, )Zz 
and 
(3.6) 
Gi=tif2(K -Z. +Z; )'(K -Zi+Z; ). (3.7) 
Lemma 1 If both countries apply the residence principle, changes in the corporation 
tax rates of both countries have no effect on the allocation of capital between the two 
countries. 
Perfect international mobility of capital implies that capital earns an equal after- 
tax rate of return in the two countries. Therefore, with the residence principle, this 
gives the equilibrium condition in the capital market such that 
(1-ti)f1(Kt-Zi+Z; )'= (1-t;, )f; (K; +Zi-Z; )'. (3.8) 
55 
If the common factor, (1 - ti), in both sides of (3.8) is eliminated, it is clear that 
Zi is influenced neither by domestic corporation tax rate nor by foreign corporation 
tax rate. Therefore, if both countries apply the residence principle, international 
capital mobility does not impose any influence on the tax decision of the each govern- 
ment. Each government's decision on the corporation tax has no effect on the other 
government's tax decision. 
Lemma 2 When both countries apply the source principle, an increase in the corpo- 
ration tax rate of one country increases the outflow of its capital to the other country 
or decreases the inflow of foreign capital from the other country. Changes in the 
corporation tax of the other country have the opposite effect. 
With the source principle, the equilibrium condition in the capital market gives 
(1-tz)fa(K. -Zi+z; )'= (1-t3)f3(K; +Zi-Zj) '. (3.9) 
If we take total differentials of (3.9), we have 
äZ1 
_ -ff(Ki-Zz+Z, 
)' 
>0, (3.10) ati (1-tz)fz(K%-Z; +Z, )"+(1-t; )f, (K; +Zz-Z; )" 
9Z; fä(KZ-Zz+Z, )' 
<0) atz (1-ti)fi(Ki -ZZ+Z; )"+(1-tj)ff(K; +Z2-ZJ)11 , 
(3.11 
OZi 
_ 
f; (K; + Z. - Z; )' (3) 
ät; (1-t; )fi(K; -Z;, +Z, )"+(1-tý)ff(Ki + Zý-Z1)" 
<0 . 12 
and 
az; 
_ -fi(Ki+zi-Z; 
)' (3.13) ate (1-ti)fi(Kz-Zi+Zj)"+(1-tý)fj(KK+Zz-Zj)ýý >0 
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The signs of (3.10) - (3.13) are unambiguous because ti, t3 < 1, f (. )' >0 and f (")" < 0. 
Currently, most countries are adopting world income principle, which is a mixture 
of the source principle and the residence principle. The income of an UK subsidiary 
established in the USA is taxed by USA corporation tax and, if it is repatriated to 
the UK, it is taxed by UK corporation tax, with credit for the tax paid in the USA. 
Whether the current corporation income taxation should be modelled as a residence- 
based tax or a source-based tax will not be analysed in the thesis. Rather, it is 
assumed that corporation tax follows the source principle. 
3.3 Symmetric Nash equilibrium 
The game of the tax competition between two identical economies has an ad- 
vantage in that it shows the distortion arising purely from the manipulation of tax 
rates because there is no movement of capital at the equilibrium. Suppose that 
country 1 and country 2 are identical in that they have the same production func- 
tion, fi = f3 = f, the same endowment of capital and labour, Ki = Kj =K and 
L1 = Lj = L, and the same social welfare function, WW = W; = W. 
When each country is closed (Zi = 0, i=1,2), country i is to maximize 
max W(CZ, G2) (3.14) 
t; 
with subject to 
C_ f(K) - tif(K)'K, 
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Gx = ti f (K)'K 
0< t2 < 1. (3.15) 
The first-order conditions8 give 
Wci 
.f 
(K)KK 
= 1. (3.16) WG, f (K)'K 
Each country sets its tax rate at the level where the marginal rate of substitution 
between private consumption and public consumption is 1.9 The tax rate is optimal 
not only for each country but also world-wide. 
Definition 3 When there is no international mobility of capital, each country is said 
to be in autarky. 
Definition 4 The optimal tax rate is the tax rate at which world capital is efficiently 
allocated between countries and national income is divided efficiently between private 
and public consumption in each country. 
Proposition 5 When capital can move internationally, at the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium in a two-identical economy model, each country sets its corporation tax 
8In the optimization problem with an inequality in the constraints, the classical first-order condi- 
tion must be replaced by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Here, we restrict our analysis to the interior 
solution and the classical first-order condition is considered. 
9The second-order condition is not investigated explicitly. Even if the assumption on the social 
welfare function such that W(C, G) is strictly increasing in C and G, and strictly quasi-concave, 
W(t) is not always strictly quasi-concave with respect to t. With given maximization problem, 
aät2 
= (ßv11- 21V12 +W22){f(K) K12. 
The sign of the second-order derivative is ambiguous even if TV,, < 0, TV22 <0 and TV11 W22 - W12 < 
0. 
58 
rate at a level which is lower than the optimal level. The inefficiency of non-corporative 
equilibrium is entirely incurred by strategic use of the corporation tax rate. 
Suppose that the international capital market is introduced and capital can move 
across the borders. Country i maximizes 
max W(C2, Gi) (3.17) tt 
subject to 
Ci =f (Ki - Zi + Z3. ) - fi(Ki - Zi+ Zj)'(Ki-Zi-I-Zi) 
-ý(1 - ti). fi(Ki - Zi + Z, )'(Ki - Zi) 
+(1 - t; ) f3(Kz + Zs - Z; )'Zi> 
C. = tif(K- ZZ+Z; )'(K- Zi+Z; ), 
o< ti < 1, 
0<Z. < K. (3.18) 
The private consumption in (3.18) can be silplified using the equilibrium condition of 
(3.9) as 
Ci= f(K-ZZ+Z; )- f(K-ZZ+Zj)'(tiK-ZZ). (3.19) 
For notational simplification, let Z be country i's net export of capital, i. e. Z= 
Zi - Zj. When ti = t3, there is no incentive for capital of both countries to move to 
the other country and thus all capital is invested domestically. Therefore, Z= Zs = 
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Zj = 0. If ti > tj, capital of country i will move to country j until satisfying 
(1-ti)f(K-Zi)'=(1-tj)f(K+ZZ)'. (3.20) 
The capital of country j does not move at all. Therefore, Z= Z% >0 and Z3 = 0. If 
ti < t3, Z= -Z3 <0 and Zi = 0. Therefore, the following relationships stand: 
1. When Z>0, ZZ>0andZZ=O. 
2. When Z<0, Z1=0andZ3>0. 
3. When Z=0, Zi=Z. j=O. 
Definition 6 When some amount of capital of country i is invested in country j and, 
at the same time, some amount of capital of country j is invested in country i, it is 
called cross-hauling of capital. Full cross-hauling implies that all capital of a country 
is invested in the other country and vice versa. 
Lemma 7 When capital income is taxed by the source principle, cross-hauling of 
capital does not occur. 
The equilibrium condition in the international capital market for capital of country 
1 is 
(1-tl)f(K-Z)'=(1-t2)f(K+Z)'. (3.21) 
For capital of country 2, the equilibrium condition in the international capital market 
is 
(1-t2)f(K-Z)'=(1-tl)f(K+Z)'. (3.22) 
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In (3.21) Z is the net export of capital of country 1, i. e. Z= Zl - Z2, while in 
(3.22) Z is the net export of capital of country 2, i. e. Z= Z2 - Z1. By assuming 
Z= Zi - Z2, (3.21) and (3.22) are expressed as 
(1 - ti) f (K + (-1)1Z)' = (1 - tj) f (K + (-1)'Z)', i, j=1,2 and j i. (3.23) 
Then, budget constraints of private consumption and public consumption in (3.18) 
can be rewritten as 
C. =f (K + (-1)2Z) -f (K + (-1)2Z)'(t2K + (-1)'Z) 
Gi = tz f (K + (-1)2Z)'(K + (-1)2Z). (3.24) 
The first-order conditions10 give 
Wci f (K + (-1)2Z)'(K + (-1)1Z) + (-1)'. tif (K + (-1)'Z)"(K + (-1)1Z)'L 
Wc, f (K + (-1)2Z)'K + (-1)i f (K + (-1)zZ)"(ttiK + (-1)zZ) L' 
+(-1)itif(K + (-1)1Z)'ci (3.25) 
where 
az 
2 
We can define O from (3.23) as follows. 
(-I)' f (K + (-1) jZ)l (3.26) ý' = (1-ti)f(K+(-1)iZ)"+(1-tj)f(K+(-1)jZ)" 
By plugging (3.26) into (3.25), we get 
WC; f (K + (-1)2Z)"(K + (-1)'Z) + (1 - t; ) f (K + (-1)jZ)"(K + (-1)'Z) 
WGI - f(K + (-i)iZ)"(K + (-1)iZ) + (i - t, ) f(K + (-i)iZ)"K 
+tif (K + (-1)2Z)' (3.27) 
loThe second-order condition is assumed to be satisfied. 
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By symmetry, t*11 = tl = t2 at the equilibrium and it implies that Z* = 0. 
Thereby, (3.27) is reduced to 
W* c 
Wý _ 
f(K)"K+(1 - t*)f (K)"K + t*f (K)' 
= 14 
f (K)"K + (1 - t*)f (K)"K 
t*f (K)' 
-, (2 - t*) f (K)"K 
- 1. (3.28) 
(3.28) implies that the marginal utility from public consumption is greater than that 
from private consumption. Thus, it is welfare-increasing to consume more public 
goods and less private goods by increasing tax revenue with higher tax rate. This 
implies that tax rates are too low and public goods is under-provided at the non- 
cooperative equilibrium. This is the same for both countries. There is no distortion 
caused by capital allocation between the two countries. The distortion of the under- 
supply of public goods arises either because each government has an incentive to 
attract foreign capital or because it is concerned with the threat of tax base erosion 
caused by the lower tax rate of the foreign country. 
(3.28) can also show the results of tax competition where the objectve function 
of governments are defined differently. If the social welfare function is reduced to 
maximizing total outcome, i. e. the sum of privete goods and public goods, then the 
marginal utility of private goods and public goods are always the same, i. e. Wc = WG. 
This condition makes (3.28) produce that t* = 0. This result implies that capital tax 
vanishs either if pubic goods is not included as a separate argument of the social 
welfare function or if the supply of public goods can be financed by efficcieant taxes 
11Asterisk denotes values at the equilibrium. This is applied throughout the thesis. 
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other than capital taxes. 
The tax rate in the case of tax competition between Leviathan governments is 
also derived from (3.28). Leviathan governemnts do not care about the private con- 
sumption so that WC = 0. Therefore, (3.28) becomes 
t* _ 
2f (K)"K (3.29) 
.f 
(K)"K - .f 
(K)l 
It should be stressed that the rusults presented above are based on the assumption 
that an equilibrium tax rate exists as defined in (3.28). However, (3.28) does not tell 
us much about the properties of this equilibrium. Is there indeed an equilibrium and, 
if so, is it one or a set of multiple equilibria? Is the equilibrium stable? To what 
extent will tax cutting be executed? Those questions can not be answered until the 
reaction functions are definded by additional assumptions of the social welfare and 
production function. 
3.4 Extensions 
3.4.1 Leviathan government 
Some economists have questioned the assumption that the government is a benevo- 
lent maximizer of social welfare. Instead, they assume that governments seek to max- 
imize their own interest. This form of selfish government has been called Leviathan. 
In our model, the objective of the Leviathan government is to maximize its own inter- 
est, R, which is proportional to the size of the tax revenue, R= KG, where nE (0,1). 
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In autarky, the objective function of country i is 
max 1 (3.30) C; 
subject to 
Ri = ic{ti f (K)'K} 
0< ti < 1. (3.31) 
The corporation tax rate of both countries must be close to 112 and all of capital 
income is appropriated to tax revenue. 
Proposition 8 Tax competition can restrict the expansion of Leviathan government 
effectively and tax harmonization can be viewed as a means to resist the restriction 
imposed by the international mobility of capital. 
With the introduction of mobility of capital, each government is restricted in 
collecting tax revenue from the capital income by increasing tax rate. This is because 
capital moves to the foreign country if the domestic tax rate is higher than that of 
the foreign country. The government is to maximize 
max F 
t; 
subject to 
R, = K{t;, f (K + (-1)'Z)'(K + (-1)2Z)} 
12The objective function is monotonically increasing and there is no interior solution. 
(3.32) 
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o< ti<1, 
-K <Z<K. (3.33) 
The first-order conditions give 
0= rý{ f (K + (-1)'Z)'(K + (-1)2Z) + (-1)'ti f (K + (-1)2Z) "(K + (-1)'Z)O 
+(-1)itti f (K + 
where 
az 
ýti 
ýb is the same with (3.26). By plugging (3.26) into (3.34), we get 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
0_f 
(K + (-1)tZ)"(K + (-1)2Z) + (1 - t; ) f (K - (-1)'Z)"(K + (-1)'Z) 
(1 - ti) f (K + (-1)iZ)" + (1 - tj) f (K - (-1)2Z) 
+tif (K + (-1)2Z)' (3.36) 
At the symmetric equilibrium, t* = tl = t2 and Z* = 0. Therefore (3.36) is simplified 
to 
2f (K)"K 2 
3.37) 
. 
f(K)"K-. f(K)' 1+e' 
where 
.f 
(K)' 
e=-f(K)"K (3.38) 
e is the elasticity of supply (demand) of exported (imported) capital. When 0<e<1, 
t* is close to 1, as is the case in the closed economy. However, when e>1, t* is less 
than 1. Therefore, under tax competition, Leviathan governments have to set their 
tax rates below those of the closed economy. In addition, (3.37) is the same with 
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(3.29) which has been derived directly from the general equilibrium condition by 
restricting WC = 0. 
This result implies that the introduction of international capital mobility places 
a restriction on the expansion of Leviathan governments. This also gives an explana- 
tion for why governments seek for harmonized capital taxation. With the perspective 
of Leviathan governments, the harmonization of world capital taxation is not de- 
sirable for the efficient allocation of goods between private consumption and public 
consumption. The hidden goal of the international harmonization of capital taxation 
might be seen as to avoid the pressure of international capital mobility and to pursue 
governments' selfish interest effectively. 
However, it is worth stressing that tax competition does not force Leviathan gov- 
ernments to set tax rates at the optimal level from the citizens' point of view. The 
tax rates at the non-cooperative equilibrium can be either higher or lower than the 
socially optimal level. 
3.4.2 GNP vs GDP 
In the standard model presented in section 3, private consumption is defined as 
national product, net of tax. The income of foreign capital is not counted into private 
consumption but capital income earned abroad is counted into private consumption. 
With this definition, private consumption becomes Gross National Product (GNP) 
However, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is more frequently cited as the economic 
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policy target of governments. It is therefore reasonable to assume that governments 
regard domestic product net of tax for private consumption. 13 With the new defini- 
tion, the income from foreign capital is counted into private consumption but, capital 
income earned abroad is not counted. 
Proposition 9 When governments care about domestic income rather than national 
income, tax competition is more intensive and as a result tax rates in both countries 
become lower. 
With the new definition of private consumption, the objective of the government 
of country i is 
max W (C1, Gi) (3.39) 
c. 
subject to 
C. =f (K + (-1)'Z) - ti f (K + (-1)'Z)'(K + (-1)'Z) 
Gi = ti f (K + (-1)'Z)'(K + (-1)'Z) 
0< ti < 1, 
-K <Z<K. (3.40) 
The first-order conditions give 
WC, 
_f 
(K + (-1)ZZ)'(K + (-1)2Z) (3.41) W, f (K + (-1)iZ)I (K - Z) - (-1)i f (K + (-1)tZ)' 
+(-1)itif(K + (-1)tZ)"(K + (-1)tZ) + (-1)itif(K + 
+(-1)iti f(K + (-1)=Z)"(K + (-1)=Z)ß + (-1)iti f(K + (-1)tZ)' ' 
13 UK government is likely to count the profit of UK Toyota into GDP of the UK. 
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where 
az 
t 
We can define 0 as (3.26). By plugging (3.26) into (3.41), we get 
WC, f (K + (-1)1Z)"(K + (-1)2Z) 
W, f (K + (-1)iZ)"(K + (-1)iZ) 
+(1 - t3) f (K + (-1)jZ)"(K + (-1)2Z) + ti f (K + (-1)tZ)' 
+(1 - t; ) f (K + (-1)jZ)"K - (1 - ti) f (K + (-1)2Z)' 
(3.42) 
By symmetry, t* = tl = t2 at an equilibrium and it implies that Z* = 0. Thereby, 
(3.42) is reduced to 
f (K)"K + (1- t*)f(K)K + t*f(K)' 
WGti f (K)"K + (1 - t*)f (K)"K - (1 - t*). f (K)' 
+ f(K)' 1. (3.43) = 1(2-t*)f(K)"K-(1-t*)f(K)' < 
The above result implies that public goods is under-provided in both countries. 
Is the under-supply of public goods more serious than in previous case where GNP 
is used? Suppose that tN is the tax rate which is defined in (3.28). tN can not satisfy 
(3.43). 
W. 
_ 
(2 
- tN)f 
(K)"K + t* f (K)' 
W1 (2 - t* )f(K)"K 
(2 - tN) f (K)"K + tN f (K)'+ (1 - tiv). f (K)' (3.44) 
(2 - tiv)f(K)"K - (1- t* ). f (K)l 
Tax rates greater than tN cannot satisfy (3.43) because any tax rate greater than tN 
increases the left-hand side of (3.43) while decreasing the right-hand side. Only a tax 
rate below tN can satisfy (3.43) by decreasing the left-hand side and, at the same 
time, by increasing the right-hand side. The tax rate which satisfies (3.43) should be 
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lower than tN. Therefore, the problem of the under-supply of public goods is more 
serious. 
3.4.3 Large number of countries 
Here, the model is modified to reflect the situation where a large number of iden- 
tical countries are involved in tax competition. The additional assumption is that 
when the tax rates of foreign countries are the same, the amount of capital movement 
from/to each foreign country is the same. Let us assume there exist n+1 identi- 
cal economies, where country 1 is the domestic country, and country 2, country 3, 
and country n+1 are foreign countries. 
Let Zk be the amount of capital export from country 1 to country k. Then the 
total quantity of the capital located in the foreign countries are E'±2 Zk - nZ. The 
private consumption and public consumption of country 1 are defined as 
Cl = f(K-nZ)- f(K-nZ)'(K-nZ)+(1-t2)f(K+Z2)'Z2 
{-ý1- t3) f (K + Z3)'Z3 
.................................. 
ill - to+1ýf (K'ý 
Z1, 
+1)'Zn+1 
and 
(3.45) 
(3.46) 
Gl = tl f (K - nZ)'(K - nZ). (3.47) 
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The equilibrium condition in the international capital market is 
(1 - tl)f (K - nZ)' = (1 - t2)f (K + Z2)' 
(1 - tl)f (K - nZ)' = (1 - t3)f (K + Z3)' 
(1 - tl)f (K - nZ)' = (1 - to+1)f (K + Zn+1)'. (3.48) 
By substituting (3.48) into (3.46), the private consumption is defined as 
Cl =f (K - nZ) -f (K - nZ)'(t1K - nZ). (3.49) 
Therefore, the objective function of country 1 is 
max W(Cl, G1) 
subject to 
Cl =f (K - nZ) -f (K - nZ)'(t1K - nZ) 
Gl = tl f (K - nZ)'(K - nZ) 
0< ti<1, 
-nK < nZ <K 
The first-order conditions give 
(3.50) 
Wal 
_ 
f(K-nZ)'(K-nZ)-ntlf(K-nZ)"(K-nZ)cb-ntlf(K-nZ)'O 
WGl f (K - nZ)'K - of (K - nZ)"(t1K - nZ)¢ ' 
(3.51) 
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where 
aZ 
3.52 
at, ) 
We can define 0 using the equilibrium condition in the international capital market 
as follows. 
= 
-f(K-nZ)' 353 
n(1-tl)f(K-nZ)"+(1-t2)f(K+Z2)" 
() 
By plugging (3.53) into (3.51), we get 
WC, 
_ 
nf(K-nZ)"(K-nZ)+(1-t2)f(K+ Z2)"(K - nZ) + ntlf (K - nZ)' 
WGl nf (K - nZ)"(K - nZ) + (1 - t2)f (K + Z2)"K 
(3.54) 
By symmetry, t* = tl = t2 at equilibrium and it implies that Z* = 0. Thereby, 
(3.54) is reduced to 
Wal 
- 
(n+1-t*)f(K)"K+nt*f(K)' 
WWl (n +1- t*) f (K)"K 
1+ nt* 
f (K)' 
(3.55) = (n+1-t*)f(K)"K<1. 
With two identical economies, n+1=2, (3.55) becomes (3.28). 
Proposition 10 As the number of countries involved in tax competition increases, 
the tax rate at the Nash equilibrium becomes lowered. However, even if an infinite 
number of countries are involved in tax competition, the tax rate does not fall to zero. 
Suppose that nl < n2 and tn1 and tn2 are tax rate at the equilibrium when n= nl 
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and n= n2 respectively, satisfying (3.55). If t, **1 < tn2, then 
nltnl f (K)' WC1(tn1) 
1+ (ni +1-t, *ý1)f(K)"K - WG1(tn1) 
WC1(tn2) 
-1+ 
n2tn2f (K)' (3.56) 
WG1(tn2) (n2 +1- tn2 ). f (K)"K 
However, for every n>1, 
1+ nitnl 
f (K)' 
>1+ 
n2tn2f(K)' 14 
(ni +1- tn1)f (K)"K (n2 +1- tn2)f (K)"K 
(3.57) 
Therefore, tn1 < tn2 is contradictory to nl < n2. Therefore, tn1 should be higher than 
t* n2 
When n goes to oo, (3.55) becomes 
WC1 
=1+ 
t*f (K)F 
> 0. (3.58) Ival 
.f 
(K)"K 
(3.58) implies that, even if the number of countries increases to infinity, the tax on 
capital income never drops to zero. 
The result is different from Yang (1996), who predicts a zero tax rate under tax 
competition among an infinite number of countries. The different result is due to 
difference in assumptions. His model differs from mine in two ways: firstly, there 
is an efficient tax other than capital income tax, and secondly, the inflow of foreign 
capital is modelled to increase public consumption only. 15 Therefore, tax cutting in 
"The following is the proof for (3.53). 
nltn f(K)r n2t;.. f(K)r Il + 
ni+1-t ;1fK "KJ - 
Il + 
n2+1-t, ' 2fK 
"K 
1(K)' 
-f TK 7-K 
I 
nx+1-t,, i n2+1-tara 
>0 because f(K)K <0 and nltil 
(1 -t ; 1) - n2tn2 
(1 t, *, 
,)< 
0- 
"Yang (1996) assumes that labour income is fully taxed. Labour income is all ecomomic rent 
because the supply of labour is fixed. Labour income tax is an efficient tax. 
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his model causes a less serious distortion of the under-supply of public goods and 
there is still supply of public goods even with zero corporation tax rate. 
In contrast, in my model, the same degree of decrease in tax rate causes a more 
serious distortion of the under-supply of public goods because the inflow of foreign 
capital increases tax revenue only via enlarged tax base. Furthermore, a zero capital 
tax rate implies no supply of public goods because other tax than capital tax is not 
available. Therefore, there is a certain level of tax rate below which the inflow of 
capital motivated by lower tax rate does not result in an increase in the level of 
social welfare. Below this tax rate, the positive effect of an increase in consumption 
of private goods is dominated by the negative effect of the under-supply of public 
goods. 
In reality, public goods is financed by other taxes than capital income tax but 
with some limitations. The limitations derives from not only consideration of eco- 
nomic inefficiency but also from political consideration. For example, even after all 
other factors are taxed, the marginal social value of public goods is still high so that 
governments inevitably tax capital income. Moreover, governments cannot substitute 
labour tax for capital tax above a certain level because of tax evasion in labour tax. 
This limitations make capital income tax rate be a positive value. 16 
16It will be discussed in section 3.6 how to incorporate this limitation into the current model. 
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3.5 Numerical results 
Even if the pressure of tax competition leads to a lower tax rate on capital income, 
two questions still remain: "Is tax rate cutting significant? " and "Is the Nash equi- 
librium unique and stable? ". To obtain specific values of tax rates, it is necessary to 
assume tractable forms of social welfare and production functions. They are assumed 
as 
W (Ci, Gi) =ß In C2 + In Gi, ßE (0, oo) (3.59) 
and 
f (K) =KaE (0,1). (3.60) 
,ß represents the relative preference for the private consumption and a represents the 
income share of capital. 17 
Firstly, the tax rates in autarky can be obtained by using the result of 
W=1. 
The tax rates under specific values of a and 0 is defined as 
_1 t2^ a(ß+1ý. 
(3.61) 
Table 3.1 shows the tax rates in autarky under specific values of a and /3. The higher 
the value of , 3, the lower the tax rate. This result is to be expected because the higher 
value of ,ß implies that people prefer private consumption and oppose a higher tax 
rate. The higher the value of a, the lower the tax rate is. This is because the higher 
"These production function and social welfare function satisfy all the assumptions made in section 
3.2 and make the second-order condition for maximization satisfied. 
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1/3 a= 1/2 a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
,ß=I close to 1(1.5) close to 1 0.75 0.67 0.625 
,ß=2 close to 1 0.67 0.5 0.44 0.42 
,ß=3 0.75 0.5 0.38 0.33 0.31 
Table 3.1: Tax rates in the autarchy 
a= 1/3 a= 1/2 a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
1 0.65 0.50 0.37 0.30 0.26 
ß=2 0.54 0.40 0.29 0.24 0.21 
ß=3 0.46 0.33 0.24 0.20 0.18 
Table 3.2: Tax rates in tax competition between symmetric two countries 
value of a enlarges the tax base and a lower tax rate can therefore collect certain 
amount of tax revenue. 
Tax rates under tax competition can be calculated by the equilibrium tax rate 
expressed in (3.28). Substituting (3.59) and (3.60) into (3.28) and rearranging give 
t2{a + a(1 + ß)(1 - a)} - t{(2 - a) + 2a(1 - a)(1 + ß)} + 2(1- a) = 0. (3.62) 
Table 3.2 shows the tax rates given values of 3 and a. Compared with tax rates in 
autarky, tax rates are lowered in all values of ,3 and a. The lower values of /3 and 
a, the more serious the tax undercutting, measured by absolute amount. For most 
of the values of 3 and a, tax under-cutting ranges around 40-50% of tax rates in 
autarky. 
When two identical Leviathan governments are involved with tax competition, the 
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= 1/3 = 1/2 a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
,ß=1 0.8 0.67 0.50 0.40 0.34 
ß=2 0.8 0.67 0.50 0.40 0.34 
,ß=3 0.8 0.67 0.50 0.40 0.34 
Table 3.3: Tax rates in tax competition between two Leviathan governments 
tax rates are 
t;, = 
2(1 - a) 
2-a 
(3.63) 
Table 3.3 shows that each government always sets its tax rate lower than 1 because 
f (K)"K 1- a 
(3.64) 
Tax competition always places a restriction on the Leviathan government. Table 3.3 
also shows that 0 is not relevant in deciding the tax rate in tax competition between 
Leviathan governments. This is because Leviathan governments are not concerned 
with private consumption. It is noteworthy that tax competition between Leviathan 
governments can lead to either higher or lower tax rates than the socially optimal 
level. 
Table 3.4 shows the tax rates when GDP (net of tax) is assumed to represent the 
private consumption. The tax rates at the non-cooperative equilibrium are defined 
as 
t2{a(1 +, 8)(2 - a)} - t{2(1- a) + a(3 - 2a)(1 + ß)} + 2(1 - a) = 0. (3.65) 
The tax rates here are always lower than the tax rate when GNP (net of tax) is 
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a= 1/3 a= 1/2 a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
/. 3 =1 0.60 0.42 0.28 0.21 0.17 
/3 =2 0.46 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.12 
,8=3 0.37 0.23 0.15 0.11 
0.09 
Table 3.4: Tax rates in tax competition with GDP optimization 
assumed to represent the private consumption (Proposition 9). The degree of tax 
undercutting is around 60-70% of the optimal level. 
Table 3.5 - 3.7 show the relationship between the number of competing countries 
and the tax rates. The tax rates at the non-cooperative equilibrium are defined as 
0= t2{na + a(1 + ß)(1 - a)} - t{(1 +n- a) (3.66) 
+(n + 1)a(1 - a)(1 +, ß)} + (n + 1)(1 - a). 
When n goes to the oo, (3.66) becomes 
ate-t{l+a(1-a)(1+, 8)}+(1-a)=0. (3.67) 
Table 3.5 - 3.7 confirm that as more countries are involved in tax competition, the tax 
rates become lower. However, even if the number of countries goes to the infinity, the 
tax rates do not drop to zero (Proposition 10). They also indicate that an increase 
in the number of countries results in a small decrease in tax rates. When the number 
of countries increases from two, to an infinity, tax rates fall by 3-7% point for most 
values of a and 0. 
Up to this point, using the condition of a symmetric equilibrium, we have obtained 
the tax rates at the Nash equilibrium. However, an important question still remains: 
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1/3 a= 1/2 a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
/3 =1 0.60 0.45 0.32 0.26 0.22 
0=2 0.50 0.36 0.26 0.21 0.18 
, 3=3 0.43 0.31 0.22 0.18 0.16 
Table 3.5: Tax rates in tax competition when n=2 
a= 1/3 a= 1/2 a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
,Q=1 0.58 0.43 0.31 0.24 0.20 
ß=2 0.48 0.35 0.25 0.20 0.17 
, ß=3 0.41 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.15 
Table 3.6: Tax rates in tax competition when n=3 
a= 1/3 a= 1/2 a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
ß=1 0.53 0.38 0.26 0.20 0.17 
2 0.44 0.31 0.22 0.17 0.15 
ß=3 0.38 0.27 0.19 0.15 0.13 
Table 3.7: Tax rates in tax competition when n=oo 
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"Is the equilibrium unique and stable? " We can answer this question by drawing 
reaction functions. 
Proposition 11 The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is unique and stable in a two- 
identical economy model. 
K= =c, f() The case of a=0.5 and ß=2 is analysed. By substituting C. 
Ko. s, f (K)' = 0.5K-o. 5, f (K)" _ -0.25K-1.5 and Z={ 
(i=ti)_2+ýi_t2)_ý}K, (3.28) 
gives reaction functions as 
(1 - 2ti)(1 - tß)4 + (5ti - 16tß, + 4) (1 - t=)(1 - tß)2 + (1 - t2)5 = 0. (3.68) 
Figure 3.1 shows that the symmetric equilibrium tax rate (ti = tj* = 0.4) is unique 
and stable18. El (0.67,0.67) is the equilibrium in autarky. As capital can move across 
countries, each country can attract capital by manipulating its tax rate. ti(t2) is 
the trace of tax rates maximizing the social welfare of country 1, given country 2's 
tax rate. t2* (h) is the best tax rates for country 2. The reaction functions intersect 
(ti = t; = 0.4) and (ti = t3 = 1). By the assumption of tz < 1, (ti = t3 = 1) is not an 
equilibrium. 19 
It should be stressed that the derivation of the reaction functions and the proper- 
ties of the equilibrium depend on the specification of the social welfare and production 
18Stability refers to the situation that the simple dynamic adjustment process in which two coun- 
tries take turns myopically playing best response to each other's current tax rates converges to the 
Nash equilibrium from any tax rate pair in a neighborhood of the equilibrium. 
19If we define tE [0,1], (ti = tj = 1) is an unstable Nash equilibrium in that each country can 
attract all foreign capital by decreasing its tax rate by arbitrarily small amount. 
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t2 
I 
0.67 
0.4 
0' 
.................................................................................. 
t' (t2) 
ý' t2 (t, ) 
0 0.4 0.67 1 
ti 
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium of symmetric tax competition 
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function. In addition, the degree of tax cutting depends on the values of a, the income 
share of capital, and ß, the relative preference for the private consumption. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has built up a model which is microfounded in analysing interna- 
tional corporation tax competition. Using the model, two fundamental questions are 
answered: "Is tax undercutting serious? " and "Is the Nash equilibrium unique and 
stable? " The answers depend on the functional forms of production and social wel- 
fare functions. Even if the exact size of tax undercutting depends on a, the share of 
income of capital, and ß, preference for private consumption, numerical calibration 
suggests that tax undercutting generally ranges from 40-50% below the optimal level. 
The answer to the second question is yes as far as these specific functional forms are 
assumed. 
It is noteworthy that the model predicts t -+ t* >0 even if as n --> oo. This is 
different from previous studies which predicts zero tax rate in a small-open economy 
model. This is related with the assumption that supply of public goods is solely 
financed by corporation tax revenue. However, the availability of other taxes than 
capital income tax can be incorporated into the model presented in this thesis. /3 has 
been interpreted as the magnitude of marginal substitution between private goods 
and public goods. Alternatively, 0 can be interpreted as the relationship between 
supply of public goods and capital income tax revenue. The higher 8 is, the less 
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restricted supply of public goods is by capital income tax revenue. As far as there 
are limitations in financing supply of public good by other taxes than capital income 
tax (ß is positive), tax rates at the noncooperative equilibrium do not drop to zero. 
The basic model is extended in three cases. Firstly, benevolent governments are 
replaced by Leviathan governments. It is demonstrated that international capital 
mobility places an effective restriction on the expansionary tendency of Leviathan 
governments. In this context, the current movement towards international tax har- 
monization is undesirable. The movement can be viewed as designed to avoid the 
restrictions imposed by the international mobility of capital. 
Secondly, when each government evaluates its economic performance with GDP 
rather than GNP, tax competition leads to a much lower tax rate. This is because the 
income of foreign capital invested in its territory is counted into private consumption 
and thus foreign capital is more attractive under the maximization of GDP. 
Thirdly, the analysis is extended to the case in which more than two countries 
compete to attract foreign capital. It is demonstrated that as more countries are 
involved in tax competition, tax rates become lower. However, even when the number 
of countries becomes close to the infinity, the tax rate is still positive. Numerical 
calibration reveals that the effect of an increase in number of countries on the level 
of tax rates is not large. 
It is, however, dangerous to simply apply the results presented here to the real 
world. Firstly, countries are never identical. There are asymmetries in their size, 
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capital endowment, production function, and preference for public goods. Secondly, 
international mobility of capital is far from perfect. Theoretical developments which 
incorporate imperfection in capital mobility are necessary for deeper understanding 
of tax competition. Thirdly, firms' decision on location is a complicated process, 
and there are influential variables other than tax, such as financing, marketing, and 
restructuring, which must be taken into account. These three factors must be con- 
sidered in order to generate more realistic results. 
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Chapter 4 
Three asymmetric tax 
competitions 
4.1 Introduction 
Although symmetric tax competition analysis has an advantage in showing the 
distortion which arises purely from strategic tax setting behaviour, it is less realistic in 
the sense that it does not allow for movement of capital at the equilibrium. Compared 
with large number of research carried out on symmetrical tax competition, the study 
of asymmetric analysis is relatively rare. Among the limited number of studies are 
Bucovestsky (1991), Wilson (1991), Kanbur and Keen (1993), Eggert and Haufler 
(1996) and Haufler (1996b). 
With the exception of Haufler (199Gb), all assume that asymmetry derives from 
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differences in country (jurisdiction) size. The first two analyse tax competition with 
capital income tax in a federal country, while the third and fourth deal with tax 
competition with consumption tax in an international context. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse three asymmetric tax competition cases which 
is significant in an international context. Three asymmetric cases of tax competition 
are: (1) countries differ in their sizes, (2) countries differ in their per capita capital 
endowments, and (3) countries differ in their preferences for public goods. Difference 
both in preference for public goods and in per capita capital endowment is more 
significant in the international context than in a federal country. 
In this chapter, not only the different level of tax rates but also the different size 
of tax cutting at the non-cooperative equilibrium will be investigated. The size of tax 
cutting is important because even if the country with a strong preference for public 
goods have a higher tax rate than the country with a weak preference, the former 
decreases tax rate more than the latter at the non-cooperative equilibrium. With 
the results of analyses of three cases, I will discuss an international tax coordination 
which is feasible in all three cases and is simple to implement. 
Firstly, when countries are different in their sizes, the smaller country is shown 
to undercut the larger country. This is consistent with the results of previous studies 
mentioned above. In this thesis, the non-cooperative equilibrium is demonstrated 
to be unique and stable. Numerical calibration shows that the tax differential be- 
tween two countries is relatively small compared with the size of tax cutting in both 
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countries. 
The second asymmetry derives from differences in per capita capital endowment 
among countries. This case has not been fully investigated by previous studies. This 
is because previous studies assume that residents in each jurisdiction own an identical 
share of total capital stock. This assumption eliminates the possibility of different per 
capita capital endowment. The asymmetry in country size can be applied properly 
to tax competition between France, a larger one, and Belgium, a smaller one. The 
asymmetry in per capita capital endowment can be applied to the tax competition 
between Sweden, a country with higher per capita capital endowment, and Portugal, 
a country with lower per capita capital endowment. 
The analysis finds that tax competition leads to the same size of tax cutting in 
both lower and higher per capita capital endowment countries. At the non-cooperative 
equilibrium, capital moves from the country with higher per capita capital endowment 
to the country with the lower one, resulting in the same amount capital in both 
countries. Therefore, there is no distortion in capital allocation between two countries. 
The distortion stems from too low tax rate (the under-supply of public goods) in both 
countries. Numerical calibration shows that the degree of tax cutting is the same 
regardless of the degree of asymmetry. 
The third asymmetry derives from differences in preference for public goods. It is 
found that the country with a weak preference for public goods undercuts the country 
with a strong preference for public goods. As a result, capital moves from the latter to 
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the former. This result parallels the results presented by Haufler (1996b). However, 
this should not surprise us because the country with a strong preference for public 
goods is expected to have higher tax rate without strategic tax setting behaviours. 
Being different from Haufler (1996b) which concludes that the country with a strong 
preference for public goods will have a lower tax rate than the country with a weak 
preference, my thesis stresses that the former will cut its tax rate to a greater degree 
than the latter. 
Existing research suggests that international tax harmonization is not feasible in 
asymmetric cases because small countries are opposed to it if they are better off at the 
non-cooperative equilibrium than at the coordinated outcome. Therefore, Kanbur and 
Keen (1993) propose the imposition of a minimum tax rate which is strictly Pareto- 
improving. However, their result is not applied to three cases presented here. As 
Haufler (1996b) pointed out, the imposition of minimum tax rate is not always welfare- 
improving for both countries if governments care about private consumption and 
public consumption. ' In addition, the imposition of minimum tax rate is technically 
impossible in the case of tax competition between countries of different per capita 
capital endowment because tax rates at the non-cooperative equilibrium are the same. 
This thesis considers a simple form of tax coordination. It is found to be welfare- 
improving for both countries to raise their tax rates by the same amount. ' The small 
country (the country with smaller per capita capital endowment and the country 
'In Kanbur and Keen (1993), governments are assumed to behave as revenue-maximizers. 
2This tax coordination is suggested in Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990). 
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with a weak preference for public goods) always prefers this cooperative equilibrium 
to the non-cooperative equilibrium because the tax differential at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium is maintained and thus the amount of capital inflow is the same. The 
large country (the country with larger per capita capital endowment and the country 
with a strong preference for public goods) prefers this cooperative equilibrium to the 
non-cooperative equilibrium only when the positive effect of an increase in public 
goods outweighs the negative effect of a decrease in the income from foreign invest- 
ment. Numerical calibration shows that this is the case in all three asymmetric cases 
presented here. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the asymmetric tax com- 
petition between two countries of different sizes. Section 3 analyses the asymmetric 
tax competition between two countries of different per capita capital endowments. 
The asymmetric tax competition between countries of different preferences for public 
goods is analysed in section 4. Policy considerations are presented in section 5, and 
a summary is drawn in the final section. 
4.2 Different size of country 
Suppose that country 1 is endowed with capital and labour amounting (nK, nL) 
and country 2 (K, L). The assumption that n>1 makes country 1 larger country and 
country 2 smaller country. Then, with the production function defined in (3.60), total 
production and marginal product of capital of country 1 are expressed as follows. 
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F(nK, nL) = nF(K, L) =nf (K) (4.1) 
and 
Fl (nK, nL) = Fl (K, L) =f (K)'. (4.2) 
In autarky, the objective of country 1 is 
max W(Cl, Gl) (4.3) 
el 
subject to 
Cl = of (K) - tinKf (K)', 
Gl = tinKf (K)', 
0< tl < 1. (4.4) 
The first-order conditions give 
Wcl 
- 
nK f (K)' 
_ 1. (4.5) WGl nK f(K)' _ 
With the same procedure, the condition for maximizing country 2's social welfare is 
Wc2 K. f (K)' 
_ 1. (4.6) WG2 -K f(K), - 
With the social welfare function and the production function, defined in (3.59) and 
(3.60), the tax rates in both countries are the same at the level of 
1 
to = 
a(1 + ß), 
i=1,2. (4.7) 
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Now, assume that capital can move across the borders. When Z is net outflow of 
capital from country 1, the equilibrium condition in the international capital market 
is 
(1 - tl)f (K -n )' _ (1 - t2) f (K + Z)'. (4.8) 
(4.8) implies that capital moves from the high-tax country to the low-tax country and 
that the amount of the movement of capital, given constant tax differential, increases 
as the difference in sizes of two countries increases. 
The private consumption and the public consumption of country 1 are 
Cl =nf(K- n) - 
f(K- 
Z)'(tinK-Z) (4.9) 
n 
and 
Gl = tlf (K - n)'(nK - 
Z). (4.10) 
The objective of country 1 is 
max W(Cl, Gl) (4.11) 
e, 
subject to 
Z 
Cl = of (K - n) -f (K - n)'(t, 
nK - Z), 
Gl = tlf (K - 
Z)'(nK 
- Z), n 
0< tl < 1, 
-K <Z< nK. (4.12) 
90 
The first-order conditions give 
WGl 
_ 
f(K-, )'(nK-Z)-tlf(K-n)ýý(nK-Z)n0 
WGi f (K -n )'nK -f (K - n)"(t, nK - Z) nO 
-tlf (K -n )'0 (4.13) 
where 
az 
ßt1. 
We can define 0 from (4.8) as follows. 
-f(K (4.14) 
(1-tl)nf(K- n)"+(1-t2)f(K+Z)"" 
By plugging (4.14) into (4.13), we get 
W7 f(K - z"), ý(K - n') + (1 - t*)f (K + Z*)"(nK - Z*) + t* f (K - 
n` )' 
WWI f(K- n`)'ý(K--n)+(1-t*)f(K+Z*)'lnK 
=1} 
-(1 - t*)f(K + Z*)'ýZ* + t* f (K - 
n* )' 
(4.15) _2 
1 
f(K- n')ll(K- n')+(1-t*)f(K+Z*)"nK* 
Whether (4.15) is greater than 1 or not depends on the sign of Z*. If Z* is positive, 
(4.15) is always less than 1. This implies the under-supply of public goods in the 
large country. 
The objective of country 2 is 
max W(C2, G2) (4.16) t2 
subject to 
C2 =f (K + Z) -f (K + Z)'(t2K + Z), 
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G2 = t2 f (K + Z)'(K + Z), 
0< t2 < 1, 
-K <Z< nK. 
The first-order conditions give 
Wc2 
_f 
(K + Z)'(K + Z) + t2f (K + Z)"(K + Z)V 
Wc2 f (K + Z))'K +f (K + Z)"(t2K + Z)cp 
+t2 f (K + Z)'co 
1 
(4.17) 
where 
az 
ät2 
We can define 0 from (4.8) as 
nf (K + Z)' (4.18) 
(1-tl)f(K- n)"+n(1-t2)f(K+Z)" 
By plugging (4.18) into (4.17), we get 
Wem, 
_ 
(1-t*)f(K- n*)"(K+Z*)+nf(K+Z*)"(K+Z*)+t*nf(K+Z*)' 
Wk (1-ti)f(K- n')"(K+Z*)+nf(K+Z*)"(K+Z*) 
ten f (K + Z*)' 
<1 (4.19) = 1+ (1-ti) f(K- ný')"(K+Z*)+nf(K+Z*)'ý(K+Z*) . 
Therefore, there is an under-supply of public goods in the small country regardless 
of the sign of Z*. However, this implies neither that the new tax rate at the non- 
cooperative equilibrium is lower than that in autarky, nor that absolute amount of 
public goods is less than that in autarky. 
The equilibrium is no more symmetrical. With complicated (4.15) and (4.19), it 
is difficult to ascertain the economic implications. With the assumption that a=0.5 
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and ß=1, the reaction functions of country 1 and country 2 are 
-2n(n + 1)(1 - tl)(1 - t2)2 + 5n(n + 1)tl(1 - tl) 
(1 - t2)2 
-2n 
2 (n + 1)(1 - tl)4 + n2(1 - 
tl)2(2t1 - 
1)(1 - t2)2 
+n2(1 - tl)4(2nt1 + 1) + n(2t1 - 1)(1 - t2)4 
- n(2t1 - 1)(ntl + 1)(1 - tl)(1 - t2)2 
0 (4.20) 
and 
n(n + 1) (5t2 - 2)(1 - tl)2(1 - t2) + (n + 2t2) (1 - t2)4 
+n(1 - t2)2(2t2 - 1)(1 - tl)2 - 2(n + 1)(1 - t2)4 
- n(2t2 - 1)(t2 + n)2(1 - 
tl)2(1 - t2) + n2(2t2 - 1)(1 - tl)4 
=p (4.21) 
By plugging n=1 into (4.20) and (4.21), we can get the reaction functions which are 
symmetric for tl = t2 such as 
(1-2ti)(1-t; )4+4(t2 -3t2+1)(1-ti)(1-tß)2+(3-2ti)(1-t=)4=0. (4.22) 
At the equilibrium, tax rates are (ti = t2 = 0.5). 3 
When n=2, we have 
-12(l - t1)(1 - t2)2 + 30t1(1 - t1)(1 - t2)2 - 24(1 - tl)4 
3The reaction functions are different from those in chapter 3 because here ß=1. 
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+4(1 - tl)2(2t1 - 1)(1 - t)2 + 4(1 - tl)4(4t1 + 1) + 2(2t1 - 1)(1 - t2)4 
- 2(2t1 - 1)(2t1 + 1)(1 - tl)(1 - t2)2 
=o 
and 
6(5t2 - 2)(1 - tl)2(1 - t2) + (2 + 2t2) (1 - t2)4 
+2(1 - t2)2(2t2 - 1)(1 - t1)2 - 6(1 - t2)4 
- 2(2t2 - 1)(t2 + 2)2(1 - tl)2(1 - t2) + 4(2t2 - 1)(1 - tl)4 
(4.23) 
=0 (4.24) 
The reaction functions are no longer symmetrical as shown in Figure 4.1. At the 
equilibrium, tax rates are (ti = 0.54, t2 = 0.47). Both countries lower their tax rates 
below the tax rates in autarky. Furthermore, the small country sets its tax rate below 
that of the large country. Therefore, capital moves from the large country to the small 
country. The large country is worse off than in autarky because of the capital flight 
and the under-supply of public goods. Country 2 is also worse off if the negative 
effect of the under-supply of public goods outweighs the positive effect of the inflow 
of capital. 
With the same way with the above, when n=3, the tax rates are (ti = 0.44, t2 = 
0.31) at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition 12 At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the smaller country undercut 
the larger country and attracts foreign capital. The larger country is worse off than 
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Figure 4.1: Asymmetric tax competition of different sizes 
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in autarky due to the capital flight and the under-supply of pubic goods, while the 
smaller country is either worse off or better off. 
Why does the larger country choose the higher tax rate than that of the smaller 
country? Suppose that the tax rates of the two countries are the same, i. e. tl = 
t2. Then, there is no movement of capital between two countries, Z=0. A tax 
cutting causes the same amont of capital inflow in both countries. This result can 
be confirmed by the identity between (4.14) and (4.18) with Z=0. The inflow of 
capital increases the same amount of private consumption and public consumption 
in both countries. A tax cutting, however, causes the distortion by reallocating more 
products from public consumption to private consumption. The larger the size of 
country (the amount of capital endowment), the graeter the distortion is. The tax 
cutting decision of the governemtns rest on the relative size between the positive effect 
of capital inflow and the negative effect of the distortion. 4 Tax cutting gives the same 
'The first-order derivatives of private consumption and public consumption with respect to tax 
change are 
äC1 
_ -. f (K -Z )'nK -f (K - 
Z)"(t, 
nK - Z)101 8t1 nnn 
äG1 
=f(K- 
Z)'nK-tif(K- Z)"(nK-Z)1V) 
-tlf(K- 
Z)ý, 
8t1 nnnn 
ä 22 
= -f (K - Z)'K +f (K + Z)"(t2K + Z)V 
and 
ä 22 
= f(K - Z)'K + t2 f(K + Z)"(K + Z)ý + t2 f(K + Z)'c. 
From t1=t2i Z=0 and b= -cp, wehave 
acl acl acz ace 
at, atl at2 (ßt2 
Therefore, a tax cutting of country 1 (the larger country) transfers public consumption to private 
consumption more than that of country 2 (the smaller country). 
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positive effect to both countries but causes greater distortion to the larger country 
than the smaller country. Therefore, the smaller country always has an incentive to 
lower its tax rate further below the tax rate at the level of which the larger country 
has no incentive for tax cutting. 
The result that the smaller country tends to undercut the larger country has also 
been shown by Bucovetsky (1991), where a quadratic production function is assumed. 
It should be stressed that the proposition 12 in this section also holds for the specific 
functional forms defined in (3.60) and may not hold in the more general case. 
4.3 Different endowment of capital 
Suppose that two countries are identical except that country 1 is endowed with 
capital of nK while country 2 is endowed with K. Even if their capital endowments 
are different, the two countries are assumed to have the same population. Then, with 
the production function defined in (3.60), total production and marginal product of 
capital of country 1 are expressed as follows. 
F(nK, L) =f (nK) (4.25) 
and 
Fl (nIK, L) =fi (nIC, L) =f (nK)'. (4.26) 
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In autarky, the objective of country 1 is 
max W(Cl, G1) tl 
subject to 
Cl =f (nK) - tinK f (nK)', 
Gl = t1nK f (nK)', 
0< tl < 1. 
The first-order conditions give 
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
WCl 
- 
nK f (nK)' (4.29) 
Wal nK f (nK)' 
With the same procedure, the condition maximizing country 2's social welfare is 
W°2 
- 
Kf (K)' 
- 1. (4.30) Wc, K. f (K)' - 
With the assumed social welfare function and production function, the tax rates in 
both countries are the same at the level of 
to =1 
a(1 +, ß) 
(4.31) 
Now, assume that capital can move across the borders. When Z is net outflow of 
capital from country 1, the equilibrium condition of capital market is 
(1-tl)f(nK-Z)'=(1-t2)f(K+Z)'. (4.32) 
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(4.32) implies that capital does not always move from the high-tax country to the 
low-tax country. When tax rates are the same in two countries, capital moves from 
the country with larger per capita capital endowment to the country with smaller 
endowment. As the difference in capital endowments increases, the amount of the 
movement of capital also increases. 
The private consumption and the public consumption of country 1 are 
Cl =f (nK - Z) -f (nK - Z)'(tinK - Z) (4.33) 
and 
G1 = tif (nK - Z)'(nK - Z). (4.34) 
The objective of country 1 is 
max W(Cl, Gl) 
el 
subject to 
(4.35) 
Cl =f (nK - Z) -f (nK - Z)'(tinK - Z), (4.36) 
Gl = tl f (nK - Z)'(nK - Z), 
0< tl < 1, 
-K <Z< nK. 
The first-order conditions give 
W1_f (nK - Z)'(nK - Z) - tl f (nK - Z)"(nK - Z), O 
WG, f (nK - Z)'nK +f (nK - Z)"(tinK - Z), O 
-tlf (nK - Z)' (4.37) 
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where 
az 
at, 
We can define O from (4.32) as 
(4.38) 
= -f(nK-Z)' 4. (4.39) (1- tl)f(nK - Z)ý' + (1 - t2)f (K + Z)" 
By plugging (4.39) into (4.37), we get 
Wal 
_f 
(nK - Z*)"(nK - Z*) + (1 - t2) f (K + Z*)"(nK- Z*) + tif (nK - Z*)' 
W1 
1f 
(nK - Z*)"(nK - Z*) + (1 - t2)f(K+Z*)"nK 
-(1-t2)f(K+Z*)"Z*+tif(nK-Z*)' (4.40) =1+ f(nK - Z*)"(nK - Z*) + (1 - t*) f (K + Z*)"nK* 
Whether (4.40) is greater than 1 or not depends on the sign of Z*. If Z* is positive, 
(4.15) is always less than 1. This implies the under-supply of public goods in the 
country with larger per capita capital endowment. 
The objective of country 2 is 
max W(C2, G2) (4.41) t2 
subject to 
C2 = f(K + Z) - f(K + Z)'(t2K + Z), 
G2 = t2 f (K + Z)'(K + Z), 
0< t2 <1, 
-K <Z< nK. (4.42) 
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The first-order conditions give 
Wc1 
W1 
where 
f(K+Z)'(K+Z) +t2f(K+Z)"(K+Z)0 
f(K + Z))'K + f(K + Z)"(t2K + Z) 
+t2f(K+Z)'o 
az 
ä 2 
We can define O from (4.32) as follows. 
_ 
f(K+Z)' 
(1-tl)f(nK-Z)"+(1-t2)f(K+Z)"' 
By plugging (4.45) into (4.43), we get 
(4.43) 
(4.44) 
(4.45) 
WC, 
_ 
(1-ti)f(nK-Z*)"(K+Z*)+f(K+Z*)"(K+Z*)+t2f(K+Z*)' 
WW2 (1-ti)f(nK-Z*)"K+f(K+Z*)"(K+Z*) 
= 1+ 
(1-ti)f(nK-Z*)"Z*+t; f(K+Z*)' 
(4.46) 
(1-ti)f(nK-Z*)"K+f(K+Z*)"(K+Z*)' 
Whether (4.46) is less than 1 is ambiguous when Z* is positive. This implies that 
public goods is either under-provided or over-provided in the country with smaller 
per capita capital endowment. ' 
With given a=0.5 and 0=1, the reaction functions of country 1 and country 2 
are respectively 
n(1 - 2t1)(1 - t2)4 + (2n +1- 2nti)(1 - t1)4 
'With given example, at the non-cooperative equilibrium, the private and public consumption of 
country 2 are 
C, 2 _ 
11 (n+1)K10.5+ 1{(n+1)K}_0.5K 
22 
and 
1 (n+1)K o. s G2=4{ 
2}. 
Here, public goods is under-provided. 
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+(1 - t1)(1 - t2)2{4nt12 - 3(3n + 1)tl + 3n + 1} 
= 0, (4.47) 
and 
(1 - 2t2)(1 - tl)4 + (n +2- 2nt2)(1 - t2)4 
+(l - t2)(1 - tl)2{4t22 - 3(n + 3)t2 +n+ 3} 
= 0. (4.48) 
With n=1, the reaction functions are the same with (4.22) and symmetric for tl = t2. 
When n=2, the reaction functions are 
2(1 - 2t1)(1 - t2)4 + (5 - 4t1)(1 - tl)4 
+(1 - tl)(1 - t2)2(8t12 -2 1t1 + 7) 
=0 (4.49) 
and 
(1 
- 2t2)(1 - tl)4 + 2(2 - t2)(1 - t2)4 
+(1 - t2)(1 - t1)2(4t22 - 15t2 + 5) 
= 0. (4.50) 
The reaction functions are not symmetric for tl = t2 as shown in Figure 4.2. At 
the equilibrium, however, the tax rates are (ti = t2 = 0.5). 6 Both countries set their 
'We have the same result regardless of the value of n. 
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Figure 4.2: Asymmetric tax competition of different capital endowment 
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tax rates lower than those in autarky. However, as long as the new tax rates are the 
same in both countries, the capital allocation is efficient worldwide. Total capital in 
the world, (1 + n)K, is divided to the same amount to the each country, 1+2 K7 
Proposition 13 At the non-cooperative equilibrium, both countries set their tax rates 
at the same level regardless of difference in their per capita capital endowments. Each 
country attracts a half of the world capital, which is an efficient allocation of capital. 
The country with larger per capita capital endowment is worse off than in autarky 
due to the capital flight and the under-supply of public goods, while the country with 
smaller endowment is either worse off or better off. 
4.4 Different preference for public consumption 
Suppose now that countries are different, in that country 1 has a relatively strong 
preference for public goods and country 2 has a relatively weak preference for public 
goods. Without losing generality, suppose that country 1 has a preference for public 
goods twice as strong as that of country 2. Then, using the welfare function defined 
in (3.59), we can define welfare function of two countries as 
W(C1, GI) =1n Ci + In Gi (4.51) 
7Country 1, whidi have higher per capita capital endowment, is regarded as rich country and 
country 2 as poor country. In this context, Proposition 13 is interpreted as that tax competition 
does not create tax differential between rich countries and poor countries at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
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and 
W (C2, G2) =2 In C2 + In G2. (4.52) 
In autarky, the objective of country i is 
max IV(Ci, G=) (4.53) 
ti 
subject to 
Ci =f (K) - tZKf (K)', 
Gi = tiKf (K)', 
0< ti < 1. (4.54) 
The first-order conditions give 
W°` 
-Kf 
(K)' 
- 1. (4.55) WG, K. f (K)' - 
With the production function given as (3.60), the tax rates in country 1 and country 
2 are 
ti = 
2a 
(4.56) 
and 
t2 = 
3a 
(4.57) 
With a=0.5, the optimal tax rates in two countries can be calculated. As shown in 
Table 3.1, country 1, which has a relatively strong preference for public goods, sets 
its tax rate higher than that of country 2 in autarky. 
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Now, assume that capital can move across the borders. When Z is net outflow of 
capital from country 1, the market equilibrium condition of capital is 
(1-tl)f(K-Z)'=(1-t2)f(K+Z)'. (4.58) 
The private consumption and the public consumption of country 1 are 
Cl =f (K - Z) -f (K - Z)'(t1K - Z) (4.59) 
and 
Gl = tl f (K - Z)'(K - Z). (4.60) 
The objective of country 1 is 
max W(Cl, G1) (4.61) 
c, 
subject to 
Cl =f (K - Z) -f (K - Z)'(t1K - Z), 
Gl = tlf (K - Z)'(K - Z), 
0< tl < 1, 
-K <Z<K. (4.62) 
The first-order conditions give 
WC, f(K - Z)'(K - Z) - tl f(K - Z)"(K - Z)0 W1f (IK - Z)'K +f (K - Z)"(t1K - Z)b 
-tlf (K - Z)'4 (4.63) 
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where 
az 
ät 
We can define 0 from (4.58) as 
_ -f(K-Z)' (4) (1-tl)f(K-Z)"+(1-t2)f(K+ Z)" . 
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By plugging (4.64) into (4.63), we get 
W* 
_ 
f(K-Z*)"(K-Z*)+(1-t2)f(K+Z*)"(K-Z*)+tif(K-Z*)' cl 
_ WWI f (K - Z*)"(K - Z*) + (1 - t2*) f (K + Z*)"K 
-(1 - t*)f (K + Z*)"Z* + t*f (K - Z*)' (4) = 1+ f(K-Z*)"(K-Z*)+(1-t2)f(K+Z*)"K* . 65 
Whether (4.65) is greater than 1 or not depends on the sign of Z*. If Z* is positive, 
(4.65) is always less than 1. This implies the under-supply of public goods in the 
country with a strong preference for public goods. 
The objective of country 2 is 
max W(C2, G2) (4.66) c2 
subject to 
C2 = fix + Z) - fix + Z)'(t2K + Z), 
G2 = t2 f (K + Z)'(K + Z), 
0< t2 < 1, 
-K <Z<K. (4.67) 
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The first-order conditions give 
WC, 
_ 
f(K+Z)'(K+Z)+t2f(K+Z)"(K+Z)zb+t2f(K+Z)' 
' 
(4.68) 
Wal f (K + Z))'K +f (K + Z)"(t2K + Z)b 
where 
az 
ät 2 
We can define O from (4.58) as follows. 
= 
f(K+Z)' 
469 0 (1-tl)f(K-Z)it +(1-t2)f(K+Z)ýý" 
() 
By plugging (4.69) into (4.68), we get 
Wý2 
_ 
(1-ti)f(K-Z*)"(K+Z*)+f(K+Z*)"(K+Z*)+t; f(K+Z*)' 
WW2 (1-ti)f(K-Z*)"K+f(K+Z*)"(K+Z*) 
(1 - ti) f(K - Z*)"Z* + t2 f(K + Z*)' (4.70) = 1+(1-ti)f(K-Z*)"K+f(K+Z*)"(K+Z*)' 
Whether (4.70) is less than 1 is ambiguous when Z* is positive. This implies that 
public goods is either under-provided or over-provided in the country with a weak 
preference for public goods8. 
With given social welfare function in (4.51) and (4.52) and a=0.5, the reaction 
function of country 1 and country 2 are respectively 
(1 - 2t1)(1 - t2)4 + (3 - 2t1)(1 - tl)4 
8With given example, at the non-cooperative equilibrium, the amount of capital moving from 
country 1 to country 2 is 
z-{(1-tl)-2-(1-t2)-2}K=0.1256K. 
(1 - tl)- + (1 - t2) - 
The marginal substitution between private and public consumption is 
WVc2 0.4350Ko. 5 
Wc" - 0.8085Ko. 5 <1. 
Here, public goods is under-provided. 
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+4(1 - t1)(1 - t2)2(4t12 - 3t1 + 1) 
=0 (4.71) 
and 
(1 
- 2t2)(1 - tl)4 + 
(1 
- t2)5 
+(1 - t2)(1 - tl)2(5t22 - 16t2 + 4) 
= 0. (4.72) 
The reaction functions are drawn in Figure 4.3. At the equilibrium, the tax rates 
are (t1 = 0.48, t2 = 0.41). Both countries set their tax rates below the level in autarky. 
Country 2, which has a weak preference for public goods set its tax rate below that of 
country 1, which has a strong preference for public goods. Capital moves from country 
1 to country 2. Country 1 is worse off than in autarky because of the under-supply 
of public goods and capital flight. Country 2 is also worse off if the negative effect 
of the under-supply of public goods outweighs the positive effect of inflow of capital. 
Compared with the autarkic equilibrium (t1 ^_- 1.00, t2 = 0.67), the country with a 
strong preference for public goods reduces its tax rate to a greater degree than the 
country with a weak preference for public goods at the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
As a result, the tax differential between two countries becomes smaller. 
Proposition 14 At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the country with a weak prefer- 
ence for public goods has a lower tax rate than the country with a strong preference 
and attracts foreign capital. However, the latter cuts tax rate to a greater degree than 
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Figure 4.3: Asymmetric tax competition of different preference for public goods 
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the former. The country with a strong preference for public goods is worse off than 
in autarky due to the capital flight and the under-supply of public goods, while the 
country with a weak preference is either worse off or better off. 
4.5 International coordinations 
Existing research suggests that international tax harmonization is not feasible 
when there are asymmetries between countries. When two countries are different in 
size, the small country is opposed to it if it is better off at the non-cooperative equi- 
librium than at the coordinated outcome (see Bucovetsky [1991] and Wilson [1991]). 
Kanbur and Keen (1993) propose the imposition of a minimum tax rate which is 
strictly Pareto-improving. However, this is not applied to three cases presented here. 
As Haufler (1996b) pointed out, the imposition of minimum tax rate is not always 
welfare-improving for both countries if governments care about private consumption 
and public consumption. 9 In addition, the imposition of minimum tax rate is techni- 
cally impossible in the asymmetrical case of different per capita capital endowments 
because tax rates at the non-cooperative equilibrium are the same. 
We consider an alternative form of tax coordination where both countries increase 
tax rates by the same amount. The smaller country (the country with smaller per 
capita capital endowment and the country with a weak preference for public goods) 
always prefers this cooperative equilibrium to the non-cooperative equilibrium be- 
91n Kanbur and Keen (1993), governments are assumed to behave as revenue-maximizers. 
111 
cause it can increase supply of public goods, keeping the amount of capital inflow 
the same. However, the larger country (the country with larger per capita capital 
endowment and the country with a strong preference for public goods) may oppose 
this tax coordination because the income from capital located abroad is decreased by 
the higher tax rate of foreign country. The larger country (the country with larger per 
capita capital endowment and the country with a strong preference for public goods) 
consents to this tax coordination only when the positive effect of increase in public 
goods outweighs the negative effect of decrease in the income from foreign investment. 
Firstly, let's investigate the effect of this tax coordination in the case of tax com- 
petition between countries of different sizes. Given the social welfare function in 
(3.59), the production function in (3.60), 3=1, a=0.5 and n=2, the amount 
of capital moving from country 1 to country 2 at the non-cooperative equilibrium, 
(ti = 0.54, t2 = 0.47), is 
Z* ={ 
(1 - ti)*-2 2 (1 - t2) 2l }K = 0.17K. (4.73) 0.5(1 - tl) + (1 - i2) 
At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the social welfare of country 1 is 
Wi (C , G1) 
where 
(4.74) 
Cl* =nf (K - 
Z*) 
-f (K - 
Z*)(tinK 
- Z*) n 
(4.75) 
and 
Gi = of (K - -)'(nK - Z*). (4.76) 
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The effect of an arbitrarily small increase of tl on the social welfare is 
öWl 
= ("W1 ){- f (K - 
Z* 
)'nK} + (äW1 ){f(K - 
Z*)'(nK 
- Z*)} ät1 äC1 n äG1 n 
{-f(K- n`)'nK} {f(K- n)'(nK-Z*)} 
=+ Cl Gi 
_ -1.0454K°"5 
{f (K - n- )'(nK - Z*)} 
1.43734K°"5 + ti f (IK - n)'(nK - Z*) 
_ -0.727 + 1.852 >0 (4.77) 
Therefore, country 1 is in favour of the coordination of arbitrarily small increase in 
tax rates of both countries maintaining the gap in tax rates at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
Secondly, when asymmetry derives from the differences in per capita capital en- 
dowment, the tax rate at the non-cooperative equilibrium is the same in both coun- 
tries. Given n=2, the amount of capital moving from country 1 to country 2 at the 
non-cooperative equilibrium, (ti = t2 = 0.5), is 
z* = 
I2 
. (4.78) 
At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the social welfare of country 1 is 
Wi (C , Gi) (4.79) 
where 
C= f (nK - Z*) -f (nK - Z*)'(t*nK- Z*) (4.80) 1 
and 
Gi = ti f (nK - Z*)'(nK - Z*). (4.81) 
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The effect of an arbitrarily small increase of tl on the social welfare is 
äW1 
_( ac, 
W){-f(nK-Z*)'nK}+( 
5G1 
W 
8t1 
){f (nK - Z*)'(nK - Z*)} 
_ 
{-f (nK - Z*)nK} {f (nK - Z*)'(nK - Z*)} 
_ Cl + G* 
-0.8165K°"5 + 
{f(nK- Z*)'(nK - Z*)} 
1.02062K°"5 ti{ f (nK - Z*)'(nK - Z*)} 
= -0.800 +2>0 (4.82) 
Therefore, country 1 is in favour of the coordination of arbitrarily small increase in 
tax rates of both countries maintaining the gap in tax rates at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
Lastly, when the asymmetry comes from the difference in the preference for pub- 
lic goods, the amount of capital moving from country 1 to country 2 at the non- 
cooperative equilibrium, (t1 = 0.48, t2 = 0.41), is 
Z={(1-tl)-2-(1-t2)-2}K=0.1256K. (4.83) 
(1 - tl)- + (1 - t2)- 
At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the social welfare of country 1 is 
Iii (C i, G*) 
where 
(4.84) 
Ci =f (K - Z*) -f (K - Z*)'(tiK - Z*) (4.85) 
and 
G* = tf (K - Z*)'(K - Z*). (4.86) 
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The effect of an arbitrarily small increase in tl on the social welfare is 
aý 1= (aCi ){- f (K - Z*)'K} + (äG1){. f (K - Z*)'(K - Z*)} 
- 
{-f (K - Z*)'K} + 
ff (K - Z*)'(K - Z*)} 
Ci Gi 
_ -0.5348K°"5 
{f (K - Z*)'(K - Z*)} 
0.6849K°"5 + ti f (K - Z*)'(K - Z*) 
= -0.781 + 2.083 >0 (4.87) 
Therefore, the country with a strong preference for pubic goods is in favour of arbi- 
trarily small increase in tax rates of both countries. 
Proposition 15 A Pareto improving tax coordination is for both the smaller country 
(the country with smaller per capita capital endowment and the country with a weak 
preference for public goods) and for the larger country (the country with larger per 
capita capital endowment and the country with a strong preference for public goods 
to increase their tax rates by equal amount. 
Therefore, the proposed tax coordination is feasible in all three cases because it 
is welfare-improving for both countries. Two points, however, need to be mentioned. 
Firstly, the above result is applied to an arbitrarily small increase in tax rates. In 
practice, the change in social welfare of the larger country (the country with larger per 
capita capital endowment and the country with a strong preference for public goods) 
depends on the size tax increase. Secondly, the feasibility of the tax coordination 
depends on two parameters. From the first line of (4.77), we can say that capital 
exporting country might be better off by this coordination when the net out flow of 
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capital, Z*, is small and the substitution between private goods and public goods, 
aw" )/( is is small. These are self-explanatory; if the amount of exported ca ital ýCl ýGl IPP 
is small, an increase in the tax rate of the foreign country causes small reduction in 
the income from foreign investment; if the substitution between private goods and 
public goods is small, an increase in public consumption by higher tax rate is more 
effective in increasing the social welfare. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Three cases of asymmetric tax competition are analysed in this chapter. When 
asymmetry derives from differences in the size of countries, the smaller country sets 
its tax rate below, that of the larger country at the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Therefore, capital moves from the larger country to the smaller country. The larger 
country is always worse off than in autarky due to the capital flight and the under- 
supply of public goods. The smaller country can be better off if the positive effect of 
capital inflow outweighs the negative effect of the under-supply of capital. 
The second asymmetry derives from different initial endowments of capital per 
capita. At the non-cooperative equilibrium, both countries set their tax rates below 
those in autarky. However, because the new tax rates of two countries are the same, 
there is no distortion from the misallocation of the world capital. The country with 
larger per capita capital endowment is always worse off than in autarky due to the 
capital flight and the under-supply of public goods. The country with smaller per 
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capita capital endowment can be better off if the positive effect of capital inflow 
outweighs the negative effect of the under-supply of capital. 
The third asymmetry derives from different preferences for public goods. At the 
non-cooperative equilibrium, the country with a relatively weak preference for public 
goods sets its tax rate below that of the country with a relatively strong preference 
for public goods. Therefore, capital moves from the latter to the former. The latter 
becomes worse off due to the capital flight and the under-supply of public goods. The 
former can be better off if the positive effect of capital inflow outweighs the negative 
effect of the under-supply of capital. 
It is found to be welfare-improving for both countries to raise their tax rates by 
the same amount in all three cases. The smaller country (the country with smaller 
per capital and the country with a weak preference for public goods) always prefers 
this cooperative outcome to the non-cooperative one because the differential at the 
non-cooperative equilibrium is maintained and thus the amount of capital inflow is 
the same. The larger country (the country with larger per capita capital and the 
country with a strong preference for public goods) consents to this tax coordination 
only when the positive effect of an increase in public goods outweighs the negative 
effect of a decrease in the income from foreign investment. Numerical calibrations 
show that this is the case in any asymmetric tax competition. 
One of advantages10 of this tax coordination is that the benefit and cost of the 
'°The disadvantage of this tax coordination is that it dose not improve efficiency in capital allo- 
cation caused by tax differentials. This might be a reason why it has not been fully considered in 
117 
coordination is easily calculated by each country because it does not change the 
allocation of capital. Only the amount of increased tax revenue by higher tax rate of 
its own and the amount of reduced foreign income due to higher tax rate of foreign 
country are taken into account by the larger country (the country with large per capita 
capital endowment and the country with a strong preference for public goods). Tax 
harmonization and the imposition of minimum tax rate create uncertainty on capital 
allocation and on change in welfare. The other advantage is that this is feasible in all 
asymmetric cases discussed in this chapter. In realty, tax differentials among countries 
reflect compound effect of various different asymmetries and we cannot differentiate 
the sources of tax differentials. In this situation, this tax coordination is feasible 
irrespective of the source of asymmetry. 
In addition to the three elements of asymmetry analysed in this chapter, there 
are a variety of sources of asymmetry. Countries differ in the extent of their budget 
constraints, in the productivity of immobile factors, in the productivity of public 
sector, etc. The analysis carried out in this chapter can be extended to those cases. 
subsequent studies after Crombrugghe and 'liken (1990). 
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Chapter 5 
Tax rule and tax competition 
5.1 Introduction 
Tax competition is closely related with the tax principle. Most of theoretical 
models of tax competition assume that capital income is taxed by a source-based tax. 
If countries employ a residence-based tax, tax competition is no longer a problem. 
In an international context, tax rule is a decision variable for a country which fight 
against capital flight. A country can strategically choose its tax between a source- 
based tax and a residence-based tax. 
Earlier studies have recognized the effect of tax rules on the capital allocation 
between countries. One issue is which double taxation relief method yields more 
efficient allocation of capital. While Hamada (1969), for example, advocates the 
credit rule, Bond and Samuelson (1989) favour the deduction rule. On the other 
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hand, Mintz and Talken (1996) find that the residence principle is not compatible 
with the non-cooperative equilibrium while Razin and Sadka (1991) assert that it can 
be sustained as the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Even if tax rules are recognized to have an influence on tax competition by those 
studies, they are not treated as a strategic decision element as tax rates are. Janeba 
(1995) presents a model in which the decision on tax rules can also be a strategic 
element used by governments in a similar way to the decision on tax rates. Given 
that the decision on a tax rule is a long-term decision and remains fixed for a long 
time, while tax rates changes annually, he assumes that, at the first stage, both 
governments decide their tax rules simultaneously and, then, with knowledge of each 
other's tax rules, also decide their tax rates simultaneously. 
His analysis shows that the decision on tax rules has no influence on national in- 
come and capital flow. The capital-exporting country prefers less capital outflow when 
the host country taxes foreign investment income. Therefore, the capital exporting 
country sets its tax rate to zero. With zero tax rate, the form of double taxation 
relief becomes irrelevant. However, his model cannot fully exploit the strategic char- 
acteristics of tax rules because tax rules are decided only by the capital-exporting 
country. His results also imply that the tax rate of the capital-importing country will 
be increased than the optimal level. This result runs counter to the prediction of tax 
competition theory that tax competition leads to lower tax rates. ' 
'Lower tax rates are not unanimously predicted. Ghosh (1991) predicts that public goods can 
be either over-supplied or under-supplied by tax competition. 
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In this chapter, the structure of the game is similar to that in Janeba (1995). 
There are, however, three major differences between his model and that presented 
here. Firstly, in his model, one country is assumed to be a potential exporter of 
capital and the other an importer of capital. This assumption limits the analysis 
in that tax rules are decided by only one country, capital-exporting country. In 
contrast, I present a game between two identical economies, which produces a variety 
of strategic behaviours. Either country can be a capital-exporting country and the 
tax rule of both countries is relevant to the result. 
Secondly, in this thesis, each government is assumed to maximize its social welfare 
as a function of private consumption and of public consumption. Janeba (1995) 
assumes that governments optimize their national income as the sum of domestic 
output and net factor payments to the other country. His striking conclusion such 
that the tax rate in the capital-exporting country tends to drop to zero and the 
decision on forms of double taxation relief is irrelevant derives from this objective 
function. When the supply of public goods is financed by other taxes than capital 
income tax, the international mobility of capital forces capital income tax to vanish. 
Lastly, Janeba (1995) analyses only the game in which the decisions on tax rules 
are among methods of double taxation relief: exemption, credit, and deduction. In 
addition to these, I also analyse the situation in which the decisions on tax rules are 
among the residence principle and the source principle. This is informative because 
many tax competition models employ the assumption that the capital tax is a source- 
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based tax. 
In section 3, each government is assumed to select one tax rule from five variations 
of the residence principle and the source principle. ' When one country applies the 
residence principle and the other applies the source principle, the income from the 
capital invested abroad is taxed not only by the host country but also by the home 
country. The home country which applies the residence principle has five options 
through which it can relieve the burden of double taxation. ' Therefore, altogether 
there are six options for each government in selecting its tax rule. These strategies 
for each government make thirty six subgames, which reduce to twenty one different 
subgames due to the symmetry. For each subgame, tax rates at the Nash equilibrium 
are sought and then the social welfare of both countries can be defined. By comparing 
these social welfare at the equilibrium in each subgame, I will find the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium. 
2According to the residence principle, residents are taxed on their worldwide income equally, 
regardless of whether the source of the income is domestic or foreign and foreigners are not taxed 
at all. According to the source principle, residents of a country are not taxed on their income from 
foreign sources and foreigners are taxed equally as residents on income from domestic sources. 
3The home country which applies the residence principle has five options through which to relieve 
the burden from double taxation. First, the government ignores the problem of double taxation (No 
adjustment). By ignoring, it can discriminate the outgoing investment. Second, the government can 
tax the income net of tax paid to the foreign government (Deduction). Third, the government can 
give full credit for the tax paid to the foreign government from the tax calculated on the total income 
of domestic investment and investment abroad (Full credit). If the tax credit is greater than the tax 
payable to the government, the government may repay the money back. Fourth, the government can 
give the credit with limitation up to the amount of the tax payable to the government (Credit with 
limitation). With this system, the money is not given to the taxpayer even if the tax paid to the 
foreign government is greater than the tax payable to the domestic government. The double taxation 
problem is relieved partially. Finally, the government may tax only the income earned domestically 
exempting the income earned abroad from calculating tax base income (Exemption). In this case, 
the owner of capital can benefit from this exemption by allocating investment abroad if the domestic 
tax rate is higher than the foreign tax rate or the domestic tax rule adopts progressivity even if the 
domestic tax rate is the same with the foreign tax rate. 
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It is found that the game has multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Each 
country adopts one of four variations of the residence principle: no adjustment, de- 
duction, credit with limitation and exemption. However, tax rates under one of four 
tax rules are the same with optimal tax rate and thus there is no distortion from tax 
competition. The simple intuitive explanation for this result is that these four tax 
rules never treat the income from capital located abroad preferentially to that from 
capital at home. Therefore, these four tax rules perfectly protect the country from 
capital flight. 
In section 4, each government is assumed to select the double taxation relief 
method under the world income taxation. Currently, most countries adopt the prin- 
ciple of world income taxation, which is a mixture of the source principle and the 
residence principle. 4 Under the principle of world income taxation, foreign invest- 
ment is always subject to international double taxation because the income of capital 
invested abroad is subject to both the host country's tax and the home country's tax. 
Each government is assumed to select one of three methods: deduction, credit with 
limitation and exemption. 
The equilibrium under the world income taxation is similar to that of the case in 
'For example, suppose that `A-Company', established in the UK and entirely owned by UK na- 
tionals, sets up a subsidiary in the US. The income of the subsidiary is subject to the US corporation 
tax but it is not subject to the UK corporation tax if the income is not repatriated to `A-Company'. 
The above shows that the UK is applying source principle in the corporation tax. However, when 
the income of the subsidiary is sent to `A-Company', `A-Company' has to pay the corporation tax 
on the sum of its own income in the UK and the income received from the subsidiary. This looks 
as though the UK is applying the residence principle. There are many complications in corporation 
tax and applications are different across countries and across the form of investment abroad. 
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which the source principle and the residence principle are decision variables. Both 
countries always adopt the credit method or the deduction method which never treats 
investments abroad preferentially to domestic investments. Once these rules are em- 
ployed, tax competition does not occur at all. The tax rates in both countries are 
optimal for each country and world-wide and international tax coordination (harmo- 
nization) is therefore not necessary. 
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in the next section. In 
section 3,1 analyse the situation in which the decision on tax rules is between the 
residence principle and the source principle. In section 4, the decision is on the method 
of double taxation relief under the world income taxation. Concluding remarks are 
presented in the final section, together with limitations and suggestions of extension. 
5.2 The model 
The basic assumptions made concerning the social welfare function, the production 
function, the objective function of governments and firms' decision on location of 
capital are the same as those made in chapter 3. The structure of the game, however, 
requires one change. At first, each government decides its tax rule simultaneously. 
In the second stage, the two governments set their corporation tax rates knowing 
the tax rule of the other country. Firms in both countries decide how much capital 
to locate at home and how much abroad, after knowing tax rules and tax rates, 
domestic and foreign. Firms are given full information about the corporation tax 
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ry2 
country 1 
Figure 5.1: Structure of the game of tax rules and tax rates 
rules and rates of the two countries which are known and fixed. Each government 
takes other government's corporation tax rule and rate as given and fixed. A non- 
cooperative Nash equilibrium is reached when the owners of capital maximize their 
capital incomes, given tax rates and tax rules, and each government has no incentive 
to alter its corporation tax rule and rate, given the tax rule and rate of the other 
government. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the structure of the game in which world income taxa- 
tion is applied. Both countries decide their tax rule - exemption (E), credit(C) 
or deduction(D) - simultaneously and then, knowing each other's decision on tax 
rule, decide their tax rates simultaneously. Therefore, in Figure 5.1, the first decision 
nodes of country 2 are joined into an information set because country 2 does not know 
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the tax rule of country 1 when it decides its tax rule. However, the second decision 
nodes of country 1 are not joined and every node is a single information set because 
country 1 knows its own tax rule and that of the other country. Again, the second 
decision nodes of country 2 are joined into an information set because country 2 does 
not know the tax rate of country 1. 
The equilibrium in this game can be sought by a backward induction method. The 
whole game is divided into several subgames according to the tax rules two countries 
select. Tax rates at Nash equilibrium in each subgame are sought. With a reduced 
game where the following subgame is replaced with the Nash equilibrium outcome, 
the Nash equilibrium of the whole game can be defined. The equilibrium sought here 
is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
5.3 Source principle vs residence principle 
5.3.1 When both countries apply residence principles 
When both countries apply the residence principle, the income from capital, ir- 
respective of its location, is subject to the corporation tax of the home country. 
Therefore, the market equilibrium condition for country i's capital is 
(1 - tt)f(x + (-1)zZ)' = (1- ti)f(x + (-1)ýZ)', i=1,2. (5.1) 
Given the strict concavity of the production function, Z is always 0. Therefore, 
there is no movement of capital between two countries when both countries apply 
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the residence principle. Movement of capital is not influenced not only by domestic 
corporation tax but also by foreign corporation tax. Neither government's decision 
on corporation tax has an effect on the allocation of capital between countries and 
thus has an effect on the tax decision of the other government. In this situation, the 
tax rate is set at a level to maintain the optimal level of social welfare. The allocation 
of capital is also optimal worldwide. 
These results are the same whichever tax rule of double taxation relief both coun- 
tries employ. As far as the foreign country employs the residence principle, the income 
from the capital located in the foreign country is not subject to the foreign tax and 
thus the tax rule of the double taxation relief becomes irrelevant. 
5.3.2 When both countries apply source principles 
When the source principle is applied in both countries, the income from capital 
located in the home country is subject to the domestic tax rate and the income from 
the capital located in foreign country is subject to the tax rate of the foreign country. 
Therefore, the market equilibrium condition for country i's capital is 
(1 - ti)f(K + (-1)'Z)'= (1 - t; )f(K + (-1)jZ)', i =1,2. 
(5.2) 
In this situation, an increase in the domestic tax rate increases the amount of capital 
moving from the domestic country to the foreign country. In contrast, an increase 
in the foreign tax rate diminishes the amount of capital moving from the domestic 
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country to the foreign country. When setting its tax rate, each government considers 
the movement of capital which depends on the difference between two tax rates. 
The objective of country i is 
max W (CC, Gi) 
subject to 
Ci =f (K + (-1)'Z) -f (K + (-1)'Z)'(tiK + (-1)2Z), 
G1 = ti f (K + (-1)iZ)'(K 
0< ti<1, 
-K < Z<K. 
The first-order conditions give 
(5.3) 
Wci f (K + (-1)2Z)'(K + (-1)'Z) + (-1)it:. f (K + (-1)'Z)"(K + (-1)'Z)b 
Wc; f (K + (-1)iZ)'K + (-1)if (K + (-1)iZ)"(tzK + (-1)1Z) L 
+(-1)'. tif (K + (-1)1Z)'ß (5.4) 
where 
az 
ät 
We can define 0 from (5.2) as follows. 
= 
(-1)z f (K + (-1)'Z)' 
(1 - ti)f (K + (-1)zZ)" + (1 - t; )f (K + (-1)iZ)" 
(5.5) 
By plugging (5.5) into (5.4), we get 
WC; f (K + (-1)'Z)"(K + (-1)'Z) 
Wc; 
.f 
(K + (-1)iZ)"(K + (-1)iZ) 
(1 - t; ) f (K + (-1)i Z)"(K + (-1)'Z) + ti f (K + (- 1)'Z)' (5.6) 
+(1 - t; ) f (K + (-1)jZ)"K 
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By symmetry, t* = tl = t2 at the equilibrium and it implies that Z* = 0. Thereby, 
(5.6) is reduced to 
W' c 
W* c 
f (K)"K + (1 - t*)f (K)"K + t*f (K)' 
= 1+ 
f (K)"K + (1 - t*)f (K)"K 
t*f (K)' (5.7) 
(2 - t*) f (K)"K 
< 1. 
(5.7) implies that the marginal utility from public consumption is greater than that 
from private consumption. Thus, it is welfare-increasing to consume more public 
goods and less private goods by increasing tax revenue with higher tax rate. This 
result implies under-supply of public goods and, at the same time, lower tax rate 
than the optimum. The tax rate at the non-cooperative equilibrium is the same for 
both countries. At the equilibrium, there is no distortion caused by capital allocation 
between two countries. The distortion of the under-supply of public goods arises 
either because of each government's incentive to attract foreign capital or because of 
the threat of tax base erosion caused by the lower tax rate of the foreign country (see 
chapter 3 for detailed analysis of the equilibrium). 
5.3.3 When one country applies the residence principle and 
the other the source principle 
No adjustment 
When two countries apply the same tax principle - either the residence principle 
or the source principle - the world capital is allocated between the two countries 
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according to one single equilibrium condition, respectively defined in (5.1) and (5.2). 
However, when two countries apply different tax principles, there is no single condition 
according to which the world capital is allocated. The condition which produces the 
same rate of return irrespective of location of capital differs between the capital of 
country 1 and the capital of country 2. There are three possibilities: both conditions 
are satisfied; 5 only one of them is satisfied; or neither of them is satisfied. 
Suppose country 1 applies the residence principle without any double taxation 
relief and country 2 applies the source principle (throughout this subsection, country 
2 is assumed to apply the source principle). For the capital of country 1, the income 
from the capital invested domestically is subject to the tax rate of country 1 and 
the income from the capital which is moved to country 2 is subject not only to the 
tax of country 1 but also to the tax of country 2. Therefore, the market equilibrium 
condition for country l's capitals is 
(1 1 tl) f (K - Z)' _ (1 - tl - t2) f (K + Z)'. (5.8) 
For the capital of country 2, the income from the capital invested domestically is 
subject to the tax of country 2 and the income from the capital moved to country 1 
is not subject to any tax. Therefore, the market equilibrium condition for country 
'More accurately, two conditions become the same in this case. 
6The term `the market equilibrium condition' is misleading because it may not stand at the 
equilibrium. This condition means that capital of country 1 should be allocated in order to earn 
an equal rate of return in the two countries. Therefore, the term `the arbitrage condition of the 
allocation of country 1's capital' is technically more appropriate. However, for the sake of consistency, 
the first term is used throughout the thesis. 
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2's capital is 
(1 - t2) f (K + Z)' =f (K - Z)'. (5.9) 
Only when t2 = 0, (5.8) and (5.9) are satisfied at the same time with Z=0. 
Then, country 1 can choose the optimal tax rate. The tax rate will be the same in 
autarky because its tax rate does not have an influence on the movement of capital. 
Therefore, the social welfare of country 1 is the same as that in autarky but that of 
country 2 deteriorates due to a lack of supply of public goods. 
What if t2 is not equal to zero? The capital of country 2 moves to country 1 up 
to the amount satisfying (5.9). However, for the owners of the capital in country 1, 
it is always profitable to locate all capital in the country 1 at any tax rates of two 
countries.? Therefore, country 1 sets its rate at the optimum with given amount of 
inflow of capital from country 2. However, country 2 must set the tax rate, considering 
the movement of capital which satisfies (5.9). 
The objective of country 2 is to 
max W(C2, G2) (5.10) t2 
subject to 
C2 = f(K+Z)- f(K+Z)'(t2K+Z), 
G2 = t2 f (K + Z)'(K + Z), 
'In the case of large inflow of country 2's capital into country 1, the right-hand side of (5.8) can 
be greater than the left-hand side of (5.8). This result implies that country 1's capital earns the 
higher after-tax rate of return in country 2 than in country 1. However, the above case does not 
occur because the amount of capital inflow from country 2 is restricted by (5.9). This restriction 
always makes the left-hand side of (5.8) greater than the right-hand side. 
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(1 - i2) f(K + Z)' = f(K + z)', 
0< t2<1, 
-K <Z<0. (5.11) 
The first-order conditions give 
WC, 
-f 
(K + Z)'(K + Z) - t2 f (K + Z)"(K + Z)b - t2 f (K + Z)' (5.12) 
W2 f(K+Z)'K+ f(K+Z)'- f(K+Z)"(t2K+Z)i ' 
where 
__ 
az 
ate 
(5.13) 
We can define 0 from (5.9) as follows. 
_ 
f(K+Z)' 
(5.14) ý' 
f (K - Z)" + (1 - t2)f(K + Z)" 
By plugging (5.14) into (5.12), we get 
W* f (K - Z)"Z + t*f (K + Z)' () 
WW2 = 
1+ f(K-Z)"K+ f(K+Z)"(K+Z) < 
1.5.15 
Because Z* < 0, (5.15) is always less than 1. This result implies that public goods 
are under-supplied in country 2.8 
Which of the two, t2 =0 or t2 54 0, is the better for country 2? If country 2 
chooses t2 = 0, there is no loss of welfare caused by the capital flight but there is a 
serious loss of welfare caused by a lack of provision of public goods. On the contrary, 
8This does not necessarily imply that the tax rate of country 2 in this subgame is lower than the 
tax rate in the autarky. It is impossible to compare these two tax rates because there is a change in 
the amount of capital in country 2. The under-supply of pubic goods should be evaluated with the 
changed amount of capital, K+Z, not with the original endowment of capital, K. 
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with t2 # 0, the loss of welfare from the inefficient allocation between private goods 
and public goods is less serious than in the case of t2 =0 but there is another loss of 
welfare caused by the capital flight. It is obvious that country 2 is worse off than in 
autarky in both cases. 
However, is country 1 better off due to the inflow of the capital? If t2 = 0, there is 
no inflow of capital from country 2 and the tax rate and the social welfare of country 
1 is the same as in autarky. If t2 0, the total output of country 1 will increase due 
to the increased capital. Country 1 can allocate this increased output into the private 
consumption and the public consumption by setting its tax rate to get 
Wcl 
WG1 = 
1. (5.16) 
Therefore, the social welfare of country 1 is greater than that in autarky. The new 
tax rate also be higher than tA. 9 
Lemma 16 When one country applies a source-based tax and the other applies a 
residence-based tax without adjustment, capital never moves from the latter to the 
former. The former is worse off but the latter is not worse off than in autarky. 
Deduction method 
Suppose that country 1 taxes the capital income from abroad, net of tax paid to 
the foreign country. For the capital of country 1, the income from the capital which 
9The inflow of capital increases the total income of labour but decreases the total income of 
domestic capital. Therefore, capital income tax rate must be increased in order to divide total 
income into equal private and public consumption. 
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is moved to country 2 is subject to country 2's tax rate and country l's tax rate with 
deduction. Therefore, the market equilibrium condition for country 1's capital is 
(1 - tl) f (K - Z)' = (1 - tl) (1 - t2) f (K + Z)'. (5.17) 
For the capital of country 2, the market equilibrium condition is (5.9). 
(5.9) and (5.17) are the same. For any value of t1, Z<0 and only t2 matters. 
This result is the same with the previous case where country 1 applies the residence 
principle without adjustment. The method of double taxation relief, either no ad- 
justment or deduction, does not matter because capital never moves abroad from the 
country which applies one of these methods. 
Lemma 17 When one country applies a source-based tax and the other applies a 
residence-based tax with deduction rule, capital never moves from the latter to the 
former. The former is worse off but the latter is not worse off than in autarky. 
Full credit method 
Suppose that country 1 gives full credit for the tax paid to the foreign country. 
When t2 is higher than tl, country 1 subsidises the difference between the tax paid to 
country 2 and the tax payable to country 1. For the capital of country 1, the capital 
income is subject to t1, regardless of the location in which the capital is invested. 
Therefore, the market equilibrium condition for country 1's capital is 
(1-tl)f(K-Z)'=(1-tl)f(K+Z)' (5.18) 
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For the capital of country 2, the market equilibrium condition is (5.9). 
When t2 = 0, Z must be 0 satisfying (5.9) and (5.18). When t2 0, Z must have 
a negative sign, which means that the capital of country 2 moves to country 1. By 
plugging (5.9) into (5.18) we get 
(1 - tl) f (K - Z)' < (1 - tl) f (K + Z)'. (5.19) 
(5.19) implies that, for the owners of the capital in country 1, it is more profitable 
to move some of its capital to country 2 than to locate it in country 1 because the 
inflow of capital from country 2 lowers the marginal productivity of capital located 
in country 1. Country 1's capital moves to country 2 until (5.18) is fulfilled. In this 
situation, (5.9) is not satisfied. 
(1 - t2) f (K + Z)' <f (K - Z)'. (5.20) 
(5.20) implies that it is profitable for country 2's capital to move to country 1. This 
process will continue until all of the capital in country 2 moves to country 1 and all 
of the capital of country 1 moves to country 2. 
The full cross-hauling of capital gives pure gains of tax revenue to country 2 
because all tax revenue is entirely born by foreigners who locate capital in its territory. 
Therefore, country 2 sets its tax rate close to 1. 
Because the capital tax is the only source of tax revenue of country 1, tl must not 
be lower than t2 if full credit is to be given. This makes country 1 set its tax rate 
close to 1. At the equilibrium, (tl = t2 ^- 1), the welfare of country 1 and country 2 
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are respectively 
IV, = Wi [. f (K) - .f 
(K)'K, 0] (5.21) 
and 
Iv2 = tiv2 [. f (x) + .f 
(K)'K, 
.f 
(K)KK] (5.22) 
Country 2 is better off than in autarky and than the case t2 = 0. But country 1 is 
worse off than in autarky because most of the capital income goes to the tax revenue 
of country 2 and there is no tax revenue. 
Lemma 18 When one country applies a source-based tax and the other applies a 
residence-based tax with the full credit method, the tax rates of both countries are 
close to 1. The former is better off while the latter is worse off than in autarky. 
Credit-cum-limitation method 
Suppose that country 1 gives credit for the tax paid to country 2. Contrary to 
the full credit method, the credit is limited to the tax payable to country 1. When 
the tax rate in country 2 is higher than that of country 1, the government of country 
1 does not give money back to make up for the payment of tax to country 2. For the 
capital of country 1, the income from capital moved to country 2 is subject to the 
higher of the tax rates of country 1 and country 2. Therefore, the market equilibrium 
condition for the capital of country 1 is 
(1 - tl) f (K - Z)' = {1 - max(tl, t2)} f (K + Z)'. (5.23) 
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For the capital of country 2, the market equilibrium condition is (5.9). 
When t2 = 0, Z must be 0 satisfying (5.9) and (5.23). Country 1 can maintain 
the same welfare level by setting tl = to while country 2 is worse off than in autarky 
due to no supply of public goods. When t2 # 0, there are two cases; Case 1 (t1 = 0) 
and Case 2 (t1 0). With Case 1, (5.23) becomes 
f (K - Z)'= (1 - t2)f (K + Z)'. (5.24) 
This equilibrium condition is the same as (5.9). Country 2's capital moves to country 
1 up to the amount satisfying (5.9). Country 2 is worse off because of the capital 
flight and because of the under-supply of public goods. Country 1 can be worse off or 
better off than in autarky. It is better off if the positive effect of the inflow of foreign 
capital outweighs the negative effect of the lack of supply of public goods. 
With Case 2, regardless of the values of tl and t2, full cross-hauling of capital 
occurs. This result is confirmed because when (5.9) is satisfied, the right hand side 
of (5.23) is less than the right hand side regardless of which is the higher of tl and 
t2. Country 2 will set its tax rate close to 1. tl is irrelevant because there is no 
capital income on which to impose tax because country 2 takes all capital income as 
tax revenue. Country 1 does not necessarily set its tax rate as close to 1 as country 2 
because country 1 has no obligation to give money back if its tax rate is lower than 
that of country 2. 
If tl is expected to be positive, country 2 sets its tax rate close to 1. However, if 
tl is expected to be 0, then country 2 sets its tax rate at t2 (tl = 0) which is defined in 
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(5.15). In contrast, country 1 sets its tax rate at 0 if country 2 is expected to set its 
tax rate close to 1. If country 2 is expected to set its tax rate at t2(tl = 0), country 
1 will set its tax rate at ti(t2 = t2(tl = 0)). 
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium will exist when t2(tl = 0) 0 and ti(t2 = 
t2(tl = 0)) = 0. Otherwise, only the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium may exist. '0 
At (t1 = 0, t2 = t2(tl = 0)), country 2 is worse off, not only due to the capital flight 
but also due to the under-supply of public goods. Country 1 can be better off if the 
positive effect of the inflow of foreign capital outweighs the negative effect of the lack 
of supply of public goods. Otherwise, it is worse off. 
Lemma 19 When one country applies a source-based tax and the other applies a 
residence-based tax with the credit-cum limitation rule, the existence of a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. If it does, the former is worse off while the latter 
is either better off or worse off than in autarky. 
Exemption method 
Suppose that country 1 does not impose tax on the income from the capital located 
in the foreign country. For the capital of country 1, the income from capital moved 
to country 2 is subject to country 2's tax rate. Therefore, the market equilibrium 
condition for country 1's capital is 
(1 - tl) f (K - Z)'= (1 - t2) f (K + Z)'. (5.25) 
10For the conditions for existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, see Dasgupta and Maskin 
(1986). 
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For the capital of country 2, the market equilibrium condition is (5.9). 
This equilibrium condition is the same with Case 2 in which country 1 applies 
the residence principle with credit-cum-limitation and t2 is not lower than t1. The 
equilibrium in the previous case does not depend on the assumption that t2 is not 
lower than t1. Therefore, the equilibrium is the same. When t2(tl = 0) 54 0 and 
ti(t2 = t2(tl = 0)) = 0, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is {(ti = 0), (t2 = 
t2(tl = O))}. Country 2 is worse off, not only due to the capital flight but also due to 
the under-supply of public goods. Country 1 is better off if the positive effect of the 
inflow of foreign capital dominates the negative effect of the lack of supply of public 
goods. Otherwise, it is worse off. 
Lemma 20 When one country applies a source-based tax and the other applies a 
residence-based tax with the exemption rule, the existence of pure strategy Nash equi- 
librium is not guaranteed. If it does, the former is worse off while the latter is either 
better off or worse off than in autarky. 
5.3.4 Summary 
The analysis presented above can be summarized as follows. Here to and tc denote 
the tax rate in autarky and in tax competition respectively where both countries apply 
the source principle. WA and tiWW denote the social welfare under (t1 = t2 = tA) and 
(tl = t2 = tC). 
1. Both countries apply the residence principle : Each country maintains tax rate 
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the same with that in autarky and the level of social welfare is the same as in 
autarky. This outcome is optimal with respect to each country and worldwide. 
(ti = t2 = tA) is the Nash equilibrium tax rate and the payoff corresponding to 
this is (Wj* = W2 = WA). This result is the same regardless of the method of 
double taxation relief. 
2. Both countries apply the source principle : The threat of capital flight (the in- 
centive of attracting foreign capital) makes each country set its tax rate below 
that in autarky. Given the same tax rates in both countries, there is no move- 
ment of capital but there is an allocative distortion of products between private 
consumption and public consumption in both countries. (ti = t2 = tC < tA) is 
the Nash equilibrium tax rate and the payoff corresponding to this is (Wi = 
W2 = WC9 WA) . 
3. One country (country 1) applies the residence principle and the other (country 
2) applies the source principle: 
(1) No adjustment and deduction method : tl has no influence on the movement 
of capital and is thus decided at the level to maximize its social welfare. At the 
equilibrium (ti > tA, t2 tA)11 If t2 0, capital moves from country 2 to country 
1. Country 1 is better off than in autarky due to the inflow of foreign capital, while 
country 2 is worse off due to the under-supply of public goods and the capital flight. 
11The inflow of foreign capital reduces the income of capital whilst increasing the income of labour. 
Therefore, the optimal ti must be higher than to to secure tax revenue. 
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Source Full No adjust Exemption 
principle credit / Deduction / Credit 
Source WC, W++, W_, W_, 
principle WC W__ W+, W_+ 
Full W 
_, 
WA, WA, WA, 
Credit W++ WA WA, WA 
No adjust W+, WA, WA, WA, 
/ Deduction W_, WA, WA, WA, 
Exemption W_+, WA, WA, WA, 
/ Credit W_ WA WA, WA 
Table 5.1: Reduced payoff table (1) 
If t2 = 0, there is no movement of capital. Country 2 is worse off due to the lack of 
supply of public goods while country 1 has the same level of social welfare as that in 
autarky. Therefore, (Wi > WA, W2 < WA). 
(2) Full credit method : Fill cross-hauling of capital makes country 2 set its tax 
rate close to 1. (ti = t2 - 1) is the equilibrium tax rates and the payoff corresponding 
to this is (Wi < WA, W2 > WA). 
(3) Credit-cum-limitation method and exemption method : (ti = 0) t2 = t2 (tl = 
0)) is the pure strategy equilibrium if it exists. Country 1 is better off if the positive 
effect of the net inflow of capital outweighs the negative effect of the lack of supply 
of capital. Country 2 is worse off due to the capital flight and the under-supply of 
public goods. Thus, (Wi WA, W2 < WA). 
Table 5.1 summarizes the above result with a reduced payoff table. The first value 
of a payoff is for the country which applies the tax rule shown in the first column and 
the second is for the country which applies the tax rule shown in the first row. The 
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payoff in the subgame in which one country adopts `no adjustment' and `deduction' 
is exactly the same and thus they are merged into one. This merger is applied to 
the subgames in which one country adopts `credit-cum-limitation' and `exemption'. 
Here, we can sayW++> W+> WA > W_, WC> W__, andW+> W_+. We do 
not know the superiority of preference between WA and W_+, and between We and 
W_+. This ambiguity does not change the following result. 
There are four multiple Nash equilibria in the whole game. Each country choose ei- 
ther the residence principle with `no adjustment / deduction' or `credit-cum-limitation 
/ exemption'. When one country applies the residence principle with `full credit', the 
other country has an incentive to change its tax principle to the source principle from 
the residence principle. Therefore, the residence principle with `full credit' is not a 
Nash equilibrium. At these four Nash equilibria, the tax rates and social welfare are 
(ti = t2 =W and (Wi = W2 = WA). 
Proposition 21 The subgame perfect Nash equilibria are (Reresidence principle with 
No-adjustment, Deduction, Credit-cum-limitation or Exemption, ti = W. Therefore, 
the international allocation of capital between two countries and the allocation of 
products between private and public consumption are optimal for each country and 
worldwide. 
Two points need to be mentioned. The Nash equilibrium concept does not pre- 
clude the use of weakly dominated strategies in randomizing its strategies. How- 
ever, weakly dominated strategies are unappealing because they are dominated un- 
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less a player is absolutely sure of what other players will play. In the above game, 
the residence principle with `no adjustment/deduction' weakly dominates the res- 
idence principle with `credit-cum-limitation/exemption'. This result derives from 
that W+ > W_+. In the equilibrium in both subgames, country 1 has the same 
amount of the inflow of foreign capital. However, the tax rate of country 1 is 
optimal in the subgame of the residence principle with `no adjustment/deduction' 
while the tax rate is zero in the subgame of the residence principle with `credit- 
cum-limitation/exemption'. Therefore, only the residence principle with `no adjust- 
ment/deduction' is the trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium. " 
What if only mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the subgame in which 
one country adopts the residence principle with `credit-cum-limitation/exemption' 
and the other country adopts the source principle? The equilibrium of the whole 
game depends on the expected payoff of the mixed strategy for both countries. The 
expected payoff for the country which adopts the residence principle is less than W+. 
The payoff for the other country can be either greater than WA or less than WA. If 
it is not greater than WA, the result is the same as analysed above. Otherwise, only 
the residence principle with `no adjustment/deduction' is employed at the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium. 
12The trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium is robust to the possibility that, with some very 
small probability, players make mistakes. See Mas-colell, Whinston and Green (1995) for the formal 
definition. 
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5.4 World income tax principle 
5.4.1 When the same methods are applied 
Deduction method 
Suppose that both countries apply deduction methods. For the capital of country 
1, the income from capital invested domestically is subject to the tax rate of country 
1 while the income from capital invested in country 2 is subject to the tax rate 
of country 2 and of country 1 with deduction. Therefore, the market equilibrium 
condition for capital of country 1 is 
(1 - tl) f (K - Z)' = (1 - tl)(1 - t2) f (K + Z)'. (5.26) 
Z must be negative with any value of (t1, t2). This result implies that the net inflow 
of capital for country 2 cannot be positive and thus country 2 cannot change the 
allocation of capital between two countries when country 1 does not attract capital 
from country 2. 
For the capital of country 2, the income from capital invested domestically is 
subject to the tax rate of country 2 while the income from the capital invested in 
country 1 is subject to the tax rate of country 2 and of country 1 with deduction. 
Therefore, the market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 2 is 
(1 - t2) f (K + Z)' = (1 - tl)(1 - t2) f (K - Z)'. (5.27) 
Z must be positive with any value of (t1, t2). This result implies that country 1 cannot 
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attract capital from country 2 even with a lower tax. Therefore, each country cannot 
attract capital from the other. Tax is not useful in attracting foreign capital and tax 
competition does not occur. Therefore, tax rates in both countries are the same as 
those in autarky. The allocation of products between private consumption and public 
consumption is optimal and the allocation of capital is also optimal worldwide. 
Lemma 22 When both countries apply the deduction method under the world in- 
come taxation, both countries cannot attract capital from each other. Therefore, tax 
competition does not occur. 
Credit method 
With the credit-cum-limitation method, for the capital of country 1, the income 
from the capital invested domestically is subject to the tax rate of country 1 while 
the income from the capital invested in country 2 is subject to the higher one between 
the tax rate of country 1 and that of country 2. Therefore, the market equilibrium 
condition for the capital of country 1 is 
(1 - tl) f (K - Z)' = {1 - max(ti, t2)} f (K + Z)'. (5.28) 
Z cannot be positive with any value of (tl, t2). This result implies that country 2 
cannot attract capital from country 1 even with a lower tax rate. 
For the capital of country 2, the income from the capital invested domestically 
is subject to the tax rate of country 2 while the income from the capital invested in 
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country 1 is subject to the higher one between the tax rate of country 2 and that of 
country 1. Therefore, the market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 2 is 
(1 - t2) f (K + Z)' = {1- max(t1, t2)} f (K - Z)'. (5.29) 
Z cannot be negative with any value of (t1) t2). This result implies that country 1 
cannot attract capital from country 2 even with a lower tax rate. Therefore, each 
country cannot attract capital from the other. Tax is useless in attracting foreign 
capital and tax competition does not occur. 
Lemma 23 When both countries apply the credit method under the world income 
taxation, both countries cannot attract capital from each other. Therefore, tax com- 
petition does not occur. 
Exemption method 
With the exemption method, for the capital of country i, the income from the 
capital invested domestically is subject to the tax rate of country i while the income 
from the capital invested in country j is subject to the tax rate of country j. Therefore, 
the market equilibrium condition for the capital of country i is 
(1 - ti) f (K + (-1)'Z)' = (1 - t; ) f (K + (-1)'Z)'. (5.30) 
This condition is exactly the same situation where both countries apply the source 
principle. The analysis under the source principle has demonstrated that both coun- 
tries are involved with tax competition, which leads to lower tax rates in both coun- 
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tries. There is no distortion from the allocation of capital between countries but there 
is a distortion in the allocation of products between private consumption and public 
consumption. 
Lemma 24 The world income taxation with the exemption rule for the relief of double 
taxation is exactly equivalent to the source principle. Therefore, tax competition leads 
to lower tax rates in both countries. 
5.4.2 When different methods are applied 
Deduction method and credit method 
Suppose that country 1 applies the deduction method and country 2 applies the 
credit method. The market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 1 is 
(5.26) and the market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 2 is (5.29). 
Neither country can attract capital from the other. Tax is not a useful mechanism 
for attracting foreign capital and tax competition does not occur. Tax rates in both 
countries are the same with those in autarky. 
Lemma 25 When both countries apply one of deduction rule and credit rule, the 
difference of tax rates does not cause movement of capital at all. Therefore, tax 
competition does not occur. 
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Deduction method and exemption method 
Suppose that country 1 applies the deduction method and country 2 applies the 
exemption method. The market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 1 is 
(5.26) and the market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 2 is (5.30). Z 
cannot be positive with any value of (t1, t2). This result implies that country 2 cannot 
attract capital from country 1 even with a lower tax. Country 1 can attract capital 
from country 2 by setting its tax rate below that of country 2. Therefore, country 1 
can maintain its level of social welfare, at least, at the level of WA by fixing its tax 
rate at tA. If it manipulates its tax rate, the expected social welfare must be greater 
than WA. However, for country 2, the maximum level of its social welfare is WA when 
ti = t2 = tA. Otherwise, W2 < WA. 
Lemma 26 When one country applies the exemption rule and the other country ap- 
plies the deduction rule, the former is not better off than in autarky and the latter is 
not worse off than in autarky. 
How do both countries make their mixed strategies? Country 1 is better off when 
setting the lower tax rate than that of country 2 and thus attracting capital. For 
country 2, it is best to set its tax rate at the same level as that of country 1. Even a 
lower tax rate is not able to attract capital from country 1. If the expected utility of a 
mixed strategy, randomizing its tax rates, is less than tiVA for country 1, (ti = t2 = tA) 
is a Nash equilibrium tax rate and the social welfare is (WI* = W2 = WA). Otherwise, 
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both countries will randomize their tax rates at the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Credit method and exemption method 
Suppose that country 1 applies the credit method and country 2 applies the ex- 
emption method. The market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 1 is 
(5.29) and the market equilibrium condition for the capital of country 2 is (5.30). 
Z cannot be positive with any value of (t1, t2). This result implies that country 2 
cannot attract capital from country 1 even with a lower tax rate. Country 1, however, 
can attract capital from country 2 by setting its tax rate below that of country 2. 
Therefore, country 1 can maintain its social welfare, at least, at the level of WA by 
fixing its tax rate at tA. If it manipulates its tax rate, the expected social welfare 
must be greater than WA. However, for country 2, the maximum of its social welfare 
is WA when ti = t2 = tA. Otherwise, W2 < WA. 
Lemma 27 When one country applies the exemption rule and the other country ap- 
plies the credit rule, the former is not better off than in autarky and the latter is not 
worse off than in autarky. 
5.4.3 Summary 
The equilibrium in each subgame can be summarized as follows. 
1. Subgame of Deduction-Deduction, Credit-Credit and Deduction-Credit : Tax 
competition does not occur and thus {(ti = t2 = tA), (Wi = W2 = WA)} is a 
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Nash equilibrium. 
2. Subgame of Exemption-Exemption : Tax competition leads to a lower tax in 
both countries and thus the under-supply of public goods. Therefore, both 
countries are worse off than in autarky. {(ti = t2 = t0), (Wi = W2 = Wc)} is 
a Nash equilibrium. 
3. Subgame of Deduction-Exemption and Credit-Exemption : Regardless of tax 
rates at the equilibrium, the country applying the Deduction or Credit method is 
not worse off than in autarky while the country applying the Exemption method 
is not better off than in autarky. Wi > WA > W2 at the Nash equilibrium. 
From the above analysis, we can get a reduced payoff table. The payoff for the 
deduction rule is exactly the same as those for the credit rule. Therefore, these two 
subgames are merged into one. Table 5.2 summarizes the results. It is obvious that 
W+ > WA > WC and W_ . 
However, the ordering of preference between WC and 
W_ is not obvious. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is { (Deduction or Credit, 
Deduction or Credit), (ti = t2 = tA), (Wj = W2 = WA)}. The result is not changed 
according to the ordering of preference between WW and TV- 
The implication of the result is the same as in the previous section where two 
countries select one of two polar tax principles with double taxation relief. Each 
country can protect capital flight by not treating the income of the capital located 
abroad more favourably than the income from the capital located domestically. The 
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Deduction Exemption 
/ Credit 
Deduction WA, W+, 
/ Credit WA W_ 
Exemption W_, WC, 
W+ We 
Table 5.2: Reduced payoff table (2) 
deduction method and the credit method are these schemes. 
Proposition 28 Under the world income taxation, the subgame perfect Nash equi- . 
librium is {{(Deduction/Credit, Deduction/Credit), (ti = t2 = tA), (Wi = W2 = 
WA)}. Therefore, the international allocation of capital and the allocation of products 
between private consumption and public consumption is optimal for each country and 
worldwide. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, tax rule is treated as a decision variable of governments in the 
same way as tax rate. In this modified dynamic game, neither countries apply the 
source principle (the exemption method under the world income taxation) and thus 
international capital mobility does not provoke strategic tax setting behaviour of 
governments. The result is perhaps surprising in that current concerns about the 
distortional effects of tax competition appear to be irrelevant only if countries are 
free to choose their own tax rules as well as tax rates. 
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However, although in a legal sense corporation tax is a residence-based tax, there 
are many cases in practice in which it functions as a source-based tax. Firstly, the 
government is likely to have incomplete information about the foreign income of do- 
mestic firms. While domestic income can be thoroughly monitored by tax authorities, 
foreign income cannot be completely monitored because of the national boundaries 
of the jurisdiction of tax authorities. Of course, foreign income can be monitored 
by the sharing of information among tax authorities. However, it has been argued 
that self-interested tax authorities do not share information fully with foreign tax 
authorities (see Bacchetta and Espinosa [1993]). Therefore, given limitations of avail- 
able information about foreign income, corporation tax becomes a source-based tax 
in practice (the exemption method under the world income taxation). 
Secondly, the financial behaviour of firms seeking to minimize tax burden effec- 
tively transforms a residence-based tax as a legal form into a source-based tax in fact. 
When subsidiaries defer the repatriation of profits to the holding company, only the 
tax of the host country is applied. Given that the profits of subsidiaries are commonly 
retained or used for reinvestment in themselves and in other subsidiaries, the tax of 
the home country does not matter. 
Thirdly, when subsidies are used for attracting foreign capital along with tax rate 
cutting, tax rules are irrelevant in the context of tax competition. Tax competition 
occurs with both a source-based and residence-based tax (this will be analysed in 
chapter 6). 
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The analysis can be extended to asymmetric cases. The potential losers of tax 
competition (the larger country and the country with a strong preference for public 
goods) are more likely to select the tax rules by which they can prohibit their capital 
from moving abroad. However, the country with larger per capita capital endowment 
cannot prohibit its capital from moving abroad by employing these tax rules because 
domestic capital moves to the foreign country seeking for the higher marginal pro- 
ductivity of capital even if there is no tax differential. Therefore, this country may 
prefer tax rule which causes tax competition. The asymmetric cases provide another 
strategic aspects of governments' decisions on tax rules and tax rates. 
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Chapter 6 
International tax and subsidy game 
6.1 Introduction 
The standard model of tax competition has not considered subsidies for foreign 
and/or domestic investment separately from tax competition. It seems to me that 
they assume that all subsidies can be converted into effective tax rates and therefore, 
there is no need for the separate treatment. This explanation is supported by the 
fact that empirical tests on tax competition have been carried out with using not 
nominal tax rates but rather effective tax rates (see Devereux [1995], and Chennells 
and Griffith [1997]). 
However, there are three reasons why subsidies cannot be incorporated into effec- 
tive tax rates and might be analysed separately with tax rates. Firstly, the same tax 
rates are applied to all the capital income in a country, regardless of the nationality of 
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investors. However, subsidies are usually granted either to all investors or exclusively 
to foreign investors. Preferential subsidy creates a difference in effective tax rates 
between the income from domestic capital and the income generated by domestically 
invested foreign capital. Secondly, subsidy is always granted according to the source 
principle, even when taxation follows the residence principle. Thirdly, the decisions 
on subsidies are different from those on tax rates, in that tax rates are under a stricter 
control of the assembly and are changed less frequently than subsidies. 
On the other hand, the introduction of subsidies into the model is significant in 
that, without it, the analysis of tax competition games appears to be trivial when 
tax rules are decided strategically along with tax rates. This result has been demon- 
strated in chapter 5. According to the result of that chapter, a source-based tax 
(the exemption method under the world income taxation) is never used and thus tax 
competition does not occur at all. Table 6.11 shows that, of 24 OECD countries, 12 
countries adopt the credit rule for foreign source dividends while the same number 
of countries adopt the exemption rule. Credit(1) and Credit(2) imply `world-wide 
credit' and `country by country credit' respectively. This situation contradicts the 
prediction of the previous chapter. At the same time, a related question is whether 
tax competition is really irrelevant in the countries which adopt the credit rule. 
This chapter will consider these two issues. The basic model, described in section 
'The data are from Griffith and Chennels' tax data base and Corporate taxes-1998 Worldwide 
Summaries by PriceWWaterHouse. Those are the methods which are applied in general. Different 
methods can be applied according to the income-source country and categories of income. OECD 
(1991) provides the tax rules applicable as of 1991. 
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Country Dividends Interests 
Australia Exemption Credit (1) 
Austria Exemption Credit (2) 
Belgium Exemption (up to 95%) Credit (1) 
Canada Exemption Credit (2) 
Denmark Exemption Credit (2) 
Finland Exemption Credit (2) 
France Exemption (up to 95%) Credit (2) 
Germany Exemption Credit (2) 
Greece Credit (2) Credit (2) 
Iceland Credit (1) Credit (1) 
Ireland Credit (2)2 Credit (2) 
Italy Credit (2) Credit (2) 
Japan Credit (1) Credit (1) 
Luxembourg Exemption Credit (2) 
Netherland Exemption Credit (2) 
New Zealand Exemption Credit (2) 
Norway Credit (2) Credit (2) 
Portugal Credit (2) Credit (2) 
Spain Credit (2) Credit (2) 
Sweden Credit (2) Credit (2) 
Switzerland Exemption Credit (2) 
Turkey Credit(2) Credit(2) 
UK Credit (2) or Deduction Credit (2) 
USA Credit (1) Credit (1) 
Table 6.1: Treatment of foreign source income 
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Figure 6.1: Structure of the game of tax rates and subsidies 
3.2, is used for the analysis here. The necessary modification is the change in the 
structure of the game. Both countries decide their tax rates simultaneously and, 
with knowledge of each other's tax rates, then decide their subsidies simultaneously. 
Capital is allocated according to the marginal rate of return, net of taxes and gross of 
subsidies. I will investigate the subgame perfect Nash equilibria, which can be pure 
or mixed strategies, by the method of backward induction. 
The outline of the game is illustrated in Figure 6.1. At the first stage of the game, 
both countries decide their tax rates simultaneously and, at the second stage, they 
decide their subsidies simultaneously, with the knowledge of each other's tax rate. In 
Figure 6.1, the first decision nodes of country 2 are joined to a single information set 
because country 2 is not aware of the tax rate of country 1 when it decides its tax 
rate. However, the second decision nodes of country 1 are not joined and every node 
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appears as a single information set because country 1 knows its own tax rate as well 
as that of country 2. Again, the second decision nodes of country 2 are joined to 
an single information set because country 2 does not know the amount of subsidy of 
country 1. 
The form of subsidy is significant to the result of the tax and subsidy game. 
I therefore analyse separately the preferential subsidy granted exclusively to foreign 
capital and the universal subsidy granted to both domestic capital and foreign capital. 
Contrary to the common belief that preferential subsidies are more effective than 
universal ones in attracting foreign capital, it is found that they are less effective 
under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. 
When both countries apply the exemption method, preferential subsidies are use- 
less in attracting more capital. They only replace domestic capital with foreign 
capital, leaving total capital in the territory of the country constant. This non- 
effectiveness of subsidies makes the two-stage game into a one-stage game of tax 
rates. Therefore, the introduction of subsidies into the model does not change the 
equilibrium of the game analysed in section 5.4. 
However, when both countries apply the credit method, preferential subsidies can 
be used to attract foreign capital by the country which has set the lower tax rate 
at the previous stage. When the country with the higher tax rate grants subsidies, 
full cross-hauling of capital occurs. The country with the higher tax rate is always 
worse off by granting preferential subsidies because there is no net inflow of capital 
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and it must grant subsidy to all foreign capital invested in its territory. Therefore, 
it never grants preferential subsidies. 3 This asymmetric effect of granting subsidies 
causes strategic decisions on tax rates in the previous stage. Each country reduces 
its tax rate in order to create the situation in which it can attract foreign capital 
by granting subsidies at the second stage. At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 
both countries set their tax rates lower than the optimal level but subsidies are not 
granted by both countries. 
Universal subsidies are shown to be a perfect substitute for tax undercutting when 
both countries apply the exemption method. There are an infinite number of subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria where tax undercutting and granting of subsidy are used 
together. Taking the additional assumption that the smaller subsidy is preferred, a 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. At this subgame perfect equilibrium, 
the tax rates of both countries are the same with those in pure tax competition game 
and subsidies are not used. 
Under the credit rule, tax undercutting is not used but subsidies are, at the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium because subsidies are more effective than tax un- 
dercutting. Subsidies can either attract foreign capital or protect a flight of domestic 
capital while tax undercutting is effective only in protecting a flight of domestic 
capital. Granting subsidies leads to the under-supply of public goods just as tax 
'This is true when the foreign country does not grant subsidies. Otherwise, the country with the 
higher tax rate can be better off by granting preferential subsidies and by causing a cross-hauling 
of capital. This is because domestic capital located in the foreign country can get foreign subsidies 
and net outflow of capital is reduced. This is demonstrated in section 6.3. 
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undercutting does, thereby lowering the effective tax rates. 
The result of the analysis has clear implications for the anti-tax competition poli- 
cies. International coordination to adopt the residence principle does not work when 
subsidies are available to each government. Under the residence principle, tax compe- 
tition is replaced by subsidy competition. Effective tax rates are the same as those at 
the non-cooperative equilibrium and the distortion from the under-supply of public 
goods occurs. International tax coordination (tax harmonization or the imposition of 
minimum tax rate) can change effective tax rates only if governments are forbidden 
from using subsidies. Otherwise, increases in tax rates are followed by increases in 
the level of subsidies. Therefore, these tax coordinations are likely to increase the 
size of governments. 
The next section of this chapter discusses the forms of subsidy which are adopted 
here. One of the difficulties in modelling subsidies is that there are many different 
forms of subsidy and the result of the analysis depends on their forms. It is therefore 
necessary to be explicit about which subsidies are considered in the analysis. Pref- 
erential subsidies are analysed in section 3 and universal subsidies in section 4. The 
conclusion of this chapter provides a summary along with shortcomings and possible 
extensions of the analysis. 
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6.2 Which subsidies? 
There are various specific forms of subsidies. Firstly, subsidy can be given either 
to all capital located in its territory or to exclusively foreign capital. Suppose that 
subsidy is given only to foreign capital invested within its territory. When an amount 
of capital of the other country moves into the territory seeking for the subsidy, the 
inflow of foreign capital lowers the marginal productivity of domestic capital and 
thus, the same amount of domestic capital will leave the territory seeking the higher 
marginal productivity of capital abroad. Therefore, preferential subsidy substitutes 
domestic capital with foreign capital. ' In contrast, when subsidy is given to all capital 
invested in its territory regardless of its nationality, it can attract more capital into 
its territory just like tax undercutting. 
The effectiveness of subsidy contradicts a simple conjecture that a preferential 
subsidy is more effective in attracting foreign capital than a universal subsidy. If two 
countries are assumed to compete to attract multinational enterprise's capital, prefer- 
ential subsidy is more effective. With the same total amount of subsidies, preferential 
subsidies can increase the rate of return for multinational capital more than universal 
subsidies because the former is given exclusively to multinational capital while the 
latter is given to multinational and domestic capital. 
Definition 29 A preferential subsidy is a subsidy which is granted exclusively to 
4This is true only when capital has the perfect mobility and the source-based tax (the exemption 
rule under the world income taxation) is Used. Otherwise, this does not stand. 
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foreign capital. If a subsidy is granted to domestic and foreign capital, it is a universal 
subsidy. 
Secondly, the amount of subsidy may be determined according to marginal pro- 
ductivity of capital (proportional subsidy) or fixed per unit (unit subsidy). The 
sequence of the game is that the government announces the amount of subsidy for 
the capital and then marginal productivity of capital is determined as a result of cap- 
ital movement. Investors are less impressed by a subsidy the amount of which will be 
decided after their investment. A `unit subsidy' is more realistic than a `proportional 
subsidy'. 
When a `proportional subsidy' is granted and taxed, the marginal rate of the 
return of capital is 
(1-ti)(1+s2)f(K-Z)'-(1-wi)f(IK-Z)' (6.1) 
where w; = tt - si + tisi. w2 is an effective tax rate. When si > 05, wi < t;,. 
When a `unit subsidy' is granted and taxed, the marginal rate of the return of 
capital is 
(1-ti)f(K-Z)'+(1-ti)si. (6.2) 
A single effective tax rate does not capture the effect of tax and subsidy at the same 
time. Even if a unit subsidy looks to be more appropriate in highlighting the role of 
subsidies, a proportional subsidy is adopted in the following sections for the purpose 
of the analytical simplicity. This issue will be discussed in section 3 and 4. 
5A negative subsidy is not considered here. 
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Third, subsidies for capital can be taxed, being added to the marginal productivity 
of capital, or not. If a `proportional subsidy' is taxed by the government, the effective 
tax rate is wi = t;, - si +ti s;.. If not, w2 = tj - s; . There is no difference between them in 
converting the total effect of tax rate and subsidy into a single effective tax rate. The 
only difference derives from the fact that when subsidy is taxed, budget constraints 
does not impose a restriction such that t= > si, which is inevitable otherwise. 
The selection between the two relies on current practice. If subsidies are cash 
grants, subsidies are taxed via increasing the profit of firms. If subsidies are not cash 
grants but rather free provision of land, simplified licensing procedure, low interest 
loans and guarantee, granting monopoly, etc., it is less obvious whether those subsidies 
are taxed or not. However, those subsidies will be eventually reflected in profits of 
firms and then be taxed. Therefore, we assume that subsidies are taxed. 
Regardless of the form of subsidy, granting subsidy always increases private con- 
sumption6 and decreases the same amount of public consumption. Therefore, tax 
undercutting and granting subsidy have a similar effect. Higher tax rate and greater 
subsidy can have the same allocation of products between private and public con- 
sumption as lower tax rate and smaller subsidy. Infinite number of combination of 
tax rates and subsidies can maximize the social welfare. In order to define tax rates 
and subsidies in autarky, we need an assumption that lower tax rate and lower subsidy 
are preferred. 
6A preferential subsidy increases private consumption of non-residents while a universal subsidy 
increases that of residents and non-residents. 
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This assumption can be attributed to the needs of politicians. Politicians need to 
maintain tax rates at their lowest level because tax rates are regarded by voters to 
indicate the effectiveness of monitoring government. Lower tax rates are helpful to 
their being re-elected. The simpler explanation is that democratic principle requires 
to restrict government's arbitrary power of granting subsidy at a minimum. 
6.3 Preferential subsidy 
6.3.1 Exemption rule 
When both countries compete to attract capital only through tax undercutting, 
both countries lower their tax rates at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. How 
does the subsequent subsidy competition change the result? Suppose that tax rates 
are the same for two countries. If one country tries to attract capital from the other 
by giving subsidy to foreign capital, some foreign capital will move into the territory. 
The inflow of foreign capital must lower the marginal productivity of domestic capital 
and, thus the same amount of domestic capital will leave the territory seeking higher 
marginal productivity of capital abroad. This process continues up to the point where 
the marginal productivity of capital is the same in the home country and abroad. 
Therefore, the subsidy cannot successfully attract more capital. It only substitutes 
domestic capital with foreign capital. 
Let Z. be defined as the amount of capital of country i invested in country j and 
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Zj as the amount of capital of country j invested in country i. 7 Here, 0< ZZ and Z3 
< K. The capital of country i invested in country i earns marginal productivity net 
of the tax paid to country i while the capital of country i invested country j earns 
marginal productivity of capital net of the tax paid to country j, and the subsidy of 
country j. Therefore, the equilibrium condition is 
(1 - t1) f (K + (-1)2(ZZ - Zj))' = (1 - tß)(1 + s3) f (K + (-1)'(Z= - Zj))'. (6.3) 
The capital of country j invested in country j earns marginal productivity net of the 
tax paid to country j while the capital of country j invested country i earns marginal 
productivity of capital net of the tax paid to country i, and the subsidy of country i. 
Therefore, the equilibrium condition is 
(1 - t; ) f (K + (-1)'(Z2 - Z; ))' _ (1 - t%)(1 + s; ) f (K + (-1)i(Z; - Z3))'. (6.4) 
Suppose that the tax rates are the same in two countries and neither country 
grants subsidies. (6.3) and (6.4) are the same as 
f (K + (-1)2(Zi - Z; ))' =f (K + (-1)'(Z; - Zj))'. (6.5) 
(6.5) gives Z$ = Z3. The relationship is drawn in Figure 6.2 (a). The dotted line rep- 
resents the relationship satisfying (6.4) and the solid line represents the relationship 
of (6.3). With the assumption that firms locate their capital domestically when they 
are indifferent to the location of their capital, Z; = Zj =0 at the equilibrium. 
7In chapter 3, we denote Z= ZZ - Zj. It is not possible to use this expression here because there 
is cross-hauling of capital. 
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Suppose that country j tries to attract capital from country i by granting subsidy 
to foreign capital while country i does not. In this setting, we have 
f (K + (-1)'(ZZ - Z; ))' = (1 + sj)f (K + (-1)'(Z;, - Zj))' (6.6) 
and 
f (K + (-1)'(Z, - Z; ))' =f (K + (-1)''(Zi - Z; ))'. (6.7) 
From (6.6), for any positive subsidy of country j, the difference between Zi and ZZ, 
must be positive; Z. - Zj > 0, for any sj > 0. Zz and Zj are in a linear relation. 
When Zj = 0, Zz = ZO > 0, where ZO denotes the amount of capital of country i 
which satisfies (6.6). When 0< Zj <K- Zo, 
Zi = Zj + Z0. When Zj >K- Zo, 
Zs =K because Zz can not be greater than K. From (6.7), Z; = Z2. 
The relationship is drawn in Figure 6.2 (b) and (c). When either country gives 
subsidy, at the equilibrium Zi = Zj = K. This results in a full cross-hauling of capital. 
Neither country can attract more capital into its territory by providing subsidy. The 
country which grants subsidies is worse off because it pays subsidies for all capital of 
foreign country, failing to increase capital invested in its territory. Neither country 
has an incentive to grant preferential subsidies when tax rates of both countries are 
the same. 
When tax rates in the two countries are different, the country with lower tax 
rate can attract capital from the country with higher tax rate (see Figure 6.3 (a)). 
Suppose that the country with the lower tax rate grants subsidies in order to attract 
more capital from the foreign country. This will move the dotted line leaving the 
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solid line unchanged. The new equilibrium is E, in which all capital of foreign capital 
moves into its territory and some capital of its own moves to the foreign country, not 
changing the net inflow of capital. Any amount of subsidy of the country causes a 
cross-hauling of capital, leaving the net inflow of capital unchanged (see Figure 6.3 
(c)). Therefore, the country with the lower tax rate does not need to provide subsidy 
in order to increase the net inflow of capital. 
In contrary, suppose that the country with the higher tax rate grants subsidies in 
order to reduce the net outflow of capital. In the new equilibrium, all of its capital 
moves to the foreign country and some amount of capital of the foreign country moves 
into its territory, reducing the net outflow of capital (see Figure 6.3 (b)). When the 
subsidy is large enough, the net outflow of the capital can be zero. However, the 
country with the higher tax rate cannot make a positive net inflow of capital even 
with an extremely large subsidy. 
Proposition 30 Preferential subsidy for foreign capital always causes a cross-hauling 
of capital between two countries when both countries apply exemption method. The 
effect of preferential subsidy is asymmetric in that it is not useful in increasing the 
net inflow of capital but is useful in reducing the net outflow of capital. 
Is it beneficial to the country with the higher tax rate to reduce the net outflow 
of capital even if this causes a cross-hauling of capital? The answer depends not only 
on the magnitude of the parameters which characterise the social welfare function 
and the production function but also the tax rates in two countries. By reducing the 
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net outflow of the capital, the country with the higher tax rate can increase private 
consumption and tax revenue. However, it has to provide the subsidy to all foreign 
capital invested in its territory. The increase in subsidies might result in a sharp 
decrease in public consumption and thus also lead to a lower social welfare. 
Suppose that tl > t2 and thus, without subsidy, the net outflow of capital of 
country 1, Z= Zl - Z2 >0 because Zl >0 and Z2 = 0. The private and public 
consumption of country 1 are respectively 
Cl =f (K - Z) -f (K - Z)'(t1K - Z) (6.8) 
and 
Gl = tl f (K - Z)'(K - Z). (6.9) 
Suppose that country 1 gives any small amount of subsidy. Then, the changes in 
private consumption and public consumption are 
)+ f(K - Z)'(- ) as 
l- -f(K - Z)'(az) + f(K - Z)(tiK - Z)(aos, es, 
= f(K-Z)"(t1K-Z)(-Z) (6.10) 
and 
acl 
= -tlf(K - z)(x - Z)(- - tlf (K - Z)'(az)+(L (K - Z). (6.11) asl os, asl es, 
The last two terms of the right hand side of (6.11) denote the effect of increased 
subsidies due to a cross-hauling of capital. 
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Here, we can define (as) from (6.6) as 
az 
- 
(1 - tl) f (K - Z)' (6.12) 
gis, (1- tl)(1 + si)f(K - Z) + (1 - t2)f(K + Z)" 
< o. 
Substituting 2 into (6.10) and (6.11), we get 
8C1 
_ 
f(K-Z)"(t1K-Z)(1-tl)f(K-Z)' 
as, (1-tl)(1+si)f(K-Z)"+(1-t2)f(K+ Z)" 
(6.13) 
and 
acl -tif (K - Z)"(K - Z)(1- tl)f(K - Z)' - tlf(K - Z)'(1- tl)f(K - Z)' asl (1 - tl)(1 + sl)f (K - Z)" + (1 - t2)f (K + Z)" 
+(1 - tl) f (K - Z)' 
- (K - Z). (6.14) 
The sum of changes in private consumption and in public consumption is 
acl acl 
asl + asl = 
-f 
(x 
- z)" 
f(K - z)ß(1 - tl)2Z - t1(1 - tl){. 
f (K - Z)'}2 
I ýý ý1/J ý.. -, - (K - Z). 
-Z)"+(1-t2)f(K+ Z)" (1 - t1)(1 + sl) f (K 
_t, lf(u_7lß (6.15) 
The sign of (6.15) can be positive or negative. Here, I make an assumption that 
(6.15) is negative for all combination of tl and t2. This assumption means that 
the country with the higher tax rate has no incentive to reduce the net outflow of 
capital by manipulating the subsidy. This assumption makes the solution of the game 
simple. With the above assumption, both countries have no incentive to manipulate 
subsidy and thus they do not need to consider what effect their tax rates will have 
on the next stage of the game. They may think that the whole game is over when 
tax rates are decided. Therefore, the unique perfect subgame Nash equilibrium is 
{(ti = tc, si = 0), (t2 = tC, s2 = 0)}. 
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Proposition 31 With the assumption that a cross-hauling of capital is not beneficial 
at any case, preferential subsidy is not used under the exemption rule. Therefore, the 
availability of subsidy as a means of attracting foreign capital has no effect on the 
tax competition. At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, {(ti = tc, si = 0), (t2 = 
tC, s2 = o)}. 
6.3.2 Credit rule 
When subsidy is not available, tax competition does not occur under the credit 
rule. Even if one government lowers its tax rate, foreign capital does not come 
into the territory because the final tax burden for foreign capital is the tax rate of 
its residence. When both countries grants preferential subsidies, the capital market 
equilibrium condition is 
(1-ti) f (K+(-1)i(ZZ-Zj))' _ {1-max(ti, tj)}(1+sj) f (K+(-1)1(Zs-Z5))'. (6.16) 
When tl = t2, a subsidy of both countries cannot attract more capital (see Figure 
6.2 (b) and (c)). A subsidy of either country causes a full cross-hauling of capital, 
leaving the net inflow of capital zero. Therefore, when the tax rates in two countries 
are the same, neither country manipulates the subsidy. 
Suppose that tl > t2. Without subsidy, there is no movement of capital between 
the two countries even if there is a difference in tax rates (see Figure 6.4 (a)). Suppose 
that the country with the higher tax rate, country 1, tries to attract capital by giving 
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Figure 6.4: Movement of capital when tl > t2 under the credit rule 
a subsidy while country 2 does not. The capital market equilibrium conditions are 
f(K-Z1+Z2)'= f(K+Z, -Z2)' (6.17) 
and 
(1 - t1)(1 + sl)f (K - Zi + Z2)' = (1 - t2)f (K + Z1 - Z2)'. (6.18) 
(6.17) and (6.18) are for the capital of country 1 and country 2 respectively. 
Country 1's subsidy makes the dotted line approach to the solid line. However, 
when 0< sl <-1, the equilibrium is still E is Figure 6.4 (a), where there is no 
movement of capital between two countries. When sl >-1, the new equilibrium 
is E in Figure 6.4(b), where all capital of country 1 locate in country 2 and vice 
versa. Country 1 fails to attract more capital into its territory, resulting in the waste 
of subsidy. 
Now suppose that country 2, which sets the lower tax rate, tries to attract capital 
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from country 1 by providing subsidy. The capital market equilibrium conditions are 
f(K-Z1+Z2)'=(1+s2)f(K+Z, -Z2)' (6.19) 
and 
(1 - tl)f (K - Zl + z2)' _ (1 - t2)f (K + Z1 - Z2)'. (6.20) 
The amount of capital movement is decided solely by the subsidy of country 2 which 
has set the lower tax rate. Country 2 can attract capital from country 1 by ma- 
nipulating the amount of subsidy such that 0< s2 <-1. If s2 >-1, a t2 1-t2 
cross-hauling of capital occurs. Thus, the maximum amount of the subsidy of country 
2 iss2= -1. 
Proposition 32 Under the credit rule, preferential subsidy is useful in attracting 
foreign capital only when the tax rate of the country is lower than that of the other 
country. Any subsidy of the country with higher tax rate results in a full cross-hauling 
of capital, leaving the net inflow of capital unchanged. 
Can country 2 increase subsidy up to s2 =-1? The answer is yes only 
when country 2 is certain that country 1 will not grant any subsidy. ' What happens 
if country 1 provides a small amount of subsidy, say e? This subsidy reduces the 
net inflow of capital from country 1 to country 2, causing a cross-hauling of capital. 
Country 1 can benefit from the cross-hauling because all domestic capital is entitled to 
8The other precondition is that granting subsidies will increase the social welfare of country 2. 
This condition is not explicitly considered in the analysis here. 
173 
a foreign subsidy, while it provides a small subsidy to foreign capital. Even if granting 
subsidies increases the distortion of resource allocation between private consumption 
and public consumption, it may be beneficial to country 1. The social welfare of 
country 2 deteriorates because the public consumption of country 2 must be reduced 
sharply due to increased subsidies to all capital of country 1. Therefore, country 2 
must increase subsidy up to the point where a cross-hauling of capital is not beneficial 
to country 1. 
Is it beneficial for the country with the lower tax rate to grant subsidy? The 
private consumption and public consumption of country 2 are respectively 
C2 =f (K + Z) -f (K + Z)'(K + Z) + (1 - t2) f (K + Z)'K 
=f (K + Z) -f (K + Z)'(t2K + Z) (6.21) 
and 
G2 = t2 f (K + Z)'K + (t2 - s2 + t2s2) f (K + Z)'Z. (6.22) 
The effect of subsidy on the private consumption and the public consumption are 
19822 = 
f(K+Z)'(ä-)-. f(x+z)(t2K+Z)(az)- f(K+Z)'(ä? ) 
_ 
ý-f(K+z)(t2K+Z)(Z) 
>o 
and 
(6.23) 
act 
= t2. f (K + z)K(az) + (t2 - s2 + t2s2)f 
(K + z)z(a? ) 
1932 1952 aS2 
+(t2 - s2 + t2s2) f (K + Z)'(- )- (1 - t2) f (K + z)'z ; 0. (6.24) 082 
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Even if tl > t2, Z' =0 without subsidy. Then, the sum of (6.23) and (6.24) is 
ace 
+ 
2G2 
= (t2 - s2 + t2S2)f (IC)s(-Z) > 0. (6.25) a82 a82 \ aS2 
(6.25) implies that an arbitrarily small subsidy increases the sum of private consump- 
tion and public consumption at any value of t2. However, it does not necessarily 
mean that granting subsidy is welfare-improving at any tax rate. The distortion of 
the under-supply of public goods dominates the positive effect of the increase in the 
sum of private consumption and public consumption at the lower value of t2 = tL. 
As long as t2 > tL, subsidy can increase the level of social welfare. 
The objective of the government of country 2 is 
max W(C2, G2). 82 
The first order condition gives 
WW2 
_ 
t2f(K+Z)"KO+ (t2 - s2 +t2s2)f(K+Z)"ZVi 
Wc2 f (K + Z)1"(t2K + Z)b 
+(t2 - s2 + t2s2) 
f (K + Z)'1/. l - 
(1 
- t2) f 
(K + Z)'Z 
=o 
where 
(6.26) 
(6.27) 
aZ -f(K+Z)' 
- äs2 - f(K - Z)" + (1 + S2) f (K + Z) 
(6.28) 
By substituting Vi, we have 
W_f (K + Z)ii(t2K + Z) + (t2 - s2 + t2s2) f 
(K + Z)' + 
.f 
(K 
- Z)"(1 - t2)Z 
W2 f(K+Z)"(t2K+Z) 
(6.29) 
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With the same welfare function and production function, we have 
Wc2 
_ 
GZ 
_ 
t2 f (K + Z)'K + (t2 - s2 + t2s2) f (K + Z)'Z (6.30) WG, CZ f(K+Z)- f(K+Z)'(t2K+Z) 
Therefore, we have 
82 = S2(t2). 
9 
We assume that t2 exists such that 
(6.31) 
s2(t2 = t9) = 0.10 (6.32) 
Each country sets its tax rate below that of the other country in the first stage 
of game so that it can attract capital by granting subsidy at the second stage. The 
process of tax undercutting will continue until the positive effect of attracting foreign 
capital dominates the negative effect of the under-supply of public goods. Subsidy 
competition does not occur when the tax rates in both countries are below certain 
level, say t8. Both countries will lower their tax rate to to at the first stage, and 
none of countries have an incentive to grant a subsidy at the second stage. Therefore, 
{(t$ = t3, s2 = 0), (tý = t8, sý = 0)} is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
Why do both countries not deviate from this equilibrium by increasing their tax 
rates even if it does not cause the capital flight? If one increases its tax rate above t8, 
it will make the other country to utilize a subsidy at the second stage of the game. 
As a result, it suffers from the capital flight. 
'The amount of capital movement is a function of subsidy of country 2 (see (6.19)). Therefore, 
the tax rate of country 1 dose not have an effect on the optimal value of subsidy of country 2. 
10The existence and uniqueness of t, is not demonstrated. 
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Proposition 33 Under the credit rule, preferential subsidy is not used. However, the 
availability of subsidy as a means of attracting foreign capital makes both countries 
set their tax rates to the lower level. At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, ti* _ 
t; =is<toandsý=sj* =0. 
6.4 Universal subsidy 
Here, subsidy is granted to the capital in its territory, both domestic and for- 
eign. When each country is in autarky, capital can not move across countries at all. 
Therefore, Zz is always 0. The objective of country i is 
max W(C1, Gi) (6.33) ti, si 
with subject to 
ci = .f 
(x) - t2(1 + s=). f(K)'K + sif(K)'K, 
G1 = ti(1 + sz) f (K)'K - si f (K)'K 
0<t; < 1. (6.34) 
The first-order conditions are 
aW 
= Wc; {-(1 + si) f (K)'K} + WC; { (1 + si) f (K)'K} =0 (6.35) ate 
and 
ow 
= aWc, 
{-tif (K)'K+ f(K)'K} +Wc; {ti f (K)'K - f(K)'K} = 0. (6.36) s= 
177 
Therefore, W=1. The marginal rate of substitution between private consump- L 
tion and public consumption is 1. 
With the social welfare function defined in (3.59) with ,ß=1 and the production 
function defined in (3.60), the optimal condition, W=1, gives Ci = Gi. Therefore, 
we get 
ti=1- 
2a- 1 (6.37) 
2a(1 + s;, ) 
Now, the optimal tax rate is a non-linear function of subsidy. Table 6.2 shows 
the relationship between tax rates and subsidies when a= 3/4. As the government 
increases subsidies, the optimal tax rate must also be increased. Subsidies transfer 
income from public consumption to private consumption and thus the tax rate must 
be increased to make up for this income transfer effect. On the assumption that the 
government prefers the least subsidy, the solution is 
ti =1 (6.38) 2a 
and 
Si = 0. (6.39) 
6.4.1 Exemption rule 
When the exemption rule is applied, for capital of country i, the income from 
capital invested domestically is subject to the tax of country i and eligible for the 
subsidy of country i while the income from the capital invested in country j is subject 
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subsidies (s2) tax rates (ti) 
0 0.67 
0.10 0.70 
0.25 0.73 
0.50 0.78 
1.00 0.835 
goes to 00 gose to 1 
Table 6.2: Tax rates and subsidies in autarky 
to the tax rate of country j and eligible for the subsidy of country j. Therefore the 
equilibrium condition is 
(1 - t2)(1 + sz) f (K + (-1)'Z)' = (1 - t)(1 + s; ) f (K + (-1)jZ)'. (6.40) 
(6.40) is the same for the capital of country j. If we take total differentials with (6.40) 
with regard to one policy variable, given that other policy variables are fixed, we have 
dZ 
_ 
-(1 + si)f (K - Z)' 
dti (1-ti)(1+si)f(K-Z)"+(1-t; )(1+s; )f(K+Z)" ýý' 
dZ (1+s; )f(K+Z)' 
dt; (1 - ti)(1 + si)f(K - Z)"+(1-t; )(1+sj)f(K+Z)" 
< 0, 
dZ (1-ti)f(K-Z)' 
<o dsi - (1-ti)(1+si)f(K-Z)"+(1-t, )(1+s, )f(K+Z) 
and 
dZ 
_ -(1-t; 
)f(K+Z)' 
dsj (1-ti)(1+si)f(K-Z)"+(1-tß)(1+sj)f(K+Z)" >0. 
(6.41) 
(6.41) implies that an increase in its own tax rate makes more domestic capital 
leave its territory but that an increase in its own subsidy makes more foreign capi- 
tal move into its territory. Therefore, the government can attract capital either by 
lowering its tax rate or by increasing its subsidy. 
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Lemma 34 An increase (A decrease) in its own universal subsidy leads to an increase 
(a decrease) in net inflow of capital. The change in the other country's subsidy has 
the opposite effect. 
The private consumption and the public consumption for country i are 
CZ = f(K-Z)- f(K-Z)'(K-Z)+{(1-ti)(1+si)f(K-Z)'}(K-Z) 
+{(1 - tß)(1 + sj) f (K + Z)'}Z 
=f (K - Z) -f (K - Z)(ti - Si + tisj)K +f (K - Z)'Z. (6.42) 
and 
Gi = t1(1 + si) f (K - Z)'(K - Z) - si f (K - Z)'(K - Z) (6.43) 
- (ti - si + tisi) f (K - Z)'(K - Z). 
Let (1 - t$)(1 + s2) be (1 - w2). Then, the maximization with respect to t2 and si 
is the same with the maximization with respect to wt. The solution is 
WC` 
=1+ 
w%f (K)' (6.44) 
WG: (2 - wi ). f (K)"K. 
With the social welfare function and the production function defined in chapter 3, we 
have, assuming a=0.5, 
wi = ti - si + tisi = 0.5. (6.45) 
There are infinite combinations of ti and si which produce the same effective tax 
rate. The relationship between tt and s2 is 
_ 
ti - 0.5 (6.46) Sy 
1- t{ 
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tax rate (ti) subsidy (si) 
close to 1 goes to 00 
0.9 4 
0.8 1.5 
0.7 0.67 
0.6 0.25 
0.5 0 
Table 6.3: Tax rates and subsidies under the exemption rule 
Table 6.3 gives values of tt and si which give the same social welfare. 
All of these combination of tax rates and subsidies are subgame perfect Nash 
equilibria. However, by the assumption that the least subsidy is preferred, {(t= = 
0.5, sz = 0), (tj = 0.5, s3 = 0)} is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Only 
tax cutting is used at the equilibrium. 
Proposition 35 Under the exemption rule, there are an infinite number of subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria, in which both countries use tax cutting, granting subsidies or 
both of them. Every equilibrium results in the same effective tax rate, which is lower 
than the optimal level. 
The result of this analysis will be different if a `unit subsidy' is used instead of 
`proportional subsidy'. With a `unit subsidy', the total effect of tax rate and subsidy 
cannot be denoted by a single value of effective tax rate. If tax undercutting is 
more effective than subsidy in attracting foreign capital, only tax undercutting is 
used. Contrarily, if subsidy is more effective than tax undercutting, tax rate will 
be increased to the maximum and subsidy will be granted at the maximum value. 
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However, as has been shown in (6.41), the relative effectiveness of tax cutting and 
granting subsidies depends on all four policy variables and changes according to these 
values. Therefore, tax cutting and granting subsidies are likely to be used together. 
6.4.2 Credit rule 
With the credit with limitation rule, for the capital of country i, the income from 
the capital invested domestically is subject to the tax rate of country i and eligible 
for the subsidy of country i while the income from the capital invested in country j 
is subject to the higher one between the tax rate of country i and that of country j 
and eligible for the subsidy of country j. The equilibrium condition is 
(1 - tz)(1 + si) f (K + (-1)'Z)' = {1 - max(ti, tj)}(1 + sj) f (K + (-1)jZ)'. (6.47) 
Country i cannot attract capital from country j solely by lowering its tax rate but 
it can attract foreign capital by increasing its subsidy. Therefore, granting subsidy 
and tax cutting are not perfect substitutes for each other under the credit rule. The 
difference between them is in contrast to the case under the exemption rule. Tax 
cutting is not useful in attracting foreign capital but is useful in reducing the outflow 
of domestic capital. In contrary, subsidies are useful in both purposes. 
Can {(ti = tC, s1 = 0), (tj = tC, sj = 0)} be a Nash equilibrium? When tt = tc, 
country j will raise its tax rate to the optimal level, tA, because tax difference does not 
cause the capital flight only if s= = 0. For the country with higher tax rate, it is not 
beneficial to reverse tax differential by granting subsidy. It is also not beneficial for 
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country with the lower tax rate of tc because the effect of distortion in the allocation 
of products between private and public consumption outweighs the positive effect of 
attracting foreign capital for both countries. Therefore, {(si = 0), (sj = 0)} is an 
equilibrium when {(ti = tc), (ti = tA)} is the result in the first stage. However, this 
outcome cannot be an equilibrium in the whole game because country i will increase 
its tax rate to to and grant a positive subsidy. 
Suppose the result of the stage of tax competition is {(ti = tA), (tj = tA)}. Subsidy 
competition at the second stage leads to {(si = sC), (sj = sc)}. There is no movement 
of capital between two countries but both countries are worse off because of distortion 
between private and public consumption. Subsidies transfer tax revenue to private 
consumption from public consumption. The effective tax rate is the same with when 
only tax rate is available to manipulate. 
The problem arises from the assumption that both countries prefer the least level 
of subsidy if other things are equal. Each country prefers {(t = tc), (s = 0)} to 
{(t = tA), (s = sc)}. We return to the starting point. There is no pure-strategy 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if we stick to the assumption. If both countries 
are concerned with the effective tax rates regardless of composition of tax rates and 
subsidies, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (t = tA, s= SC) for both 
countries. Both country prefer (t = tA, s= SC) to (t = tc, s= 0) because the former 
can attract capital when the other country chooses the strategy of (t = tA, s< SC) 
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while the latter cannot. " In any case, pure strategy equilibrium and mixed strategy 
equilibrium, the effective tax rates of both countries will be lower than those in 
autarky. 
Proposition 36 Under the credit rule, each country does not lower its tax rate but 
grants subsidies at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The effective tax rate will 
be the same with that under the exemption rule. With the assumption that the least 
subsidy is preferred, only mixed subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. Each country 
mixed tax cutting and granting subsidies, which leads to lower effective tax rate. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to set up a game in which both tax cutting and 
subsidies are manipulated by governments in order to attract foreign capital. The 
game was sought to emphasize that the outcomes of international tax competition 
depend both upon the strategies available to each government and the structure of 
the game. The availability of subsidies has an effect on tax competition and its effect 
depends on the nature of subsidy. When subsidy competition follows tax competition, 
strategic tax setting behaviours occur even under the credit method. 
Under the exemption rule, preferential subsidies might not be used because they 
result in a cross-hauling of capital, leaving net inflow of capital unchanged. Universal 
1' (t = tA, s= Sc) weakly dominates (t = tc, s= 0). However, the concept of Nash equilibrium 
does not exclude the use of the weakly dominated strategy. 
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subsidies can be used to attract foreign capital along with tax undercutting, leaving 
effective tax rates identical to those of the game where only tax undercutting is 
available. On the assumption that a lower tax rate with a lower level of subsidy is 
preferred to a higher tax rate with a higher level of subsidy, providing they result 
in the same level of social welfare, it can be concluded that only tax undercutting is 
used at the equilibrium. 
The more surprising results are provided when the credit rule is applied. Under 
the credit rule, the availability of preferential subsidies at the second stage of the 
game forces both countries to set lower tax rates at the first stage. Preferential 
subsidies can be used to attract foreign capital only by the country with the lower 
tax rate. At the equilibrium, both countries lower their tax rates to a level where 
there is no incentive for both countries to grant subsidies at all. Universal subsidies 
are more powerful than tax undercutting if they lead to the same effective tax rates. 
Tax undercutting cannot make the net inflow of capital positive whilst subsidy, in 
contrast, can. Therefore, only universal subsidies are used to lower effective tax rates, 
leaving tax rates at the optimal level. However, when the least subsidy is preferred, 
tax cutting and granting subsidy is used together to get the lower effective tax rate. 
The result has significant implications for anti-tax competition policies. Unless 
countries are forbidden from granting subsidies for the purpose of attracting foreign 
capital, anti-tax competition policies cannot work as expected in previous studies. If 
the residence principle is enforced by the international coordination, tax competition 
185 
is replaced by subsidy competition. Effective tax rates are the same as those at 
the non-cooperative equilibrium and the distortion from the under-supply of public 
goods occurs. In this sense, international tax coordinations (tax harmonization or 
the imposition of minimum tax rate) are likely to lead to higher tax rates and higher 
levels of subsidy. Therefore, the under-supply of public goods is not eased but the 
total tax revenue, before granting subsidies, becomes greater than that when only tax 
undercutting is available. 
The original questions raised in the introduction of this chapter can be answered. 
The analysis has demonstrated that the difference between the exemption rule (a 
source-based tax) and the credit rule (a residence-based tax) disappears12 when sub- 
sidies are available in attracting foreign capital. The effective tax rates will be lowered 
under any tax rule and public goods is under-supplied. Therefore, countries are in- 
different to the tax rules. Tax competition, in terms of effective tax rates, occurs not 
only under the exemption rule but also under the credit rule. 
It is not my intention to argue that subsidies will effectively nullify the expected 
effect of international tax coordinations. In reality, subsidies are regulated by the 
international rules. In this thesis, I suggest the possibility of that the outcome of tax 
coordinations can be altered by other factors which governments can manipulate. 
One direction of extending the model presented in this chapter would be to explore 
a variety of forms of subsidy. The results in this chapter rest on the assumption that 
"This is not strictly applied to preferential subsidies because tc (equilibrium tax rate under the 
exemption rule) is not necessarily equal to t8 (equilibrium tax rate under the credit rule). 
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the amount of subsidy is determined according to the marginal productivity of capital, 
and subsidy is subject to capital income taxation. However, a `unit subsidy' appears 
to be a more appealing option because the marginal productivity of capital is rarely 
known when a decision on the location of capital is made. In addition, some subsidies 
which are given as form of granting cash are likely to be subject to capital income 
taxation, but there are many other subsidies which are not subject to taxation at all. 
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Chapter 7 
Tax competition with imperfect 
capital mobility 
7.1 Introduction 
Standard tax competition models have adopted the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility. The assumption of perfect capital mobility, however, runs counter to the 
established results of empirical research on the international capital mobility. Most 
empirical studies indicate a higher positive correlation between domestic saving and 
investment, which is believed to indicate imperfect capital mobility. In addition, real 
interest rates have not been equalized across major countries. Imperfection in the 
international capital market is an accepted phenomenon (among many, see Feldstein 
and Horioka [1980] and Feldstein [1996]). 
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The imperfection of capital mobility in the context of tax competition has been 
studied by Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Eggert and Haufler (1996). Imperfec- 
tion in capital mobility is incorporated into the standard model by transaction costs. 
Those two models have focused on the welfare effects of changes in the size of trans- 
action costs. A decrease in transaction costs is predicted to intensify tax competition 
between identical countries and thus pushes the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
away from the optimal level. However, this result depends on the assumption that 
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium exists under imperfect capital mobility as is 
the case under perfect capital mobility. 
They can go round away from the problem of the existence of Nash equilibrium 
by assuming a specific form of transaction costs. The crucial assumption is that the 
marginal costs of locating the first unit of capital abroad are zero. Any tax differential 
will then lead to the movement of capital between two countries. The introduction of 
transaction costs does not change the result of the existence of the Nash equilibrium 
in the perfect capital mobility model. 
These models, however, fail to explain the situation in which capital does not 
necessarily move across countries even if there is tax differential. The objective of this 
chapter is to explore the effect of imperfect capital mobility on tax competition. In this 
thesis, the imperfection of capital mobility is assumed to originate from transaction 
costs. When capital moves internationally, investors may bear extra costs which do 
not occur in domestic movement of capital. These extra costs include long-distance 
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transportation costs, learing costs which are paid by foreign investors doing business in 
an unfamiliar climate, the risk of non-repatriation of the product by host countries, 
etc.. More importantly, transaction costs are specified different from the previous 
studies. The marginal transaction costs for the first unit of capital movement are not 
zero. Therefore, a tax differential does not necessarily cause the movement of capital. 
When transaction costs are large, international capital mobility does not change 
tax rate in both countries. As transaction costs become smaller, international capital 
mobility triggers tax competition between the two countries. While there must be 
the pure strategy Nash equilibrium at which tax rate is lower than the optimal tax 
rate under perfect capital mobility, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium under 
imperfect capital mobility. 
The non-existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is due to a change in the 
strategy of each country and thus a discontinuity in its reaction function. When the 
tax rate of the foreign country is high, the country is willing to undercut its own tax 
rate to attract capital from the foreign country. However, as the tax rate of the foreign 
country is lowered, the country gives up undercutting because the distortion from tax 
undercutting is greater than the benefit derived from attracting foreign capital. In 
this situation, the best strategy is to set its tax rate at a level above that of the 
foreign country but below the tax rate at which domestic capital moves abroad. 
When this strategy is used by both countries, there is no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. If a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, each country randomly 
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selects its tax rate from tax rates below the optimal level. These tax rates are within 
the range of twice the size of transaction costs. ' Due to randomization of tax rates, the 
realized tax rates in the two identical countries may be different. As transaction costs 
decrease, the tax rates of both countries decrease and the expected tax differential 
between them also becomes smaller. Finally, as transaction costs tend to zero, the tax 
rates converge to the tax rate which is the Nash equilibrium under tax competition 
with perfect capital mobility. 
The analysis is also carried out with a small-open economy model. The result 
shows that there is always a unique equilibrium tax rate even under imperfect capital 
mobility, as is the case under perfect capital mobility. The degree of tax undercutting 
of a small-open country depends on the size of transaction costs. Under imperfect 
capital mobility, tax undercutting is less intensive than under perfect capital mobility. 
The rationale for this result is that transaction costs counteract the tax differential 
and thus the movement of capital is less sensitive to the tax differential than under 
perfect capital mobility. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the equilibrium tax rate 
in perfect capital mobility and imperfect capital mobility is compared with a two- 
identical economy model. A small-open economy case is analysed in section 3. Con- 
cluding remarks are presented in section 4, together with limitations of the analysis 
and suggestions for future research. 
1WVhen 0 denotes the size of transaction costs, the range of tax rates is fK, 
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7.2 Symmetric two countries case 
7.2.1 Perfect capital mobility 
The analysis of this model is provided in chapter 3. At the symmetric equilib- 
rium, the marginal utility from public goods is greater than that from private goods. 
Thus, it is welfare-increasing to consume more public goods and less private goods by 
increasing tax revenue with a higher tax rate. This result implies that public goods 
is provided below the optimal level and the tax rate is also below the optimal. At 
the non-cooperative equilibrium, there is no distortion caused by capital allocation 
between the two countries. The distortion of the under-supply of public goods arises 
either because of each government's incentive to attract foreign capital or because of 
the threat of tax base erosion caused by the lower tax rate of foreign country. 
Numerical calibrations show that the Nash equilibrium is unique and stable by 
drawing the reaction function of both countries. The reaction functions of both 
countries are continuous and monotonic ones with regard to the tax rates of the 
foreign country as shown in Figure 3.1. 
7.2.2 Imperfect capital mobility 
When firms invest their capital abroad, they must bear extra transaction costs, 0, 
which do not occur when capital is invested domestically. If a domestic investor sends 
an amount of capital Z abroad, transaction costs, T= OZ, be paid in the transaction 
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process. The marginal transaction costs are constant and, more importantly, the 
marginal transaction costs for the first unit of capital movement are not zero. 2 The 
costs are assumed to be identical for capital moving from country 1 to country 2 and 
for the capital moving from country 2 to country 1. 
Now, we have two different capital market equilibrium conditions, one for the 
capital of country 1 and the other for that of country 2. These conditions are 
(1-tl)f(x-z, +z2)'=(1-t2)f(K+Z1-z2)'-0 (7.1) 
and 
(1-t2)f(K+Z1-Z2)'=(1-tl)f(K-Z1+z2)'-9.3 (7.2) 
Suppose that country 2 lowers its tax rate enough to attract the capital of country 
1 to the level to satisfy (7.1). In this situation, it is profitable to locate all the capital 
of country 2 domestically because the left-hand side of (7.2) is strictly greater than 
the right-hand side. If the tax rate of country 1 is lowered enough to attract capital 
from country 2, the capital of country 1 never moves to country 2 at the same time. 
As a result, cross-hauling of capital never occurs and thus we can write Z= Zl - Z2. 
21t is not critical to the result of analysis whether transaction costs are linear or convex. The 
critical assumption is that the marginal transaction costs for the first unit of capital movement is 
not zero. Therefore, instead of the linear transaction costs, we may assume the general transaction 
costs function as 
T= T(Z), 
where T(Z = 0) = 0, T(Z)' >0 and T(Z)" > 0. 
3Here, transaction costs are assumed not to be deducted from the tax base income. If it is 
deducted, (7.1) and (7.2) should be changed as follows. (1 - tl) f (K - Zl + Z2)' = (1 - t2){ If (K + 
Zl -Z2)'-B} and (1-t2)f(K+Z1 -Z2)' =(1-tl){f(K-Z1+Z2)'-0}. 
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Z>0 implies Zl >0 and Z2 =0 and Z<0 implies Zl =0 and Z2 > 0. When 
Z=0, Z1=Z2=0. 
Due to the two different equilibrium conditions (both of which cannot be satisfied 
at the same time), we have to divide (t1, t2) space with three mutually exclusive 
regions and derive reaction function for each region. The three regions are as follows. 
1. t2 < tl - f(K), :Z>0 and 
(7.1) is satisfied while (7.2) is not satisfied. 
2. t2 > t1 + f(K), :Z<0 and 
(7.2) is satisfied while (7.1) is not satisfied. 
3. tl + 7p? 5' >_ t2 > tl - f(h), :Z=0 and 
both of (7.1) and (7.2) are not satisfied. 4 
Firstly, when Z>0, the private consumption and public consumption of country 
1 are 
Cl =f (K - Z) - (K - Z) f (K - Z)' + (1 - tl)(K - Z) f (K - Z)' 
+(i - t2) f(K + Z)'Z - OZ 
=f (K - Z) - (t1K - Z) f (K - Z)'. 
and 
(7.3) 
Gl = tl f (K - Z)(K - Z) (7.4) 
The private consumption and public consumption of country 2 are 
C2 = f(K + Z) - (K + Z) f(K + Z)' + (1 - t2)Kf (K + Z)' 
=f (K + Z) -f (K + Z)'(K + t2Z) (7.5) 
4This region is equivalent to the `double autarky' regime in Mintz and Maens (1986). This 
region does not exist with the assumption that the marginal transaction costs for the first unit of 
capital movement are zero. 
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and 
G2 = t2 f (K + Z)'(K + Z) (7.6) 
The private consumption and the. public consumption of both countries are the 
same with those in the model of perfect capital mobility. Therefore, the first order 
conditions are the same with those in (3.28). However, the reaction function is not 
the same because the amount of moving capital, Z, is differently defined. When 
Zf and Z= f denote the amount of movement of capital under perfect and imperfect 
capital mobility given equal tax differential such that tl - t2 = dt > 0, the equilibrium 
conditions defined in (3.23) and (7.1) give 
f(K - Z, )' -_ 
(1 - t2) > (1 - t2) _0= 
f(K - Z; f)' (7.7) f (K + Z1)' (1 - tl) (1 - tl) (1 - t2)f (K + Z=f)' f (K + Zif)'. 
(7.7) implies Zf > Zi f because the production function defined in (3.60) has a mono- 
tonically decreasing marginal product. 
The reaction function can not be expressed explicitly because Z cannot be explic- 
itly expressed with the function of tl, t2 and 0. Here we assume that the reaction 
function under imperfect capital mobility has a shape similar to that under perfect 
capital mobility as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Secondly, when Z<0, the private consumption and the public consumption of 
both countries are the same with those in (7.3)-(7.6). The reaction functions are 
symmetrical with Z>0. 
When tl + f(K), > t2 > t1 - f(K), , there is no movement of capital. Therefore, it 
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is the best policy of country 1 to set its tax rate as close to the optimal tax rate as 
possible. The following is the best response for country 1. 
0 1. If t2 + f(K)' 
ý ti (h) ý t2 - 7? 
3 > tA, tl (t2) - t2 - f(K), 
2. If t2 + f(k ý, > to 
>< fi (tz) ? t2 - f(Ký, 7 ti 
(t2) = tA. 
3. If to > t2 + f(K)l 
- ti (t2) t2 - f(Kýý) 
tl (t2) t2 + f(K)' 
Figure 7.1 and 7.2 show different response functions depending on the size of 
transaction costs. As transaction costs become smaller, the response function changes 
from Figure 7.1 to Figure 7.2.5 The discontinuity occurs because the strategy of the 
country changes from `undercutting foreign tax rate' to `approaching to the optimal 
tax rate'. As Figure 7.1 shows, with large transaction costs, each country sets its 
tax rate at the optimal level. As transaction costs become smaller, the reaction 
functions of both countries become as shown in Figure 7.2. In this case, the two 
reaction functions do not intersect, which implies that there is no pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. There might be mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 6 
Proposition 37 A pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for sufficiently small 
transaction costs. Instead, both countries randomize their tax rates. 
5Compared with Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 has three different features. Firstly, two transaction cost 
lines are closer to the diagonal line, representing smaller tranaction costs. Secondly, the curved 
reaction function is far away from the diagonal line. Third, the position of EI is far away from E0. 
6The social welfare function is no longer continuous with respect to tax rates. However, discon- 
tinuities in the payoff function are not the real problem for the existence of mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium (see Dasgupta and Aaskin [1986]). 
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How does each country create its mixed strategy? Do they randomize their tax 
rate over ti E [0,1)? The strictly dominated strategies are not used in randomizing its 
strategy. The set remaining after iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies 
is identical to the set of rationalizable strategies.? A rationalizable strategy consists 
of only the best responses8. The set of rationalizable strategies consists of those that 
may be played in a game where the structure of the game and the rationality of 
the players are common knowledge among the players. A player should not play a 
strategy that is never a best response. Moreover, common knowledge of rationality 
and the structure of the game implies that we can iterate the deletion of strategies 
that are never a best response. The set of strategies surviving this iterative deletion 
process can be the set of strategies that can be played by rational players. 
We can exclude tax rates which are not best response. First, for t1, the range of 
[0, t,,,, ) and (ta, 1) are excluded in Figure 7.2. Then, for t2, we can exclude the tax 
rates except the tax rates corresponding tl E (tm, tn). This iterative process leads 
to a range of ti E (tL) tH), i=1,2. The concept of rationalizable strategy leads to 
the conclusion that only t; E (tL, tH) constitutes a rationalizable strategy. Therefore, 
both countries randomize only with tax rates lower than the optimal level, tA, but 
higher than the tax rate under tax competition with no transaction cost, tc. 
It is also expected that the tax rates are different from each other as a result 
7This is true only in two players' game. Genarally, the set of rationalizable strategies is no larger 
than the set remaining after iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 
8Strategy ai is a best response for player i to his rival's strategies, a_; if ui(oi, Q_; ) > ui(o , a_i) 
when a; is all possible responses of player i. Strategy (Ti is never a best response if there is no o_i 
for which os is a best response (see Alas-colell, A., M. D. Whinston and J. R. Green [1995], 242-245). 
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of randomization. This result is striking because two identical countries can have 
different tax rates. However, the tax differential does not cause the movement of 
capital because the tax differential is smaller than transaction costs. As transaction 
costs become smaller, tL and tH become smaller and, at the same time, the interval 
between tL and tH becomes narrower. Finally, as transaction costs become close to 
zero, tL and tH converge to the tax rate under tax competition with perfect capital 
mobility, tC. 
7.3 Small economy case 
7.3.1 Perfect capital mobility 
The world rate of return of capital is assumed not to change due to the movement 
of capital from/to a small-open economy. ' The world tax rate is also assumed to be 
fixed. Suppose that the gross rate of return of capital in the world is r,,, and that the 
tax rate is tw. When Z denotes the net inflow of capital into the small-open country, 
capital will be allocated satisfying the equilibrium condition 
(1 - tao). f (K + Z)'= (1 - tw) rw, (7.8) 
9In this thesis, `open' economy implies that there is no restriction to capital flow from/to the 
country. 
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where t80 denotes the tax rate of the small-open country. The objective of the small- 
open country is 
max W(C, G) (7.9) tao 
subject to 
C= f(K+Z) -f (K + Z)'(t, K + Z), 
G= tsa f (K + Z)'(K + Z), 
0< t0<1, 
-K < Z. (7.10) 
The first-order conditions give 
We f(K+Z)'(K+Z)-tsof(K+Z)"(K+Z), i-tsof(K+Z)'i 
' 
(7.11) 
WG f (K + Z)'K -f (K + Z)"(ts0K + Z)i 
where 
az (7.12) 
atso 
We can define ip from (7.8) as follows. 
f(K + Z)' (7.13) 
(1 - tsa)f(K + Z)" 
By plugging (7.13) into (7.11), we get 
f(K+Z*)"(K+Z*)+t*f(IC+Z*)' 
Wý f (K + Z*)"(K + Z*) 
t4f(K+Z*)' 
< 1. (7.14) =1+ f(K + Z*)" (K + Z*) 
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(7.14) implies that the small economy sets its tax rate lower than the optimal 
tax rate and that public goods are under-provided. However, the under-provision 
of public goods does not necessarily mean that the quantity of public goods at this 
equilibrium is less than in autarky. Even if the tax rate is lower, the small-open 
economy can collect more tax revenue due to increased capital (tax base) and can 
provide more public goods. The under-supply of public goods only implies that, with 
given amount of capital inflow, it is welfare increasing to consume more public goods 
and less private goods by raising the tax rate. In addition, the under-supply of public 
goods also does not necessarily mean that a new tax rate is lower than in autarky. 
We are not able to compare the level of tax rate after tax competition with that 
before tax competition by (7.14) because there is a change in the amount of capital 
due to the inflow of capital at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In contrary, 
with a two identical economy model, the under-supply of public goods implies the 
lower tax rate because there is no movement of capital at the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium. The explicit way of comparison between ante- and post-tax competition 
is to calculate tax rates with the production function and social welfare function used 
in the previous chapters. (7.14) gives 
, ßt; Of(K+Z)'(K+Z) _ 
f(K+Z)"(K+Z)+t; 
Of(K+ Z)' (7.15) f(K+Z) - f(K+Z)'(ts0K+Z) f(K+Z)"(K+Z) 
where 
tw)-2 - (1- tsn)-2 
t" )-2 
}K. (7.16) 
(1 - so 
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Substituting (7.16) into (7.15) and rearranging it gives 
(1-a-tsa)-a(1-a-t; 
0)(1-tw)2{(1-tý, 
)-2-(1-t; 
O)-2} =ßte0a(1-a). 
(7.17) 
Given that a=0.5 and 6=2, the tax rate of the small-open country before tax 
competition and the world tax rate are 0.67.10 The tax rate of the small-open country 
after tax competition is 0.28 by (7.17). Tax competition makes the small-open country 
reduce its tax rate. 
Proposition 38 A small-open economy always sets its tax rate at a lower level than 
the world level and attracts capital from the rest of the world. 
Two points need to be mentioned. Firstly, a small-open economy does not have 
zero tax rate. This result is novel compared to previous works which predicted a zero 
tax rate (see Diamond and Mirrlees [1971], Gordon [1992] and Yang [1996]). This dif- 
ference results from the assumption in this thesis that other taxes cannot substitute 
capital income tax completely in financing supply of public goods". Even if a small- 
open country can attract more capital by lowering its tax rate, a decrease in tax rate 
causes a serious distortion between private consumption and public consumption and 
thus does not contribute to an increase in social welfare. Secondly, tax competition 
of a small-open economy is different from that among a infinite number of identical 
countries. At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the tax rate of the small-open country 
10A small open economy and the rest of world are identical except the difference in their size. 
11With a two-identical-economy model, it will be demonstrated that tax competition leads to the 
zero tax rate if there are unlimited alternative taxes for financing the supply of public goods (see 
chapter 8). This result can be applied to a small open economy model. 
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is lower than the tax rate of identical countries. They also differ in that tax compe- 
tition amongst an infinite number of countries leads to no movement of capital (see 
chapter 3), while a small-open economy can attract capital from the rest of world. 12 
7.3.2 Imperfect capital mobility 
With transaction costs, (7.8) becomes 
(1-t8O)f(K+Z)'-0=(1-tw)rw. (7.18) 
The objective of the small-open country and the constraints are the same as (7.9) 
and (7.10). The first-order condition is the same with (7.14). However, due to 
transaction costs, the same degree of tax undercutting leads to less inflow of capital 
under imperfect capital mobility than under perfect capital mobility. This is reflected 
in Z. 
The tax rate of a small-open economy is influenced by the size of transaction costs. 
How do the tax rates change when transaction costs decrease? The amount of capital 
moving into the small economy is 
Z= -K + (1 - ts. ) °11(6 + x0 ) °`11, (7.19) 
where 
, ß) 
}Ka-1. (7.20) b= {1 - a(1 +1 
12Strictly speaking, a small open economy model is not a tax competition model in that there is 
no reciprocal reaction between more than one player. The small open country unilaterally choose 
its optimal tax rate with given tax rate and interest rate of the world. 
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By plugging (7.19) into (7.14), we get 
(1- a)(aßt* -1+a+ ts0) + aK(1 -t *) &l (S +)l 
la (1 -a- t80) = 0. (7.21) 
By taking a total differential of (7.21), we get 
ötso K(1 - tso) ý11(S +n lea (1 - a)-1(-1 +a+ te0) 
ä0 
-(1 - a) - aß(1 - a) - aK(1 - tso) °1' + i)11a (1 - a)-1(tBOa) 
(7.22) 
Is (7.22) negative, positive, or indefinite? From (7.21), aßtso-l+a+tso and 1-a-t* , 
must have different signs if t90 E [0,1) exists. In addition, the former is always less 
than the latter. 13 This restricts the range of t8O as follows. 
+1< t8O < 1- a. (7.23) 
Therefore, (7.22) is always positive. This result implies that the tax rate at the 
equilibrium becomes lower as the size of transaction costs decreases. 
Given that a=0.5 and 0=2, the amount of capital moving into the small 
economy is 
Z= -K + 9(1 - t8O)2(K'0.5 + 6O)_2. (7.24) 
By plugging (7.24) into (7.14), we get 
9(4t80 - 1) + (2tä0 - 1)(1 - t8o)-1K{K-o-5 + 60}2 =0 (7.25) 
13Otherwise, -I- > t* and t* >1-a. In this case, t* does not exist. 
205 
By taking total differential of (7.25), we get 
at* 
_ 
12(2t*,, - 1)(1 - t; 0)-'K{K-° 
5+ 60} 
--so 8 
199 36 + 2(1 - täo)-1K{K-0.5 + 60}2 - (2t80 - 1)(1 - t* )-2K{K-° 5+ 60}2 
(7.26) 
From (7.25), t0 must be between 0.25 and 0.5. And this makes the sign of (7.26) al- s 
ways positive. Therefore, the small open economy decreases its tax rate as transaction 
costs decrease. 
Proposition 39 The lower transaction costs, the greater the tax cutting by a small- 
open economy. 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
By analysing tax competition under both perfect and imperfect capital mobility, 
we have found that the size of the transaction costs plays a significant role in deciding 
the level of tax rates at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In general, as long as 
transaction costs are large, international capital mobility does not impose restrictions 
on tax rate decisions made by governments and thus there is no distortion from tax 
competition. As transaction costs become smaller, tax competition makes the non- 
cooperative Nash equilibrium diverge from the optimal level. 
In contrast to the results of standard models which assume perfect capital mobility, 
the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist under the assumption of imperfect 
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capital mobility. This result is also different from that of models which have con- 
sidered transaction costs but still predict the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The 
difference results from the different definition of transaction costs. Although a tax 
differential always causes international capital movement in previous studies, tax dif- 
ferential, in my model, causes capital movement only when it is greater than the size 
of transaction costs. 
If there exists mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, each country randomizes with tax 
rates below the optimal level. Therefore, tax competition leads not only to lower tax 
rates but also to variation of tax rates between two identical countries. As transaction 
costs become smaller, the tax rates are lowered and the expected variation becomes 
smaller. Finally, as transaction costs become close to zero, tax rates converge to the 
level identical to that under perfect capital mobility. 
A small-open economy, however, always reduces its tax rate below the world tax 
rate. Tax undercutting becomes greater as transaction costs become smaller. Trans- 
action costs reduce the intensity of tax competition because an equal degree of tax 
undercutting leads to less inflow of capital compared with that under perfect capital 
mobility. 
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Chapter 8 
Testable propositions 
8.1 Introduction 
From the economists' point of view, tax competition implies an inefficient alloca- 
tion of resources. From the politicians' point of view, tax competition results in an 
unequal burden of tax for immobile factors, mostly for labours. From the govern- 
ments' point of view, tax competition entails limits on the utilization of taxation to 
finance expenditure. As the world economy becomes more integrated and thus tax 
bases move at a smaller cost and by a greater amount, these concerns become more 
pressing. 
However, it is worth asking whether most countries really set their tax rates in 
the way tax competition theory predicts. Goodspeed (1999) suggests four reasons 
why the empirical measurement of the effects of tax competition, especially corporate 
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tax competition, is so problematic. They are the complexity and opaqueness of tax 
systems, the existence of non-tax factors which have effects on the decision of location, 
the difficulty of measuring the benefit from public spending, and the difficulty of 
isolating effect of tax competition from other government's policies. Apart from 
those problems mentioned above, the initial difficulty in undertaking empirical study 
is to clarify the propositions of tax competition theory as testable ones. 
The main propositions of tax competition theory were tested by Devereux (1995), 
Chennells and Griffith (1997) and Grubert (1999). Devereux (1995) finds mixed 
evidence in the sense that there is little difference on average between tax rates for 
large and small countries but open countries tend to have a lower tax rates than 
closed countries. Chennells and Griffith (1997) find no clear empirical evidence to 
support tax competition theory. They conclude that tax competition is not driving 
tax rates to zero and that there has been no significant erosion of the capital tax base. 
Grubert (1999) finds inconsistent evidence of tax competition. Effective tax rates fell 
on average but there was a wide diversity of behaviour among different countries. 
More mobile manufacturing industries such as electronics did not enjoy greater tax 
reductions. Tax rates did not fall more in homogeneous areas with low trade barriers 
such as EU. However, he also has results which imply tax competition. The smaller, 
poorer and more open countries lowered their tax rates the most. 
There are three propositions which have been tested in common by previous stud- 
ies. Firstly, they have investigated whether corporation tax rates of major countries 
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have decreased. Secondly, it was investigated whether small and open countries have 
lower tax rates than large and closed countries. Thirdly, tax rates were investigated 
to see whether they were converged. A decline of corporation tax rates, lower tax 
rates of open and small countries, and convergence of tax rates are interpreted as 
evidence of tax competition. 
However, theoretical analyses do not provide sufficient results to support these 
interpretation. Firstly, tax competition theory predicts one-shot downward jump 
in tax rates. Therefore, if this tax decrease happens before the sample period, tax 
rates are not expected to decrease. Secondly, tax differential between open-small 
and closed-large countries are expected only if other things are equal between two 
groups of countries. Thirdly, a divergence of tax rates are also predicted by tax 
competition. Tax competition creates tax differential between countries of different 
sizes. If the degree of openness among countries has a tendency of divergence rather 
than convergence, tax rates across countries are not likely to converge. ' 
The objective of this chapter is to draw empirically testable propositions and to 
discuss some problems arising in testing them. In the previous chapters, I have derived 
some predictions. (1) Tax competition leads to lower corporation tax rates but tax 
rates do not drop to zero. (2) As the international mobility of capital increases, 
corporate tax rates should decrease. (3) As the number of countries involved in the 
international capital market increases, corporation tax rates should decrease. (4) 
'The convergence of tax rates will be discussed in chapter 9. 
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More-open countries decrease corporation tax rates more than less-open countries. 
(5) Smaller countries decrease corporation tax rates more than larger countries. (6) 
The countries with a strong preference for public goods decrease corporation tax rates 
more than the countries with a weak preference for public goods. 
A realistic explanation for the gradual decrease in tax rates, instead of one-shot 
downward jump, may be a partial adjustment of tax rates due to political and eco- 
nomical constraints. I suggest two other reasons for a gradual decrease of corporation 
tax rates; increasing capital mobility and increasing number of countries in the in- 
ternational capital markets. The other thing to need clarification is whether tax 
competition leads to zero tax rate or not. The analysis in previous chapters have 
found that tax competition does not lead to zero tax rate but to a positive tax rate 
due to the limitations in financing supply of public goods by other taxes than capital 
income tax. 
Devereux (1995) and Chennells and Griffith (1997) test the significance of tax 
differential between average tax rates of more-open countries and less-open countries 
(smaller countries and larger countries). The simple mean-comparison method (in 
this thesis, this is named as `level-comparison test') is based on the assumption that 
other factors which may have an effect on the tax rates are equal between two groups. 
If there are other factors which have a significant effect on the level of tax rates and 
they differ between groups, the `level-comparison test' is no longer valid. 
If we can identify the effect of other factors, the effect of these factors must be 
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excluded from the data. The validity of this process depends on how successfully we 
can identify the effects of those factors. Unless the exclusion of effects of other factors 
is possible, the alternative is to compare the difference in size of tax cutting between 
two groups (in this thesis, this is named as `change-comparison test'). More-open 
countries (smaller countries and the countries with a strong preference for public 
goods) are expected to decrease corporation tax rates more than less-open countries 
(larger countries and the countries with a weak preference for public goods). 2 
It is the difference in the level of tax rates between different countries at the 
non-cooperative equilibrium that most of theoretic analyses have focused on. Smaller 
countries are predicted to tend to set their tax rates lower than those of larger coun- 
tries under the pressure of tax competition. The size of tax cutting is not analysed 
because the tax rates at autarkic equilibrium are not defined. This thesis have taken 
different approach. This thesis has investigated the size of tax cutting between pre-tax 
competition and post-tax competition (between autarkic and non-cooperative equi- 
librium). Smaller countries are predicted to tend to cut tax rates to a greater degree 
than larger countries. 
Therefore, the comparison of levels of tax rates between the groups ('level-comparison 
test') is the main interest in testing the validity of tax competition theory. However, 
reliability of the `level-comparison test' depends on the satisfaction of the assumption 
that other things are equal between the groups. In this context, the comparison of 
2It is implicitly assumed that the difference of those factors which have effects on tax rates 
between the two groups remains constant throughout the period. 
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the size of tax cutting between the groups ('change-comparison test') can be comple- 
mentary to the `level-comparison test'. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, the effect of the degree of capital 
mobility and the number of countries in the international capital market is analysed 
with regard to the level of tax rates at the non-cooperative equilibrium. In section 
3, asymmetric cases of different size and of different preference for public goods are 
analysed. The design of empirical tests is discussed in the final section. 
8.2 Decreasing capital income tax 
8.2.1 Is zero capital tax inevitable? 
Chapter 3 shows that tax competition caused by international capital mobility 
does not lead to zero capital taxation but rather a positive tax rate which is lower 
than the optimal level. The result of non-zero lower tax rate is the same in the 
asymmetric cases analysed in chapter 4. The smaller country and the country with a 
weak preference for public goods are predicted to set its tax rate lower than that of the 
larger country and the country with a strong preference for public goods. Even if tax 
rates are different at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, they are all lower than 
the optimal level. Tax competition among an infinite number of identical countries 
also predicts none-zero tax rate. 
However, there have been many theoretical models which predict zero tax rate. 
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Source-based capital income tax should be zero when capital has perfect capital mo- 
bility (see Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] and Bucovetsky and Wilson [1991]). In their 
setting, capital income tax should not be used because other efficient tax instruments 
are available. In other words, there is no obligation to finance the supply of public 
goods by capital income tax. Our model adopts the assumption that there is no tax 
to finance public goods other than capital income tax and thus predicts a positive 
tax rate. 
The availability of other taxes can be accommodated into my model by assum- 
ing that governments are to maximize only the private consumption. The changed 
objective function of the government of country i (i = 1,2) is 
Max C; (8.1) 
e; 
subject to 
C. =f (K + (-1)'Z) -f (K + (-1)'Z)'(t1K + (-1)'Z) 
o<t; < 1, 
-K <Z<K. (8.2) 
The effect of an increase in the tax rate on the private consumption is 
aci (-l)' f (K + (-1)`Z)"(t1K + (-1)'Z)' -f (K + (-1)1Z)'K, (8.3) ati 
where 
oz (-1)t f (K + (-1)1Z)' 
- 8ti - (1 - t2)f(K + (-1)=z)" + (1 - t; )f(K+ (-1)'z)". 
(8.4) 
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Plugging (8.4) into (8.3) and arranging it gives 
aCi 
__ 
-f (K + (-1)'Z)"(t1K + (-1)'Z)f (K + (-1)2Z)' -f (K + (-1)'Z)' < 0. öt= (1 - ti) f (K + (-1)iZ)" + (1 - tj) f (K + (-1)jZ)" 
(8.5) 
(8.5) implies that the lower tax rate always makes each country better off. Therefore, 
both countries set their tax rates at zero. 
The reality lies between these two extremes. Alternative taxes can be available 
only with limitations. Given the social welfare function such as 3 In C+ in G, 0 is 
interpreted to represent the relative preference for the private goods. In other words, 
the higher the value of 8 is, the highly evaluated private goods is. /3 can have a 
different interpretation such that it represents the degree of the relationship between 
the revenue from corporation tax and the supply of public goods. The higher the 
value of 6 is, the weaker the relationship. When alternative taxes are available and 
thus the relationship is weak, the tax rate at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
is lower (see Table 3.2). 
If we assume that governments decrease tax rates step by step due to political 
restriction rather than a single shift, we expect time series data on tax rates to show 
a declining trend. There are two other factors which contribute to the prediction of a 
declining trend in tax rates. One is imperfection in capital mobility, which is analysed 
in chapter 7, and the other is the increase in the number of countries participating in 
the international capital market, which is analysed in chapter 3. 
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8.2.2 Imperfect capital mobility 
Chapter 7 has changed the model of perfect capital mobility by introducing the 
idea of imperfect capital mobility. The analysis done in chapter 7 will not be reiterated 
here. Rather, the relationship between the size of transaction costs and the level of 
tax rates will be discussed in less formal ways. With a symmetric two countries 
model, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. There might be mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium. Both countries randomize only with tax rates which are lower 
than the optimal level. As transaction costs become smaller, tL and tH become lower. 
Finally, when transaction costs converge to zero, tL and tH converge to tc, which is 
the tax rate under perfect capital mobility. 
With a small-open economy model, the tax rate is found to be related to the size 
of transaction costs. In other words, as transaction costs become smaller, the tax 
rates of the small-open country become lower. The transaction costs mitigate the 
intensity of tax competition because the same degree of tax undercutting leads to a 
smaller inflow of capital compared with that in perfect capital mobility. 
The imperfection of capital mobility is assumed to derive from transaction costs. 
These may include transportation costs, learning costs paid by foreigners in doing 
business in an unfamiliar climate, the risk of the non-repatriation of products by host 
countries, etc. Therefore, the model predicts a positive correlation coefficient between 
tax rates and transaction costs. In this context, tax competition theory can be tested 
by regressing tax rates as a dependent variable with respect to the size of transaction 
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costs. 
However, it is difficult to collect the data which measure transaction costs. Interna- 
tional shipment tariffs, air travelling tariffs, international phone call tariffs, the ability 
of command to foreign language, access to the foreign currency, the transparency of 
legislation, etc. are a few of factors consisting of transaction costs. However, none of 
these is in isolation to measure transaction costs effectively. Given difficulty in getting 
the data on transaction costs, an alternative test would be to establish whether time 
series data of capital income tax show a declining trend assuming that transaction 
costs have been lowered for a long term period. 
8.2.3 Number of countries 
Chapter 3 has demonstrated that the tax rates under the pressure of tax com- 
petition will be lowered as more countries become involved in tax competition. As 
more countries participate in the international capital market, the elasticity of capital 
supply (capital demand) becomes greater. Therefore, the same degree of tax under- 
cutting leads to a greater increase in capital and tax competition is more intensive. 
The relationship between tax rates and the number of countries are given in Table 
3.5 to 3.7. 
Even if an infinite number of countries are involved in tax competition, the tax 
rate does not drop to zero. There is a certain level of tax rate below which the inflow 
of capital motivated by a lower tax rate does not increase the level of social welfare. 
217 
Below this tax rate, the positive effect of an increase in the consumption of private 
goods is dominated by the negative effect of under-supply of public goods. Therefore, 
there is no incentive for each country to cut tax rates below this level in order to 
attract further capital. 
The test will be to regress tax rates with respect to the number of countries in 
the international capital market. However, it is difficult to collect the data on the 
number of countries because the integration of a country into the international capital 
market is a gradual process. An alternative test would be to establish whether the 
time series data of capital income tax rates show a declining trend, assuming that 
more countries participate in the international capital market for a long term period. 
8.3 Asymmetries in tax rates 
8.3.1 Openness 
The proposition that tax competition leads to lower tax rates implies that `open 
countries' have lower tax rates than those of `closed countries'. However, this propo- 
sition is difficult to test in the sense that the openness of a country is a problem of 
the degree, not a problem of the kind. The introduction of imperfection in capital 
mobility produces a testable prediction; `more-open countries' have lower tax rates 
than those of `less-open countries'. ' The procedure of the test is to divide countries 
'This result can be derived regardless of the functional forms of transaction costs (see Persson 
and Tabellini [1992], Eggert and Haufler [1996] and chapter 7). 
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into two groups - relatively more-open countries and relatively less-open countries 
and to establish whether the tax differential between two groups is significant. 
If there are other factors which have an effect on the level of tax rates and they 
differ between more-open and less-open countries, tax competition may not necessarily 
lead to the tax differential predicted above. An alternative test is to see whether more- 
open countries decrease tax rates more than less-open countries. If the autarkic tax 
rates are the same for both groups, more-open countries cut their tax rate to a greater 
degree than less-open countries and, as a result, the tax rates of the former are lower 
than those of the latter. If not, a greater tax cutting does not necessarily results in 
lower level of tax rates. 
There are various ways by which to measure the degree of openness of a country. 
One is the openness of product market which is measured by the sum of imports and 
exports divided by GDP. This criterion is used in Devereux (1995)4 and Chennells 
and Griffith (1997). Grubert (1999) uses degree of restrictions based on World Bank 
listings. There are many alternative measures: (1) the import penetration rate5, (2) 
the intensity of exposure of manufacturing industries to foreign competition6 and 
(3) share of foreign affiliates in manufacturing production. As for the degree of 
'He uses a criterion of the import divided by GDP. 
5lmport penetration is defined as the ratio of manufacturing imports to apparent consumption 
of manufactured goods (domestic production minus exports plus imports). 
6The exposure to foreign competition (E) is a synthetic measure which takes into account both 
the export orientation of an industry and its import penetration. It is defined as 
E=1X-, f (1-y)DIV, , 
where Y is output, lit imports, X exports and D domestic demand. 
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openness of the capital market, it can be measured by the sum of inflow and outflow 
direct investment divided by GDP. Alternatively, the reservation of OECD Code of 
Liberalisation of Capital Movement can be used. 
8.3.2 Size of a country 
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that a smaller country sets its tax rate lower than 
that of a larger country. When there is no capital mobility, the tax rates of two 
countries are the same. Tax competition pressure makes the smaller country set its 
tax rate below that of the larger country. This is because the smaller country has 
a more elastic capital supply (capital demand). Therefore, the test is to establish 
whether the difference between the tax rates of two groups - larger countries and 
smaller countries - is significant. The argument about the relative validity between 
the `level-comparison test' and the `change-comparison test' can be applied to this 
case as well. 
What are criteria for grouping larger countries and smaller countries? Devereux 
(1995) adopts a cut-off point of $160 billion GDP and Chennells and Griffith (1997) 
use the relative size of GDP instead of the cut-off point. Is population of a country 
more appropriate for grouping than GDP? This argument derives from the fact that, 
in theoretic models, the size of a country is defined by its population. With the 
assumption that the production technology and per capita capital endowment are 
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the same across countries, the relative size7 of GDP should be the same with that 
of population. In reality, these two differ and we are to choose between the two. I 
suggest that GDP is more appropriate than population because the standard model 
implies not simple population but quality-adjusted labour force. The latter might be 
related with the level of GDP. 
8.3.3 Different preference for public consumption 
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the country with a weak preference for public 
goods sets its tax rate lower than that of the country with a strong preference. How- 
ever, a test to establish whether the countries with a weak preference for public goods 
set their tax rates lower is misleading. The countries with a weak preference for pub- 
lic goods set their tax rates lower without strategic tax setting behaviour which tax 
competition theory assumes. Therefore, whether the countries with a weak preference 
for public goods set their tax rates lower than the countries with a strong preference 
is not relevant to the validity of tax competition theory. 
Instead of the typical assumption of tax setting behaviour adopted by tax compe- 
tition models, governments are assumed to set tax rates as if any change in their tax 
rates does not have an influence on the movement of capital between two countries. 
These governments are called `myopic'. They consider that the allocation of capital 
is fixed and that their tax rates have no effect on the allocation of capital. When 
'As defined in chapter 4, what matters in tax competition is the relative size of a country, not 
the absolute size. 
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both countries maintain their optimal tax rates decided in autarky after the opening 
of the capital market, the amount of capital moving country 1, the country with a 
strong preference, to country 2, the country with a weak preference, is 
Z= pK, 
/2a-11Q11 
_ 
(a +re-1)o11 
_ {l 
21( , ß+1 
, p `(2 1)nll + a' 
j 
2 13+1 
0< P< 1. (8.6) 
The objective of country 1 is 
max W(Cl, Gl) (8.7) tl 
subject to 
Cl f (K - pK) - tlf (K - pK)'(K - pK) + (1 - t2)f (K + pK)'pK, 
Gl = tlf (K - pK)'(K - pK), 
0< tl < 1. (8.8) 
The first-order conditions give 
yyý, 
= 1. (8.9) Wcl 
Tax rate is 
t, -1+ 
a(1 - t2)(1-ß p)-lp 
1 2a 
> 
2a 
= ti . 
(8.10) 
The objective of country 2 is 
max W(C2, G2) (8.11) t2 
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subject to 
C2 =f (K + pK) -f (K + pK)'(t2K + pK), 
G2 = t2f(K+ pK)'(K+ pK), 
0< t2 < 1. 
The first-order conditions give 
(8.12) 
WC2K+PK>1. 
(8.13) 
WW2 K 
(8.13) implies that country 2 sets the tax rate at the level higher than the optimal 
and thus public goods are over-provided. This is because country 2 is willing to get 
more tax revenue from the income of foreign capital by means of a higher tax rate. 
The tax rate of country 2 is 
l+p(1-a) 
t2 _ 
a(, ß + 1) 
1 
a(ß + 1) 
= t2 (8.14) 
(8.10) and (8.14) together imply that both countries set their tax rates at the higher 
level than those in autarky. This is opposite of the prediction that both countries set 
their tax rates at the lower level below the tax rates in autarky. 
Table 8.1 shows that both countries have higher tax rates than those in autarky. 
It also shows that country 1 sets its tax rate higher than that of country 2 as is the 
case in autarky. Therefore, the fact that countries with a relatively strong preference 
for public goods set their tax rates higher than those of countries with a relatively 
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a= 2/3 a= 3/4 a= 4/5 
tl 0.83 
t2 0.63 
0.77 
0.53 
0.74 
0.48 
Table 8.1: Tax rates with myopic governments 
weak preference is not relevant to the validity of tax competition theory. Under any 
of three tax-setting behaviour of the government - tax competition, `status quo'8 and 
`myopic' -, countries with a strong preference set their tax rates higher than countries 
with a weak preference. 
In contrast with previous two asymmetric cases, the `level-comparison test' cannot 
applied in this case. An appropriate test is to analyse whether countries with a strong 
preference have reduced their tax rates more than countries with a weak preference 
(the `change-comparison test'). As I suggested in chapter 4, the country with a 
strong preference for public goods tends to cut its tax rate to a greater degree than 
the country with a weak preference for public goods, when they face the pressure of 
tax competition even if the former still sets its tax rate higher than that of the latter. 
When preference of country 1, for example, is twice that of country 2, the tax rates 
in autarky, (tl = 19, t2 = 0.67), becomes (ti = 0.48, t2 = 0.41). 10 
If `status quo' tax setting behaviour is adopted, there should be no declining 
tendency in tax rates. On the contrary, if governments set their tax rate myopically, 
'This refers to governments which do not change their tax rates even if capital becomes to be 
able to move internationally. 
9The tax rate of country 1 will be close to 1. 
101t is noteworthy that this is derived from specified production function and social welfare 
function. 
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the data of tax rates should show an increasing trend and the countries with a weak 
preference for public goods should increase their tax rates sharply than the countries 
with a strong preference. 
Another problem is how to measure the preference for public goods. The relative 
size of government may represent the degree of preference for public goods. Probable 
measurement for the relative size of government are the total receipt of government 
divided by GDP, the total tax revenue divided by GDP and the final consumption 
of government divided by GDP. Traditionally, tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is 
the common measurement of government size (for example see Oates [1982]). Ferris 
and West (1996) term this measurement as nominal size of government and suggest 
the real size of government which is measured by the data not including transfer 
payment. 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
This section discusses how to test the propositions derived in the previous sections. 
Firstly, corporation tax rates are predicted to decrease as transaction costs of foreign 
investment are lowered or as more countries participate in the international capital 
market. If data on transaction costs and/or the number of countries involved in the 
international capital market are available, it is possible to test the proposition using 
a simple regression method for each or using a multiple regression model for both. 
However, it is difficult to obtain data on transaction costs and/or the number of 
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countries in the international capital market. An alternative is to establish whether 
the time series data of capital income tax reveals a declining trend, assuming decreas- 
ing transaction costs and increasing number of countries in the international capital 
market. The results of this test is only suggestive for the validity of tax competition 
theory because such a declining trend is caused by various factors other than tax 
competition. 
A more informative test is to divide countries into two groups and to see whether 
tax differential between the two groups is consistent with the prediction of tax compe- 
tition theory (the `level-comparison test'). More-open countries and smaller countries 
are expected to have lower tax rates than less-open countries and smaller countries. 
However, it is misguided to test the validity of tax competition theory by establishing 
whether countries with a relatively weak preference for public goods undercut those 
with a relatively strong preference for public goods. The reason for the invalidity 
of the test is that the tax difference between these two groups can be expected to 
emerge when governments do not follow the strategic tax settings which tax compe- 
tition theory generally assumes. 
The validity of the `level-comparison test' discussed above depends on the rele- 
vance of the assumption that other factors which have an effect on the level of tax 
rates are equal across the groups. Alternative test is to establish differences in degree 
of decrease in tax rates of two groups (the `change-comparison test'). More-open 
countries, smaller countries and the countries with a strong preference for public 
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goods are predicted to cut tax rates more than less-open countries, larger countries 
and the countries with a weak preference for public goods. 
It is noteworthy that the level-comparison test and the change-comparison test 
are based on different assumption on the process of tax competition. The `level- 
comparison test' implicitly assume that tax competition is effective and countries have 
already adjusted their tax rates accordingly at the specific sample year or through- 
out the sample period. In contrast, the `change-comparison test' assumes that tax 
competition started to work at some point of the sample period. If tax competition 
started to work before the sample period, adjustments of tax rates are carried out 
gradually during the sample period. Without the assumption of gradual adjustment, 
there is no systematic change of tax rates because tax rates are already adjusted. The 
gradual adjustment is is an additional assumption which is not explicitly considered 
in theoretical models. 
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Chapter 9 
Evidence of tax competition 
9.1 Introduction 
Contrasting with abundant theoretical literature and its emphatic claims, only a 
few empirical works on tax competition have been found. Devereux (1995), Chennells 
and Griffith (1997) and Grubert (1999) are the papers which have, to date, been 
directly concerned with empirical tests. There are three propositions which have 
been tested in common by these studies: (1) whether corporation tax rates have 
decreased; (2) whether small and open countries have lower tax rates than large and 
closed countries; (3) whether tax rates were converged. They have not found clear 
empirical evidence to support any of those predictions. 
As Devereux (1995) acknowledges, there are two difficulties in undertaking em- 
pirical study. Firstly, many of the propositions put forward by theoretical studies are 
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difficult to test empirically. Secondly, collecting and interpreting the relevant data is 
far from straightforward. For example, suppose that we try to test the proposition 
that tax competition should lead to a lower tax on capital income than the optimal 
level. A central problem stems from the fact that optimal tax rates are not directly 
observable. The other problem is the measurement of the level of capital income 
taxation. There are many alternative measurements of tax burdens and they differ 
significantly from each other. These problems must be discussed prior to the carrying 
out of tests. 
This chapter seeks to draw main propositions and to test them with the marginal 
effective corporate tax rates (MECTRs) of 24 OECD member countries during 1960- 
1998. MECTRs are computed by the method suggested by King and Fullerton (1984). 
The propositions tested are as follows. (1) Corporation tax rates should show a 
decreasing trend. ' (2) More-open countries should cut corporation tax rates more 
than less-open countries. (3) Smaller countries should cut corporation tax rates more 
than larger countries. (4) Countries with a strong preference for public goods should 
cut corporation tax rates more than those with a weak preference for public goods. 
For detecting a decreasing trend of tax rates, this thesis fits the data with various 
statistical models: simple linear model, trend-stationary process model and difference- 
stationary process model. For detecting tax differential between different groups of 
countries, previous studies mainly carried out tests with cross section data. They 
'This derives from three assumptions. (1) Mobility of capital has increased. (2) The number of 
competing countries has increased (3) Adjustment of tax rates occurs gradually. 
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compared the level of tax rate between open countries (smaller countries) and closed 
countries (larger countries). This thesis uses time series data to establish whether 
open countries (smaller countries and countries with a strong preference for public 
goods) have decreased tax rate more than closed countries (larger countries and coun- 
tries with a weak preference for public goods). This comparison will be carried out 
not only with the average tax rates of groups but also with tax rates of individual 
countries. 
The first proposition that corporation tax rates have decreased is consistently 
supported by the data. There is a remarkable drop, on average, from 54% in 1960 to 
37% in 1998 across 24 OECD countries. 2 Out of these 24 countries, 19 countries have 
a negative trend when tax rates are fitted with a linear model. A decreasing trend is 
detected using different specifications of regression model such as simple linear model, 
trend-stationary process model and difference-stationary process model. 
Proposition (2)-(4) are tested in two ways. Firstly, the countries are divided into 
two groups and the difference between the average tax rates of the two groups is placed 
under the significance test (here, this is named as `level-comparison test'). This is 
the method employed in previous studies. When countries are grouped by the trade 
intensity ratio measured by the sum of import and export divided by GDP (here, 
this is named as product market openness)3, more-open countries have, on average, 
'The countries which have joined OECD recently are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, 
Poland and Republic of Korea. They are excluded form the analysis. This is because the availibility 
of the data is restricted and because the degree of capital mobility is likely to differ from that of the 
rest member countries. 
3Devereux (1995) measures the openness of the market by the import divided by the output. 
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lower tax rates than less-open countries but the difference is not significant. However, 
when countries are grouped by the foreign capital flow intensity measured by sum of 
inflow and outflow of direct investment divided by GDP (here, this is named as capital 
market openness)4, more-open countries have, on average, significantly lower tax rates 
than less-open countries. 
When countries are grouped by size measured either by GDP or by population, 
larger countries have, on average, lower tax rates than smaller countries. This result 
contradicts the prediction of tax competition theory that smaller countries should 
have lower tax rates than larger countries (see Bucovestsky [1991], Wilson [1991], 
Kanbur and Keen [1993] and Eggert and Haufler [1996]). When countries are grouped 
by the scale of their preference for public goods, the countries with a strong preference 
for public goods have higher tax rates than those with a weak preference. As was 
discussed in chapter 8, this tax differential, by itself, is not a relevant evidence of tax 
competition theory. 
Alternative method of test is to see the difference of the magnitude of decrease in 
tax rates of the two groups (here, this is named as `change-comparison test'). The 
data consistently support proposition (2), (3) and (4) when the average tax rates of 
the two groups are linearly fitted with respect to time variable and the estimates of 
coefficient of time variable of two groups are compared. More-open countries have 
cut their tax rates more than less-open countries. This result is derived under the 
4As Chennells and Griffith (1997) argue, this measurement may be problematic because these 
flows of foreign direct investment are volatile over time and because the definition of foreign direct 
investment is not consistent across countries. 
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grouping either by product or capital market openness. In addition, smaller countries 
are found to have cut their tax rates more than larger countries and the countries 
with a strong preference for public goods are also found to have cut their tax rates 
more than the countries with a weak preference for public goods. The difference in 
the degree of tax cutting is significant in all these cases. 
Lastly, an econometric model is set up to consider explicitly other factors which 
may have an effect on corporate tax rates and to see the effect of the openness, the 
size of country and its preference for public goods at the same time. The MECTRs 
of 24 countries are regressed with respect to two `non-tax competition' variables 
(the unemployment rate and total tax revenue proportional to GDP) and two `tax 
competition' variables (the openness of a country and the size of a country) for each 
year. 
The results of multiple regressions reveal that the `tax competition' variables have 
significant joint power in explaining tax differences among countries only in recent 
years, 1988-1995. However, the pure effect of the size of country on tax rates is 
negligible throughout the period if the effect of the openness of the country on tax 
rates is excluded. This is because the size of a country is highly correlated with the 
openness of the country and therefore, it has little additional explanatory power. The 
total tax revenue proportional to GDP is insignificant except for the first two years 
as predicted by tax competition theory. 
Overall, this thesis provides some positive evidence for validity of tax competition 
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theory. This is different from the results of previous empirical studies which have 
found mixed evidence(see Devereux [1995], Chennells and Griffith [1997] and Grubert 
[1999]). However, the result of this thesis should not be interpreted to deny the results 
of previous works because this thesis adopts different assumptions and uses the data 
computed in different way. The validity of `the change-comparison test' depends on 
whether process of tax adjustment is gradual. The marginal effective corporate tax 
rates in this thesis is computed with a simplified method in the sense that economic 
parameters are assumed to be the same across countries and across period. The tests 
in this thesis are suggestive for alterative approach to the previous studies and further 
study is needed. 
Section 2 discusses technical problems in testing the propositions defined in chap- 
ter 8. Section 3 explains the methodology used in computing the MECTRs and the 
sources of the data. The results of the tests are presented in section 4. Section 
5 evaluates overall effects of tax competition with an econometric model. Several 
limitations and possible extensions of the tests are discussed in the conclusion. 
9.2 Testable propositions 
In chapter 8, several testable propositions are derived and possible designs of tests 
are discussed. Here, I will discuss more technical problems arising in carrying out the 
tests. While the central claim of tax competition theory is that tax competition leads 
to a lower tax on the income from capital than the optimal level, the exact meaning 
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of a lower tax rate differs across models. The level of tax rates at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium depends on not only the number of competing countries and but also 
on the availability of other taxes in financing supply of public goods. If the capital 
tax should finance the supply of public goods, tax competition even in a small-open 
economy model will not lead to zero tax rate. 
However, it is difficult to compare the level of real tax rates with the level of 
optimal tax rates because optimal tax rates are not directly observable. Instead, we 
have established two reasons for a gradual decrease in tax rates; decreasing transac- 
tion costs and an increasing number of countries in the international capital market. 
Considering technological progress in the transportation, telecommunication and in- 
formation industries, it is not unreasonable to assume that transaction costs have 
been decreasing in the long term. Neither does it seem unreasonable to assume that 
more countries have become involved in the international capital market. Given these 
assumptions, capital tax rates must have decreased if tax competition theory has been 
valid in the real world. 
Data should be collected in the long term and for many countries in order to 
increase the reliability of tests. Chennells and Griffith (1997) use the data of ten 
countries - the G7 countries, Australia, Ireland and Australia - for 1979-1994. Their 
results do not show a decreasing trend in capital tax rates. In contrast, Grubert 
(1999) investigates 60 countries. However, it may not improve the reliability of tests 
to increase number of countries up to 60 if the degree of capital mobility may be 
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considerably different among 60 countries. The time span of the data also matters. 
In detecting a downward trend, Devereux (1993) compares effective tax rates as of 
1980 and 1991 and Grubert (1999), as of 1984 and 1992. Chennells and Griffith 
(1997) investigate changes throughout 1979-1994. The longer the data are collected, 
the stronger the test is. The data used in this chapter cover the period 1960-1998. 
In this thesis, 24 OECD countries are divided into two groups according to the 
average product market openness between 1960-1996. (1) More-open countries : Aus- 
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland. (2) Less-open countries : Australia, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA. ' However, 
according to the average capital market openness between 1983-19966, two groups are 
rather defined as follows. (1) Open countries : Australia, Belgium, Canada, Fiance, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. 
(2) Closed countries : Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Japan, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, USA7. 
GDP is used for grouping countries between small and large countries by Devereux 
(1995) and Chennells and Griffith (1997). (1) Smaller countries: Austria, Belgium, 
'During the period, New Zealand and Finland have changed their groupings with each other. 
However, this does not change the results of the test. 
6Before 1983, the data on the inflow and outflow of direct investment are available only for a few 
countries. 
7Due to high volatility of the amount of foreign direct investment, this grouping is not applied for 
every year. If the criterion measured by the sum of inward and outward direct investment (these are 
stocks) is applied, the USA is grouped into the open countries instead of Norway and this grouping 
is correct for every year. 
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Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Turkey. (2) Larger countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. Population is another 
criterion for grouping countries according to their size. The standard models assume 
that production technology and capital endowment per capita are the same across 
countries. Therefore, there must be no difference in grouping either by GDP or by 
population. However, with real data, the two are not related perfectly. According to 
population, Turkey and Belgium are grouped into larger countries instead of Sweden 
and Switzerland. We use the GDP criterion8. 
The grouping by the preference for public goods is more controversial than the 
two previous groupings. Several different criteria can be found: (1) final consumption 
by government divided by GDP; (2) tax revenue divided by GDP; (3) total gov- 
ernment's revenue divided by GDP. The higher value of all these implies stronger 
preference for public goods. In this thesis, the second criterion is used. According to 
the data between 1965-1995, grouping is as follows. (1) Strong preference for public 
goods: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxem- 
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK. (2) Weak preference: Australia, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, 
USA. 9 
8The reason for choosing GDP instead of population in this thesis is that the standard model 
implies not simple population but quality-adjusted labour force. The latter might be related with 
the level of GDP. 
9During 1983-1984 and 1987-1988, Ireland was grouped into the countries with a strong preference 
for public goods instead of the UK. In 1989, New Zealand was grouped into the countries with a 
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9.3 Methodology and sources of data 
The marginal effective tax rate (METR) is a powerful tool in comparing the over- 
all tax burden because it can evaluate the overall capital income taxes by summary 
statistics. It has been frequently used by economists in measuring allocational in- 
efficiency of capital incurred by capital taxes. King and Fullerton (1984) use it to 
show the differences in the tax burdens between different assets, different financing 
methods and different investors. OECD (1991) further enlarges the application of 
the METR by calculating the METR for the cross-border investment for all OECD 
countries. 
Devereux (1995) and Chennells and Griffith (1997) adopt the same concept for car- 
rying out empirical tests of tax competition theory. I, however, modify the standard 
concept in two ways because my aim is not to analyse the tax-induced allocational 
distortion of capital but rather the historical changes in tax burdens in the context of 
tax competition. Firstly, only corporate taxes are included in computing the METR. 
When a firm decides between alternative locations for an investment, it is less rele- 
vant who provides the capital which it uses. Secondly, the values of all parameters 
except those of tax system are assumed to be fixed across countries and across pe- 
riods. We can exclude the effect of non-tax variables by setting them being equal 
across countries and across period. This also makes the calculation of METR much 
simpler. 
strong preference for public goods instead of the UK. Since 1990, Italy has been grouped into the 
countries with a strong preference for public goods instead of the UK. 
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Two points need mentioning in relation to the limit of the marginal effective cor- 
porate tax rates (MECTR). Firstly, the MECTR is valid only for the `hypothetical 
investment'. The values of the MECTR vary greatly according to what is assumed as 
the `hypothetical investment'. Aggregated values using the weights of assets, indus- 
tries and methods of finance can be misleading in evaluating the burden of corporate 
tax for different investment projects. The comparison of the MECTR between coun- 
tries is not likely to provide a good indication when you decide which country is the 
best for your investment because your investment is not the same as the `hypotheti- 
cal investment' used in calculating the MECTR. For example, according to Alworth 
and Castellucci (1994), the METR in Italy was around 20% in 1980s. However, the 
METR in the area of Mezzogiorno, southern Italy, was only 6%. 
Secondly, the MECTR does not represent all provisions of corporate income taxes. 
Devereux and Pearsson (1994) surveys 176 firms in the UK with regard to which tax 
provisions are important in their decision on investment location. `Loss carry-over' 
is reported to be as influential as `capital allowances'. According to Ishi (1993), 
the Japanese government has depended heavily on `free-tax reserves' as incentives 
for investments. However, the MECTR cannot represent tax provisions on loss carry- 
over, tax-free reserve, time lag of tax payment, tax appliance cost, etc. Therefore, the 
MECTR reflects only tax provisions on tax rates, capital allowances, stock valuation 
and general tax incentives. 
Given these drawbacks, it is important to describe what is assumed to be the 
238 
`hypothetical investment' in computing the MECTR and how the conversion of com- 
plicated tax provisions into simple numerical values is carried out. The values of the 
MECTR should be read in a close connection with these two factors. The details 
on `hypothetical investment', economic parameters and formulas for conversions are 
annexed. 
The main sources for information about corporate tax system are Income taxes 
outside the UK by Inland Tax Revenue, International tax summaries and Doing 
business Series by Price Waterhouse. Due to the complicated tax systems of each 
country, it is inevitable to use only some parts of information of tax systems in 
calculating the MECTR. A summary of changes in the corporate tax systems of 
OECD countries is also annexed. This will help understand which information of tax 
systems is used in calculating the MECTR. 
Macroeconomic data differ between different sources and even between different 
editions of the same source. Therefore, it is necessary to make clear all the sources 
and editions of the data used here. Data for inflow10 and outflow direct investment", 
10Code and Table: Inflows by country / Partner : World, International Direct Investment, Finan- 
cial and Fiscal Affairs 
"Code and Table: Outflows by country / Partner : World, International Direct Investment, 
Financial and Fiscal Affairs 
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GDP12, import13, export14, tax revenue15, population", labour force17 and unemploy- 
mentl$ are drawn from OECD Statistical Compendium 1999. 
Table 9.1 provides time series data of all variables used in this chapter and their 
basic statistics. All values are caculated by a simple average of 24 countries. Table 
9.2 provides cross-country data which are averaged for the period. OPEN (1) and (2) 
represent respectively the product market openness and the capital market openness. 
The central proposition that tax rates should have decreased is based on the as- 
sumption of the increasing mobility of capital and an increasing number of countries 
involved. Therefore, tax rates are expected to have a negative correlation with prod- 
uct market openness and capital market openness, both of which might be used as 
proxy for capital mobility. The data reveal that tax rates have been decreased while 
the degree of openness, both of product market and of capital market, has been 
increased. 
The data for each country are provided in appendix. Figure9.1 - 9.7 provides 
the overall summary of each variable for 24 countries. The simple average values are 
12Code and Table: Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure) in billion US$ - current prices and 
exchange rates, National Accounts 1 
13Code and Table: Imports of goods and services in billion US$ - current prices and exchange 
rates, National Accounts 1 
14Code and Table: Exports of goods and services in billion US$ - current prices and exchange 
rates, National Accounts 1 
11 Code and Table : Total Tax Revenue / Tax as percentage of GDP, Revenue Statistics, Financial 
and Fiscal Affairs 
16 Code and Table : Population (Thousand, mid-year estimate), Annual Labour Force Statistics, 
Labour Force and Social Issues 
17Code and Table : Total Labour Force (Thousand), Annual Labour Force Statistics, Labour 
Force and Social Issues 
'8Code and Table : Unemployment : Total, Annual Labour Force Statistics, Labour Force and 
Social Issues 
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Year METRs OPEN OPEN TAX UNEM GDP POP 
(1) (2) /GDP 
1960 0.52 0.49 N/A N/A 2.67 2.39 9.21 
1965 0.50 0.49 N/A 0.26 2.19 2.83 9.27 
1970 0.50 0.54 N/A 0.29 2.35 3.23 9.31 
1975 0.48 0.58 N/A 0.32 3.66 4.07 9.36 
1980 0.48 0.64 0.12 0.34 4.83 4.71 9.39 
1985 0.45 0.71 0.17 0.36 7.60 4.62 9.42 
1990 0.45 0.66 0.30 0.38 6.38 5.42 9.45 
1995 0.41 0.69 0.31 0.38 8.44 5.66 9.50 
1998 0.39 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
mean 0.47 0.59 0.28 0.34 5.01 4.16 9.37 (variance) (1.5X10-3) (5.8X10-3) (2.4X10-3) (1.5X10-3) (6.1) (1.13) (7.1X10-3) 
Source : Tax data are from own caculation. 
OECD St atistical Compendium, 1999 
Note 1: unemployment rate, Unit (%) 
Note 2: Unit [log(billionUS$) , 
log(thous and population)] 
Table 9.1: Summary of time series data 
represented by bold round marks. 
9.4 Empirical results 
9.4.1 Test 1: Are corporation tax rates decreasing? 
Changes in the average tax rate of 24 OECD countries between 1960-1998 are 
shown in Figure 9.8, which reveals a decreasing trend. The average tax rate was 
51% in 1960s, 49% in 1970s, 46% in 1980s and finally 41% in 1990s. Of the 24 
countries, 19 countries have experienced a decrease in the corporation tax rates. 
The magnitude of a decrease is different across countries. In some countries such as 
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country METRs OPEN 
(1) 
OPEN 
(2) 
TAX 
/ GDP 
UNEM' GDP POP 
Australia 0.465 0.33 0.34 0.28 5.34 4.52 9.57 
Austria 0.591 0.65 0.11 0.39 2.52 3.74 8.93 
Belgium 0.430 1.13 0.59 0.42 6.67 4.11 9.19 
Canada 0.433 0.49 0.24 0.33 7.43 5.21 10.07 
Denmark 0.439 0.63 0.24 0.44 5.22 3.65 8.52 
Finland 0.591 0.53 0.20 0.37 5.00 3.40 8.47 
France 0.524 0.38 0.27 0.39 5.81 5.88 10.88 
Germany 0.604 0.46 0.13 0.40 3.96 6.21 11.06 
Greece 0.450 0.34 0.11 0.31 5.41 3.29 9.15 
Iceland 0.580 0.72 0.02 0.29 1.34 0.55 5.41 
Ireland 0.316 0.97 0.19 0.33 9.69 2.43 8.08 
Italy 0.412 0.39 0.86 0.32 7.77 5.56 10.91 
Japan 0.601 0.21 0.81 0.25 1.93 6.44 11.63 
Luxembourg 0.455 1.72 0.59 0.39 1.03 1.08 5.89 
Netherlands 0.387 0.95 0.69 0.43 5.10 4.44 9.53 
New Zealand 0.484 0.54 0.60 0.32 2.91 2.75 8.02 
Norway 0.472 0.74 0.20 0.40 2.38 3.51 8.30 
Portugal 0.474 0.58 0.22 0.25 4.89 2.87 9.15 
Spain 0.307 0.32 0.23 0.25 10.02 4.67 10.49 
Sweden 0.481 0.56 0.47 0.47 2.66 4.27 9.01 
Switzerland 0.476 0.64 0.43 0.29 7.55 4.11 8.76 
Turkey 0.469 0.22 0.04 0.17 8.18 3.79 10.67 
UK 0.377 0.50 0.50 0.35 5.50 5.70 10.94 
USA 0.427 0.16 0.16 0.26 6.04 7.64 12.31 
Source : Tax data are from own caculation. 
OECD Statisti cal Compendium, 1 999 
Note 1: unem ployment rate = (unemployment / to tal labour force) x 100 
Note 2: Unit [log(billionUS$), log(thousand population)] 
Table 9.2: Summary of cross-country data 
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time variables. The regression model is 
Tit=Cki'+'/it+eit, ý9.1) 
where eit N iid N(0, o,? ). The results of estimation are provided in Table 9.3.19 R2 
and DW denote the coefficient of determination and Durbin-Watson test statistic. 
For the 19 countries, the value of estimate of 3 is negative. Compared with 
t37, a=0.025 < t30, a=0.025 = 2.042, the null hypothesis that ßa =0 is rejected against the 
alternative hypothesis that , ßz <0 for 18 countries. For the UK, the null hypothesis 
is not rejected. For Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain and Turkey, the value of estimate of 
/3 is positive. 
Instead of (9.1), one single regression equation is estimated using tax rates of 
all countries, on the assumption that a and 0 are the same across countries. The 
regression model is 
Tit =a+ /3t + eßt, (9.2) 
where stt N iid N(0, a2). The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho: Q=O (9.3) 
and 
Hl: ß<0. (9.4) 
The result of estimation is 
Tit = 0.533- 3.222E-3 t, R2 = 0.095, (9.5) (-9.893) 
19The OLS estimations in this thesis are carried out by SPSS. 
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country aT f3 t value of /3 R2 DW 
Australia 0.509 -2.195E- -2.952 0.191 0.320 
Austria 0.737 -7.336E-3 -6.224 0.511 0.401 
Belgium 0.480 -2.544E-3 -2.886 0.184 0.481 
Canada 0.514 -4.075E-3 -4.528 0.357 0.234 
Denmark 0.473 -1.669E-3 -2.476 0.142 0.442 
Finland 0.816 -11.240E-3 -11.286 0.775 0.290 
France 0.601 -3.846E-3 -6.608 0.541 0.402 
Germany 0.631 -1.353E-3 -3.952 0.297 0.320 
Greece 0.400 2.478E-3 3.885 0.290 0.605 
Iceland 0.657 -3.838E-3 -6.525 0.535 0.265 
Ireland 0.668 -17.600E-3 -13.108 0.823 0.365 
Italy 0.353 2.949E-3 3.156 0.212 0.136 
Japan 0.577 1.186E-3 2.939 0.189 0.229 
Luxembourg 0.515 -3.030E-3 -5.596 0.458 0.277 
Netherlands 0.420 -1.689E-3 -2.111 0.108 0.376 
New Zealand 0.573 -4.473E-3 -3.762 0.277 0.656 
Norway 0.627 -7.747E-3 -10.963 0.765 0.500 
Portugal 0.558 -4.201E-3 -2.755 0.170 0.248 
Spain 0.278 1.443E-3 4.284 0.332 1.020 
Sweden 0.567 -4.331E-3 -4.369 0.340 0.321 
Switzerland 0.456 -0.966E-3 -3.098 0.206 0.184 
Turkey 0.457 0.574E-3 1.433 0.053 0.538 
UK 0.402 -1.264E-3 -0.779 0.016 0.624 
USA 0.517 -4.493E-3 -10.088 0.733 0.529 
Average 0.533 -3 -18.199 0.900 0.465 
Table 9.3: Results of regression with standard disturbance term 
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where t-value is provided in the parenthesis. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 
5% significance level. 
The lower values of Durbin-Watson test statistic for all countries imply the exis- 
tence of autocorrelation in the disturbance term. The values of Durbin-Watson test 
statistic for all countries, shown in Table 9.3, are below the lower bound (dL =1.43 
when k=2, n= 39 and a=0.05). The existence of autocorrelation in the dis- 
turbance term makes the test based on OLS estimates invalid because the standard 
errors of estimates are underestimated. 
Therefore, the disturbance term is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process. 
The regression model is 
Tit = ai+fit'+'ui, t, 
uit = Piuit-1 + Eit, 
it N lid N(0, Qi ). (9.6) 
The results of estimation are provided in Table 9.4. pis are estimated by the iterative 
Cochrane-Orcutt method. 
For 10 countries, the null hypothesis that ßt =0 is rejected against the alternative 
hypothesis that Qt < 0. For the rest of countries except Spain, the null hypothesis 
that , 3i =0 is not rejected. 
Instead of (9.6), one single regression equation is estimated using tax rates of 
all countries, on the assumption that a and ß are the same across countries. 20 The 
20We can make three different assumptions on the covariance and the autocorrelation of the 
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country ai 137 t value of (3 R2 A 
Australia 0.576 -4.56E- -2.0820 0.110 0.8103 
Austria 0.820 -10.53E-3 -3.0578 0.211 0.7846 
Belgium 0.494 -3.22E-3 -1.2618 0.044 0.7591 
Canada 0.393 -0.12E-3 -0.0464 0.000 0.8324 
Denmark 0.467 -1.63E-3 -0.8119 0.018 0.7745 
Finland 0.912 -14.69E-3 -4.2415 0.340 0.8440 
France 0.618 -4.28E-3 -2.5064 0.152 0.7827 
Germany 0.679 -3.14E-3 -2.2275 0.124 0.8754 
Greece 0.380 3.14E-3 2.1333 0.115 0.6734 
Iceland 0.862 -10.93E-3 -2.9814 0.202 0.9168 
Ireland 0.631 -15.30E-3 -3.2814 0.235 0.8213 
Italy 0.226 6.73E-3 1.2576 0.043 0.9327 
Japan 0.653 -1.63E-3 -0.6430 0.012 0.9209 
Luxembourg 0.645 -7.79E-3 -3.0596 0.211 0.8882 
Netherlands 0.468 -3.30E-3 -1.4432 0.056 0.7870 
New Zealand 0.567 -4.05E-3 -1.4192 0.054 0.6698 
Norway 0.653 -8.51E-3 -4.8711 0.404 0.7192 
Portugal 0.675 -8.06E-3 -1.3678 0.051 0.8680 
Spain 0.280 1.33E-3 2.2096 0.122 0.4770 
Sweden 0.612 -6.40E-3 -1.7107 0.077 0.8459 
Switzerland 0.537 -1.80E-3 -1.6157 0.069 0.8861 
Turkey 0.464 0.15E-3 0.1365 0.000 0.7230 
UK 0.345 -0.78E-3 -0.7790 0.001 0.6647 
USA 0.492 -3.44E-3 -3.0340 0.208 0.7188 
Average 0.543 -3.65E- -7.3839 0.609 0.7457 
Table 9.4: Results of regression with AR(1) disturbance term 
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regression model is 
Tit =a+, 3t + uit, 
uit - Puit-1 + Cit, 
e;, t N iid N(0, a2). (9.7) 
The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho: ß=O 
and 
(9.8) 
H1:, ß < 0. (9.9) 
disturbance term respectively. This makes nine sets of results. So, S1, and S2 denote `No correlation', 
`Countrywise heteroscedasticity' and `Cross country correlation and countrywise heteroscedasticity'. 
Ro, Rl and R2 denote `No autocorrelation', `AR(1) with the same p' and `AR(1) with different p; 
across countries'. 
The estimated results are as follows with z =, Q /s. e. 
1. So - Ro: Tct= 0.53 - 3.22E-3t, z= -9.90 
2. Sl - Ro: Tit= 0.51 - 2.46E-3, z= -11.37 
3. S2 - Ro: Tit= 0.51 - 2.45E-3, z= -54.27 
4. So - RI: Tit= 0.53 - 3.24E-3, z= -4.70 
5. Si - RI: Ttit= 0.51 - 1.75E-3, z= -3.72 
6. S2 - R1: Tit= 0.51 - 1.14E-3, z= -4.99 
7. So - R2: rit= 0.53 - 3.47E-3, z= -5.64 
8. Sl - R2: 7, tt= 0.51 - 2.41E-3, z= -5.00 
9. S2 - R2: rit= 0.51 - 2.38E-3, z= -7.02 
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The result of estimation21 is 
-rit = 0.528- 3.240E-3 t, p= 0.91298, (9.10) (-4.704) 
where z-value is provided in the parenthesis. Therefore, the null hypothesis is re- 
jected at the 5% significance level. 
However, higher value of p suggests that the disturbance term may follow a random 
walk process instead of AR(1). By subtracting ptrit_1 from Tit, the model defined in 
(9.7) can be rewritten as 
Tit = R1 - Pi)ai + Piail + Pt7-ie-1 + Qa(1 - Pi)t + cit. (9.11) 
The regression model is 
Tit = Oi +7 Tit-1 + bit + Litt (9.12) 
where O_ [(1 - ps)ctit + pißz], yi = pirrit_i and Si = , ß; (1 - pi). If ryi =1 and bi =0 
(this is equivalent to pi =1 and , ßa(1 - pi) = 0), random walk process is a more 
appropriate model in this case. Therefore, the null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho: 'y =1andö1=O (9.13) 
and 
H1: ryt 1 orbi 0. (9.14) 
The F-test statistic for the null hypothesis is 
F. - 
(RSST - RSSu)/2 (9.15) 
RSS,,, /35 
21LIMDEP produces two-step GLS estimates. 
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country RSSU, RSSr F ratio 
Australia 0.02766 0.0333 3.57 
Austria 0.08805 0.1036 3.09 
Belgium 0.06031 0.0666 1.83 
Canada 0.02797 0.0333 3.33 
Denmark 0.03258 0.0370 2.37 
Finland 0.04668 0.0518 1.92 
France 0.02200 0.0259 3.10 
Germany 0.00493 0.0055 2.02 
Greece 0.03685 0.0444 3.59 
Iceland 0.01478 0.0185 4.40 
Ireland 0.11100 0.1184 1.17 
Italy 0.02047 0.0222 0.15 
Japan 0.00639 0.0074 2.77 
Luxembourg 0.01295 0.0148 2.50 
Netherlands 0.03800 0.0444 2.95 
New Zealand 0.14200 0.1702 3.48 
Norway 0.03844 0.0444 2.71 
Portugal 0.09687 0.1073 1.88 
Spain 0.01592 0.0211 5.69 
Sweden 0.05313 0.0592 2.00 
Switzerland 0.00258 0.0033 4.88 
Turkey 0.01392 0.0148 1.11 
UK 0.24300 0.2997 4.08 
USA 0.01624 0.0185 2.44 
Table 9.5: Unit root test statistics 
where RSSU, is the residual sum of squares when (9.12) is estimated and RSST is the 
residual sum of squares when (9.12) is estimated with the restriction of ryt =1 and 
Si = 0. The F ratio for each country is provided in Table 9.5. 
According to Dickey-Fuller tables, the critical value is 7.24 when n= 25 (6.73 when 
n= 50) at the 5% significance level. The F ratios for all countries are not greater than 
this critical value. This result implies that `difference-stationary process' represented 
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by (9.16) is more appropriate than `trend-stationary process' represented by (9.7) 
in modelling the movement of tax rates. However, given rit E [0,1), 'difference- 
stationary process' is restricted to the current sample of observation (a finite period). 
It must not be extrapolated beyond the current sample. 
Therefore, the regression model is 
Tit = Tit_, + d1 +c it, 
(9.16) 
where eit N iid N(0, aä). The results of estimation are provided in Table 9.6 
For 20 countries, the sign of the estimated drift is negative. However, the null 
hypothesis that di =0 is not rejected for any country against the alternative hypoth- 
esis that di <0 at the 5% significance level. Pooled data across countries are used to 
estimate one single equation with the assumption that the drift is the same across all 
countries. Then, the regression model is 
Tit = 7-it-1 +d+ Eit, (9.17) 
where ezt ' iid N(0, Q2). d, estimate of d, is defined as 
NT 
d-_ 
ý, 
=1 
ýt=2 Tit (9.18) 
N(T-1) 
A Tzt is the first difference of tax rate. The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
HO : d=0 (9.19) 
and 
Hl :d<0. (9.20) 
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country di t value of di 
Australia -0.08E- -0.176 
Austria -0.65E-2 -0.765 
Belgium -0.35E-2 -0.500 
Canada -0.64E-2 -1.280 
Denmark -0.29E-2 -0.569 
Finland -1.05E-2 -1.721 
France -0.26E-2 -0.634 
Germany -0.15E-2 -0.750 
Greece 0.10E-2 0.167 
Iceland -0.60E-2 -2.000 
Ireland -1.30E-2 -1.444 
Italy 0.30E-2 0.750 
Japan -0.00E-2 -0.000 
Luxembourg -0.40E-2 -1.333 
Netherlands -0.00E-2 -0.000 
New Zealand -0.29E-2 -0.264 
Norway -0.50E-2 -0.833 
Portugal -0.30E-2 -0.750 
Spain 0.10E-2 0.250 
Sweden -0.60E-2 -1.000 
Switzerland 0.10E-2 0.500 
Turkey -0.10E-2 -0.500 
UK -0.50E-2 -0.333 
USA -0.40E-2 -1.000 
Average -0.32E- -2.286 
Table 9.6: Estimates of drift in random walk process 
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The result of estimation is 
d= -0.0031, s. e. = 0.0013. (9.21) 
Therefore, the test statistic is 
-2.3846 < t0.05,912" (9.22) s. e. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
9.4.2 Test 2: Do more-open countries cut tax rates more 
than less-open countries? 
According to product market openness, 24 OECD countries are divided as follows. 
(1) More-open countries : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland. (2) Less-open 
countries : Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, 
Turkey, UK, USA. However, with capital market openness, two groups are as follows. 
(1) More-open countries : Australia, Belgium, Canada, Rance, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. (2) Less-open coun- 
tries : Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, USA. 
The average tax rate of more-open countries and less-open countries for a specific 
year, Tot and -rt, are assumed to be a random sample respectively from the population 
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with mean µo and µ,. d and sd denote the sample mean and the sample variance for 
the differences Tot - Tct)" The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
H0 : f1 - µc =0 (9.23) 
and 
Hl : µo - /µ < 0. (9.24) 
The decision rule is to reject Ho if 
t=d< -to-1, «, (9.25) 
where a is significance level. When countries are grouped by product market open- 
ness, the test statistic is 
_ -0.0063 _ O. OOÖl -0.7ö 
J -138,0.05 (9.26) 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted at the 5% significance level. 
The same test is done with the grouping based on capital market openness. The 
test statistic is 
_ -0.0539 _ 0.0053 - -10.17 < -t38,0.05 
(9.27) 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. We reject the null hy- 
pothesis that there is no difference between the level of tax rates of more-open and 
less-open countries. 
In addition to the `level-comparison test', I compare the difference in changes in 
tax rates between two groups. In chapter 4, the tax rates of more-open countries are 
predicted to decrease tax rates more than less-open countries. 
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Figure 9.9 shows that more-open countries, divided by product market openness, 
have decreased on average their tax rates more than less-open countries. This figure 
also suggests that the result of the `level-comparison test' is sensitive to the year of 
comparison. Before 1983, more-open countries had set higher tax rates on average 
than less-open countries. 
The regression model is 
Tit = aj +, 3, t + Eft, Ejt - iid N(0, o), (9.28) 
j=1 for more-open countries and 2 for less-open countries. 
The results of estimation are 
Tit =0.561 - 0.00479 t, R2 = 0.801, DW = 0.305 (9.29) (0.000392) 
and 
72t =0.505 - 0.00165 t, R2 = 0.625, DW = 0.558, (9.30) (0.000210) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. 
The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
H0 : 01 =13a (9.31) 
and 
Hl : , ßl < /32. (9.32) 
The test statistic22 is 
22It is assumed that ß1 and ß2 are distributed as the standard normal in the large number sample 
and that they are independently distributed. 
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z= -0.00479 - 
(-0.00165) 
=-7.06 < -zo. 05. (9.33) (0.000392)2 + (0.000210)2 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected with the 5% significance level. This result 
is in contrast to that of the `level-comparison test'. 
However, we already know that a strong autocorrelation exists in disturbance 
terms. This indicates that the standard errors are underestimated and that the above 
test is invalid. The results of estimation with AR(1) disturbance term are 
Tit =0.550 - 0.00454 t, R2 = 0.399, DW = 1.996, p= 0.836 (9.34) (0.000928) 
and 
T2t =0.509 - 0.00183 t, R2 = 0.324, DIV = 1.966, p= 0.719, (9.35) (0.000439) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. The test statistic 
is 
z= -2.64 < -z0 05. (9.36) 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
Figure 9.10 shows the different change of the average tax rates between more- 
open and less-open countries, grouped by capital market openness. The results of 
estimation are 
Tit =0.528 - 0.00432 t, R2 = 0.913, DW = 0.857 (9.37) (0.000219) 
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and 
-r2t =0.538 - 0.00212 t, R2 = 0.663, DW = 0.129, (9.38) (0.000248) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. The test statistic 
is 
z= -6.65 < -zo. 05. (9.39) 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
With the assumption of the AR(1) disturbance term, the results of estimation are 
Tit =0.526 - 0.00426 t, R2 = 0.774, DW = 1.925, p= 0.568 (9.40) (0.000384) 
and 
72t =0.533 - 0.00245 t, R2 = 0.262, DtiV = 1.698, p= 0.948, (9.41) (0.000685) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. The test statistic 
is 
z= -2.30 < -x0.05" (9.42) 
The null hypothesis is still rejected with the 5% significance level. 
The above tests use only the average tax rates of the two groups. A more infor- 
mative test is to run a single regression using tax rates of all countries with dummy 
variables. The residual is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with different value of 
p across countries and to have countrywise heteroscedasticity. The regression model 
266 
is 
Tit = ao + a1Dzt + /30t + /31Ditt + uit, (9.43) 
where dummy variable Dit =0 for less-open countries and Dit =1 for more-open 
countries23 and uit = piuit_1 + eit. The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho: ß1=0 
and 
Hl ßl<0. 
The result of estimation24 is 
Tit= 0.48611 + 0.037851Dit - 0.0011589t- 0.0021667 Ditt, (-2.187) 
where z-value is given in the parenthesis. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% 
significance level. 
We can make three different assumptions on the covariance and the autocorre- 
lation of the disturbance term respectively. This makes nine sets of results. So, Sl 
and S2 denote `No correlation', `Countrywise heteroscedasticity' and `Cross country 
correlation and countrywise heteroscedasticity'. R0, Rl and R2 denote `No autocor- 
relation', `AR(1) with the same p' and `AR(1) with different p= across countries'. The 
estimate of Q1 and its z-value for each model are provided in Table 9.7. 
Only when the model is specified with `Countrywise heteroscedasticity' and `AR(1) 
with the same p', is the null hypothesis not rejected. If we relax the assumption that 
23The market openness is used for grouping. 
24LIMDEP produces two-step GLS estimates. 
267 
Model estimates of ßl z-value 
So - Ro -0.31383E-2 -4.886 
Sl - Ro -0.23935E-2 -5.564 
S2 - Ro -0.23929E-2 -34.191 
So - Rl -0.23678E-2 -1.705 
Si - Rl -0.10160E-2 -1.058 
S2 - Rl -0.98259E-3 -1.883 
So - R2 -0.27944E-2 -2.215 
Sl - R2 -0.21667E-2 -2.187 
S2 - R2 -0.22984E-2 -3.572 
Table 9.7: Estimates of coefficient of slope dummy variable (1) 
the countries within the same group have the same intercept by adopting a new 
assumption that each country has a different intercept, the z-value of the estimates 
of , ß1 with the same assumption on the disturbance term 
becomes -3.470.25 
9.4.3 Test 3: Do smaller countries cut tax rates more than 
larger countries? 
According to GDP, 24 OECD countries are divided as follows. (1) Larger countries 
: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, USA. (2) Smaller countries : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey. 
The average tax rate of smaller countries and larger countries for a specific year, 
Trst and Tit, are assumed to be a random sample respectively from the population with 
mean µ, and µi. d and sä denote the sample mean and the sample variance for the 
"This is estimated with a fixed effect model by LIMDEP. 
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differences Tat - Tlt)" The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho: µ9-µI=0 (9.44) 
and 
H1: µ9-µ<<0. (9.45) 
The decision rule is to reject Ho, if 
(9.46) 
where a is the significance level. The test statistic is 
0.0215 
t=0.0077 = 2.79 > -t38,0.05. (9.47) 
The null hypothesis is accepted at the 5% significance level. Therefore, the `level- 
comparison test' do not reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in the level of 
tax rates between smaller countries and larger countries. Rather, the data show that 
smaller countries have higher tax rates than larger countries on average. Figure 9.11 
shows that why the result of the simple mean-comparison contradicts the proposition 
of tax competition theory. Only since 1985, have smaller countries set their tax rates 
lower than those of larger countries. 
Now, I try to test whether smaller countries on average have cut corporation tax 
rates more than larger countries. The regression model is 
Tit = aj +33t + eft. (9.48) 
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and 
72t =0.486 - 0.00139 t R2 = 0.666, DW = 0.826, (9.52) (0.000162) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. 
The test statistic is 
z= -10.57 < -z0.05. (9.53) 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
With the assumption of AR(1) disturbance term, the results of estimation are 
ýrlt =0.572 - X0.00049 
t, R2 = 0.561, DIV = 2.048, p= 0.840 (9.54) 
and 
72t =0.487 - 0.00146 t, R2 = 0.415, DTV = 1.735, p= 0.583, (9.55) (0.000288) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. The test statistic 
is 
z= -4.43 < -zo. os. (9.56) 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
A single regression is run using tax rates of all countries with dummy variables. 
The disturbance term is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with different value of p 
across countries and to have countrywise heteroscedasticity. The regression model is 
Tic = ao + a1D,. t + ß0t + QiD, tt + uit, (9.57) 
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Model etimates of Q1 z-value 
So - Ro -0.36603E-' -5.750 
Sl - Ro -0.20758E-2 -4.620 
S2 - Ro -0.20975E-2 -26.931 
So - Rl -0.31870E-2 -2.192 
Si - Rl -0.32604E-2 -3.203 
S2 - Rl -0.33956E-3 -6.912 
So - R2 -0.21990E-2 -1.684 
Sl - R2 -0.30415E-2 -2.791 
S2 - R2 -0.32758E-2 -5.769 
Table 9.8: Estimates of coefficient of slope dummy variable (2) 
where the dummy variable D, t =0 for larger countries and Dit =1 for smaller 
countries and uit = piuit_1 + cit. The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho : Q1=0 
and 
Hl , Ql < 0. 
The result of estimation26 is 
Tit= 0.47668 + 0.072068D2 - 0.0012040t- 0.0030415 Ditt, (-2.791) 
where z-value is given in the parenthesis. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% 
significance level. 
The estimates of , land their z-values for different models are provided in Table 
9.8. 
26LIMDEP produces two-step GLS estimates. 
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9.4.4 Test 4: Do countries with a strong preference for pub- 
lic goods cut tax rates more than countries with a weak 
preference? 
According to the total tax revenue divided by GDP between 1965-1995, the group- 
ing is as follows. (1) Strong preference for public goods: Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
UK. (2) Weak preference: Australia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, USA. 
The average tax rate of the countries with a strong and a weak preference for public 
goods in a specific year, T8t and -r,,, t, are assumed to be a random sample respectively 
from the population with mean µs and y, d and sä denote the sample mean and the 
sample variance for the differences (Tst-Twt)" The null and the alternative hypothesis 
are 
Ho : Eis - IL" =0 (9.58) 
and 
H1 :I is - µw > 0. (9.59 
The decision rule is to reject Ho if 
t=d> tom, -l, a 
(9.60) 
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Tjt = (X3 + /3jt + Eft., (9.62) 
where ejt « iid N(0, o-) and j=1 for the countries with a strong preference for 
public goods and j=2 for the countries with a weak preference for public goods. 
The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho: ß1=ß2 (9.63) 
and 
Hl :, 31 < 02. (9.64) 
The results of estimation are 
Tit =0.565 - 0.00418 t, R2 = 0.839, DW = 0.601 (9.65) (0.000332) 
and 
72t =0.488 - 0.00114 t, R2 = 0.863, DW = 0.388, (9.66) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. The test statistic 
is 
z= -8.02 < -zo. o5. (9.67) 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
The results of estimation with AR(1) disturbance term are 
Tlt =0.564 - 0.00432 t, j2=0.448, DW = 1.839, p= 0.844 (9.68) 
I 
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and 
T2t =0.489 - 
00.00ö124 
t, R2 = 0.230, DtiV = 1.467, p= 0.714, (9.69) 
where the estimated standard errors are given in the parentheses. The test statistic 
is 
z= -3.49 < -zo. os. (9.70) 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
A single regression is run using tax rates of all countries with dummy variables. 
The regression model is 
Tit = ao + aiDit + Qot + /31Ditt + uzt, (9.71) 
where dummy variable Dit =0 for the countries with a weak preference for public 
goods and Dit =1 for the countries with a strong preference for public goods and 
uit = Piuit-1 + cit. The null and the alternative hypothesis are 
Ho:, ß1=0 
and 
Hl , Ql < 0. 
The result of estimation27 is 
Tjt= 0.47818 + 0.068074Dit - 0.00095357t- 0.0028535 Ditt, (-2.902) 
"LIMDEP produces two-step GLS estimates. 
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Model etimates of , ßl z-value 
So - Ro -0.19098E-' -2.970 
Sl - Ro -0.29078E-2 -6.776 
S2 - Ro -0.29012E-2 -49.762 
So - Rl -0.22654E-2 -1.629 
Sl - Rl -0.32038E-2 -3.349 
S2 - Rl -0.26804E-3 -5.653 
So - R2 -0.18051E-2 -1.426 
Sl - R2 -0.288535E-2 -2.902 
S2 - R2 -0.244910E-2 -4.624 
Table 9.9: Estimates of coefficient of slope dummy variable (3) 
where z-value is given in the parenthesis. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% 
significance level. The estimate of ß1 and its z-value for different models are provided 
in Table 9.9. 
One of the findings in Chennells and Griffith (1997) is a convergence of corporation 
tax rates between countries over 1979-1994. In contrast, Grubert (1999) reports 
that there was no notable convergence in tax rates between 1984-1992.28 Can the 
convergence itself be evidence of tax competition? As far as the preference for public 
goods is concerned, it is interpreted as evidence for tax competition. The higher-tax 
country (the country with a strong preference for public goods) tends to decrease tax 
rate more than the lower-tax country (the country with a weak preference for public 
goods). However, when the differences of country size are considered, tax rates tend 
to diverge. The smaller country tends to decrease tax rate more than the larger 
28The test result of the convergence depends on which tax rates are measured and used. Chennells 
and Griffith (1997) find a strong convergence with the marginal effective tax rates but fail to find 
with the average effective tax rates. In contrast, Grubert (1999) uses the average effective tax rates 
for the large multinational companies of the USA. 
277 
025 
015 
010 
U 
C 
N 
> 
. 005 
l 
. 020 
------------- -------------------- 
)k, 
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 
1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 
year 
Fir; Itre 9.13: Aiiii; It j( )I uC lax IaIt ('"ý I)I( )I : ('1) (. i suit I-ies, 1960-199 
. altliuitgli their t, ix ratrý ai(' 111(, sniiiv wvitllU'Ilt t, ix ((>>iil)('iitia»i. 
Fir; tirte 9.13 s1ºº)wti t lºe ('1ºiººº:; (' in t lºc Vori: º ice (d I ; i-,, I aI ('s of OECD eoii ºt ries. It 
(Im"", iºut, s<'eiii toi be ;) ("l('ýI1 sigh Iur ,i 'I'lIV v? tri; Iti<ni u1' tax 
nit(- was, 1-chatiV('1V bly o ill tlu' 1980" ; 111(1 it liw" Iw('u rr(lli(V(I ill (he 1990-. With 
t liee (lata l1&('(l iIi t1ii- t 1a'sis. a (oniv('rt, VVncV uf' I ax rast rti i5 sli0ývV11 l)rtW('cii 1979-1991 
; Is, (1wiiIlelIs <IiI(I (iitlitlI ( I! )! )-I) Imv(' to)nu(l. I Iv (; III we Ilse 
in<rcasc(i v, ýuriatiuii iii Ilu I, ite 1970s , mud P)Sls and its dediiºe in hie 1JS)l)ý 
Olic 11Vl)OtIleti( II ('X1)lflhl; iIIwI (; In he (lrf1vV1 l, runIt IIo; III IlYsis l)roselIt ('(l III 
i. AV'lwn the size of tr fms; t iuu (- )Kt s (d' t he iiit ('runt 1(111; 11 111( (, f (.; )] )it: il is hirgv, 
k ix ("u11I1xot it, io ll (1O('s, IIHHI ui (itr. A' III(' sire (d lion I)('('O111('ti "l1I a. ll('r tlmni 
278 
certain critical level, countries randomize their tax rates within the range of 201f (K)', 
where 0 represents the size of transaction costs. This randomization will increase the 
variation of tax rates among countries. However, as transaction costs become smaller, 
the variation becomes smaller. Until the late 1970s, the size of transactions costs was 
so large that tax competition did not occur. In the late 1970s, the size of transaction 
costs became small enough to ignite strategic tax setting behaviours of governments 
and therefore tax rates were diversified within the range of 20/f (K)'. However, the 
variation has decreased as the size of transaction costs declines in the 1990s. 29 
The above discussion is based on the assumption that tax convergence is derived 
solely by tax reforms30 and the tax reforms are motivated by the pressure from tax 
competition. When we detect convergence in tax rates, the next step must be to 
investigate how much of the convergence is derived from tax reforms solely motivated 
by tax competition. 
9.5 Overall test of tax competition theory 
The previous tests have two drawbacks. The first is that the results of previous 
tests do not tell us about the overall effect of tax competition. The effects of the 
29I must be cautious in making this statement because this is based solely on the model presented 
in chapter 7, not on the comprehensive results of tax competition theory. The other explanation is 
that the unemployment rates are significant in deciding the level of corporation tax rates and were 
diversified greatly among countries in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
30Devereux (1995) stresses that much of the convergence in the European Community over 1980- 
1991 can be traced to economic ones, such as convergence of inflation rates and interest rates, rather 
than tax reform. This argument is relevant when the METR is measured using actual inflation 
rates and interest rates of each countries. His argument is not applied to the MECTR of this thesis 
because it is computed using the same economic values across countries. 
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openness of a country, the size and its preference for public goods need to be taken 
into account together. The other is that they do not consider explicitly the effects 
of factors other than those suggested by tax competition theory. Here, I will analyse 
whether tax competition theory is significant in explaining differences in the levels of 
corporate tax rates among countries. For this purpose, multiple regression analysis 
is applied. 
The first step is to identify the factors which have influences on the level of cor- 
poration tax rates. This task is difficult in that there are many socio-political factors 
which may affect the level of corporation tax rates and that the degree of their ef- 
fects are different across countries. I have not found literature which is suggestive in 
identifying these factors. What can these explanatory variables be? 
Firstly, corporation tax rate has been thought to be related with decision on in- 
vestment. 31 Therefore, it might be recognized as an tool through which to boost 
investment. The level of tax rates is expected to be negatively related to the un- ' 
employment rate. In other words, governments with high unemployment rates are 
more likely to decrease their corporate tax rates to encourage investment in the cor- 
porate sector and thus to create employment. Secondly, the level of corporate tax 
rate is likely to be higher when the overall tax revenue, proportional to GDP, is 
31 Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) suggest that "the corporation tax may be used to provide incen- 
tives or disincentives to investment, as distinct from corporate savings. Divices like the investment 
credit or accelerated depreciation may be used for this purpose and they may be applied on a cycli- 
cal or a secular basis (p390). " They also suggest that corporation tax has an effect on investment 
because "investment is expressed as a function of the expected net rate of return. .... 
investment is 
taken to be a function of the availability of internal funds including after tax profits and depreciation 
charges (p663). " 
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larger, assuming that corporation tax produces constant share of total revenue across 
countries. Therefore, in our econometric model, the non-tax competition explanatory 
variables are the total tax revenue as a fraction of GDP (TREV) and unemployment 
rate(UNEMPLOY). 32 
As for tax competition variables, the openness and the size of country are used. 
The openness is measured either by the openness of product market (OPEN1) or 
by the openness of capital market (OPEN2), and the size of a country is measured 
either by GDP(GDP) or by population (POP). Because the relative size is relevant, 
the size is measured either by In GDP or by In POP. 
The regression model is 
TZt = at + Xzt/t + bit, Eit - iid N(0, at ), (9.72) 
where 
Pt = [ß1ß 133 , 
84t] (9.73) 
and 
XZt = [TREVt UNEMPLOYt OPEN1; t 1nGDPit]. (9.74) 
Here, ß1t and ß2t are expected to be positive. The null and the alternative hypothesis 
are 
HO : N3t-04t-0 (9.75) 
32The natural unemployment rate differs across OECD countries. For example, 7% of unemploy- 
ment rate may be thought to be high for UK government but to be low for Spanish governemnt. 
In this context, the differnece between actual unempolyment rate and the nutual unemployment 
rate might be more appropriate in my regression. This, however, brings about another controversial 
problem. What is the natural unemployment rate for each country? 
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and 
Hl : 03t >0 or , ß4t > 0. (9.76) 
The results of estimation are provided in Table 9.10 and Table 9.11. The values 
in the parentheses are p-values. 33 The F-test statistics are computed by 
_ 
(RSSR - RSSu)/(m - k) F 
RSSu/(n -m- 1) 
(9.77) 
where RSSR is the sum of the squares of the residual of estimation run without 
OPEN1 and lnGDP as explanatory variables and RSSu is the sum of the squares 
of the residual of estimation run with all four explanatory variables. Here, n is 24, m 
is 4 and k is 2. 
Considering F2,19,0 05 = 3.51, OPEN and lnGDP have explanatory power jointly 
in 1965,1966 34 and between 1988-1995. However, the sign of InGDP is the opposite 
of what might be predicted by tax competition theory. The reason for the negative 
estimates for the coefficient of lnGDP is the high correlation coefficient between 
OPEN1 and InGDP, around -0.60. The partial correlation coefficient between tax 
rate and InGDP has been positive since 1984. 
The estimates of the coefficient of TREV is significant in 1965 and 1966 at the 
5% significance level. For other years, it is positive, except 1991 and 1992, but is 
not significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with the prediction of 
tax competition theory. During the early period, the corporation tax rates are more 
33P - value means the smallest significance level at which a null hypothesis can be rejected. 
34This is not expected and I do not carry out further analysis with this result. 
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year TREV UNEMP OPEN1 InGDP F-statistic 
1965 1.074 -0.287 -0.212 -0.04171 4.229 (0.012) (0.797) (0.042) (0.027) 
1966 0.929 -0.144 -0.217 -0.04763 3.738 (0.039) (0.912) (0.089) (0.032) 
1967 0.667 -0.532 -0.183 -0.03900 2.896 (0.109) (0.658) (0.132) (0.055) 
1968 0.318 -0.788 -0.133 -0.02550 1.238 (0.410) (0.506) (0.279) (0.203) 
1969 0.335 -1.085 -0.139 -0.02977 1.549 (0.401) (0.364) (0.261) (0.157) 
1970 0.002 -1.373 -0.062 -0.02413 0.807 (0.996) (0.409) (0.632) (0.308) 
1971 0.206 -2.086 -0.090 -0.01372 0.747 (0.516) (0.088) (0.317) (0.412) 
1972 0.306 -1.643 -0.078 -0.01321 0.438 (0.475) (0.200) (0.456) (0.475) 
1973 0.364 -1.459 -0.096 -0.01309 0.922 (0.222) (0.189) (0.259) (0.389) 
1974 0.249 -2.730 -0.097 -0.01118 0.876 (0.540) (0.049) (0.268) (0.528) 
1975 0.234 -1.629 -0.033 -0.0005 0.064 (0.540) (0.141) (0.760) (0.981) 
1976 0.201 -1.228 -0.055 -0.00755 0.157 (0.617) (0.228) (0.636) (0.712) 
1977 0.248 -0.669 -0.078 -0.01510 0.348 (0.575) (0.493) (0.545) (0.501) 
1978 0.462 -0.715 -0.153 -0.02593 1.170 (0.293) (0.458) (0.254) (0.244) 
1979 0.399 -1.525 -0.155 -0.02609 1.533 (0.318) (0.126) (0.165) (0.3214) 
1980 0.265 -2.161 -0.112 -0.00999 0.938 (0.482) (0.012) (0.279) (0.593) 
1981 0.547 -2.482 -0.174 -0.00722 2.047 (0.206) (0.003) (0.152) (0.735) 
1982 0.417 -2.455 -0.112 -0.00453 1.604 (0.337) (0.001) (0.342) (0.828) 
1983 0.373 -2.407 -0.128 -0.00081 1.665 (0.340) (0.000) (0.262) (0.967) 
1984 0.413 -1.744 -0.121 0.005284 2.464 (0.794) (0.004) (0.243) (0.794) 
1985 0.383 -1.656 -0.101 0.006318 2.132 (0.306) (0.004) (0.312) (0.757) 
1986 0.226 -1.692 -0.086 0.01083 1.913 (0.534) (0.003) (0.401) (0.599) 
1987 0.156 -1.641 -0.093 0.01047 2.183 (0.655) (0.005) (0.362) (0.617) 
1988 0.318 -1.622 -0.108 0.008718 3.819 (0.271) (0.002) (0.167) (0.596) 
1989 0.397 -1.367 -0.145 -0.00286 5.129 (0.143) (0.006) (0.034) (0.842) 
Table 9.10: Results of multiple regression (1) 
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year TREV UNEMP OPEN InGDP F-statistic 
1990 0.380 -1.347 -0.165 -0.00748 6.248 (0.146) (0.008) (0.014) (0.585) 
1991 -0.128 -1.317 -0.114 0.00098 3.519 (0.619) (0.008) (0.081) (0.949) 
1992 -0.089 -1.377 -0.156 0.00048 5.982 (0.716) (0.002) (0.018) (0.699) 
1993 0.101 -1.418 -0.190 0.00592 8.794 (0.662) (0.000) (0.006) (0.622) 
1994 0.124 -1.155 -0.172 -0.198 7.136 (0.602) (0.002) (0.013) (0.626) 
1995 0.234 -0.969 -0.178 -0.201 7.957 (0.350) (0.013) (0.009) (0.640) 
Table 9.11: Results of multiple regression (2) 
closely related to the preference for public goods in such a way that countries with a 
strong preference for public goods set their tax rates higher than those countries with 
a weak preference. However, as tax competition occurs, the relationship between the 
preference for public goods and tax rates becomes weak. 
Throughout the period, the coefficient of UNEMPLOY is consistently negative, 
implying that countries with higher unemployment rates set their tax rates lower 
than those with lower unemployment rates. However, it is only since 1980 that 
the relationship between them has been significantly different from zero at the 5% 
significance level. 
Throughout the period, the coefficient of OPEN1 is consistently negative, sug- 
gesting that more-open countries set their tax rates lower than less-open countries. 
However, it is only since 1989 that the relationship between them has been signifi- 
cantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. If we ignore the fact that it is 
significantly different from zero in 1965, the result can be interpreted in such a way 
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that international capital mobility is high enough to cause tax competition between 
countries in recent years. 
The estimates of coefficient of lnGDP are problematic. The negative coefficient 
implies that smaller countries set their tax rates higher than those of larger countries. 
This is the opposite of the prediction of tax competition theory. This may be caused 
by higher negative sample correlation coefficient between In GDP and OPEN1. 
We therefore use an alternative set of explanatory variables. The size of a country 
is measured by their population and its openness is measured by the sum of the inflow 
and outflow of direct investment divided by GDP. When the degree of openness is 
measured by the openness of capital market, there are two problems. Firstly, because 
the amount of capital flow is highly volatile with annual data, annual data cannot 
be a good proxy variable for the degree of the openness of capital market. A new 
variable is created by the moving average method such that 
OPEN2t- 
OPEN2t_2 + OPEN2t_1 + OPEN2t + OPEN2t+1 + OPEN2t+2 
5 
(9.78) 
Secondly, the data on inflow and outflow of direct capital for all 24 countries are 
available only for recent years. 
The estimated results are presented in Table 9.12. For the lack of the data for 
several countries, the estimation is carried out only for 1986-1994. All signs of coef- 
ficients are as expected except that the estimated coefficient of TREV is negative in 
1991 and 1992. But they are not significantly different from zero. The joint explana- 
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year TREV UNEMP OPEN2 InPOP F-statistic 
1986 0.229 -1.896 -0.002319 0.02579 2.48 (0.446) (0.001) (0.139) (0.127) 
1987 0.219 -1.900 -0.001978 0.02549 2.32 (0.481) (0.002) (0.152) (0.132) 
1988 0.362 -1.909 -0.001372 0.02801 2.93 (0.195) (0.001) (0.197) (0.053) 
1989 0.349 -1.586 -0.001046 0.02000 1.69 (0.240 (0.005) (0.307) (0.147 
1990 0.283 -1.422 -0.001159 0.01501 1.63 (0.327 (0.014) (0.220) (0.255) 
1991 -0.187 -1.288 -0.0008142 0.01359 1.35 (0.489) (0.014) (0.350) (0.267) 
1992 -0.119 -1.275 -0.001586 0.01207 2.75 (0.649 (0.007) (0.092) (0.294) 
1993 0.089 -1.354 -0.001983 0.01458 4.38 (0.723) (0.001) (0.036) (0.185) 
1994 0.166 -1.184 -0.002104 0.01272 4.28 (0.513) (0.003) (0.028) (0.255) 
Table 9.12: Results of multiple regression (3) 
tory power of the tax competition variables, OPEN2 and 1nPOP, was significant in 
1993 and 1994. 
Two points are worthy of mention. Firstly, the estimated coefficient for each year is 
not stable throughout the period. This suggests that an econometric estimation with 
pooled data may be misleading. If the data for recent years are pooled with those for 
early years and then are used for the estimation of a single equation, the estimates 
of the coefficients of tax competition variables are not likely to be significant in 
explaining tax differences among countries. Secondly, in spite of theoretical emphasis 
on the effect of the size of country on the tax difference, the size of a country has 
little marginal explanatory power in explaining tax difference among countries if the 
effect of the openness is excluded. 
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It should be stressed that the analysis in this section is an exploratory consider- 
ation of the data, which does not make use of the benefits of panel data techniques. 
It would be possible to regress tax rates with respect to the explanatory variables, 
with either time or country dummy capturing movements over time or unobserved 
country effects respectively. There are, however, three reasons why panel data anal- 
ysis was not carried out within this thesis. Firstly, the two non-tax competition 
explanatory variable - unemployment rate and tax revenue proportionl to GDP - are 
merely examples taken from a range of possible candidates. Further consideration 
therefore needs to given to choosing explanatory variables which may have effects 
on the level of tax rates across different countries and throughout the period under 
study. 35 Secondly, the relationship between tax rates and these explaatory variables 
are far from being simple `direction of causation'. Indeed, a completely reverse cau- 
sation is possible. Tax rates might influence unemployment rates, the relative size 
of the government sector and the degree of openness. Lower corporation tax rates 
can boost capital investment which often creates more jobs, reduces tax revenue and 
increases the amount of international direct investment. These mutual causation re- 
quires a structural form. econometric model instead of reduced form which was used 
in this section. Lastly, we cannot include both time and country dummies because we 
have one single observation with correspondng combinations of these two dummies. 
Therefore, we are forced to decide which dummy variable is to be used. The decision 
35The characteristic of political regimes in power, the doininent ideologies of countries, the de- 
gree of incorporation, and the effectiveness of lobbying by corporations are some of these possible 
explanatory variables. 
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depends on the aim of the regression analysis and the properties of the data. For ex- 
ample, if the aim of the regression is to investigate tax differentials across countries, 
the time dummy should be used. However, if the aim is to investigate changes in tax 
rates throughout the period under consideration, the country dummy should be used. 
These three issues must be addressed before panel data analysis can be successfully 
carried out. 
9.6 Concluding remarks 
The data shows a decreasing trend in corporation tax rates on average across 
OECD countries. The result is robust in that various statistical models for estimation 
detect a decline in corporation tax rates. However, it is noteworthy that the degree 
of decrease in tax rates differ across countries. Five countries have experienced an 
increase in tax rates. 
The `level-comparison test' produces inconsistent results. When countries are 
grouped according to product market openness, more-open countries are found not 
to have significantly lower tax rates than less-open countries. In contrary, when 
countries are grouped according to capital market openness, more-open countries are 
found to have significantly lower tax rates than less-open countries. When countries 
are grouped according to their GDP, larger countries are found to have lower tax rates 
than smaller countries, which contradicts the prediction of tax competition theory. 
Alternatively, the `change-comparison test' produces consistent results. More- 
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open countries, smaller countries and countries with a strong preference for public 
goods have decreased corporation tax rates respectively more than less-open countries, 
larger countries and countries with a weak preference for public goods. 
Lastly, an econometric model is set up to consider explicitly other factors which 
may have an effect on corporate tax rates and to see the effect of the openness and the 
size of country. The results of estimation show that the explanatory variables of tax 
competition theory have significant joint power in explaining tax differences among 
countries only for recent years, 1988-1995. However, the marginal explanatory power 
of the size of country is negligible throughout the period if the effect of the openness 
of the country is excluded. 
Two caveats need to be made. The first is the robustness of the tests. The result 
of the unit root test suggests that `difference-stationary process' is more appropriate 
than `trend-stationary process' in fitting the data. When the data is fitted to a 
'difference-stationary process', the null hypothesis of no decline in corporate tax rates 
is rejected by a narrow margin. Therefore, with a `difference-stationary process', the 
results of Test (2)-(4) will be reversed. The null hypothesis that there is no difference 
in degree of tax cutting between groups is not rejected. 
The second concerns the problem of `direction of causation' between tax rates 
as dependent variable and explanatory variables in (9.72). A completely reverse 
causation is possible. Tax rates might have influenced unemployment rate, relative 
size of the government sector and openness. Lower corporation tax rates can boost 
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capital investment which creates more jobs, can reduce tax revenue and can increase 
the amount of flow of direct investment which result in higher degree of openness. 
In order to consider these mutual causation, the econometric model in (9.72) as a 
reduced form should be changed into a structural form. 
Is the marginal effective tax rate the only relevant measurement of the level of 
corporation tax rates in testing validity of tax competition theory? As Devereux 
(1995) mentions, a simple statutory tax rate is more relevant if tax competition occurs 
mainly via profit shifting by transfer pricing because tax burden is proportional to 
nominal tax rates. The other alternative is the average effective corporate tax rate, 
which is corporate tax revenue divided by profits of corporation sector. This will 
be better measurement of tax burden when other tax provisions, not included in 
computing the marginal effective tax rate, are influential on decision of investment 
location; for example, tax-free reserve in Japan and Sweden; and regional investment 
incentives in Italy. 
Considering the difficulty of getting and interpreting the effective tax rates, the 
empirical tests may be carried out with the data on the supply of public goods. Tax 
rate and the level of the supply of public goods are different sides of the same coin. 
While most theoretical models predict the under-supply of public goods as a whole, 
Boskin (1973) predicts the under-supply of redistributive public goods and, at the 
same time, the over-supply of non-distributive goods. Therefore, the analysis of the 
total amount and composition of the supply of public goods will provide an alternative 
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approach to testing the validity of tax competition theory. 
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Chapter 10 
Summary, conclusion and further 
exploration 
10.1 Summary 
The aim of chapter 3 was to set up a model to analyse international tax com- 
petition with corporation tax. The model is stylized to show the size of tax cutting 
caused by tax competition. Two identical countries decide their source-based tax 
rates simultaneously and, with a knowledge of these tax rates, firms decide to locate 
their capital according to the marginal rate of return net of corporation tax. The 
equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. The main 
findings are as follows. 
1. The tax rate at the Nash equilibrium is not zero but rather a positive value 
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below the optimal level. The equilibrium is unique and stable with Cobb- 
Douglas production and social welfare functions. 
2. The results of numerical calibration are presented to indicate the size of tax 
cutting caused by tax competition. It is shown that the degree of tax cutting 
depends on two parameters: a, the share of income of capital, and 31, preference 
for private goods. Generally speaking, tax cutting ranges from 40-50% of the 
optimal tax rate. 
3. Three extensions are presented by changing the objective functions of govern- 
ments. Firstly, when governments are assumed to be Leviathan, tax competition 
is shown to be a desirable pressure to place a limit on the expansion of govern- 
ments. Tax competition between Leviathan governments leads to either higher 
or lower tax rates than the socially optimal level. Secondly, when government 
are concerned to maximise domestic products rather than national products, tax 
competition is more serious and the tax rate is set at the lower level. Lastly, 
as more countries become involved in tax competition, tax cutting becomes 
greater. However, even if an infinite number of countries become involved in 
tax competition, the tax rate does not drop to zero but rather remains at a 
positive value. 
1,3 can be interpreted as the degree of restriction in increasing tax revenue by other taxes. The 
higher , 0, the more easily a country can increase tax revenue by other taxes. 
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In chapter 4, three asymmetric cases have been analysed and a simple form of tax 
coordination is suggested. The main findings are as follows. 
1. The smaller country undercuts the larger country. Therefore, at the non- 
cooperative equilibrium, the smaller country attracts capital from the larger 
country. The latter is worse off due to capital flight and the under-supply of 
public goods while the former can be better off if the benefit of increased capital 
outweighs the distortion of the under-supply of public goods. Tax differential 
creates inefficiency in the allocation of world capital. 
2. Tax competition between countries with different per capita capital endowments 
leads to the same size of tax cutting in both countries. Therefore, at the non- 
cooperative equilibrium, the tax rates are the same in both countries and a half 
of world capital is allocated to each country, which is the efficient allocation of 
world capital. Distortion derives from the under-supply of public goods due to 
lower tax rates in both countries. 
3. The country with a weak preference for public goods undercuts the country 
with a strong preference for public goods. However, the latter decreases tax 
rate more than the former. At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the country 
with a weak preference for public goods attracts capital from the country with 
a strong preference for public goods. The latter is worse off due to capital 
flight and the under-supply of public goods while the former can be better off if 
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the benefit of increased capital outweighs the distortion of the under-supply of 
public goods. Tax differential creates inefficiency in allocation of world capital. 
4. The equal increase in the tax rates of both countries is shown to be a feasible 
tax coordination in all three asymmetric cases. The smaller country (the coun- 
try with smaller per capita capital endowment and the country with a weak 
preference for public goods) always prefers this cooperative equilibrium to the 
non-cooperative equilibrium because the tax differential at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium is maintained and thus the amount of capital inflow is the same, 
while the problem of the under-supply of public goods is lessened. However, 
the larger country (the country with larger per capita capital endowment and 
the country with a strong preference for public goods) accepts this coordina- 
tion only when the positive effect of an increase in public goods outweighs the 
negative effect of a decrease in income from foreign investment. This is the case 
with Cobb-Douglas production and social welfare functions. 
The aim of chapter 5 was to analyse a case in which tax rules are a strategic 
variable used by governments as tax rates. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is 
sought by backward induction. The main findings are as follows. 
1. When both governments choose tax principles between the residence principle 
and the source principle, they adopt one of four variations of the residence 
principle: `no adjustment', `deduction', `credit with limitation' and `exemption'. 
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Tax rates under one of these four tax rules are identical to the optimal tax rate 
and thus there is no distortion from tax competition. 
2. When both governments choose the method of double taxation relief, they adopt 
the credit method or the deduction method. Tax competition does not occur 
at all. 
3. The tax rates in both countries are optimal for each country and worldwide when 
both countries are free to decide their tax rules and tax rates. International tax 
coordination (harmonization) is not necessary. 
The aim of chapter 6 was to analyse a game where subsidies are manipulated to 
attract foreign capital along with tax rates. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is 
sought in a dynamic game in which both countries decide their tax rates in the first 
stage and amounts of subsidies at the next stage. The main findings are as follows. 
1. Universal subsidies have the same effect on capital movement as tax cutting. 
However, preferential subsidies can attract foreign capital but this always causes 
a cross-hauling of capital. 
2. Under the exemption method (a source-based tax), the availability of subsidy 
does not change the level of the effective tax rate. Universal subsidies are used 
along with tax cutting while preferential subsidies are not. 
3. Even under the credit method (a residence-based tax), both governments set 
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their tax rate strategically due to the subsequent subsidy competition. Avail- 
ability of subsidies in attracting foreign capital, both preferential and universal 
subsidies, leads to lower effective tax rates. 
4. If subsidies can be used by governments, tax coordinations (tax harmonization 
and the imposition of minimum tax rate) lead to higher tax rates and larger 
subsidies, failing to increase efficiency in world capital allocation and to alleviate 
the distortion from the under-supply of public goods. 
The aim of chapter 7 was to establish how the imperfection in capital mobility 
affects the existence of an equilibrium and the level of tax rate under tax competition. 
The main findings are as follows. 
1. With a symmetric two countries model, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium no 
longer exists. Both countries may randomize their tax rates over those lower 
than the optimal level. The tax rates of identical countries may differ from each 
other due to randomization. As transaction costs decrease, the level of tax rates 
and the expected tax differential also decrease. 
2. With a small-open economy model, it is found that the small economy always 
sets its tax rate lower than the world tax rate. Tax cutting becomes larger as 
transaction costs become smaller. 
The aim of chapter 8 was to define testable proposition which are based on theo- 
retical analyses. The testable propositions are as follows. 
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1. As the degree of international mobility of capital increases, corporate tax rates 
decrease. As long as alternative taxes can be used only with limitations in 
financing supply of public goods, tax rates do not drop to zero. 
2. As the number of countries involved in the international capital market in- 
creases, corporation tax rates decrease. Even if an infinite number of countries, 
however, are involved in tax competition, tax rates do not drop to zero. 
3. Smaller countries undercut larger countries. If other things are equal between 
smaller and larger countries, the former should have lower tax rates than those 
of the latter under the pressure of tax competition. When other things are not 
equal, the former should decrease tax rates more than the latter. 
4. The countries with a weak preference for public goods undercut the countries 
with a strong preference. However, this tax differential turns up even under 
either myopic or status quo tax setting behaviour other than tax competition. 
Under the pressure of tax competition, the countries with a strong preference 
for public goods should cut their tax rates more than the countries with a weak 
preference. 
The last chapter of this thesis presented the results of empirical tests. Five main 
propositions were tested against the marginal effective corporate tax rates (MECTRs) 
of 24 OECD member countries between 1960-1998, which are computed by the method 
suggested by King and Fullerton (1984). The main results of the tests are as follows. 
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1. The average corporation tax rates of 24 OECD countries dropped from 54% in 
1960 to 37% in 1998. While 19 countries experienced a decrease, 5 countries 
experienced an increase of tax rates. However, the data, as a whole, support 
that corporation tax rates has decreased. 
2. The `level-comparison test' produces inconsistent results. When countries are 
divided by product market openness, the difference of sample mean between 
more-open countries and less-open countries is not significantly different from 
zero. In contrast, when capital market openness is used in grouping, more- 
open countries set their tax rates significantly lower than those of less-open 
countries. Moreover, smaller countries set their tax rates higher than those of 
larger countries on average. This contradicts the proposition of tax competition 
theory. 
3. The `change-comparison test' produces consistent results which support the 
propositions of tax competition theory. More-open countries (regardless of the 
criterion of grouping), smaller countries and countries with a strong preference 
for public goods have cut their tax rates more than less-open countries, larger 
countries and countries with a weak preference. The differences between groups 
are found to be significant. 
4. By regressing the marginal effective tax rates with respect to `non-tax compe- 
tition' variables (unemployment rate and the total tax revenue proportional to 
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GDP) and `tax competition' variables (the openness and the size of a country), 
it is shown that tax competition theory is significant in explaining the difference 
of tax rates among countries only for recent years. 
10.2 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was specified in three ways at the beginning of the thesis: 
to suggest not only the direction but also the magnitude of effect of tax competition, 
to analyse tax competition in a more international context and to investigate the 
validity of tax competition theory with empirical data. Among many taxes which are 
vulnerable to tax competition, corporation tax is analysed in this thesis. 
For the first objective, the model is stylised to identify the magnitude of the 
effect of tax competition in terms of the size of tax cutting. Numerical calibration 
exercises are used for this purpose. In symmetric cases, countries decrease their tax 
rate around 40-50% below the optimal tax rates. In asymmetric cases, not only the 
level of tax rate at the non-cooperative equilibrium but also the size of tax cutting 
are provided. For example, the size of tax cutting of both the smaller country and 
the larger country is much greater than tax differential between them at the non- 
cooperative equilibrium. Furthermore, even if the country with a weak preference for 
public goods has the higher tax rate than the country with a strong preference at the 
non-cooperative equilibrium, the latter decreases tax rate to a greater degree than 
the former. 
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For the second objective, this thesis analysed asymmetric cases which are more 
significant across countries than across regions in a federal country. Countries differ 
in their preference for public goods and in per capita capital endowment. In addition, 
this thesis analysed tax competition in which governments can use other measures 
than tax rates under the pressure of tax competition. Those measures are tax rules 
and subsidies. Tax competition is also analysed in the context of imperfect interna- 
tional capital mobility. These considerations produced various strategic tax setting 
behaviour which is different from that in the standard model. 
For the third objective, the main propositions of tax competition theory are de- 
fined as testable forms and then tested against empirical data. This thesis carried out 
analysis with time-series data, in addition to cross-section data. Consistent evidence 
in favour of tax competition theory is provided. 
The aims of this thesis have, however, been achieved at the cost of generality. My 
desire to get over the limitations of the `comparative static analysis' has forced me to 
adopt a stylised model. The existence of the unique and stable Nash equilibrium, 40- 
50% tax undercutting below the optimal level at the Nash equilibrium and the level of 
tax rates in the cases of three asymmetric tax competition cases all depend crucially 
on my simplifying assumptions. Although the results depend on these assumptions, 
they are suggestive for the future research. 
The analysis is targeted not at `the capital tax' but at corporate tax which is 
relevant to the allocation of real capital. If the analysis is targeted at tax competi- 
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tion for financial capital, some assumptions, such as objective functions, equilibrium 
condition in the international capital market, tax rules, subsidies and imperfection in 
capital mobility, must be modelled differently. 
The tenor of the analysis presented here is not normative but rather positive. 
This is because the aim of the thesis is not to establish whether tax competition is 
a good thing or bad thing. However, most of the public debates on tax competition 
focus on this issue. One influential economic magazine asserted that "a bit of tax 
competition in European countries would be beneficial because it would keep down 
the general level of taxes, which tends to be too high" and that "European countries 
should embrace tax competition, not try to stifle it" .2 
It seems to me that a balanced judgement for tax competition requires more 
comprehensive analysis which extends beyond the existing results of tax competition 
theory. Here, it may be helpful to go back to a classic work in which economic think- 
ing is not elaborate and mathematical but rather broad and comprehensive. Oates 
(1972) suggests three ways in which welfare can be enhanced through decentralized 
governments: 
In summary, a decentralized public sector possesses several economically 
desirable characteristics. First, it provides a means by which the levels of con- 
sumption of some public goods can be tailored to the preferences of subsets of 
the society. In this way, economic efficiency is enhanced by providing an allo- 
cation of resources that is more responsive to the tastes of consumers. Second, 
by providing more increased innovation over time and by providing competitive 
pressures to include local governments to adopt the most efficient techniques of 
production, decentralization may increase both static and dynamic efficiency 
in the production of public goods. Third, a system of local government may 
2The Economist, Auguet Ist 1998, p19 
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provide an institutional setting that promotes better public decision-making by 
compelling a more explicit recognition of costs of public programs. 
The first advantage is ignored implicitly in most literature on tax competition 
theory because they assume the existence of homogeneous consumers in the economy. 
This is a mechanism for which Tiebout (1952) admires fiscal federalism. The third 
advantage is in line with the perspective of Public Choice Theory. The second advan- 
tage is rarely investigated' because all governments are assumed to be equipped with 
same level of productivity in the provision of public goods. Theoretical and empirical 
studies on the relationship between productivity of governments and tax competition 
are required for comprehensive evaluation of the effects of tax competition. 
In predicting the changing role of the state in the future, Tanzi (1997) asserts that 
globalization will reduce the scope of stabilization and redistributive policies because 
tax competition is likely to reduce the revenue of governments. It is challenging for 
public finance economists to investigate whether traditional disciplines of taxation 
and provision of public goods can operate in the closely integrated world economy. 
The separation between economic reality and principles of taxation and provision of 
public goods emerges from the fact that taxation and the provision of public goods 
are designed and implemented by national sovereignty whilst economic activities, 
both of firms and consumers, are performed beyond the boundaries of that national 
sovereignty. Tax competition is one of many problems caused by this separation. 
Existing research, including my own, takes it for granted that the current discipline 
3Wilson (1986) analyses the inefficiency in production of public goods by governments. 
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both of taxation and of the provision of public service will remain unchanged in the 
future. This issue remains the subject of future research 
10.3 Further exploration 
The unchanged feature of tax competition models is their assumption that govern- 
ments decide their tax rates `only once' and `at the same time'. This assumption may 
illuminate the strategic interaction of countries but fails to produce more realistic 
outcomes. In reality, decision on tax rates is a repeated game. Moreover, some gov- 
ernments may exploit aggressively the incentive to attract foreign capital but others 
passively respond to the tax cutting of foreign countries. Therefore, tax competition 
can be modelled with an infinite repeated game or a `first mover-follower' game. 
One of the issues regarding tax competition is whether it leads to convergence of 
the tax rates across countries. This thesis has suggested that this is not necessarily 
the case. It has been shown that countries of different sizes have different tax rates 
under tax competition even if their tax rates are the same without tax competition. 
Moreover, the convergence of tax rates could be derived either by tax competition 
or by a convergence in economic variables. This subject requires further theoretical 
analysis and empirical research. 
Given the difficulty of obtaining and interpreting effective tax rates, empirical tests 
may be carried out on data from the level of supply of public goods. The tax rates 
and the level of the supply of public goods are different sides of the same coin. While 
304 
most theoretical models predict the under-supply of public goods as a whole, Boskin 
(1973) predicts an under-supply of redistributive public goods and, at the same time, 
the over-supply of non-distributive goods. Therefore, the analysis of the total amount 
and composition of the supply of public goods will provide an alternative approach 
for testing the validity of tax competition theory. 
The theoretical analysis presented in this thesis has resulted in a number of propo- 
sitions which have not yet been tested against empirical data. Theses are: (1) Tax 
competition between countries with different per capita capital endowments (this is 
equivalent to tax competition between poor and rich countries) leads to the same tax 
rates at the non-cooperative equilibrium. (2) Subsidies are more likely to be used 
by the countries which employ the credit method. (3) There is no difference in the 
effective tax rates of those employing the exemption method and those employing the 
credit method. 
The difficult but significant research agenda for tax competition theory is how 
tax competition changes the productivity of governments in providing public goods. 
This research will be informative in establishing whether tax competition among 
governments works in a positive way as competition in private markets enhances the 
efficiency of the economy. 
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Appendix A 
Marginal effective corporate tax 
rates 
A. 1 Concept of MECTR 
An effective tax rate is better measurement for tax burden on capital income than 
a statutory tax rate. Many different effective tax rates have been used for different 
purposes. According to Fullerton (1984), there are three dimensions; marginal or 
average, tax rate or tax wedge, and corporate level or sum of corporate and personal 
level. The combination of these three dimensions produces eight different effective tax 
rates. Economists have long been concerned with allocational inefficiency of capital 
incurred by capital taxes. The main interest is the disincentives for investments 
and savings which capital taxes impose. Comparison of tax burden among countries 
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and ante- or ex-tax reform comparison in certain country are of frequent purposes. 
More complicated calculation of tax rates are done to see the allocational inefficiency 
caused by different treatments of capital taxes among industries, assets of investment, 
methods of finance and investors. 
Marginal effective tax rate (METR) is the most frequently used concept for all 
these purposes. King and Fullerton (1984) have made the concept of METR oper- 
ational and refined. Their aim is to see differences of tax burdens among different 
assets, different financing and different investors for the USA, the UK, Sweden and 
Germany. Jorgenson and Landow (1993) apply the same method to G7 countries, 
Australia and Sweden. Their additional analysis is to distinguish distortion caused 
by corporate income tax and personal income tax and analyse different tax burdens 
between corporate sector and non-corporate sector. OECD (1991) enlarges applica- 
tion of METR by calculating METR for domestic investment and for cross-border 
investment separately. 
Empirical studies on tax competition, Devereax (1995) and Chennells and Griffith 
(1997), use the same concept of King and Fullerton (1984). However, it is doubtful 
whether METR of King and Fullerton (1984) can be applied in the context of tax 
competition. This is because the main interest of tax competition theory is not to 
analyse the disincentives for saving and investment but to analyse the comparative 
advantage of countries in attracting capital. I modified the concept of King and 
Fullerton (1984) mainly in two ways. 
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Firstly, only corporate taxes are included in computing the METR. When a firm 
decides between alternative locations for an investment, it is less relevant who provides 
the capital which it uses. Secondly, the values of all parameters except those of tax 
system are assumed to be fixed across countries and across periods. We can exclude 
the effect of non-tax variables by setting them being equal across countries and across 
period. This also makes the calculation of METR much simpler. 
It is important to describe what is the hypothetical investment and how conversion 
of complicated tax provisions into simple numerical values is carried out because value 
of MECTRs heavily depends on these two factors. Next section is to make clear 
the hypothetical marginal investment. Section 3 is to describe technical matters in 
calculating MECTRs. 
A. 2 Assumptions of marginal investment 
One of the most difficult problems in measuring MECTR is that it may differ 
greatly from investment project to investment project. Even in a specific economy, it 
varies greatly according to which industry the investment occurs in, which asset the 
investment formulates, which source the investment is financed by, which situation 
firms are in, and how high inflation rate is, etc. One way to get around this difficulty is 
to assume a hypothetical investment project and measure marginal effective corporate 
tax rate of the project. 
1. The firm is a large manufacturing company. The applicable tax rates 
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depend on the size of firms and source of income of firms in some countries. Almost 
of half of countries have applied a reduced tax rate for income of small and medium 
sized companies or for small profits. The corporate income from manufacturing is 
subject to favourite tax rates in some countries. For example, the income from man- 
ufacturing is subject to special tax rate which is 10% instead of the normal tax rate 
of 40% in Ireland. In Switzerland, the income from manufacturing is subject to 7% 
of rebaitment. 
2. The firm earns large profits from the first year of investment enough 
to fully utilize capital allowances. It is common for firms to suffer losses in the 
first few years after investments. For this reason, tax provisions of loss carry-over 
are one of keen interests of investors. By assuming that firms earn profits from the 
first year of the investment, we ignore the possibility that tax provisions on the loss 
carry-over matter. Furthermore, it is assumed that the firms earn profits enough 
to fully utilize capital allowances. When, firms do not have enough earnings in the 
first few years, they are allowed to defer capital allowances to later years which are 
specified in tax provisions. By this assumption, we ignore tax provisions on deferring 
of capital allowances. 
3. The marginal investment consists of 45% of the general machinery, 
30% of industrial buildings and 25% of inventories. Composition of assets 
of the marginal investment matters because capital allowances are different among 
different assets. King and Fullerton (1984) assume that the marginal investment 
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Author Country Machinery Buildings Inventories 
King and Fullerton UK 46.8% 33.2% 20.0% 
USA 22.47% 53.85% 23.68% 
Sweden 32.3% 34.1% 33.6% 
Germany 41.72% 29.75% 28.53% 
Chennel and Griffith All 50% 28% 22% 
OECD UK 53% 24% 23% 
USA 48% 23% 29% 
Sweden 37% 35% 28% 
Germany 38% 34% 28% 
Table A. 1: Composition of assets used in previous studies 
has a composition of assets which is the same in the economy. They use different 
compositions across countries because their aim is to compare allocational inefficiency 
which each country's tax system causes on typical domestic saving and investment of 
each country. Instead, Chennells and Griffith (1997) use the same composition across 
countries because their interest is to see which country gives favourite tax treatment 
for a single international investment. Table A. 1 gives the compositions which are 
used in previous studies. 
Among the machinery, vehicles are treated differently. Among buildings, com- 
mercial buildings are treated less favourably than industrial buildings and residential 
buildings are treated less favourably than non-residential buildings. We ignore all 
these complicated tax provisions. Furthermore, we also ignore intangible assets which 
become significant in modern industries. 
4. The opportunity cost of capital is 10% of the nominal interest rate 
which is a sum of 5% of the real interest rate and 5% of inflation rate. The 
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Author Country Machinery Buildings Inventories 
King and Fullerton UK 7.9% 2.5% 0% 
USA 13.31% 3.43% 0% 
Sweden 7.1% 2.6% 0% 
Germany 5.66% 4.56% 0% 
Chennel and Griffith All 12.5% 3.61% 0% 
OECD All 12.3% 3.6% 0% 
Table A. 2: Economic depreciation rates used in previous studies 
opportunity cost depends on the source of capital and is a key element in calculating 
METRs by King and Fullerton. We assume that capital is owned by firms which 
decide location of capital. We can think this is the case of retained earnings in King 
and Fullerton (1984) and, with an assumption of no personal capital income taxes and 
no capital gains taxes, firms' discount rate is equal to the market interest rate. The 
other way to define the discount rate is to think the real interest rate as the preference 
for consumption. If capital is not to be consumed but to be invested, the required 
yield, which is the discount rate, must be at least sum of consumption preference rate 
and the inflation rate. The latter interpretation is more related with the model we 
are explored. 
5. The machinery and industrial buildings are depreciated at an expo- 
nential rate of 12.5% and 4% respectively. Inventory is not depreciated at 
all. King and Fullerton (1984) use different economic depreciation rates across coun- 
tries while Chennells and Griffith (1997) use the same economic depreciation rates. 
Table A. 2 gives economic depreciation rates which are used in previous studies. 
323 
A. 3 Calculation of MECTRs 
A. 3.1 General 
For computing marginal effective tax rate, I use the methodology suggested by 
King and Fullerton (1984). The tax wedge, w, is the difference between pre-corporation 
tax rate of return and post-corporation tax rate of return. 
w=p-r, (A. 1) 
where r is the real interest rate in the international capital market and p is the 
minimum rate of return which the investment must yield before paying corporation 
tax in order to provide at least real rate of return. MECTR is defined to be the 
tax wedge either divided by the post rate of return or divided by pre-tax rate of 
return. The formal is a tax-exclusive measurement and the latter is a tax-inclusive 
measurement. Our MECTRs are defined as the latter. 
wý METRexýus,, ve =-A. 2 r 
and 
wý METRinclusive = -" (A. 3) p 
Consider an investment project with an initial cost of one unit. Let MRR denote 
the gross marginal rate of return of the marginal investment. Then, 
p= MRR - 6, (A. 4) 
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where 6 is the real economic depreciation rate, assuming assets are depreciated at a 
single exponential rate. 6 is different from the tax depreciation rate which is specified 
by tax provisions and generally calculated by the declining balance method (DB 
method) or the straight line method (SL method). 
The present discounted value, PV, of the profits of the marginal investment, net 
of taxes, is 
00 
PV =J (1 - t)MRR e(-P-a+") sds 
8=0 
_ 
(1 - t)MRR 
P+6 - 7r ' 
(A. 5) 
where p is the rate at which firms discount cash flows in nominal terms and 7r is the 
inflation rate. The rate at which firms will discount after-tax cash flows is the market 
interest rate which is the sum of real interest rate, r, and inflation rate, ir. Then, 
p=r+zr. (A. 6) 
If the initial cost of the marginal investment is assumed to be a unit, the present 
cost of the investment is a unit less of the present discounted value of investment 
grants and capital allowances given by tax provisions. The present value of such 
grants and allowances is denoted by A. Hence, the present cost of capital, PC, is 
PC=1-A. (A. 7) 
The value of MRR that equates the present value of the investment with the present 
cost of the investment is the return the investment must earn if it is to be a feasible 
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investment. By setting PV equal to PC, the pre-tax rate of return, p, is 
p- 
(1- A) (P +S- ir) 
- S. (A. 8) (1-t) 
Finally, METRinclv. sive is defined as 
(1-A)(P+6-7r) 
-S-r 
ý1-t) M ET Rinclusive (A. 9) p 
A. 3.2 Tax rates 
First of all, it is necessary to distinguish the taxes which are considered in com- 
puting MECTRs and the taxes which are not considered. Generally corporations are 
subject to corporate income taxes, net wealth taxes, property taxes, payroll taxes, 
poll taxes, cost-based taxes, etc. The only taxes which are considered in computing 
MECTR, s are corporate income taxes. The other taxes are not considered not be- 
cause they are not important as much as corporation income taxes but because they 
are difficult to be converted into income related tax rates. For example, there are 
complicated local taxes in Iceland; turnover tax, the tax base of which is defined as 
total turnover cost of companies, Industrial Fee, Industrial Loan Fund Contribution, 
Municipal Business Operating Expense Tax, etc. However, the base of all these taxes 
are operating expenses which are allowed as deduction from gross income for State 
income tax purpose. None of these taxes are considered in our calculation. 
What is the value of t when only corporate income taxes are considered? Even if 
defining t looks straightforward at a first sight, it is not a simple task. Different tax 
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Taxable income 
over not - over 
Tax rate 
0 50,000 15% 
50,000 75,000 25% 
75,000 100,000 34% 
100,000 335,000 39% 
335,000 10,000,000 34% 
10,000,000 15,000,000 35% 
15,000,000 18,333,333 38% 
18,333,333 35% 
Table A. 3: Federal corporate tax rates of USA as of January 1,1999 
rates are applied according to the size of corporate income, legal forms of corporations, 
sources of corporate incomes, size of firms, etc. 
First, we use the tax rates which are applied to the highest income bracket when 
the tax rates are a graduated system. For example, the federal corporate tax rates of 
USA are given in Table A. 3. The value of t used for METRs of the USA is 0.35. 
In Switzerland, tax rates depend on the value of income divided by equity. We 
use the highest tax rates with the assumption that the value belong to the threshold 
of the highest tax rates. 
In some countries, different tax rate is applied to the retained profits and the dis- 
tributed profits. Only tax rate for the retained profits is considered in our calculation 
of MECTRs. 
Local corporate taxes cause a different problem because local governments have 
different tax rates. King and Fullerton (1984) calculate the average local tax rate of 
USA using the weights which are based on the value of existing assets in each states 
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in 1981. Their approach is difficult to apply to ours because necessary data on the tax 
rates of each local government throughout period and the data on the relevant weights 
are difficult to get. Instead, we use maximum tax rates which are restricted by the 
central government. In some countries, we use the tax rates of a local government 
which may represent the country. For example, the tax rate of Geneva is used for the 
local tax in Switzerland. 
When there are multiple corporate income taxes, the payment of one tax may be 
deducted from the corporate income for the others. Suppose that tl and t2 are the 
tax rate of national tax and local tax and the payment of local tax is deducted from 
the corporate income for the national tax, then total tax rate is 
t= t2 +tl(1 - t2). 
(A. lo) 
In some countries, local tax is deducted not only from the corporate income for a 
national tax but also for its own tax base. Then the total tax rate is 
t-(1+t2)+tl{1-(1+t2)}. (A. 11) 
A. 3.3 Capital allowances 
Capital allowances are deducted from income of firms and thus reduce their tax 
liabilities. Therefore, firms are assumed to maximize the present value of capital 
allowances by taking the shortest useful lives of assets, the maximum rates and the 
most profitable methods of depreciation, and earliest depreciation. In some countries, 
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tax depreciation follows accepted accounting practices. We assume that the accepted 
useful life for the machinery and industrial buildings are respectively 8 years and 40 
years. 
In addition to the assumptions in the section 2, we assume that the investment 
is made at the beginning of an accounting year. This assumption is necessary to 
calculate A because timing of investment matters when initial allowances are granted 
and when the half-year convention is applied. Initial allowances can be claimed in the 
first accounting year irrespective of asset's service period. Therefore, an investment at 
the last day of an accounting year gives large present value of initial capital allowance 
than an investment at the first day of an accounting year. Timing of an investment 
also matters when only half of capital allowances can be claimed in the first year of the 
investment, so-called the half-year convention. If an investment occurs at the second 
half of a year, the half-year convention grants benefits. Otherwise, it is harmful. 
The most frequently used methods for calculation of the capital allowances are 
the DB method and the SL method. Assume that the depreciation is granted at the 
DB method at a rate of a per annum for infinite years. ' The present value of tax 
saving from the capital allowances is 
A3 = J_00 tae-(a+P)sds = 
to (A. 12) 
o a+p 
With the SL method for the asset with tax life time, L, the present value of tax saving 
'OECD (1991) assumes that depreciation by the DB method occurs until 99% of asset cost is 
recovered. 
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from the capital allowances is 
As =f_L0 t(1)e-P9ds =t1e 
PL) (A. 13) 
For the USA, the sum-of-the-years-digits method (SYD method) is used. When 
the tax life is L, the capital allowance for each year, J, is 
L-J-1 
Ci =L, i is integral not greater than L. (A. 14) EZ-1 
For example L=3, then the capital allowances for three years are respectively 3/6, 
2/6 and 1/6. The present value of tax saving from the capital allowances is 
As =ZL- LJ 
-1L to-Psds =tZL- L- 
1{ 1-e -pL (A. 15) 
_1 
Ei=1 z ". _O J=1 
Ei=1 2P J_ 
The rate of the DB method is 1.5 -3 times higher than that of the SL method. 
Therefore, the DB method is better than the SL method in that it allows large capital 
allowances in the early years. However, it dose not give complete recovery of cost of 
the investment. Therefore, the switch-over to the SL method is allowed in many 
countries. 2 The switch-over is assumed not to be allowed during an accounting year. 
There are two different switch-overs. First, the rate of the SL method is fixed 
regardless of the years when the DB method is applied. Second, the rate of SL 
methods is calculated to give the same depreciation for each remaining year. The 
remaining value of the asset is divided by the remaining useful life of asset. The 
switch-over by the second method leaves the useful tax life of the asset unchanged 
while the first method shortens the useful life. 
21n some countries, the switch-over is compulsory. 
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The first method of switch-over incurs another problem in calculating present 
value of capital allowances. the remaining capital allowance for the last year may 
be less than the normal capital allowance. We assume that the remaining capital 
allowance is granted throughout a whole year. King and Fullerton (1984) assume 
that the accounting year is shortened if the remaining capital allowance is less than 
the normal one. 
When the switch-over follows the first method for the asset with a useful life of 
L, the switch time from the DB method to the SL method is optimal when the latter 
provides more deduction than the first. Let define L9 be the year of switch-over and 
B be the times of the DB method rate in terms of the SL method rate. Since the 
DB method provides a deduction of B times (1- B) 
J-1 in the year of J and the SL 
method allows i in every year, LS is 
LS> 1+1nB (A. 16) 1nL' 
When is the best switch-over in the case of the second method? Since the DB method 
would allow capital allowance at a rate of B/L on remaining basis and straight line 
would allow 1/(L - LS) on the same remaining basis, LS is 
Ls > (BB 
1)L. (A. 17) 
When is time for the optimal switch from the DB method to the SYD method? 
Since the DB method starts out with higher depreciation allowances and the SYD 
method on the remaining basis must exceed the DB method, the optimal switching 
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point can be found by equating depreciation under the two methods. The switching 
time is 
_L- 
Ls 
F(L LS) 
ý' (A. 18) 
where the F function is defined by 
L 
F(L) = E(L - J). (A. 19) 
J=O 
Additional thing to be considered is the use of the half-year convention, which 
allows only half of capital allowance in the first year. This makes depreciation period 
one year longer than the useful tax life of the asset. For example, if the useful life of 
the asset is 5 years, the annual rate of the SL method is 20%. But, with half year 
convention, it will be 10%, 20%, 20%, 20%, 20%, and 10%. USA has a special rule 
not to make the depreciation period longer. the capital allowance of the last half year 
can be moved up to the previous year. Therefore, the capital allowances are 10%, 
20%, 20%, 20% and 30%. 
In many countries, accelerated capital allowances are granted with different forms. 
If it is given additional to the normal capital allowance, we call it initial allowance. If 
it is given alternative of the normal capital allowance of the first year, we call it the 
first' year allowance. They are also different in that initial allowances can be claimed 
in the first accounting period irrespective of the date of the investment while first-year 
capital allowances can be claimed only proportional with the period when the asset 
is used in the first accounting period. However, this can not make a difference when 
an investment is assumed to be made on the first day of every accounting year. 
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A. 3.4 Stock valuation 
Generally, inventories are not granted capital allowances and thus A is equal 
to zero. The use of historical cost accounting means that the inflationary gain on 
inventory is taxed as current profit when inventories are turned over. This realization 
of inventory profits for tax purpose can occur fairly soon if traditional FIFO (first 
in, first out) accounting is used, or it can be postponed almost indefinitely if LIFO 
(last in, first out) accounting is used. We assume that v denotes the proportion of 
inventories taxed on historical cost principles, and thus it is 1 when FIFO accounting 
is used, or 0 when LIFO accounting is used. The marginal investment of one unit of 
inventory, if there is no change in relative price, will incur an additional tax of tv7r 
per annum. This modifies the equation of present discounted value of the marginal 
investment. 
00 
PV = f{(i - t)MRR - tv7r} " e(-P-5+")sds 
s=O 
(1 - t)MRR - tv7r _ (A. 20) p+S-7r 
With high inflations, especially in 1970s', corporations suffered from increase of tax 
burden due to higher profits from stock valuation. Many countries had implemented 
scheme to counteract this effect. In some countries, stock relief is granted. With 
stock relief, A= ißt, where 0 is the proportion of the stock relief. 
During 1974-1980, UK corporations were allowed to deduct for tax purposes the 
excess of the change in the book value of inventories over 15% of trading profits. The 
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increase in the book value of inventories in any one year consists of the inventory 
valuation adjustment plus the value of the net physical investment in inventories. 
The initial idea was to take the former component out of the tax base to leave in for 
the latter. Since distinguishing between two components was impossible, the scheme 
not only offered relief for the effect of inflation, but also granted immediate expense 
on the purchase of inventories. Thus, in this period, inventories are valued by LIFO 
even if FIFO is applied. In addition, an investment in inventory has the tax saving 
of the amount of t. Therefore, A=t. 
A. 3.5 Investment incentives 
It is difficult to measure the benefits of investment incentives by a single value 
because the systems are so complicated. The incentives heavily depend on which as- 
sets a new investment forms, which industries a investment belongs to, which locality 
an investment occurs in, how large an investment is, for which function assets of an 
investment does, how many jobs an investment creates, whether an investment is for 
exports, etc. Recently, the amount of incentives is likely to be decided by negotiations 
between the government and investors. We consider only investment incentives which 
are granted to the general investment at a fixed rate. 
The investment incentives considered in our calculation of MECTRs take three 
forms; investment allowances, tax credits and cash grants. Investment allowances are 
different from accelerated capital allowances and additional capital allowances in that 
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they do not reduce the cost of assets for depreciation purpose. Accelerated capital 
allowances and additional capital allowances are classified into capital allowances even 
if they have names of investment allowances in some countries. 
When an investment allowance is given at the rate of a%, the tax saving is 
1 ta(1 - e-p) A=e tae-Psds = (A. 21) 
-0 P 
Tax saving from a tax credit of a% is different from that from a cash grant of the 
same rate because the tax credit can be claimed at the end of the first accounting 
year while cash grant can be claimed at the first day of investment. The amount of 
tax saving from a tax credit, A, and from a cash grant, A9, are 
I1 at(1 - e-P) A, = ate-°9ds = (A. 22) 
8=o P 
and 
1 
A9 ate-p8ds = at. (A. 23) - 
f=0 
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Appendix B 
Corporation Taxes in OECD 
countries 
B. 1 Australia 
[1] Tax rates 
In 1957, the income tax rate for corporations was 7s per £1,1 which was changed 
to 7s 6d in 1957, to 8s Od in 1960, to 8s 6d in 1964, to 42.5% in 1965,45% in 1968, 
to 47.5% in 1970, to 45% in 1974, to 42.5% in 1975, to 46% in 1984,49% in 1985, to 
39% in 19882, to 33% in 1993 and to 36% in 1995.3 
11s is equal to 1/20 £ and ld is equal to 1/240£. 
2The dramatic decrease in tax rate was accompanied by an introduction of an imputation system 
and abolition of accelerated depreciation in 1988. 
3These were the tax rates for public companies. The tax rates for private companies were slightly 
lower than those for public companies because undistributed profits of private companies might be 
taxed by Additional tax at the rate of 50%. 
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There have been no other taxes on corporate income, local and national. 
[2] Capital allowances 
For the machinery, 150% of the SL rate was permitted for the DB method until 
1974. In 1975, DDB was permitted. In 1979, depreciation was calculated by the DB 
of 150 % of the SL rate, which was loaded 20% of the original cost. In 1981, the 
loading was changed to 18%. The life time was 10 years. 
During 1982-1987, the machinery was eligible for write-off over three or five years. 
We use the SL method at an annual rate of 20%. 
During 1988-1991, taxpayers were allowed to make their own estimate of the 
effective life and to determine their own depreciation rate. The rate of the DB method 
was 150% of the rate of the SL method. Since 1992, a six-band depreciation schedule 
applies; for the machinery the SL method at an annual rate of 20% or the DB method 
at an annual rate of 30%. 
For industrial buildings, capital allowance was not allowed before 1982. Only 
buildings in specific industries such as farming, grazing and mining were allowed for 
depreciation deduction. From 1982, the SL method of 2.5% was used. The rate 
was increased to 4% during 1984-1987. During 1988-1991, taxpayers made their own 
estimate of the effective life and determined their own depreciation rate. Since 1992, 
a six-band depreciation schedule applies; for the industrial buildings the SL method 
of 7% or the DB method of 10%. 
Throughout the period, the switch-over is assumed to be not allowed because 
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the switch-over requires the Commissioner's approval and the approval is granted in 
certain circumstances. 
For cost of inventory, LIFO has not been permitted unless it approximates actual 
physical flows. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
Until 1985, a special deduction, known as the investment allowance, equal to 20% 
of the cost of the machinery was granted. From 1981, the rate was reduced to 18%. 
Capital cost remains unchanged for the tax depreciation purpose. 
B. 2 Austria 
[1] Tax rates 
During 1958-1972, the corporation tax rate was 44% and Equalization of Burden 
Tax, surtax, was levied at a rate of 18% on the corporation tax. During 1967-1972, 
Flood and Damage surcharge on corporation tax was levied at the rate of 3% and 
Special additional tax on the corporation income was levied at the rate of 10% during 
1969-1972. 
In 1973, corporation tax rate was 50% and there were no more surcharges. The tax 
rate was raised to 55% in 1976. Until 1988, the corporation tax rate for distribution 
and retention were 27.5% and 55%, and changed to 30% regardless of distribution or 
retention of profit in 1989. Since 1995, the rate has been 34%. 
Before 1995, there was a local Trade tax. The tax rate was different across local 
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governments. The maximum rate was 15%, which was decreased to 13.5% in 1989. 
The local corporation tax payment was deducted from the tax base of the national 
corporation tax. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Throughout the period, only the SL method is permitted for the tax deprecia- 
tions. The rate is 10% for the machinery and 4% for the industrial buildings. Initial 
allowances were granted as of 20% for the machinery and buildings before 1972. 
During 1967-1979, there was an accelerated depreciation in addition to the normal 
depreciation only for the machinery. The rate was 20% before 1972,25% during 1973- 
1975 and 50% during 1976-1979. During 1976-1979, the remaining was depreciated 
by the SL method for 4 years. 
In general, inventories are valued at the lower of cost or market value. FIFO is 
generally accepted but LIFO is permitted only if it can be shown that they accord 
with the facts. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
Since 1979, an investment allowance of a percentage of the acquisition cost can be 
claimed in the year of acquisition without reducing the basis for computing annual 
depreciation. The percentage was 20% for the machinery and buildings, 9% in 1992 
and 12% in 1997. 
There are also regional incentives as forms of cash grants per job created, an 
interest rate subsidy and extended loan terms as well as industry incentive. Because 
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of their specification, none of incentives except the investment allowance are not 
included in computing the METRs. 
B. 3 Belgium 
[1] Tax rates 
Until 1962, corporations were taxed as the same with individuals. Business tax 
was levied at the rate of 40%. In addition, there was 5% of a surcharge. 
In 1962, a tax reform introduced separated taxation of corporate income. Com- 
pany tax rate was 35%, which was changed to 42% in 1973, to 48% in 1975, to 39% 
in 1979, to 45% in 1984, to 43% in 1987 and to 39% in 19924. 
During 1968-1972,10% surcharge was levied on the company tax except 1972 
when the surcharge was 20%. During 1975-1978,4.8% of Solidarity Contribution was 
levied on the income of corporations. Since 1994, an additional 3% Crisis Tax has 
been levied on the company tax. 
There is no local tax on the corporate income. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Until 1978, only the SL method for useful life was allowed. Therefore, the ma- 
chinery was depreciated at an annual rate of 12.5% and buildings were depreciated 
at an annual rate of 4%. Since 1979, no depreciation rates are laid in the Belgian tax 
4This is the rate for Belgian companies. For foreign companies, the basic rate is 43% in 1997. 
However, companis from most of countries are taxed by treat rate of 39%. 
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laws or regulations. The only criterion stipulated in the tax law is that rates should 
be based on the normal useful life of the assets. Only guidelines are suggested; 5% 
for industrial buildings and 20% for the machinery and equipment. 
The SL method, the DB method and the switch over from the DB method to the 
SL method are permitted. In the case of the DB method, the SL rate is doubled. 
For the machinery, the DB method at an annual rate of 25%, switching to the SL 
method at an annual rate of 12.5% from the fourth year is used. For buildings, the 
DB method at an annual rate of 8%, switching to the SL method at an annual rate 
of 4% from fifth year is used. 
Inventory is valued at cost price or replacement value, whichever is lower. The 
LIFO method has been allowed since 1992. Before 1992, the LIFO method was not 
permitted unless it approximates actual physical flows. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
The Investment Credit (deduction) for equipment was 5% in 1959. This may 
reduce the taxable basis and consequently reduce the tax payable. Since 1990, the rate , 
is 3.5% unless the inflation rate of the calendar year preceding the year of investment 
plus 1% point would result in a percentage exceeding 3%. Otherwise, the latter 
percentage would apply. Because we assume that inflation rate is 5%, the Investment 
Credit is 6% throughout the period. In 1998, the Investment Credit was repealed for 
companies other than small and medium-sized companies. 
There had been other legislation for investment incentives. The Law of Economic 
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Reorientation in 1978 was to stimulate small and medium-sized businesses. Regional 
Law in 1970 was to promote activities that contribute directly to the formation of 
industrial undertakings in specific development areas. Only the Investment Credit is 
included in computing the METRs. 
B. 4 Canada 
[1] Tax rates 
Federal corporate tax rate is reduced by the Provincial abatement and the Man- 
ufacturing and processing deduction and is increased by a corporation surtax. The 
basic rate5 was 45% in 1956, which was changed to 47% in 1959. In 1972, the tax 
rate was increased to 50%, which was lowered down 1% point in each year until 1976, 
when the tax rate became 46%. The tax rate was changed to 45% in 1987 and to 
38% in 1988. 
Old-age Security tax was levied at the rate of 2% in 1956, which was raised to 3% 
during 1958-1971 and repealed in 1972. There was Temporary surtax of 3% during 
1968-1970. 
Provincial abatement6 was 7% of payable tax during 1962-1978 and was raised 
'These tax rates are for public corporations. In Canada, a public corporation is defined as a 
corporation resident in Canada and having a class of its shares listed in a prescribed Canadian stock 
exchange. A resident corporation not fulfilling this condition may, however, elect or be designated 
by the Minister of National Revenue to be a public corporation subject to certain requirements. A 
private corporation is defined as a corporation resident in Canada which is not a public corporation 
and is not directly or indirectly controlled by one or more public corporations. 
6The provincial abatement is applied only to the income earned in a province other than the 
Northwest or Yukon territory. It is assumed all income comes from other provinces. 
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to 10% in 1979. In addition, Manufacturing and processing deduction was 5% since 
1979, which was changed to 6% in 1984, to 2% in 1987, to 5% in 1991, to 6% in 1993 
and to 7% in 1994. 
Since 1986, Federal surtax has been imposed on basic rate net of provincial abate- 
ment. Federal surtax was 5%, which was changed to 4% in 1994, 
We consider Provincial tax of Ontario. The tax rate was 11% until 1976, which 
was changed to 12%. The tax rate was changed to 13% in 1978, to 13.5% in 1979, to 
14% in 1984 and 14.5% in 1988.7 The provincial tax payment is not deducted from 
the tax base of the federal tax. Specific provincial taxes such as those on income from 
mining and logging operations are not considered. 
It is informative to show a sample of corporate tax calculation. 
Taxable income $100 
Federal income tax $22.84 
Basic tax (38% of taxable income) $38 
Deduct Provincial tax abatement (10% of taxable income) ($10) 
Tax payable $28 
Add surtax 3% $0.84 
Deduct Manufacturing and processing profits tax credit 
(6% of taxable income) ($6) 
Provincial income tax $13.5 
7These are the tax rate for the income from manufacturing and processing. 
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Provincial tax (15.5% of taxable income) $15.5 
Deduct Manufacturing and processing profits tax credit 
(2% of taxable income) ($2) 
[2] Capital allowances 
For the machinery, until 1962, the SL method at a rate of 12.5% was applied. 
During 1963-1981, a special two-year write off of 50% SL method was available. In 
1982, it changed to a special three-year write off of SL method, 25% in the first year, 
50% in the second year and 25% in the third year. This reflects the principle that 
only half allowance is permitted in the first year. In 1988, the special three-year write 
off no longer existed, and it was replaced by the DB method at a rate of 35%. The 
rate has been changed to 30% in 1990, to 25% in 1991 and to 30% since 1992. 
For the buildings, the DB method at a rate of 5% was applied before 1988 and 
the rate was lowered to 4% in 1988. Only half allowance has been permitted in the 
first year since 1982. 
During 1970-1971, depreciation for the machinery and buildings were calculated 
by 115% of acquisition cost. 
All the property included in inventory may be valued at its fair market value or 
each item may be valued at the lower of its cost or fair market value. The LIFO 
basis is generally not acceptable for tax purpose. There was an inventory allowance 
which was 3% annual deduction of the cost of inventory during 1977-1985. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
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Federal and provincial governments have offered a wide range of investment incen- 
tive programmes and tax incentives. The federal Income Tax Act provided investment 
tax credits (ITCs) that were available to all taxpayers in Canada. Manufacturing and 
processing goods was qualified to 5% of tax credit during 1975-1977, which was in- 
creased to 7% in 1978,7-35% in 1984 and 3-60% in 1987. The cost of the qualified 
property was reduced for capital cost allowance. Since 1988, it has been available 
only in the limited areas. 
Regional non-tax incentives include grants, favourable loans, forgivable loans, loan 
guarantees, guidance, contribution toward salaries and training assistance. There are 
also industry-specific incentives; the targeted industries include agriculture, energy, 
exporting, mining, research and development, tourism, housing, technology, and the 
film industry. These are not included in computing the METRs here because they are 
available in the specific areas such as in less-developed regions or in specific industries. 
B. 5 Denmark 
[1] Tax rates 
The corporation tax rate was 44%, which was changed to 36% in 1968, to 37% in 
1974, to 40% in 1979, to 50% in 1988, to 38% in 1991, and to 34% in 1992. Since 
1993, corporation income has been taxed at 38%. However, corporations making tax 
payments in the income year by two equal instalments are subject to 34% instead of 
38%. 
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There is no local tax on corporation income. Local taxes such as Communal 
income tax, County income tax and Church tax are levied only on the income of 
individuals. 
[2] Capital allowances 
The DB method of depreciation is mandatory for the machinery. The maximum 
rate is 30%. $ 
Before 1968, buildings were depreciated at the annual rate of 4%. Since 1968, 
industrial buildings are permitted to be depreciated by the modified SL method. In 
the initial years, a higher rate of depreciation may be applied. The maximum rate is 
6% until the accumulated depreciation amounts to 60%. Thereafter the rate is 2%. 
Inventories are valued at cost or market value, whichever is lower. The LIFO 
method is not permitted unless it approximates actual physical flows. 
Stock in trade could be depreciated by an annual rate of 26% in 1992. The rate 
was reduced by 3% point until 1995, when the rate was 15%. The rate was 12% in 
1996 and 8% in 1997. In 1998, the depreciation was abolished. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
The Danish government's policy is to encourage investment in specific regions, 
activities and in some industry sectors rather than to provide general incentives. 
Regional support is granted in regions with high unemployment. Activity support 
8During 1982-1990, there was a yearly inflation adjustment of the depreciated balance for the 
machinery and buildings. For the machinery, the basis of depreciation was indexed except in the 
year of aquisition and disposal. In addition, in the year of aquisition, depreciation was calculated 
on 5/6 (83.33%) of the acquisition cost. We do not consider this fact in computing the METRs. 
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is given mainly to export industries and industries investing in technological devel- 
opment. Most of incentives are given in the form of financial assistance such as 
favourable loans and government guarantees. 
Local authorities provide incentives in the form of inexpensive land or development 
of new industrial areas through negotiations. 
B. 6 Finland 
[1] Tax rates 
Undistributed profit was taxed at 38%, which was changed to 45% in 1964, to 
48% in 1965, to 49% in 1968, to 43% in 1969, to 33% in 1988, to 23% in 1991, to 19% 
in 1992, to 25% in 1993, and to 28% in 1996. 
There was additional income tax of 12% during 1960-1966, which was deducted 
from taxable income. 
Municipalities levied a tax before 1993. The communal tax9 was levied at a rate 
of 14.5%, which was changed to 16.5% in 1989. 
In addition, Church income tax had been 2%, changed to 1% in 1979, to 2% in 
1989 and to 1% in 1992. 
The local taxes are not deducted from the tax base of the national corporation 
income tax. 
[2] Capital allowances 
'We take the middle figure. 
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The act on Taxation of Business and Professional Income (EVL) has detailed 
rules for the depreciation of different kinds of assets. Before 1969, the machinery was 
depreciated by the DB method at an annual rate of 12.5%. Since 1969, the machinery 
is allowed to be depreciated according to the DB method up to 30% per annum. 
Before 1969, industrial buildings are depreciated by the SL method at an annual 
rate of 2.5%. Since 1969, the maximum amount of deprecation on industrial buildings 
had been 9% by the DB method. In 1995, the rate was lowered to 7%. 
Inventory is valued at acquisition price, cost price or net selling price. Cost price 
can be determined by FIFO. The LIFO method is not permitted unless it approx- 
imates actual physical flows. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
There are no tax concessions aimed at attracting capitals. The main form of 
general nontax incentives to business and industry is low-interest loans. A wide 
range of investment grants and start-up subsidies are available for industry established 
within so-called development areas in the northern and eastern parts of Finland. No 
incentives are included in computing the METRs. 
B. 7 France 
[1] Tax rates 
Tax rates for distributed profits by dividends and retained profits were 50% during 
1959-1985. In 1986, they were 50% and 45%, which were changed to 45% and 45% 
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in 1987, to 42% and 42% in 1988,42% and 39% in 1989, to 42% and 37% in 1990, 
to 42% and 34% in 1991, to 34% and 34% in 1992 and finally to 33.3% and 33.3% in 
1994. 
Surcharge of 18% was levied on the company tax only in 1973. There was a surtax 
of 10% in 1994, which was changed to 25% in 1995 and 20% in 1999. 
No tax is levied on the corporate income at the regional or local level. Towns and 
counties levy rates which are not assessed on income of corporations. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Throughout the period, normal useful life years have been used for the machinery 
and buildings. For the machinery, depreciation was allowed by the DB method at a 
rate of 2.5 times of the rate of the SL method, switching to the SL method for the 
remaining cost of assets. In 1996, the rate was increased to 3.5 times. 
For industrial buildings, depreciation is done by the SL method. 
Inventories are valued at cost price. Cost price can be determined by FIFO. The 
LIFO method is not permitted unless it approximates actual physical flows. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
Most incentives offered by the French government and local municipals have been 
related to their policy to locate industries in the less industrialized areas of the coun- 
try, where jobs are most needed. There are no investment grants and tax incentives 
generally available to the manufacturing sector. 
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B. 8 Germany 
[1] Tax rates 
The German corporation tax has been based on a split rate system; the higher 
tax rate for the retained profit and the lower tax rate for the dividends. Under this 
system, while dividends were subject to a tax rate of 15%, retained profits were taxed 
at 51% in 1958. During 1968-1976, both rates were subject to 3% surcharge, making 
them 15.45% and 52.45%. In 1977 when a new system was introduced to give a 
dividend credit, the tax rate on retained profit was increased to 56% and the tax 
rate on the dividend was increased to 36%. At the same time the 3% surcharge was 
invalid. The tax rate for retained profits was decreased to 50% in 1990 and further 
to 45% in 1994. Solidarity surcharge was 3.75% in 1992, which was increased to 5.5% 
in 1994 and to 7.5% in 1995. 
The tax base of the local profits tax (Gewerbeertragsteuer) is different from that 
of the corporation tax in that interest payments on long-term debt are not deductible 
and 12% of the value of land is excluded from the tax base. Here, we ignore the 
difference in computing tax bases. The tax rate is assumed to be 14% as King and 
Fullerton (1984) estimated throughout the period. The local taxes are deductible 
from the Corporation income. 
There were temporary surcharges; 10% demand pressure surcharge during 1970- 
1971,10% stabilization surcharge 1973-1974 and 5% surcharge in 1984 to encourage 
investments. Because the surcharges were repaid later, we do not consider these 
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surcharges. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Service lives for individual investment goods have been provided by depreciation 
table and these are compulsory. Even if there has been a shortening of the economic 
and tax lives of both the machinery and buildings, we assume that the service lives for 
the machinery and buildings are 8 years and 50 years throughout the period because 
deviation from compulsory rates is permissible where it can be justified. '° 
For the machinery, corporations can choose between the DB method and the SL 
method for computing depreciation with a maximum limit. The rate for the DB 
method was 2.0 times rate of the SL method with 20% maximum limit in 1960, and 
increased to 2.5 times with 25% maximum limit in 1977 and 3.0 times with 30% 
maximum limit in 1981. " 
For the buildings, the SL method is mandatory. However, a special DB method 
was permitted. Before 1985, the rates were 5% for the first 8 years, 2.5% for the next 
6 years and 1.25% for the last 36 years. Since 1985, the rates have been changed to 
10% for the first 5 years, 5% for the following 3 years and 2.5% for the remaining 18 
years. 
Inventories can be valued by the LIFO method. King and Fullerton (1984) con- 
10For example, average economic lives of the machinery and buildings were reduced from 15 years 
and 52 years in 1960 to 13 years and 44 years in 1978. These shortening of tax lives reflected the fact 
that their economic lives were reduced from 14 years and 42 years in 1960 to 11 years and 30 years 
in 1978. This shows that there was no shortening of tax lives in excess of shortening of economic 
lives. 
11For some period of high demand pressure, for example 1971 and 1973, the DB method was not 
permitted. However, we ignore this exception in computing tax rates. 
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sider the real practice that half of inventories are valued by FIFO and set v=0.5. 
However, here we set v=0, because firms will use LIFO as long as it is available 
and is profitable. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
The federal government and state governments offered financial incentives, direct 
subsidies as well as tax reliefs. These were restricted to the regions bordering with 
the East Germany or to specific types of assets such as R&D and energy supply 
industries. There were special investment incentives for investments in former East 
Germany. With the merger of East Germany, the tax system of West Germany has 
been adopted with some minor exceptions, which aim at encouraging investment 
in the old East Germany. For example, Municipal trade tax is not levied, Special 
depreciation up to 50% is available, and various investment subsidies are granted. 
However, there are no general cash grants and tax incentives. Therefore, we do 
not include any incentives in computing the METRs. 
B. 9 Greece 
[1] Tax rates 
The income tax on corporations was 35%, which changed to 30% in 1974, to 49% 
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in 1984, to 40% in 1988,12 to 35% in 1992 and to 40% in 1993.13 
The tax rate was increased by 15% as a contribution towards social insurance, 
Agricultural Social Insurance Fund. Since 19G3, this contribution was deductible 
from taxable profit. 
Only in 1973, there was Special Levy of 20% over DR10,000,000, which was de- 
ductible from the taxable income. 
There is no local income tax for corporations. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Throughout the period, the SL method was compulsory. The SL method was 
applied at an annual rate of 12% for the machinery and 8% for factory buildings. Until 
1972, normal depreciation rates were increased by 50% in respect of new installations 
and machinery. 
During 1973-1982, the normal depreciation allowances were increased according 
to the number of shifts14 working and the location of the plant. For example, the 
machinery for two shifts and locating in Zone A had a 25-200% increase of the normal 
depreciation. We do not include this additional allowance. 
Inventory is valued at cost price or fair market value, whichever is lower. The 
121n 1988, the corporate tax rate depends on type of corporations and their realized investments. 
The tax rate was 46% for commercial corporations, 40% for manufacturing corporations, and 35% 
for the manufacturing corporation the share of which is quoted on the Adens Stock Exchange or 
realized investments of which are over certain amount. 
13Corporations (SA) are taxed at the rate of 40%. The tax rate of 35% is applied if Corporations 
are quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange. Limited liability companies (EPE) are subject to 35%. 
14A shift means 8 hours working in a day. Therefore, two shifts is 16 hours working and three 
shifts is 24 hours working. 
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LIFO method is permitted. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
In order to encourage the decentralization of industry away from the Athens- 
Piraeus area, various regional tax incentives had been adopted. Investment incen- 
tives include both tax and non-tax incentives. Tax incentives are tax allowances and 
increased tax depreciation rates and non-tax incentives are investment grants, inter- 
est rate subsidies of investment loans. A grant up to 50% of total investment, extra 
depreciation allowances up to a maximum of 150% of the normal depreciation, and 
fixed corporation tax rates were among many. 
Greece is divided into separate areas; A, B, C, and D15. Regular investments in 
area A do not receive tax and non-tax incentives. Therefore, we do not include any 
incentives in computing the METßs. 
B. 10 Iceland 
[1] Tax rates 
The corporate tax rate of the central government was 51% in 1984,48% in 1988, 
45% in 1990 and 33% in 1996. 
There is a local turnover tax, the tax base of which is defined as total turnover 
"Legislative Decree 1078/1971 divided Greece into three regions; (1) Region A: the district of 
Attica except for the municipality of Lavrion (2) Region B: the municipality of Lavrion, the districts 
of Thessaloniki, Boeotia, Euboea, corinthia and the province of Chalkis (3) Region C: all other areas 
in the country. Legislative Decree 1892/1990 divides the country into four regions, defining Region 
A the most developed area and Region D the least developed area. 
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cost of companies. An average tax rate was approximately 1%, which was 1.5% 
in 1996. Local governments impose many other taxes on corporations; Industrial 
Fee, Industrial Loan Fund Contribution, Municipal Business Operating Expense Tax, 
etc. However, the base of these taxes are operating expenses which are allowed as 
deduction from gross income for State income tax purpose. There are no local income 
taxes for corporations. 
[2] Capital allowances 
The SL method is applied for the depreciation . The rate was 12% for the ma- 
chinery and 2% for industrial buildings. The rate for the machinery was increased to 
15% in 1984.10% residual value should be remained before 1992. 
Inventory is valued at cost price allowing for inflation in 1990. Inventory is valued 
by the FIFO method. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
There is no investment incentives which is included in computing the METRs. 
B. II Ireland 
[1] tax rates 
Corporations were subject to income tax as well as corporation profits tax before 
1974. The payment of corporation profits tax was deducted from the taxable income 
base of the income tax. Income tax rate as 7s Gd in 1955, which was changed to 7s 
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in 1959, to 6s 4d in 1961, to 7s in 1966, to 35% in 1970.16 There was a surtax17 of 
8s 6d in 1955, which was changed to 7s 6d in 1959,9s in 1967 and to 45% in 1970. 
Corporation Profit tax rate was 10% in 1955, which was changed to 15% in 1961, and 
to 23% in 1966. 
In 1974, Corporation tax replaced the previous two taxes and the rate was 50%, 
which changed to 45% in 1979, to 50% in 1984, to 47% in 1988, to 43% in 1989 and 
to 40% in 1991. However, 10% corporation tax rate was introduced in 1981. This is 
designed to promote the development of manufacturing industry and certain services 
in Ireland. The 10% tax rate is available to companies on their manufacturing and 
certain non-manufacturing profits earned between January 1,1981 and December 31, 
2010. We use 10% for the corporation tax rate for 1981-1999. 
There is no local corporate income tax in Ireland. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Machinery was depreciated by the DB method at an annual rate of 12.5%. Taxpay- 
ers could speed up the depreciation allowances for the machinery by initial allowances 
up to 20% in 1960, which changed to 40% in 1961, to 50% in 1967, to 75% in 1968, to 
100% in 1971, to 75% in 1988, to 50% in 1989, to 25% in 1991 and abolished in 1992. 
Since 1992, the machinery has been depreciated over 7 years by the SL method; 15% 
for the first 6 years and 10% in the seventh year. 
'61d is one penny which equals 1/240 of one pound and is is one shilling which equals 12 pennies, 
i. e. 1/20 of one pound. 
17Surtax is levied on the higher incomes of individuals and also on the undistributed income of 
certain private companies. 
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Industrial buildings were depreciated by the SL method at an annual rate of 2% 
before 1975 and 4% on and after 1975. Taxpayers could speed up the depreciation 
allowances for buildings by initial allowances up to 10% in 1960, which changed to 
20% in 1966, to 50% in 1967, to 75% in 1968, to 100% in 1971, to 75% in 1988, to 
50% in 1989, to 25% in 1991 and abolished in 1992. 
Inventories are valued at cost price or market value which is lower. Cost price 
can be determined by FIFO. The LIFO is not permitted. There was a 3% of stock 
relief only in 1984. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
Since the late 1950s, a wide range of investment incentives have been used to 
increase industrial development. A broad range of financial and fiscal incentives have 
been offered including capital grants, training grants and tax relief. Among them, 
Fixed asset grants, administered by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), can 
be acquired up to 45% of the expenditure on fixed assets including the machinery and 
buildings. If the grants are given, capital allowances are applied to the acquisition 
cost net of the grants. 
However, we do not include the Fixed asset grants in computing the METRs 
because it is not granted automatically, but through negotiation. 
B. 12 Italy 
[1] Tax rates 
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Until 1974, the income of corporation was subject to Company tax as well as the 
schedular income tax, which was called Movable wealth tax. Tax payment of Movable 
wealth tax was deducted from the tax base of Company tax. Company tax rate was 
15% and Movable wealth tax rate was 20% in 1960, which changed to 24% in 1962 
and to 25% in 1965. There were three local taxes of 7.75%; Chamber of Commerce 
of 2.5%, provincial tax of 1.75% and Commutal tax of 3.5%. 
There was a surcharge on the above three taxes at a rate of 10%, which was Local 
assistance boards tax. During 1967-1973, there was another 10% of surcharge, which 
was Flood relief due to the flood in autumn of 1966. The rate was increased to 15% 
from 197118. 
There was a tax reform in 1974. Corporation tax (IRPEG) rate was 35% in 1974, 
which changed to 25% in 1976, to 27% by 8% surcharge in 1982, to 30% in 1983,36% 
in 1984 and to 37% in 1995. 
During 1974-1976, five local taxes were levied and these were deducted from the 
tax base; 8.5% of Municipal tax, 2.5% of Provincial tax, 2.0% of Regional tax, 1.2% of 
Chamber of Commerce, and 0.5% of Health, holidays and tourist centre tax. In 1976, 
these were singled into one tax of 15%, local income tax (ILOR). The rate was 15% 
and fully deductible, 16.2% and fully deductible in 1982,16.2% and 75% deductible 
in 1991, and 16.2% and no longer deductible in 1993. There was a surcharge of 1% 
18There were surcharge of 5% on Movable Wealth tax and the Local taxes during 1967-1972, 
which was to finance work in Calabria. However, this surcharge was not considered in computing 
the METRs because it is not clear whether this surcharge was levied only in Calabria or nation 
widely. 
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in 1994 only. 
Since 1998, local tax on productive activities (IRAP) has substituted ILOR. IRAP 
is computed not on the taxable income but on the gross margin basis. Any cost 
associated with labour, interest and accruals for risk are not deductible for the tax 
base for IRAP. This implies that the tax burden by IRAP is heavier than from ILOR 
even if both have the same rate. Therefore, it is difficult to convert the tax rate 
of IRAP to the tax rate of ILOR and we thus use the rate for 1998 same with in 
1997. The ordinary IRAP rate is 4.25% and is not deductible for the calculation of 
corporate taxable income. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Until 1973, depreciation as given on the SL method and the maximum rates were 
laid down by the tax authorities. For general machinery, the rate was 10% and, for 
industrial buildings, the rate was 3%. Accelerated depreciation for the machinery was 
15% of the cost in four years and the maximum deduction of 40% in four years. These 
were additional to the normal depreciation and thus reduced depreciation period by 
two-fifths. 
During 1974-1987, the normal depreciation rates were the same as the previous 
period but accelerated rates were allowed up to a maximum depreciation of 15% of 
the cost of the asset for the first 3 years. This implies the first 3 years at 25% and 
the remaining years at 10% for the machinery and the first 3 years at 18% and the 
remaining 15.3 years at 3% for industrial buildings. 
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In 1988, accelerated depreciation was changed, so that the additional allowances 
were defined as not exceeding 150% of the usual depreciation allowances in the first 
three years and only half the depreciation in the first period, so-called half year 
convention, was applied. In 1990, the additional allowances were defined as not 
exceeding 100%. In 1996, it was changed to 200%. 
Tax code lays down a system of pricing of inventories, which is basically the LIFO 
method. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
The most important incentives involve investments in the Mezzogiorno, the south- 
ern and relatively less developed parts of Italy. This area is defined as beginning a few 
kilometres east and south of Rome and includes Sicily, Sardinia and some other very 
small municipalities in northern Italy and is inhabited by 35-40% of the total pop- 
ulation of Italy. These incentives include non-tax incentives as form of low-interest 
rate loans and grants as well as tax incentives. Tax incentives are exemption from 
IRPEG and ILOR for ten years. 
According to Alworth and Castellucci (1994), the effective tax rates for invest- 
ments in the Mezzpgiorno are considerably lower than those for the rest of Italy due 
to interest rate subsidies and tax exemptions. However, we do not consider this in 
computing the METRs. 
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B. 13 Japan 
[1] Tax rates 
Since 1899, the tax on corporate profits had been combined with the individual 
income tax until 1940, when separate corporate income tax began. Corporation 
income is taxed not only by the central government but also by the two-tier local 
governments, prefectures and municipals. 
The national corporation tax rate was 38% in 1958, which was decreased to 37% 
in 1965 and further to 35% in 1966. Since 1970, there had been a trend towards 
raising tax rates due to fiscal deficits. The tax rate was increased to 36.75% in 1970, 
to 40% in 1974 and to 43.3% in 1981. However, the tax rate was decreased to 42% 
in 1987, to 40% in 1989 and to 37.5% in 1990. 
There have been five local taxes which increase tax burden significantly. Prefec- 
tural Inhabitants Taxes and Municipal Inhabitants Taxes consist of per capita tax of 
lump-sum and income tax computed as a percentage of the corporation tax. In 1963, 
Prefectural Inhabitants Per Capita Tax was levied at Y600, which was increased to 
Y1,000 in 196719 and to Y6,000 in 1976. Municipal Inhabitants Per Capita Tax was 
levied at x¬4,000 in 1963, which was increased to x¬7,000 in 196720 and to x¬40,000 in 
1976. 
Each prefecture and municipality may elect a tax rate of Inhabitants income tax 
within the range; The range for a prefecture was 5.2-6.2% in 1963, which changed to 
'9This was for corporations with capital in excess of ten million yen. 
20This was for corporations with capital in excess of ten million yen. 
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5.8-7% in 1967, to 5.6-6.6% in 1970, to 5.4-6.5% in 1976, and to 5.0-6.0% in 1984. For 
a municipal, it was 8.1-9.7% in 1963, which changed to 8.9-10.7% in 1966,9.1-10.7% 
in 1970,12.1-14.5% in 1976, to 12.3-14.7% in 1984 and to 8.4-10.1% in 1995. 
Prefectural Enterprise Tax is imposed on the corporation's income and deducted 
from tax base not only for the corporation tax but also for its own. The maximum 
rate was 12%, which changed to 13.2% in 1984 and returned to 12% in 1995. 
Table B. 1 shows the local taxes in 1963 and 1976. The maximum rates for the 
highest income band are used in computing tax rates. As far as per capita taxes are 
concerned, lump-sum taxes are converted to the proportional tax by the following 
formula. 
lum-sum tax 
tax rate for per capita tax= threshold amount of the highest income band 
For 1976, Prefectural Inhabitants Per Capita Tax was converted to 0.006% and Mu- 
nicipal Inhabitants Per Capita Tax was converted to 0.04%. For 1963, when there 
was not any threshold, the threshold of the closest year is used. Therefore, using the 
threshold of 1976, Prefectural Inhabitants Per Capita Tax was converted to 0.0006% 
and Municipal Inhabitants Per Capita Tax was converted to 0.004%. 
In addition, for some period, there were surcharges on the corporation tax. During 
1974-1976, surcharge on corporation tax was 10% and during 1991-1994, it was 2.5% 
to recoup tax revenue reduction. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Capital allowance has remained the same throughout the period. This is partly 
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Tax 1963 1976 
Prefectural Inhabitants Tax 
Per capita Tax 600 1,800 up to Y10m 
3,000 between Y10m and Y100m 
Income tax standard rate 5.2% 
maximum rate 6.2% 
6,000 over Y100m 
standard rate 5.4% 
maximum rate 6.5% 
Prefectural Enterprise Tax 6% up to Y1m 6% up to Y3.5m 
9% Y1m-1.5m 9% ß¬3.5m-7m 
9% Y1.5m-2m 12% over Y7m 
12% over Y2m 
Municipal Inhabitants Tax 
Per capital tax 1,200-4,000 12,000 up to ß¬10m 
20,000 Y10m-Y100m 
40,000 over Y100m 
Income tax standard rate 8.1% standard rate 12.1% 
maximum rate 9.7% maximum rate 14.5% 
Table B. 1: Local taxes in Japan in 1963 and 1976 
because Japan has used tax-free reserves for investment incentives instead of generous 
capital allowance. Depreciation is computed by using the DB method switching to 
the SL method. The law provides useful lives for various categories of assets and the 
rates of depreciation for both the SL method and the DB method. All assets can be 
depreciated up to 90% until 1963 and 95% from 1964. Here, it is assumed that the life 
time of the machinery and buildings are 9 years and 43 years. These are life times for 
the machinery in a petrochemical plant and for ferroconcrete factory building. The 
DB rate per annum are 22.6% and 5% and later they will change to SL method. 
For computing cost, the LIFO method has been allowed. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
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Japan implemented rigorous industrial policies to stimulate investments in key 
industries by tax exemption, tax credit, or special depreciation, for example, in the 
petrochemicals and exports industries in the 1950s and 1960s. These tax incentives 
have been phased out because of the large fiscal deficit since 1970s. At the same time, 
the Japanese government had used a wide range of investment incentives such as initial 
depreciations and accelerated depreciations for specific industries and assets. R&D, 
energy-saving and anti-pollution have been the main targets of investment incentives. 
Recently, import incentives were available during 1990-1998 and capital investment 
in computer systems receives special tax incentives. 
However, throughout the period, there are no tax incentives which are available 
to general investments. 
B. 14 Luxembourg 
[1] Tax rates 
The basic rate of Corporation tax was 40%, which changed to 45% in 1970, to 
40% in 1971, to 38% in 1987, to 36% in 1988, to 33% in 1991, to 32% in 1996, to 31% 
in 1997 and to 30% in 1998. 
A surtax, Solidarity tax, was levied. Before 1981, the surtax rate was 1% of 
Corporate income tax, which changed to 0.5% in 1976, to 2% in 1982, to 3% in 1986, 
to 2% in 1988, to 1% in 1991 and to 4% in 1995. 
There had been surcharges which were repaid later. For example, only in 1973, 
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there was 5% surcharge and the payment was reimbursed not later than the end of 
1975. Therefore, we do not consider this surcharge. 
Municipal business tax on income is levied at a rate of 4% on adjusted income, 
which is reduced by an allowance of LF -700,000.21 The tax is then multiplied by a 
coefficient that ranges from 200% to 350%, depending on the commune where the 
company is located. The coefficient was 140-250%, which was increased to 140-300% 
in 1965, to 140-350% in 1967 and 140-370% in 1973. We use the maximum rates. The 
tax is deductible as an expense from its own as well as from the corporate income tax 
base. Therefore, the nominal rate of 10% is equivalent to an effective rate of 9.09%. 
[2] Capital allowances 
The depreciation must be calculated on the normal life of the asset. Depreciation 
is normally calculated using the SL method. However, the DB method is permitted for 
other than buildings and intangible assets. The depreciation rate for the DB method 
may not exceed three times the rate for the SL method or 30%. It is permissible to 
change from the DB method to the SL method. 
Inventory is valued at the cost price or selling value, whichever is lower. Cost price 
is determined by the FIFO method. The LIFO method is not permitted unless it 
approximates actual physical flows. In 1996, the LIFO method was permitted. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
Tax credit was available at a rate of 9% of the cost of the machinery for supple- 
21The allowance was increased to LF800,000 in 1973. 
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mentary investment and 6% for the first LF 6 million and 2% for the excess of acqui- 
sition cost for an new investment during 1967-1983. The rate for the supplementary 
investment was increased to 12% in 1984. We use the rate for the supplementary 
investments. 
B. 15 Netherlands 
[1] Tax rates 
Corporation tax rate was 47% in 1957, which changed to 45% in 1963, to 47% 
in 1966,46% in 1967, to 48% in 1973, to 43% in 1984, to 42% in 1988 and to 35% 
in 199022. There was 3% of surtax on Corporation tax only in 1971 and 4% only in 
1972. 
No other taxes, national or local, are levied on corporate income. 
(2] Capital allowances 
Assets should be depreciated over their economic lives. No specific tables for tax 
depreciation rates are provided in the law. A number of depreciation methods are 
permissible if the method is in keeping with sound business practice and is consistently 
applied. The SL method, DDB method and the switch from DDB method to SL 
method are allowed. Here, we use actual life times for the buildings, 25 years and for 
the machinery, 8 years and the DDB method switching to the SL method is used. 
22The tax rate on the first amount of taxable income ( for example, NTG100,000 in 1996) is 40% 
(38% in 1996), with 35% applying thereafter. 
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For buildings, accelerated depreciation was granted during 1960-1962. One-third 
of the initial cost of an asset was written-off at will, subject to a restriction of the 
maximum annual rate to 6%. 
Inventory is valued at the lower of cost or market value. Cost can be determined 
on the basis of FIFO and LIFO. A inventory deduction of 4% of the fiscal book 
value of inventories at the beginning of the year was granted during 1984-1988. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
Investment allowance of 5% of cost in the first two years was granted to the 
machinery during 1960-1966 and to industrial buildings during 1960-1963. In 1978, 
tax credit was granted at the rate of 12.5% for general investment. This was to 
reduce unemployment through the encouragement of new investment. This general 
investment credit was eliminated in 1988. In 1989, tax credit was granted only to 
small and medium enterprises, which was replaced by investment deduction in 1990. 
B. 16 New Zealand 
[1] Tax rates 
In 1956, Income tax rate was 8s 8d, which was changed to 8s 6d in 1958. In 1967, 
Income tax rate for corporations was 42.5%, which changed to 50% in 1969, to 45% 
in 1971, to 28% in 1988 and to 33% in 1989. 
Until 1974, there was Excess Retention Tax, which was imposed on undistributed 
profits of private companies at a rate of 35%. We do not consider this tax because it 
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was imposed on the excess of undistributed profits over certain amount. 
There are no local taxes on corporate income. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Before 1984, the machinery was allowed to be depreciated by the DB method at 
an annual rate of 10%. There were special additional depreciations during 1960-1975. 
For the machinery, 6%, 5%, 4%, 3% and 2% were added to the normal depreciation 
before 1962 and 10%, 5%, 3% and 2% were added on and after 1962. In 1975,25% 
of the first year allowance was granted. In 1984, depreciation by the DB method at 
an annual rate of 10% was allowed. In 1991, the rate was increased to 12.5%. 
Industrial buildings were depreciated by the SL method at an annual rate of 1%. 
Since 1993, new depreciation rates have been applied for the machinery and build- 
ings. However, we do not have enough information and thus we use the same rates 
before 1993,12.5% and 1% for the machinery and buildings. 
Inventory may be valued at cost price, replacement price or market selling value. 
LIFO is not permitted. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
There was investment allowance of 10% for the machinery during 1963-1966. 
During 1975-1980, four investment allowances were granted; Regional allowances ex- 
cept Auckland and Wellington, Industrial Development Plan allowance, High Priority 
Activity allowance and Exporting Manufacturing allowance. We consider only the Re- 
gional allowance of 20% of allowance for the machinery and buildings because the rest 
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were not granted to the general investments. These allowances did not reduce the 
cost of assets for depreciation. 
In 1984, a special investment allowance up to 40% was granted for the machinery, 
which terminated in 1988. The special investment allowance did not reduce the cost 
of asset for tax depreciation. 
The government no longer offers general incentives except some limited grant 
assistance to create new jobs. 
B. 17 Norway 
[1] Tax rates 
During 1957-1966, State income tax was levied at a rate of 30%, which was lowered 
to 26.5% in 1970, to 27.8% in 1977 and to 28% in 1988. 
In addition, Commutal income tax was levied by county districts and municipals 
at a rate of 14-18%, which was raised to 16-19% in 1963, to 17-20% in 1970, to 18- 
22% in 1977 and to 18-21% in 1979. Maximum tax rates are used in computing the 
METRs. 
Rom 1964,5% of Equalization Levy was taxed. The rate was decreased to 3% in 
1970, to 1.7% in 1973 and to 1% in 1977. These two taxes were not deducted from 
the taxable income base for State income tax. 
There was a tax reform in 1992. The national income tax was no longer applicable. 
Local income tax rate became 28% including contribution to the tax equalization fund. 
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During 1966-1972, Special Development tax, to finance Norwegian aid to develop- 
ing countries, was levied at the rate of 0.25% in 1966,0.5% in 1969,1% in 1970 and 
1.3% in 1972. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Until 1965, the SL method was used and the standard rates were given by the 
State Taxation Authorities. We assume that useful lives for the machinery and for 
buildings were 8 years and 40 years. Since 1966, the DB method of depreciation is 
mandatory for tax purpose. For the machinery, the rate was 30%, which is decreased 
to 20% in 1984. For industrial buildings, the rate was 7%, which was lowered to 5% 
in 1984. 
During 1966-1979, for the machinery, an additional allowance, 50% of the normal 
depreciation could be claimed for the first 5 years. For industrial buildings, an ad- 
ditional allowance, 25% of the normal depreciation, could be claimed for the first 5 
years. 
The FIFO is used for calculating cost price while the LIFO method is not per- 
mitted. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
There are no general investment incentives. However, investment incentives are 
granted by local agencies and normally take the form of cheaply available developed 
industrial sites. Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) helps 
enhance profitable businesses and economic trade development throughout the coun- 
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try. The SND's most common client are small-medium businesses in need of risk 
capital and long-term capital. 
B. 18 Portugal 
[1] Tax rates 
Industrial tax rate was 15%, which changed to 18% in 1968, to 15% in 1971, to 
18% in 1974 and to 20% in 1976. There were five surcharges on Industrial tax; 14% 
of Municipal surcharge which changed to 15% in 1971,45% of Tax on Trade and 
Industry23,3% of Tax on Tourism, 2% of District Council Surcharge, 8% of State 
Surcharge on Tax on Trade and Industry. 
Tax on Income from capital was 15%, which was changed to 18% in 1971, to 15% 
in 1974 and to 22% in 1977. There were two surcharges on Tax on Income from 
capital; 10% of Municipal surcharge and 2% of District Council Surcharge. 
Complementary tax was levied at a rate of 8%, which was increased to 12% in 
1976. There was 25% of State surcharge on Complementary Tax. In 1977, there was 
a surcharge on Complementary tax at a rate of 15%. In 1985, Complementary tax 
was suspended. 
All these taxes were increased by 10% in 1976 and 15% in 1978. 
The corporate tax rate was 40%, which was decreased to 35% in 1988, to 36% 
in 1989 and to 34% in 1996. Additional tax which varied up to 10% was levied by 
23This is the tax rate in Lisbon and Oporto. 
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municipals. As OECD (1991) did, we use 7.5%, the middle value between 5% for 
Lisbon and 10% for Oporto. In 1991, the additional tax changed to 10% surtax. 
We do not include Defence tax, which was levied at a rate of 10% on the profits 
arising from the operation in Portugal of public concessions, industrial monopolies or 
other privileged commercial activities such as arms dealers and manufacturers. We 
also do not consider the taxes of specific areas. For example, Industrial tax in certain 
areas such as Northern Portugal, the North and South of Oporto but excluding Oporto 
itself is surcharged at 7%, 9% or 10%. The surcharge is paid to the autonomous port 
authorities. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Depreciation is allowed in an amount agreed by the revenue authorities as being 
reasonable. For the machinery, the rate of the SL method is 12.5% and the rate of 
the DB method is 2.5 times of the rate of the SL method. The switch-over from the 
DB method to the SL method is not permitted. Rates can be increased up to 50% 
when assets are used for more than one shift. We assume that assets are used for one 
shift. 
For industrial buildings, the rate of the SL method was 4%, which was increased 
to 5% in 1991 but depreciation by the DB method has not been permitted. 
For the valuation of the inventory, LIFO is expressly permitted for statutory 
accounting and is normally accepted by the tax authorities. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
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There was a tax credit. Companies were allowed to deduct 10% of investment 
made in new plant and equipment from corporation tax in 1986, which was lowered 
to 8% in 1987, to 6% in 1988 and to 4% in 1989. In 1990, the tax credit was no longer 
available. 
Government policy is to stimulate investment in depressed areas and industries. 
The general tax benefits and incentives are available as forms of exemption of the 
capital gains tax, exemption of corporate tax on dividends, and exemption of personal 
and corporate income tax on interest on bonds. Financial incentives are available for 
specific activities such as regional development, R&D, agriculture, tourist, energy, 
trade and telecommunications projects. None of these incentives are included in 
computing the METRs. 
B. 19 Spain 
[1] Tax rates 
The corporation tax rate was 30% in 1959, which was raised to 32% in 1976. 
There was Additional tax for Joint-stock companies, which were prevalent forms of 
corporation in Spain, at a rate of 4%. Additional tax was not allowable expense for 
Company tax. 
Only in 1968, there was Special Temporary tax of 10% and, during 1975-1978, 
Temporary surtax was 10%. 
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The income of a corporation was subject to the licence fee and local taxes24, which 
were surcharges on the licence fee. However, we do not consider the licence fee and 
its surcharges due to lack of information about the amount. 
A major reform of Spanish income taxes was carried out with effect from 1979. 
The previous Schedular system was abandoned and a new single national tax on 
the income of individuals and a corresponding tax on the income of companies were 
introduced. Company tax rate was 33% in 1979 and 35% in 1984. There is no local 
tax but a tax of 1.5% 25 levied by the Chamber of Commerce, which was changed to 
2% in 1984, to 1.5% in 1993, to 1% in 1995, to 0.8% in 1997 and to 0.75% in 1998. 
This surtax is deductible. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Throughout the period, assets can be depreciated by the DB method or the SL 
method. Therefore, we assume that the machinery and buildings are depreciated by 
the DB method. 
For the machinery, until 1978 the DB method of 30% was generally accepted. The 
annual rate could be increased to 40%. Since 1979, there have been guideline rates of 
depreciation by both industry sector and asset type, expressing a maximum rate per 
annum and a maximum number of years. For the general machinery, the maximum 
rate was 8% for the SL method, which was increased to 10% in 1990 and to 15% in 
24Provincial surcharge was 38% of the licence fee and Municipal surcharge was 18% of the licence 
fee. 
25The tax base of the surtax is not exactly the same as that of corporation income tax. 
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1993. The rate for the DB method is 200% of the SL rate. 26 During 1993-1994, the 
depreciation was allowed to be accelerated up to 1.5 times of normal depreciation. 
For industrial buildings, the maximum rate is 3% for the SL method. Since 1979, 
the DB method has been allowed. The rate for the DB method was 200% of the rate 
of the SL, which was increased to 250% in 1990. 
Until 1990, the LIFO was not permitted. Since 1991, FIFO and LIFO have 
been accepted. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
An investment tax credit of 12% could be taken in the first year on the acquisition 
of a new asset. The investment tax credit was changed to 15% in 1985, to 10% 1989, 
and to 5% in 1990. The investment credit was repealed in 1994. The higher investment 
credit is applied to the specific activities such as 20% for research and development 
and 25% for exportation activities. 
There are also tax credits and tax deductions for specific activities such as new 
technology, small and medium sized firms, job creation, regional investment, R&D 
investments, etc. 
B. 20 Sweden 
[1] Tax rates 
26The most profitable method is the SYD with 8 years of useful life. However, we compute capital 
allowance by the DB method because the DB is normally used and the SYD method cannot show 
the change in the depreciation. 
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In 1958, Company tax rate was 50%, which changed to 40% in 1960 and to 32% 
in 1984. The tax rate was increased to 52% in 1985 due to the incorporation of the 
local tax. The tax rate was decreased to 30% in 1991 and further to 28% in 1994.27 
Local corporation tax was imposed until 1984. The rate was 16% until 1966 and 
29% afterwards. The local taxes were deductible from the tax base of the national 
corporation tax. After 1985, local tax was incorporated into the national company 
tax. 
[2] Capital allowances 
For the machinery, the acquisition cost may be depreciated at an annual rate of 
30% by the DB method. However, a firm is free to write-off an amount needed to 
bring the remaining value down to what would have been if the firm had written 
20% of the original amount invested from the outset. With this arrangement, it is 
profitable for a firm to switch from the DB method at an annual rate of 30% to the 
SL method at an annual rate of 20% after 3 years. 28 
For buildings, depreciation is carried out by the SL method and the life time 
varies according to its type and use, which is specified by the guideline of the tax 
authorities. According to the estimate of King and Fullerton (1984), the buildings 
are assumed to be written off using a life time of 28 years. Since 1970, buildings have 
been depreciated more favourably. During the first five years, firms are allowed to 
27There has been Undistributed Profit Tax, which is levied on the undistributed profits of joint- 
stock companies. The tax is charged at a flat rate of 25% on the difference between the amount 
deemed to constitute a reasonable distribution and the amount actually distributed. 
28This method is called book depreciation. 
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deduct an additional 2% per year, which shortens the tax life time of the asset. With 
the original 28 years, time life becomes to 25 years with 2% extra depreciation. Since 
1984, the life time of buildings has changed to 25 years. 
Inventories are valued at acquisition cost or market value, whichever is lower. The 
acquisition cost is determined on a FIFO basis. LIFO is not permitted. According 
to King and Fullerton (1984), a deduction was allowed up to a maximum of 60% of 
the value of net purchases of inventories during 1980-1984 and 50% during 1985-1990. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
The Investment fund (IF) is one of important features of the Swedish corporate 
income tax. It is to induce firms to reserve profits during boom years to be used for 
investments during subsequent recessions. Each year a firm can deduct up to 50% of 
its tax profits by allocating an equivalent amount to its investment fund. This reduces 
tax payment by an amount equal to the allocation times the statutory corporate tax. 
According to King and Fullerton (1984), however, firms financed less than 20% of 
their investments by IF during 1970s when the IF was extensively used. We do not 
consider IF in computing the NIETRs. 
B. 21 Switzerland 
[1] Tax rates 
The maximum rate of National Defence tax was 8% in 1967. Since 1971, Federa- 
tion corporate income tax rates had been progressive, based on the ratio of taxable 
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income to net taxable equity. The overall maximum rate was 9.8% when taxable 
income was in excess of approximately 23.15% of equity. Since 1998, the Swiss Fed- 
eration has levied direct corporation income tax at a flat rate of 8.5% on profits. 
We take local taxes applied to Geneva. The tax rate is computed by 
Basic tax rate x multiplier. 
The basic tax rates are determined based on a formula such as 
Taxable income 
x Coefficient. Equity 
For Geneva, minimum and maximum basic rates were 3% and 15% and the multiplier 
is 1.875, which changed to 1.86 in 1961, to 1.85 in 1962, to 1.86 in 1963, to 2.16 in 
1964, to 2.18 in 1965, to 2.20 in 1966, to 2.26 in 1967 and to 2.28 in 1968. 
The local tax payment is not deducted from the profit of firms in terms of Feder- 
ation corporate income tax base. 
Since 1998 with the introduction of the flat rate of Federation corporate income 
tax, all taxes have been treated as tax-deductible expenses. 
[2] Capital allowances 
The rates must reasonably reflect the normal period of exhaustion and/or wear 
and tear. The Federal tax authorities have indicated depreciation rates for many 
types of assets on the basis of the DB method. If the SL method is used, depreciation 
by one-half of these rates is permissible. The allowance may, at the taxpayer's option, 
be calculated by either the SL method or the DB method. It is assumed that the 
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switch from the DB method to the SL method is not permitted. 
Inventories may not be valued in excess of the lower of cost or market value. Cost 
is generally determined by the FIFO. LIFO is not found in practice. Since 1984, it 
is permissible to write down inventories by one-third of the purchase or market value 
without further justification. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
The federal government maintains a policy of neutrality in encouraging investing 
in Switzerland and no general incentives are granted. However, federal government 
grants may be claimed for investments in specific regions threatened by economic 
decline. The promotion of industry is primarily under the responsibility of the cantons 
and a wide variety of investment incentives are granted by cantonal and communal 
governments. Tax and non-tax incentives are granted on a case-by case basis and 
thus none of incentives are included in computing the METRs. 
B. 22 Turkey 
[1] Tax rates 
Tax rate was 40% in 1984 and 46% in 1988. Supplemental levies amounted to 6% 
of the corporation tax, which was increased to 7% in 1991 and to 10% in 1992. 
Since 1994, corporations are liable to Corporate tax and Withholding tax. The 
amount of paid Corporate tax is deducted from tax base for Withholding tax. Cor- 
poration tax is imposed at a rate of 25%, which was increased to 30% in 1999 and 
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Withholding tax is imposed at a rate of 20%. 
There are no local income taxes. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Depreciation was given by the SL method or the DB method and the switch from 
the DB method to the SL method is permissible. If the taxpayer switches from the 
DB method to the SL method, the remaining value of the asset is equally divided 
over the remaining years. 
For the SL method, the annual rate was 25% for the machinery and 4% for build- 
ings. The rate for the DB method was 200% of the rates of the SL method. From 
1983, for the machinery, the SL method up to 25% per annum and the DB method 
up to 50% per annum were available. Since 1995, the rates have been reduced to 20% 
and 40%. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
Investment allowance depends on the type of asset and region of the investment. 
Investments approved by the States Planning Organization (SPO)29 benefit 30-100% 
reduction of cost from taxable income. 
B. 23 United Kingdom 
[1] Tax rates 
In the UK, the separate taxation of corporations started in 1947, until when the 
"In 1992, the approval was granted by Undersacretariat of Treasure and Foreign Trade. 
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taxation of corporate profits was integrated with the personal income tax. After 
1947, the corporation tax system has subsequently changed and thus the tax rate has 
changed also. The major changes occurred in 1958,1965,1973 and 1984. 
Between 1947-1958, a two-rate system was in force, in which undistributed profits 
were taxed at a relatively lower rate of profits tax and distributed profits were taxed 
at a higher rate. In 1958, the differential elements in profit taxation were abolished. 
Both distributed and undistributed profits were taxed at a single rate. In addition, 
shareholders were given credit for the tax paid on dividends at the corporation level. 
Companies were liable to income tax at the standard rate and to profits tax as well. 
Profit tax payable was allowable as a deduction in computing profits for income tax 
purpose. The standard income tax rate was 8s 3d and profit tax rate was 12.5%, 
which was changed to 15% in 1961. 
The election of a Labour government in 1965 saw the introduction of a straight- 
forward system of corporation tax. Under the new system, profits were taxed at a 
single rate of 40%, which was increased to 42.5% during 1967-1969. 
But in 1973, the Conservative government went back to an imputation system 
with a single rate of corporation tax, where corporation tax rate was increased from 
40% to 52%, which was lowered to 50% in 1983. At the same time, two corporate 
tax rates, full rate for large corporations and special rate for small corporations, were 
introduced. Only the full rate is considered in computing the METRs. The other 
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change in 1973 reform was Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT). 30 Corporations were 
required to make advanced payment of corporation tax for the distributed profits. 
These payments entitled the shareholders to tax credits of corresponding amounts 
which were set off against their liability to income tax at the basic rate in the gross 
dividend. When the corporations paid their corporation tax bill, the ACT paid was 
deducted from the gross liability calculated on all profits. Here, we do not consider 
ACT because the corporation is assumed to have enough profit to set the ACT off 
against the total corporation tax bill. 
The tax rate was substantially reduced during 1984-1986 as part of a range of 
measures which induced the abolition of stock relief and the reduction of capital 
allowances. The tax rate was 45% in 1984,40% in 1985 and 35% in 1986. In 1990s, 
the tax rates have been lowered mainly due to the economic recession. The tax rate 
was lowered to 34% in 1990, to 33% in 1991, to 31% in 1998 and to 30% in 1999. 
[2] Capital allowances 
Throughout the period, capital allowances for the machinery is calculated by the 
DB method at an annual rate of 25% and capital allowance for buildings is calculated 
by the SL method at an annual rate of 4%. For the machinery, the first-year allowance 
at a rate of 30% was granted in 1960, which was replaced by the initial allowance in 
1970. The rate of initial allowance was 60% in 1970, which was increased to 80% in 
1971 and 100% in 1972. The initial allowance was decreased to 75% in 1984 and to 
30The ACT was repealed in 1999. 
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50% in 1985 and finally terminated in 1986. 
For buildings, the first-year allowance had been given before 1986. The rate was 
15% in 1960, which changed to 30% in 1970, to 40% in 1972, to 50% in 1974,75% in 
1981,50% in 1984 and to 25% in 1985. 
Only in 1992, there were the first-year allowances; 40% for the machinery and 20% 
for buildings. 
Inventories have been taxed on a FIFO basis. During 1974-1979, however, com- 
panies were allowed to deduct for tax purposes the excess of the change in the book 
value of inventories over 15% of trading profits measured after depreciation allowances 
for tax purposes. King and Fullerton (1984) claim that at the margin the scheme not 
only offered relief for the effect of inflation but also granted immediate expensing 
on the purchase of inventories and thus inventories could be thought to be taxed 
according to the LIFO method in this period. We would follow their consideration. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
All investments in manufacturing were qualified for investment grants of 20-45% 
between 1966-1970. However, general cash grants have not been available since 1971. 
Only Regional Assistance and National Selective Assistance are available. Regional 
Assistance is to stimulate industrial investment in those areas suffering from high 
unemployment and National Selective Assistance is given on discretion of the gov- 
ernment. King and Fullerton (1984) estimated the former grant to be 19.46% for 
machinery and 14.76% for buildings. Here, we only consider the grants of 32.5%, 
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which was the simple average of the minimum rate and the maximum rate, for 1966- 
1970. 
All the other current investment incentives such as cash grants for investments in 
manufacturing and certain service industries, 100% of capital allowances for invest- 
ments in the Enterprise Zone and tax exemption for investments in the Free zone are 
not considered in computing the METRs. 
B. 24 United States 
[1] Tax rates 
The federal corporate income tax started in 1913 at a rate of 1%. Since then, the 
tax rate had been gradually increased to around 50%. During 1954-1963, corporate 
income was taxed at the rate of 52% by the federal corporate income tax. The tax 
rate was decreased to 50% in 1964, to 48% in 1965 and to 46% in 1979. In 1980, the 
federal corporate income tax was changed to a graduated rate structure, with a tax 
rate of 46% on the income above $100,000. We use only the tax rate of the highest 
income band. The tax rate for the highest income band was drastically decreased to 
34% in 1986 but increased to 35% in 1993. 
A tax surcharge was imposed at a rate of 10% during 1968-1969 and at a rate of 
5% in 1970. 
States and municipal taxing authorities impose corporate income taxes on corpo- 
rations within their jurisdictions. Tax rates and tax bases are different among states 
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and municipals. Here, we use the tax rate of 6.55% throughout the period, which is 
estimated for 1980 by King and Fullerton (1984). Those local taxes are deductible 
from the corporation income for the federal corporate income tax. 
[2] Capital allowances 
The United states have had the most complicated capital allowance scheme and 
the scheme has been changed frequently. The 1954 Code, adopted in 1956 was a 
basic legislation on the tax depreciation. The regulation was supplemented by a set 
of `Depreciation Guidelines and Rules' (hereafter the Guideline) published by the 
Internal Revenue Service in 1962. 
Before 1981 when the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 introduced the Ac- 
celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), the capital allowance for machinery was 
calculated by the DDB method switching to the SYD method. The life time for the 
machinery was 8 years during 1960-197031 and 7 years32 during 1971-1980 because 
the Asset Depreciation Range in 1971 made all assets to be depreciated at the rate 
of 20% shorter than the Guideline suggested. 33 Since 1981, the life time for all the 
machinery have been 5 years and capital allowances have been calculated by the DB 
method switching to the SL method. The rate of the DB method was 1.5 times the 
SL rate, which was increased to DDB in 1986. 
31The Guidelene shortened the useful lifes of assets by 30-40%. However, we do not consider this 
change because companies could not recieve full investment credit if the useful life was less than 7 
years. 
32To get full Investment Credit, the life time of asset must be 7 years at least. 
33The 20% shortening of the life time was not applied to the buildings except public utility 
structures. 
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During 1960-1968, the life time for industrial buildings was 25 years and the capital 
allowances were calculated by the DDB method switching to the SL method. In 1969, 
the DDB method was decreased to the 150% DB method. In 1981, the useful life was 
shortened to 15 years and 175% DB method was used. In, 1986, the life time was 
increased to 30 years and only the SL method was used. Since 1993, the life time has 
been increased to 39 years. 
Throughout the period, the half-year convention is considered, for all assets, the 
machinery as well as buildings. In addition, since 1981, the depreciation of the last 
half year has been moved up to the preceding year only for the machinery. These are 
discussed in detail in the section for the methodology. 
Inventories have been valued by the LIFO method throughout the period. 
[3] Investment grants and incentives 
The Investment Tax Credit (ITC) was introduced in 1962 at 7% only on the 
machinery. The ITC did not reduce the basis of the depreciation. It was repealed in 
1969 but reintroduced in 1971 at a rate of 7%. A 1975 act temporarily increased the 
credit 10%. In 1978, the 10% credit was made permanent. The Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 reduced the depreciation basis by half of the investment 
tax credit. Since 1986, the ITC has been no longer available. 
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Appendix C 
Sources of tax data 
[1] Australia 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
4. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
5. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
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6. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[2] Austria 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Austria 1997 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[3] Belgium 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Belgium 1994 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
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[4] Canada 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
4. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
5. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
G. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Canada 1994 
7. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[5] Denmark 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
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4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Denmark 1995 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[6] Finland 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Finland 1997 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[7] France 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
4. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
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5. Maillard, Didier, Tax policies in the 1980s and 1990s: The case of France, 
International CEEA Conference on "Taxation and Economic Growth" 
6. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
7. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[8] Germany 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
4. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
5. King, Mervyn and Don Fullerton, 1984, Tyhe taxation of income from capital; 
A comprehensive study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
West Germany, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 
6. Krause-Junk, Gerold, Tax policies in the 1980s and 1990s: The case of Germany, 
International CEEA Conference on "Taxation and Economic Growth" 
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7. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
8. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[9] Greece 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Greece 1992 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[10] Iceland 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
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4. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[11] Ireland 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
4. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
5. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Ireland 1993 
6. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[12] Italy 
1. Alworth, Julian S. and Laura Castellucci, 1994, The taxation of income from 
capital in Italy, Fiscal problems in the single-market Europe edited by Mario 
Baldassarri and Paolo Roberti, St. Martin's Press, Rome 
2. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
393 
3. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
4. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
5. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
6. King, Mervyn and Don Fullerton, 1984, Tylie taxation of income from capital; 
A comprehensive study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
West Germany, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 
7. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
8. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[13] Japan 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
4. Ishi, Hiromitsu, 1993, The Japanese tax system, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
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5. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
6. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
7. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Japan 1996 
8. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
9. Tajika, Euji and Yuji Yui, 1998, Cost of capital and effective tax rate: A com- 
parison of U. S. and Japanese manufacturing industries, Hitotsubash Journal of 
Economics 29,181-200 
[14] Luxembourg 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[15] Netherlands 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
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2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Netherlands 1996 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[16] New Zealand 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in New Zealand 1993 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[17] Norway 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
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3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Norway 1997 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[18] Portugal 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Portugal 1992 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[19] Spain 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
397 
4. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[20] Sweden 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
4. King, Mervyn and Don Fullerton, 1984, Tyhe taxation of income from capital; 
A comprehensive study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
West Germany, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 
5. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
6. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Sweden 1995 
7. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[21] Switzerland 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
398 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in Switzerland 1998 
5. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[22] Turkey 
1. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
2. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
3. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
4. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[23] United Kingdom 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
399 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Inland tax revenue statistics 1998, Her Majesty's Station- 
ary Office, London 
4. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
5. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
6. King, Mervyn and Don Fullerton, 1984, Tyhe taxation of income from capital; 
A comprehensive study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
West Germany, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 
7. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
8. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
[24] United States 
1. Chennells, Lucy and Rachel Griffith, 1997, Taxing profits in a changing world, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 
2. Coopers & Lybrand, International tax summaries 1985,1989 and 1993 
3. Inland Tax Revenue, Income taxes outside the United Kingdom 1966,1973 and 
1976, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London 
400 
4. Jorgenson, D. and R. Landau, 1993, Tax reforms and the cost of capital: An 
international comparison, The Brookings Institution, USA, Washington DC 
5. King, Mervyn and Don Fullerton, 1984, Tyhe taxation of income from capital; 
A comprehensive study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
West Germany, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 
6. OECD, 1991, Taxing profits in a global Economy; Domestic and International 
issues, Paris 
01 
7. Price Waterhouse, Doing business in the United States 1995 
8. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Corporate taxes; Worldwide summaries 1998 
401 
Appendix D 
Tax data used in computing 
MECTRs 
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variable description 
ntax national corporation tax rate 
ltax local corporation tax rate 
stax surtax on the corporation tax rate 
ttax total nominal tax rate 
metr marginal effective tax rate 
ded 0 indicates local tax is not deducted from tax base of national tax 
1 indicates local tax is fully deducted from tax base of national tax 
invent 0 indicates inventory is valued by LIFO 
1 indicates inventory is valued by FIFO 
srelief stock relief 
m, b, im for machinery, b for buildings and i for inventory 
method 0 indicates straight line method 
1 indicates declining balance method 
2 indicates sum of the year's digits method 
intent tax credit 
cash cash grant 
1,2,3,4 the sequence of applying capital allowance method when it change 
a total capital allowance for machinery or building 
p pre-tax rate of return 
Table D. 1: A description of abbreviations used in the statistic sheets(1) 
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country variable description 
Austria atax additional tax 
Canada ftax federal surtax 
pbate provisional abatement 
mbate manufacturing and processing deduction 
Finland ctax commutal tax 
Ireland ctax corporation profit tax 
Italy ctax company tax 
wtax movable wealth tax 
Japan piitax prefectural inhabitants income tax 
pictax prefectural inhabitants per capita tax 
miitax municipal inhabitants income tax 
mictax municipal inhabitants per capita tax 
pretax prefectural enterprise tax 
Norway etax equalization levy 
sdtax special development tax 
Portugal indtax industrial tax 
catax tax on income from capital 
comtax complementary tax 
alltax tax increase for all taxes 
Spain atax additional tax 
chtax chamber of commerce levy 
Turkey wtax withholding tax 
Table D. 2: A description of abbreviations of specific capital income taxes 
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Appendix E 
Macroeconomic data used in 
grouping and estimation 
variable description 
tax marginal effective tax rates 
un unemployment rate 
rev - total tax revenue/GDP 
op openness measured by (export+import)/GDP 
loggdp log GDP 
logpo log population 
cop simple centred 3-point moving average of the openness 
measured by (inflow+outflow of investment)/GDP 
Table E. 1: A description of abbreviations used in the statistic sheets(2) 
A: \australfa. sav 
year ntax Itax ded Invent mratel myearl mmethodl bratet byearl bmethodl 
1 1960 . 3500 1 . 1500 1 
2 1961 . 3500 1 . 1500 
1 
3 1962 . 3500 
1 . 1500 
1 
4 1963 . 3500 1 . 1500 
1 
5 1964 . 3750 
1 . 1500 
1 
6 1965 . 3750 
1 . 1500 
1 
7 1966 . 3750 
1 . 1500 
1 
8 1967 . 4750 
1 . 1500 
1 
9 1968 . 4750 
1 . 1500 
1 
10 1969 . 4750 
1 . 1500 1 
11 1970 . 4750 
1 . 1500 
1 
12 1971 . 4750 
1 . 1500 1 
13 1972 . 4750 
1 . 1500 
1 
14 1973 . 4750 
1 . 1500 
1 
15 1974 . 4500 
1 . 1500 
1 
16 1975 . 4250 
1 . 2000 
1 
17 1976 . 4250 
1 . 2000 
1 
18 1977 . 4250 
1 . 2000 
1 
19 1978 . 4250 
1 . 2000 
1 
20 1979 . 4250 
1 . 3500 1 
21 1980 . 4250 
1 . 3500 1 
22 1981 . 4250 
1 . 3300 
1 
23 1982 . 4250 
1 . 2000 5.0 
0 . 0250 40.0 
0 
24 1983 . 4250 
1 . 2000 5.0 0 . 
0250 40.0 0 
25 1984 . 4600 
1 . 2000 5.0 0 . 
0250 40.0 0 
26 1985 . 4600 
1 . 2000 5.0 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
27 1986 . 4600 
1 . 2000 5.0 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
28 1987 . 4900 
1 . 2000 5.0 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
29 1988 . 3900 
1 . 1875 1 . 0600 
1 
30 1989 . 3900 
1 . 1875 1 . 0600 
1 
31 1990 . 3900 
1 . 1875 1 . 0600 
32 1991 . 3900 
1 . 1875 1 . 0600 
33 1992 . 3900 
1 . 3000 1 . 1000 
1 
34 1993 . 3300 
1 . 3000 1 . 1000 
1 
35 1994 . 3300 
1 . 3000 1 . 1000 
36 1995 . 3600 
1 . 3000 1 . 1000 
37 1996 . 3600 
1 . 3000 1 . 1000 
38 1997 . 3600 
1 . 3000 1 . 1000 
39 1998 . 3600 
1 . 3000 1 . 1000 
`ý 
1-1 
A: \australia. sav 
mincent bincent ttax ma ba mp bp lp metr 
1 . 2000 . 
350 . 6000 . 0000 . 0698 . 
0985 . 1038 . 4248 
2 . 2000 . 
350 . 6000 . 0000 . 0698 . 
0985 . 1038 . 4246 
3 . 2000 . 
350 . 6000 . 0000 . 0698 . 
0985 . 1038 . 4246 
4 . 2000 . 
350 . 6000 . 0000 . 0698 . 
0985 . 1038 . 4246 
5 . 2000 . 
375 . 6000 . 0000 . 
0720 . 1040 . 
1100 . 4512 
6 . 2000 . 
375 . 6000 . 0000 . 
0720 . 1040 . 
1100 . 4512 
7 . 2000 . 
375 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0720 . 1040 . 
1100 . 4512 
8 . 2000 . 
475 . 6000 . 0000 . 
0832 . 1314 . 
1405 . 5535 
9 . 2000 . 
475 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0832 . 1314 . 
1405 . 5535 
10 . 2000 . 
475 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0832 . 1314 . 
1405 . 5535 
11 . 2000 . 
475 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0832 . 
1314 . 1405 . 
5535 
12 . 1800 . 
475 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0862 . 1314 . 
1405 . 5589 
13 . 1800 . 
475 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0862 . 1314 . 
1405 . 5589 
14 . 1800 . 
475 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0862 . 1314 . 
1405 . 5589 
15 . 1800 . 
450 . 6000 . 
0000 . 0827 . 
1236 . 1318 . 
5339 
16 . 1800 . 
425 . 6670 . 
0000 . 0709 . 1165 . 
1239 . 4890 
17 . 1800 . 425 . 
6670 . 0000 . 
0709 . 1165 . 
1239 . 4890 
18 . 1800 . 
425 . 6670 . 
0000 . 0709 . 
1165 . 1239 . 
4890 
19 . 1800 . 
425 . 6670 . 
0000 . 0709 . 
1165 . 1239 . 4890 
20 . 1800 . 
425 . 7778 . 
0000 . 0566 . 1165 . 
1239 . 4530 
21 . 1800 . 
425 . 7778 . 
0000 . 0566 . 
1165 . 1239 . 
4530 
22 . 1800 . 
425 . 7674 . 
0000 . 0579 . 
1165 . 1239 . 
4565 
23 . 1800 . 
425 . 7869 . 
2454 . 0554 . 1002 . 
1239 . 4184 
24 . 1800 . 
425 . 7869 . 
2454 . 0554 . 1002 . 
1239 . 4184 
25 . 1800 . 
460 . 7869 . 
3672 . 0562 . 0985 . 
1352 . 4360 
26 . 1800 . 
460 . 7869 . 
3672 . 0562 . 0985 . 
1352 . 4360 
27 . 0000 . 
460 . 7869 . 
3672 . 0818 . 0985 . 
1352 . 5007 
28 . 0000 . 
490 . 7869 . 
3750 . 0858 . 1040 . 
1461 . 5299 
29 . 0000 . 
390 . 6522 . 
3750 . 0889 . 0860 . 
1139 . 4697 
30 . 0000 . 
390 . 6522 . 
3750 . 0889 . 0860 . 1139 . 
4697 
31 . 0000 . 
390 . 6522 . 
3750 . 0889 . 0860 . 
1139 . 4697 
32 . 0000 . 
390 . 6522 . 
3750 . 0889 . 0860 . 
1139 . 4697 
33 . 0000 . 
390 . 7500 . 
5000 . 0780 . 
0788 . 1139 . 
4266 
34 . 0000 . 
330 . 7500 . 5000 . 
0715 . 0722 . 0993 . 
3643 
35 . 0000 . 
330 . 7500 . 5000 . 
0715 . 0722 . 0993 . 3643 
36 . 0000 . 
360 . 7500 . 
5000 . 0746 . 0753 . 1063 . 
3956 
37 . 0000 . 
360 . 7500 . 
5000 . 0746 . 0753 . 1063 . 
3956 
38 . 0000 . 
360 . 7500 . 
5000 . 0746 . 0753 . 1063 . 
3956 
39 . 0000 . 
360 . 7500 . 
5000 . 0746 . 0753 . 1063 . 
3956 
ýý 
A: \auslria. sav 
year ntax stax atax Itax ded Invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 
1 1960 . 4400 . 1800 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
2 1961 . 4400 . 1800 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
3 1962 . 4400 . 1800 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
4 1963 . 4400 . 1800 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
5 1964 . 4400 . 1800 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
6 1965 . 4400 . 1800 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
7 1966 . 4400 . 2100 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
8 1967 . 4400 . 2100 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
9 1968 . 4400 . 2100 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
10 1969 . 4400 . 2100 . 1000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
11 1970 . 4400 . 2100 . 1000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
12 1971 . 4400 . 2100 . 1000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
13 1972 . 5000 . 2100 . 1000 . 1500 1 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 1000 
14 1973 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 3500 1.0 0 . 1000 
15 1974 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 3500 1.0 0 . 1000 
16 1975 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 3500 1.0 0 . 1000 
17 1976 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 6000 1.0 0 . 1000 
18 1977 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 6000 
1.0 0 . 1000 
19 1978 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 6000 1.0 0 . 1000 
20 1979 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 6000 1.0 0 . 1000 
21 1980 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1500 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
22 1981 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
23 1982 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
24 1983 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1500 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
25 1984 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
26 1985 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1500 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
27 1986 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 1500 
1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
28 1987 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1500 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
29 1988 . 5500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1500 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
30 1989 . 3000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1350 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
31 1990 . 3000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1350 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
32 1991 . 3000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1350 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
33 1992 . 3000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1350 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
34 1993 . 3000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1350 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
35 1994 . 3000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1350 1 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
36 1995 . 3400 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
37 1996 
. 3400 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
38 1997 
. 3400 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
39 1998 . 3400 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1000 10.0 0 
(+-C, °J 
t-1 
A: \austrla. sav 
myea2 mmethod2 mrate3 myear3 mmethod3 bratet byearl bmethodI bratet byear2 bmethod2 
1 7.0 0 . 2400 1.0 0 . 0400 19.0 0 
2 7.0 0 . 2400 1.0 0 . 0400 19.0 
0 
3 7.0 0 . 2400 1.0 0 . 0400 19.0 
0 
4 7.0 0 . 2400 1.0 0 . 0400 19.0 
0 
5 7.0 0 . 2400 1.0 
0 . 0400 19.0 
0 
6 7.0 0 . 2400 1.0 0 . 
0400 19.0 0 
7 7.0 0 . 2400 1.0 
0 . 0400 19.0 
0 
8 7.0 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 
9 7.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
10 7.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
11 7.0 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 
12 7.0 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 
13 7.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
14 6.0 0 . 0500 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 
0 
15 6.0 0 . 0500 
1.0 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 
16 6.0 0 . 0500 
1.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
17 4.0 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
18 4.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
19 4.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
20 4.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
21 . 0400 25.0 0 
22 . 0400 25.0 0 
23 . 0400 25.0 0 
24 . 0400 25.0 0 
25 . 0400 25.0 0 
26 . 0400 25.0 0 
27 . 0400 25.0 0 
28 . 0400 25.0 0 
29 . 0400 25.0 0 
30 . 0400 25.0 0 
31 . 0400 25.0 0 
32 . 0400 25.0 0 
33 . 0400 25.0 0 
34 . 0400 25.0 0 
35 . 0400 25.0 0 
36 . 0400 25.0 0 
37 . 0400 25.0 0 
38 . 0400 25.0 0 
39 . 0400 25.0 0 
1-2 
A: 'austria. sav 
mincent bincent ttax mp bp ip tp metr 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 
591 . 1156 . 1104 . 
1947 . 1338 . 6263 
2 . 0000 . 
0000 . 591 . 
1156 . 1104 . 1947 . 
1338 . 6263 
3 . 0000 . 
0000 . 591 . 
1156 . 1104 . 1947 . 
1338 . 6263 
4 . 0000 . 
0000 . 591 . 
1156 . 1104 . 1947 . 
1338 . 6263 
5 . 0000 . 0000 . 
591 . 1156 . 1104 . 
1947 . 1338 . 6263 
6 . 0000 . 
0000 . 591 . 
1156 . 1104 . 1947 . 
1338 . 6263 
7 . 0000 . 0000 . 
603 . 1187 . 1133 . 
2016 . 1378 . 
6372 
8 . 0000 . 0000 . 
603 . 1187 . 1363 . 
2016 . 1447 . 
6545 
9 . 0000 . 
0000 . 603 . 
1187 . 1363 . 
2016 . 1447 . 
6545 
10 . 0000 . 
0000 . 688 . 
1497 . 1753 . 
2700 . 1875 . 
7333 
11 . 0000 . 0000 . 
688 . 1497 . 
1753 . 2700 . 
1875 . 7333 
12 . 0000 . 
0000 . 688 . 1497 . 
1753 . 2700 . 1875 . 
7333 
13 . 0000 . 
0000 . 749 . 1854 . 
2202 . 3488 . 2367 . 
7888 
14 . 0000 . 
0000 . 575 . 1057 . 
1271 . 1853 . 1320 . 
6212 
15 . 0000 . 
0000 . 575 . 1057 . 
1271 . 1853 . 
1320 . 6212 
16 . 0000 . 
0000 . 575 . 
1057 . 1271 . 1853 . 
1320 . 6212 
17 . 0000 . 0000 . 
618 . 0869 . 
1419 . 2114 . 1346 . 
6284 
18 . 0000 . 
0000 . 618 . 
0869 . 1419 . 
2114 . 1346 . 
6284 
19 . 0000 . 
0000 . 618 . 
0869 . 1419 . 
2114 . 1346 . 6284 
20 . 0000 . 
0000 . 618 . 
0869 . 1419 . 
2114 . 1346 . 6284 
21 . 0000 . 
0000 . 618 . 
1539 . 1419 . 
2114 . 1647 . 6964 
22 . 0000 . 
0000 . 618 . 
1539 . 1419 . 
2114 . 1647 . 
6964 
23 . 0000 . 
0000 . 618 . 
1539 . 1419 . 
2114 . 1647 . 
6964 
24 . 0000 . 
0000 . 618 . 
1539 . 1419 . 
2114 . 1647 . 6964 
25 . 2000 . 2000 . 
618 . 1002 . 
1143 . 2114 . 1322 . 
6218 
26 . 2000 . 2000 . 
618 . 1002 . 
1143 . 2114 . 1322 . 
6218 
27 . 2000 . 
2000 . 618 . 
1002 . 1143 . 
2114 . 1322 . 6218 
28 . 2000 . 
2000 . 618 . 
1002 . 1143 . 
2114 . 1322 . 6218 
29 . 2000 . 
2000 . 618 . 
1002 . 1143 . 
2114 . 1322 . 6218 
30 . 2000 . 2000 . 
395 . 0702 . 
0759 . 1152 . 0832 . 
3989 
31 . 2000 . 
2000 . 395 . 0702 . 
0759 . 1152 . 0832 . 
3989 
32 . 2000 . 2000 . 
395 . 0702 . 
0759 . 1152 . 0832 . 3989 
33 . 0900 . 0900 . 
395 . 0822 . 
0821 . 1152 . 0904 . 
4469 
34 . 0900 . 0900 . 
395 . 0822 . 
0821 . 1152 . 
0904 . 4469 
35 . 0900 . 0900 . 
395 . 0822 . 0821 . 
1152 . 0904 . 4469 
36 . 0900 . 0900 . 
340 . 0754 . 
0754 . 1015 . 0819 . 3898 
37 
. 0900 . 0900 . 
340 . 0754 . 
0754 . 1015 . 0819 . 
3898 
38 . 1200 . 1200 . 
340 . 0729 . 
0740 . 1015 . 
0804 . 3780 
39 . 1200 . 1200 . 
340 . 0729 . 0740 . 
1015 . 0804 . 
3780 
4c ca 
1-3 
A: \belglum. sav 
year ntax stax atax Invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 
1 1960 . 4000 . 0500 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
2 1961 . 4000 . 0500 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
3 1962 . 4000 . 0500 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
4 1963 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
5 1964 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
6 1965 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
7 1966 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
8 1967 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 0 
9 1968 . 3500 . 1000 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
10 1969 . 3500 . 1000 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
11 1970 . 3500 . 1000 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
12 1971 . 3500 . 1000 . 0000 1 . 
1250 8.0 0 
13 1972 . 3500 . 2000 . 0000 1 . 1250 8.0 
0 
14 1973 . 4200 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
15 1974 . 4200 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
16 1975 . 4800 . 0000 . 0480 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
17 1976 . 4800 . 0000 . 0480 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
18 1977 . 4800 . 0000 . 0480 
1 . 1250 8.0 
0 
19 1978 . 4800 . 0000 . 0480 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
20 1979 . 3900 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
21 1980 . 3900 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
22 1981 . 3900 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
23 1982 . 3900 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 
3.0 0 
24 1983 . 3900 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 
0 
25 1984 . 4500 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
26 1985 . 4500 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
27 1986 . 4500 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
28 1987 . 4300 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
29 1988 . 4300 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
30 1989 . 4300 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
31 1990 . 4300 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
32 1991 . 4300 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
33 1992 . 3900 . 0000 . 
0000 0 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
34 1993 . 3900 . 0000 . 
0000 0 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 
0 
35 1994 . 3900 . 0300 . 0000 
0 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
36 1995 . 3900 . 0300 . 0000 
0 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250' 3.0 0 
37 1996 . 3900 . 0300 . 
0000 0 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
38 1997 . 3900 . 0300 . 
0000 0 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 
0 
39 1998 . 3900 . 0300 . 
0000 0 . 2500 4.0 1 . 1250 3.0 0 
(+\D 
A: \belgium. sav 
mrate3 myear3 mmethod3 bratel byearl bmethodl brate2 byear2 bmethod2 brate3 byear3 
1 . 0400 25.0 0 
2 . 0400 25.0 0 
3 . 0400 25.0 0 
4 . 0400 25.0 0 
5 . 0400 25.0 0 
6 . 0800 25.0 0 . 
7 . 0400 25.0 0 
8 . 0400 25.0 0 
9 . 0400 
25.0 0 
10 . 0400 25.0 0 .I 
11 . 0400 25.0 
0 
12 . 0400 
25.0 0 
13 . 0400 25.0 
0 
14 . 0400 
25.0 0 
15 . 0400 
25.0 0 
16 . 0400 
25.0 0 
17 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 
18 . 0400 
25.0 0 
19 . 0400 
25.0 0 
20 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 
0322 1.0 
21 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 
0 . 0322 1.0 
22 . 0469 1.0 0 . 0800 
9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 
0322 1.0 
23 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 
0 . 0322 
1.0 
24 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
25 . 0469 1.0 0 . 0800 
9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 
0322 1.0 
26 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 
0322 1.0 
27 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
28 . 0469 1.0 0 . 0800 
9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
29 . 0469 1.0 0 . 0800 
9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
30 . 0469 1.0 0 . 0800 
9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
31 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
32 
. 0469 1.0 
0 . 0800 
9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
33 
. 0469 1.0 
0 . 0800 9.0 
1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
34 
. 0469 1.0 
0 . 0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 
0322 1.0 
35 
. 0469 1.0 
0 . 0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
36 . 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
37 
. 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 
0322 1.0 
38 
. 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 0322 
1.0 
39 
. 0469 1.0 0 . 
0800 9.0 1 . 0400 11.0 0 . 
0322 1.0 
L-i" 
1-2 
A: \belgium. sav 
bmethod3 mincent bincent ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 . 0500 . 
0500 . 4200 . 0835 . 
0881 . 1224 . 4715 
2 . 0500 . 
0500 . 4200 . 0835 . 0881 . 
1224 . 4715 
3 . 0500 . 
0500 . 4200 . 0835 . 
0881 . 1224 . 4715 
4 . 0500 . 
0500 . 3500 . 0749 . 
0784 . 1038 . 3988 
5 . 0500 . 0500 . 
3500 . 0749 . 0784 . 
1038 . 3988 
6 . 0500 . 
0500 . 3500 . 
0749 . 0784 . 1038 . 
3988 
7 . 0500 . 
0500 . 3500 . 
0749 . 0784 . 
1038 . 3988 
8 . 0500 . 
0500 . 3500 . 0749 . 
0784 . 1038 . 
3988 
9 . 0500 . 
0500 . 3850 . 
0789 . 0830 . 1126 . 
4354 
10 . 0500 . 0500 . 
3850 . 0789 . 
0830 . 1126 . 
4354 
11 . 0500 . 0500 . 
3850 . 0789 . 
0830 . 1126 . 4354 
12 . 0500 . 
0500 . 3850 . 
0789 . 0830 . 1126 . 
4354 
13 . 0500 . 0500 . 
4200 . 0835 . 0881 . 
1224 . 4715 
14 . 0500 . 0500 . 
4200 . 0835 . 
0881 . 1224 . 4715 
15 . 0500 . 
0500 . 4200 . 
0835 . 0881 . 
1224 . 4715 
16 . 0500 . 
0500 . 5280 . 
1017 . 1089 . 1619 . 
5795 
17 . 0500 . 0500 . 
5280 . 1017 . 
1089 . 1619 . 
5795 
18 . 0500 . 
0500 . 5280 . 
1017 . 1089 . 
1619 . 5795 
19 . 0500 . 0500 . 
5280 . 1017 . 
1089 . 1619 . 5795 
20 0 . 0600 . 0500 . 
3900 . 0685 . 0778 . 
1139 . 3951 
21 0 . 0600 . 0500 . 
3900 . 0685 . 
0778 . 1139 . 3951 
22 0 . 0600 . 0500 . 
3900 . 0685 . 
0778 . 1139 . 3951 
23 0 . 0600 . 0500 . 
3900 . 0685 . 
0778 . 1139 . 3951 
24 0 . 0600 . 0500 . 
3900 . 0685 . 
0778 . 1139 . 3951 
25 0 . 0600 . 0500 . 
4500 . 0737 . 
0856 . 1318 . 4553 
26 0 . 0600 . 
0500 . 4500 . 
0737 . 0856 . 
1318 . 4553 
27 0 . 0600 . 
0500 . 4500 . 
0737 . 0856 . 
1318 . 4553 
28 0 . 0600 . 0500 . 
4300 . 0718 . 
0828 . 1254 . 4352 
29 0 . 0600 . 
0500 . 4300 . 
0718 . 0828 . 
1254 . 4352 
30 0 . 0600 . 
0500 . 4300 . 
0718 . 0828 . 1254 . 
4352 
31 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 4300 . 
0718 . 0822 . 1254 . 
4340 
32 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 4300 . 
0718 . 0822 . 1254 . 
4340 
33 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 3900 . 
0685 . 0773 . 
0820 . 3289 
34 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 3900 . 
0685 . 0773 . 0820 . 
3289 
35 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 4017 . 
0694 . 0786 . 0836 . 
3397 
36 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 4017 . 
0694 . 0786 . 
0836 . 3397 
37 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 4017 . 
0694 . 0786 . 
0836 . 3397 
38 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 4017 . 
0694 . 0786 . 0836 . 
3397 
39 0 . 0600 . 
0600 . 4017 . 
0694 . 0786 . 0836 . 
3397 
(ý 
1-3 
A: \canada. sav 
year ntax staxt stax2 pbate mabate ftax Itax ded Invent srelief 
1 1960 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
2 1961 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
3 1962 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
4 1963 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
5 1964 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
6 1965 . 4700 . 
0300 . 0000 . 0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 
0000 
7 1966 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
8 1967 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0700 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 
0000 
9 1968 . 4700 . 0300 . 0300 . 
0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 
0000 
10 1969 . 4700 . 0300 . 0300 . 0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 
1.00 . 0000 
11 1970 . 4700 . 0300 . 0300 . 0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
12 1971 . 4700 . 0300 . 0000 . 0700 . 
0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
13 1972 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0700 . 
0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 
0000 
14 1973 . 4900 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 1.00 . 0000 
15 1974 . 4800 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 
0 1.00 . 0000 
16 1975 . 4700 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1100 0 
1.00 . 0000 
17 1976 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1200 0 1.00 . 0000 
18 1977 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1200 
0 1.00 . 0300 
19 1978 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0700 . 0000 . 0000 . 1130 0 1.00 . 0300 
20 1979 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0000 . 1350 0 1.00 . 
0300 
21 1980 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0000 . 1350 0 1.00 . 
0300 
22 1981 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0000 . 1350 0 
1.00 . 0300 
23 1982 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0000 . 1350 0 1.00 . 
0300 
24 1983 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0000 . 1350 0 
1.00 . 0300 
25 1984 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0000 . 1400 0 1.00 . 0300 
26 1985 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0000 . 1400 0 1.00 . 0300 
27 1986 . 4600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0600 . 0500 . 1400 0 1.00 . 0000 
28 1987 . 4500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0200 . 0500 . 1400 0 1.00 . 0000 
29 1988 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0200 . 0500 . 1450 0 1.00 . 0000 
30 1989 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0200 . 0500 . 1450 0 1.00 . 0000 
31 1990 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0200 . 0500 . 1450 0 1.00 . 0000 
32 1991 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1000 . 0500 . 0500 . 1450 0 1.00 . 0000 
33 1992 . 3800 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1000 . 0500 . 0500 . 1450 0 1.00 . 0000 
34 1993 . 3800 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1000 . 0600 . 0500 . 1450 0 1.00 . 0000 
35 1994 . 3800 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1000 . 0700 . 0400 . 1450 0 1.00 . 0000 
36 1995 . 3800 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1000 . 0700 . 0400 . 1450 0 1.00 . 
0000 
37 1996 . 3800 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1000 . 0700 . 0400 . 1450 0 1.00 . 
0000 
38 1997 . 3800 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1000 . 0700 . 0400 . 1450 0 1.00 . 
0000 
39 1998 . 3800 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1000 . 0700 . 0400 . 1450 0 1.00 . 
0000 
ýýý 1-1 
A: \canada. sav 
mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 mrate3 myear3 mmethod3 bratet byearl 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 . 0500 
2 . 1250 8.0 0 . 0500 
3 . 1250 8.0 0 . 0500 
4 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
5 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
6 
. 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
7 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
8 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
9 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
10 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
11 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
12 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
13 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
14 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
15 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
16 
. 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
17 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
18 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
19 
. 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
20 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
21 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
22 . 5000 2.0 0 . 0500 
23 . 2500 1.0 0 . 5000 1.0 0 . 2500 1.0 0 . 0250 1.0 
24 
. 2500 1.0 0 . 5000 
1.0 0 . 2500 1.0 0 . 0250 1.0 
25 . 2500 1.0 0 . 5000 1.0 0 . 2500 1.0 0 . 0250 1.0 
26 . 2500 1.0 0 . 5000 
1.0 0 . 2500 1.0 0 . 0250 1.0 
27 
. 2500 1.0 0 . 5000 
1.0 0 . 2500 1.0 0 . 0250 1.0 
28 
. 2500 1.0 0 . 5000 
1.0 0 
. 2500 1.0 0 . 0250 1.0 
29 . 1750 1.0 1 . 3500 1 . 0200 1.0 
30 
. 1750 1.0 1 . 3500 1 . 0200 1.0 
31 
. 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
32 
. 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 1 . 0200 1.0 
33 . 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
34 
. 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
35 . 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
36 
. 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
37 
. 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
38 
. 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
39 
. 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 1 . 0200 1.0 
ýt 'ý. 
1-2 
A: \canada. sav 
bmethodl bratet byear2 bmethod2 mincent bincent ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 594 . 1298 . 1378 . 1564 . 6399 
2 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 594 . 1298 . 1378 . 1564 . 6399 
3 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 523 . 1098 . 1158 . 
1197 . 5618 
4 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 523 . 0680 . 1158 . 1197 . 4751 
5 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 523 . 0680 . 
1158 . 1197 . 4751 
6 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 523 . 0680 . 1158 . 
1197 . 4751 
7 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 523 . 0680 . 
1158 . 1197 . 4751 
8 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 523 . 
0680 . 1158 . 1197 . 
4751 
9 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 536 . 0689 . 1194 . 
1256 . 4911 
10 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 536 . 0689 . 
1194 . 1256 . 4911 
11 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 536 . 0689 . 
1194 . 1256 . 4911 
12 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 523 . 0680 . 
1158 . 1197 . 4751 
13 1 . 0000 . 0000 . 540 . 0692 . 1204 . 
1274 . 4956 
14 1 . 0700 . 0700 . 530 . 0562 . 
1073 . 1228 . 4329 
15 1 . 0700 . 0700 . 520 . 
0555 . 1048 . 1183 . 4186 
16 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 510 . 
0583 . 1053 . 1141 . 4209 
17 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 510 . 
0583 . 1053 . 1141 . 4209 
18 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 
510 . 0583 . 1053 . 1126 . 4184 
19 1 . 0700 . 0700 . 503 1 . 0544 . 
1008 . 1098 . 3913 
20 1 . 0700 . 0700 . 445 . 0510 . 
0890 . 0890 . 3048 
21 1 . 0700 . 0700 . 445 . 0510 . 
0890 . 0890 . 3048 
22 1 . 0700 . 
0700 . 445 . 0510 . 0905 . 0890 . 
3092 
23 1 . 0500 1 . 
0700 . 0700 . 445 . 0567 . 0905 . 
0890 . 3326 
24 1 . 0500 
1 . 0700 . 0700 . 445 . 0567 . 0905 . 
0890 . 3326 
25 1 . 0500 1 . 
0700 . 0700 . 450 . 0570 . 0915 . 0907 . 
3401 
26 1 . 0500 1 . 
0700 . 0700 . 450 . 0570 . 0915 . 0907 . 3401 
27 1 . 0500 1 . 
0700 . 0700 . 461 . 0579 . 0936 . 0954 . 3587 
28 1 . 0500 
1 . 0300 . 0300 . 490 . 0676 . 1055 . 
1062 . 4356 
29 1 . 0400 1 . 
0000 . 0000 . 422 . 0949 . 0982 . 0830 . 
4618 
30 1 . 0400 1 . 
0000 . 0000 . 422 . 0949 . 0982 . 0830 . 4618 
31 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 422 . 0966 . 0982 . 0830 . 4663 
32 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 392 . 0934 . 0925 . 0745 . 4346 
33 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 392 . 0911 . 0925 . 0745 . 
4279 
34 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 382 . 0894 . 0908 . 0718 . 
4148 
35 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 369 . 0873 . 0885 . 0684 . 
3970 
36 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 369 . 0873 . 0885 . 0684 . 
3970 
37 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 369 . 0873 . 0885 . 0684 . 
3970 
38 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 369 . 0873 . 0885 . 
0684 . 3970 
39 1 . 0400 
1 . 0000 . 0000 . 369 . 0873 . 0885 . 0684 . 
3970 
Lfis- 
A: \denmark. sav 
year ntax Itax ded invent callow mratel myearl mmethodl bratet byearl 
1 1960 . 4400 1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0400 
25.0 
2 1961 . 4400 1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0400 25.0 
3 1962 . 4400 1 . 0000 . 
3000 1 . 0400 25.0 
4 1963 . 4400 1 . 0000 . 
3000 1 . 0400 25.0 
5 1964 . 4400 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0400 25.0 
6 1965 . 4400 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0400 25.0 
7 1966 . 4400 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0400 25.0 
8 1967 . 4400 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0400 25.0 
9 1968 . 3600 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
10 1969 . 3600 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
11 1970 . 3600 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
12 1971 . 3600 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
13 1972 . 3600 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 
10.0 
14 1973 . 3600 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
15 1974 . 3700 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
16 1975 . 3700 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
17 1976 . 3700 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
18 1977 . 3700 
1 . 0000 . 
3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
19 1978 . 3700 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
20 1979 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
21 1980 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0600 
10.0 
22 1981 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
23 1982 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
24 1983 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
25 1984 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
26 1985 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
27 1986 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
28 1987 . 4000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 
1 . 0600 10.0 
29 1988 . 5000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
30 1989 . 5000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
31 1990 . 5000 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
32 1991 . 3800 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
33 1992 . 3400 
1 . 2600 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
34 1993 . 3400 
1 . 2300 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
35 1994 . 3400 
1 . 2000 . 3000 1 . 0600 10.0 
36 1995 . 3400 
1 . 1600 . 3000 1 . 0600 
10.0 
37 1996 . 3400 
1 . 1200 . 3000 1 . 0600 
10.0 
38 1997 . 3400 
1 . 0800 . 3000 1 . 
0600 10.0 
39 1998 . 3400 
1 . 0000 . 3000 1 . 
0600 10.0 
Lý, ý, 
A: \denmark. sav 
bmethodl bratet byear2 bmethod2 mincent bincent ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 0 . 440 . 0844 . 
0948 . 1286 . 4926 
2 0 . 440 . 0844 . 
0948 . 1286 . 4926 
3 0 . 440 . 0844 . 
0948 . 1286 . 4926 
4 0 . 440 . 0844 . 
0948 . 1286 . 4926 
5 0 . 440 . 
0844 . 0948 . 
1286 . 4926 
6 0 . 440 . 
0844 . 0948 . 1286 . 
4926 
7 0 . 440 . 0844 . 
0948 . 1286 . 4926 
8 0 . 440 . 
0844 . 0948 . 
1286 . 4926 
9 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 360 . 0746 . 
0791 . 1063 . 
4038 
10 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 360 . 0746 . 
0791 . 1063 . 
4038 
11 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 360 . 0746 . 
0791 . 1063 . 
4038 
12 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 360 . 0746 . 
0791 . 1063 . 4038 
13 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 360 . 0746 . 
0791 . 1063 . 4038 
14 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 360 . 0746 . 
0791 . 1063 . 
4038 
15 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 370 . 0757 . 
0804 . 1087 . 
4142 
16 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 370 . 0757 . 
0804 . 1087 . 4142 
17 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 370 . 
0757 . 0804 . 1087 . 
4142 
18 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 370 . 0757 . 
0804 . 1087 . 
4142 
19 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 370 . 0757 . 
0804 . 1087 . 
4142 
20 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 4452 
21 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 4452 
22 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 
4452 
23 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 
4452 
24 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 4452 
25 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 
4452 
26 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 4452 
27 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 0792 . 
0845 . 1167 . 
4452 
28 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 400 . 
0792 . 0845 . 
1167 . 4452 
29 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 500 . 0938 . 
1017 . 1500 . 
5462 
30 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 500 . 0938 . 
1017 . 1500 . 
5462 
31 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 500 . 0938 . 
1017 . 1500 . 
5462 
32 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 380 . 0768 . 
0817 . 1113 . 
4246 
33 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 340 . 0725 . 
0766 . 0951 . 
3704 
34 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 340 . 0725 . 
0766 . 0959 . 
3718 
35 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 340 . 0725 . 
0766 . 0966 . 
3733 
36 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 340 . 0725 . 
0766 . 0976 . 
3752 
37 0 . 0200 
20.0 0 . 340 . 0725 . 
0766 . 0986 . 
3771 
38 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 340 . 0725 . 
0766 . 0996 . 
3790 
39 0 . 0200 20.0 
0 . 340 . 0725 . 
0766 . 1015 . 
3828 
4ý-ý 
A: \finland. sav 
year ntax atax dedl Itax ded2 ctax ded3 Invent mratel myearl 
1 1960 . 3800 . 1200 1 . 1450 0 . 0200 
0 1 . 1250 
2 1961 . 3800 . 1200 
1 . 1450 0 . 0200 0 
1 . 1250 
3 1962 . 3800 . 1200 
1 . 1450 0 . 0200 
0 1 . 1250 
4 1963 . 3800 . 1200 
1 . 1450 0 . 0200 
0 1 . 1250 
5 1964 . 4500 . 1200 
1 . 1450 
0 . 0200 
0 1 . 1250 
6 1965 . 4800 . 
1200 1 . 1450 0 . 
0200 0 1 . 1250 
7 1966 . 4800 . 1200 
1 . 1450 0 . 
0200 0 1 . 1250 
8 1967 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0200 
0 1 . 1250 
9 1968 . 4900 . 
0000 0 . 1450 
0 . 0200 0 
1 . 1250 
10 1969 . 4300 . 0000 0 . 
1450 0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
11 1970 . 4300 . 0000 0 . 
1450 0 . 0200 
0 1 . 3000 
12 1971 . 4300 . 0000 0 . 
1450 0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
13 1972 . 4300 . 0000 0 . 
1450 0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
14 1973 . 4300 . 0000 0 . 
1450 0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
15 1974 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
16 1975 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
17 1976 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
18 1977 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0200 
0 1 . 
3000 
19 1978 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
20 1979 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
21 1980 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
22 1981 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
23 1982 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 3000 
24 1983 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
25 1984 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 3000 
26 1985 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
27 1986 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
28 1987 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
29 1988 . 3300 . 0000 
0 . 1450 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
30 1989 . 3300 . 0000 0 . 
1650 0 . 0200 0 1 . 
3000 
31 1990 . 3300 . 0000 
0 . 1650 0 . 0200 0 
1 . 3000 
32 1991 . 2300 . 0000 
0 . 1650 
0 . 0200 0 1 . 3000 
33 1992 . 1900 . 0000 
0 . 1650 
0 . 0100 0 1 . 
3000 
34 1993 . 2500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
35 1994 . 2500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
36 1995 . 2500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
37 1996 . 2800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
38 1997 . 2800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 0 . 0100 
0 1 . 3000 
39 1998 . 2800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 0 . 0100 
0 1 . 3000 
tjIý 
A: \finland. sav 
mmethodl bratet byearl bmethodl ttax mp bp Ip tp metr 
1 1 . 0250 40.0 0 . 619 . 1766 . 1605 . 
2127 . 1808 . 7235 
2 1 . 0250 40.0 
0 . 619 . 1766 . 1605 . 2127 . 
1808 . 7235 
3 1 . 0250 40.0 
0 . 619 . 1766 . 1605 . 
2127 . 1808 . 7235 
4 1 . 0250 40.0 
0 . 619 . 1766 . 1605 . 
2127 . 1808 . 7235 
5 1 . 0250 40.0 
0 . 681 . 2161 . 
1950 . 2635 . 2216 . 
7744 
6 1 . 0250 
40.0 0 . 707 . 2381 . 2142 . 
2918 . 2443 . 7954 
7 1 . 0250 40.0 
0 . 707 . 2381 . 
2142 . 2918 . 2443 . 7954 
8 1 . 0250 40.0 
0 . 645 . 1913 . 
1734 . 2317 . 
1960 . 7449 
9 1 . 0250 
40.0 0 . 655 . 1977 . 
1789 . 2399 . 2026 . 
7532 
10 1 . 0900 
1 . 595 . 1143 . 
1196 . 1969 . 1365 . 6338 
11 1 . 0900 1 . 
595 . 1143 . 
1196 . 1969 . 1365 . 
6338 
12 1 . 0900 1 . 
595 . 1143 . 1196 . 
1969 . 1365 . 6338 
13 1 . 0900 1 . 
595 . 1143 . 1196 . 
1969 . 1365 . 6338 
14 1 . 0900 
1 . 595 . 
1143 . 1196 . 
1969 . 1365 . 6338 
15 1 . 0900 
1 . 595 . 
1143 . 1196 . 
1969 . 1365 . 6338 
16 1 . 0900 
1 . 595 . 
1143 . 1196 . 1969 . 
1365 . 6338 
17 1 . 0900 
1 . 595 . 
1143 . 1196 . 1969 . 
1365 . 6338 
18 1 . 0900 
1 . 595 . 
1143 . 1196 . 1969 . 
1365 . 6338 
19 1 . 0900 
1 . 595 . 1143 . 
1196 . 1969 . 1365 . 
6338 
20 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 
1330 . 6241 
21 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 
1330 . 6241 
22 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 
1330 . 6241 
23 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 1117 . 
1168 . 1910 . 
1330 . 6241 
24 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 
1330 . 6241 
25 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 1330 . 
6241 
26 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 1330 . 
6241 
27 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 1330 . 
6241 
28 1 . 0900 
1 . 585 . 
1117 . 1168 . 1910 . 
1330 . 6241 
29 1 . 0900 
1 . 485 . 
0912 . 0946 . 1442 . 
1055 . 5259 
30 1 . 0900 1 . 
515 . 0965 . 1003 . 1562 . 1125 . 
5557 
31 1 . 0900 
1 . 515 . 0965 . 
1003 . 1562 . 1125 . 
5557 
32 1 . 0900 
1 . 415 . 
0810 . 0836 . 1209 . 0918 . 
4552 
33 1 . 0900 
1 . 365 . 0751 . 0772 . 1075 . 0839 . 
4037 
34 1 . 0900 
1 . 260 . 0654 . 0666 . 0851 . 0707 . 
2927 
35 1 . 0900 
1 . 260 . 0654 . 0666 . 0851 . 0707 . 
2927 
36 1 . 0700 
1 . 260 . 0654 . 0666 . 0851 . 0707 . 
2927 
37 1 . 0700 
1 . 290 . 0679 . 0693 . 0908 . 
0741 . 3248 
38 1 . 0700 
1 . 290 . 0679 . 0693 . 0908 . 0741 . 
3248 
39 1 . 0700 
1 . 290 . 0679 . 0693 . 0908 . 
0741 . 3248 
cß. 9 
A: \france. sav 
year ntax stax ded invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 
1 1960 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
2 1961 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
3 1962 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
4 1963 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
5 1964 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
6 1965 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
7 1966 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
8 1967 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
9 1968 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
10 1969 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
11 1970 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 
0 
12 1971 
. 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
13 1972 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
14 1973 . 5000 . 1800 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
15 1974 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
16 1975 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
17 1976 . 5000 . 0000 
1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
18 1977 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 
3125 4.0 1 . 
0558 4.0 0 
19 1978 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 
4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
20 1979 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
21 1980 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 
3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
22 1981 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 
3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
23 1982 
. 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 
4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
24 1983 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 
3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
25 1984 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
26 1985 . 5000 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
27 1986 . 4500 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
28 1987 . 4500 . 0000 1 . 
3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
29 1988 . 4200 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
30 1989 . 3900 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
31 1990 . 3700 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 
0 
32 1991 
. 3400 . 0000 
1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
33 1992 . 3400 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
34 1993 
. 3330 . 0000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 
0 
35 1994 . 3330 . 1000 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
36 1995 . 3330 . 2500 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 
0 
37 1996 
. 3330 . 2500 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
38 1997 . 3330 . 2500 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
39 1998 . 3330 . 2500 1 . 3125 4.0 1 . 0558 4.0 0 
-: C7 
1-1 
A: \france. sav 
bratel byearl bmethodl mincent bincent ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
2 . 0400 25.0 0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
3 . 0400 25.0 0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 
1500 . 5572 
4 . 0400 25.0 0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 
5572 
5 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 500 . 0963 . 
1070 . 1500 . 5572 
6 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
7 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 
1500 . 5572 
8 . 0400 25.0 0 . 500 . 
0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
9 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 
5572 
10 . 0400 25.0 0 . 500 . 
0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
11 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
12 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
13 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
14 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
590 . 1166 . 1320 . 1939 . 
6443 
15 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
16 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
17 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
18 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 
1500 . 5572 
19 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
20 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
21 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
22 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 
5572 
23 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 
5572 
24 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
25 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
26 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
500 . 0963 . 1070 . 1500 . 5572 
27 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
450 . 0879 . 0966 . 1318 . 5073 
28 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
450 . 0879 . 0966 . 1318 . 5073 
29 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
420 . 0835 . 0912 . 1224 . 4768 
30 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
390 . 0796 . 0864 . 1139 . 4459 
31 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
370 . 0772 . 0834 . 1087 . 4250 
32 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
340 . 0739 . 0793 . 1015 . 3933 
33 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
340 . 0739 . 0793 . 1015 . 3933 
34 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
333 . 0731 . 0784 . 0999 . 
3859 
35 . 0400 25.0 0 . 366 . 0768 . 0829 . 1078 . 4211 
36 . 0400 25.0 0 . 416 . 0830 . 0906 . 1213 . 4730 
37 . 0400 25.0 0 . 416 . 0830 . 0906 . 1213 . 4730 
38 
. 0400 25.0 0 . 416 . 0830 . 0906 . 1213 . 
4730 
39 . 0400 25.0 0 . 416 . 0830 . 0906 . 1213 . 4730 
4--ý .i 
1-2 
A: \germany. sav 
year ntax stax Itax ded Invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 
1 1960 . 5100 . 0000 . 1400 1 0 . 2000 3.0 1 . 
1024 5.0 
2 1961 . 5100 . 0000 . 
1400 1 0 . 2000 3.0 1 . 1024 
5.0 
3 1962 . 5100 . 0000 . 1400 1 0 . 
2000 3.0 1 . 1024 5.0 
4 1963 . 5100 . 0000 . 1400 1 0 . 
2000 3.0 1 . 1024 5.0 
5 1964 . 5100 . 0000 . 1400 1 0 . 
2000 3.0 1 . 1024 5.0 
6 1965 . 5100 . 
0000 . 1400 1 0 . 2000 
3.0 1 . 1024 5.0 
7 1966 . 5100 . 0000 . 
1400 1 0 . 2000 3.0 
1 . 1024 5.0 
8 1967 . 5100 . 0000 . 1400 1 
0 . 2000 
3.0 1 . 1024 5.0 
9 1968 . 5100 . 
0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 1 . 1024 
5.0 
10 1969 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 
1 . 1024 5.0 
11 1970 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 
3.0 1 . 1024 5.0 
12 1971 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 
1 . 1024 5.0 
13 1972 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 
1 . 1024 5.0 
14 1973 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 
1 . 1024 5.0 
15 1974 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 1 . 1024 
5.0 
16 1975 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 1 . 1024 5.0 
17 1976 . 5100 . 0300 . 1400 
1 0 . 2000 3.0 
1 . 1024 5.0 
18 1977 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 2500 
4.0 1 . 
0791 4.0 
19 1978 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 2500 4.0 
1 . 0791 4.0 
20 1979 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 2500 4.0 
1 . 0791 4.0 
21 1980 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 2500 4.0 
1 . 0791 4.0 
22 1981 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 
1 . 0560 3.0 
23 1982 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 
1 . 0560 3.0 
24 1983 . 5600 . 0000 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 
1 . 0560 3.0 
25 1984 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
26 1985 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
27 1986 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
28 1987 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 
0560 3.0 
29 1988 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
30 1989 . 5600 . 0000 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
31 1990 . 5000 . 0000 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
32 1991 . 5000 . 0375 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
33 1992 . 5000 . 0375 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
34 1993 . 5000 . 0375 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
35 1994 . 4500 . 0550 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
36 1995 . 4500 . 0750 . 1400 
1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
37 1996 . 4500 . 0750 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 0560 
3.0 
38 1997 . 4500 . 0750 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 
0560 3.0 
39 1998 . 4500 . 0750 . 
1400 1 0 . 3000 5.0 1 . 
0560 3.0 
L/ Z 2ý 
A: \germany. sav 
mmethod2 bratel byearl bmethodl brate2 byear2 bmethod2 brate3 byear3 bmethod3 mincent 
1 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 0250 6.0 1 . 0150 36.0 
1 
2 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 0250 6.0 1 . 
0150 36.0 1 
3 0 . 0500 8.0 
1 . 0250 6.0 1 . 0150 
36.0 1 
4 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 0250 6.0 1 . 
0150 36.0 1 
5 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 0250 6.0 
1 . 0150 36.0 
1 
6 0 . 0500 8.0 
1 . 0250 6.0 1 . 
0150 36.0 1 
7 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 0250 
6.0 1 . 0150 
36.0 1 
8 0 . 0500 8.0 
1 . 0250 6.0 
1 . 0150 
36.0 1 
9 0 . 0500 8.0 
1 . 0250 6.0 1 . 
0150 36.0 1 
10 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0150 36.0 1 
11 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0150 36.0 
1 
12 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 0250 
6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 1 
13 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 0250 
6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 1 
14 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 
1 
15 0 . 0500 8.0 
1 . 0250 
6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 1 
16 0 . 0500 8.0 
1 . 0250 6.0 
1 . 0125 36.0 1 
17 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 1 
18 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 
36.0 1 
19 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 
1 
20 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 
1 
21 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 
1 
22 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 36.0 
1 
23 0 . 0500 8.0 1 . 
0250 6.0 1 . 0125 
36.0 1 
24 0 . 0500 8.0 
1 . 0250 6.0 
1 . 0125 36.0 
1 
25 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 
0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
26 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 
0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
27 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 
0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
28 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 
0500 3.0 1 . 0250 
18.0 1 
29 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 
0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
30 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 0500 
3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
31 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 
0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
32 0 . 1000 5.0 
1 . 0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
33 0 . 1000 5.0 
1 . 0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
34 0 . 1000 5.0 
1 . 0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
35 0 . 1000 5.0 1 . 
0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
36 0 . 1000 5.0 
1 . 0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
37 0 . 1000 5.0 
1 . 0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 1 
38 0 . 1000 5.0 
1 . 0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
39 0 . 1000 5.0 
1 . 0500 3.0 1 . 0250 18.0 
1 
ýýý 
A: \germany. sav 
bincent ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 1187 . 
6041 
2 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 
1187 . 6041 
3 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 
1187 . 6041 
4 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 
1187 . 6041 
5 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 
1187 . 6041 
6 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 
1187 . 6041 
7 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 
1187 . 6041 
8 . 579 . 
1235 . 1368 . 
1187 . 6041 
9 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
10 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
11 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
12 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
13 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
14 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
15 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
16 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 6170 
17 . 592 . 
1276 . 1417 . 
1225 . 
6170 
18 . 622 . 
1325 . 1539 . 
1321 . 6398 
19 . 622 . 
1325 . 1539 . 
1321 . 6398 
20 . 622 . 
1325 . 1539 . 
1321 . 6398 
21 . 622 . 
1325 . 1539 . 
1321 . 6398 
22 . 622 . 
1257 . 1539 . 
1321 . 6318 
23 . 622 . 
1257 . 1539 . 
1321 . 6318 
24 . 622 . 
1257 . 1539 . 
1321 . 6318 
25 . 622 . 
1257 . 1321 . 
1321 . 6132 
26 . 622 . 
1257 . 1321 . 
1321 . 6132 
27 . 622 . 
1257 . 1321 . 
1321 . 6132 
28 . 622 . 
1257 . 1321 . 
1321 . 6132 
29 . 622 . 
1257 . 1321 . 
1321 . 6132 
30 . 622 . 
1257 . 1321 . 
1321 . 6132 
31 . 570 . 
1111 . 1163 . 
1163 . 5612 
32 . 586 . 
1153 . 1208 . 
1208 . 5774 
33 . 586 . 
1153 . 1208 . 
1208 . 5774 
34 . 586 . 
1153 . 1208 . 
1208 . 5774 
35 . 548 . 
1060 . 1107 . 
1107 . 5394 
36 . 556 . 
1077 . 1126 . 
1126 . 5472 
37 . 556 . 
1077 . 1126 . 
1126 . 5472 
38 . 556 . 
1077 . 1126 . 
1126 . 5472 
39 . 556 . 
1077 . 1126 . 
1126 . 5472 
qlý-- 
1-3 
A: \greece. sav 
year ntax atax ded invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 
1 1960 . 3500 . 1500 0 0 . 1800 5.0 0 . 1000 1.0 
0 
2 1961 . 3500 . 1500 0 0 . 1800 5.0 0 . 1000 
1.0 0 
3 1962 . 3500 . 1500 0 0 . 1800 5.0 
0 . 1000 1.0 0 
4 1963 . 3500 . 1500 1 0 . 1800 5.0 0 . 1000 
1.0 0 
5 1964 . 3500 . 1500 1 0 . 1800 5.0 
0 . 1000 1.0 0 
6 1965 . 3500 . 1500 1 0 . 1800 5.0 
0 . 1000 1.0 0 
7 1966 . 3500 . 1500 1 0 . 1800 
5.0 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
8 1967 . 4000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1800 5.0 
0 . 1000 
1.0 0 
9 1968 . 3500 . 1500 1 0 . 1800 
5.0 0 . 1000 1.0 
0 
10 1969 . 3500 . 1500 1 0 . 
1800 5.0 0 . 1000 1.0 
0 
11 1970 . 3500 . 1500 1 
0 . 1800 5.0 0 . 
1000 1.0 0 
12 1971 . 3500 . 1500 1 0 . 1800 
5.0 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
13 1972 . 3500 . 1500 1 
0 . 1800 5.0 0 . 1000 
1.0 0 
14 1973 . 3500 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 
15 1974 . 3000 . 1500 
1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 
16 1975 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
17 1976 . 3000 . 1500 
1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 
18 1977 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 
8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
19 1978 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
20 1979 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 
21 1980 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 
22 1981 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 
23 1982 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 
24 1983 . 3000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 
25 1984 . 4900 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
26 1985 . 4900 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
27 1986 . 4900 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 
28 1987 . 4900 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 
29 1988 . 4000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 
30 1989 . 4000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
31 1990 . 4000 . 1500 
1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
32 1991 . 4000 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
33 1992 . 3500 . 1500 1 
0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
34 1993 . 4000 . 1500 
1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
35 1994 . 4000 . 1500 1 0 . 
1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
36 1995 . 4000 . 1500 
1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
37 1996 . 4000 . 1500 
1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 
38 1997 . 4000 . 
1500 1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 
39 1998 . 4000 . 1500 
1 0 . 1200 8.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 
cýJ.. s 
1-1 
A: \greece. sav 
bratet byearl bmethodI bratet byear2 bmethod2 ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 500 . 0910 . 0887 . 
1000 . 4596 
2 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 1.0 0 . 500 . 0910 . 
0887 . 1000 . 4596 
3 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 1.0 0 . 500 . 
0910 . 0887 . 1000 . 
4596 
4 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 1.0 0 . 448 . 
0832 . 0813 . 0905 . 4079 
5 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 1.0 0 . 
448 . 0832 . 0813 . 
0905 . 4079 
6 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 . 448 . 0832 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4079 
7 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 1.0 
0 . 448 . 0832 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4079 
8 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 1.0 
0 . 490 . 
0894 . 0871 . 0980 . 
4497 
9 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 1.0 
0 . 448 . 0832 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4079 
10 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 448 . 0832 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4079 
11 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 448 . 0832 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4079 
12 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 448 . 0832 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4079 
13 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 448 . 0832 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4079 
14 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 448 . 0957 . 
0813 . 0905 . 4448 
15 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 
4024 
16 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 
4024 
17 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 4024 
18 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 4024 
19 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 4024 
20 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 4024 
21 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 405 . 
0884 . 0763 . 0840 . 
4024 
22 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 4024 
23 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 405 . 
0884 . 0763 . 0840 . 
4024 
24 . 0800 
12.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 405 . 0884 . 
0763 . 0840 . 4024 
25 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 567 . 1237 . 1005 . 
1153 . 5638 
26 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 567 . 1237 . 1005 . 
1153 . 5638 
27 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 567 . 1237 . 1005 . 
1153 . 5638 
28 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 567 . 1237 . 
1005 . 1153 . 
5638 
29 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 490 . 1042 . 
0871 . 0980 . 
4873 
30 . 0800 12.0 0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 490 . 1042 . 
0871 . 0980 . 
4873 
31 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 490 . 1042 . 
0871 . 0980 . 
4873 
32 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 490 . 1042 . 0871 . 
0980 . 4873 
33 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 
1.0 0 . 448 . 0957 . 
0813 . 0905 . 
4448 
34 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 1.0 
0 . 490 . 1042 . 0871 . 
0980 . 4873 
35 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 1.0 0 . 490 . 1042 . 
0871 . 0980 . 
4873 
36 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 1.0 
0 . 490 . 1042 . 0871 . 
0980 . 4873 
37 . 0800 12.0 
0 . 0400 1,0 0 . 490 . 
1042 . 0871 . 
0980 . 4873 
38 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 490 . 1042 . 0871 . 
0980 . 4873 
39 . 0800 12.0 0 . 
0400 1.0 0 . 490 . 1042 . 
0871 . 0980 . 4873 
LL 
A: Uceland. sav 
year ntax tax ded Invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 
1 1960 . 5100 1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
2 1961 . 5100 1 . 1200 7,0 0 . 0600 
1.0 0 
3 1962 . 5100 1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 
1.0 0 
4 1963 . 5100 1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
5 1964 . 5100 1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 
0600 1.0 0 
6 1965 . 5100 1 . 1200 7.0 
0 . 0600 1.0 0 
7 1966 . 5100 1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 
0600 1.0 0 
8 1967 . 5100 1 . 1200 
7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
9 1968 . 5100 1 . 1200 
7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
10 1969 . 5100 1 . 1200 7.0 
0 . 0600 1.0 0 
11 1970 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 
0600 1.0 0 
12 1971 . 5100 1 . 1200 
7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
13 1972 . 5100 1 . 1200 
7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
14 1973 . 5100 1 . 
1200 7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
15 1974 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 
0600 1.0 0 
16 1975 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 0 
17 1976 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 
0600 1.0 0 
18 1977 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 
0600 1.0 0 
19 1978 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 Q . 0600 1.0 
0 
20 1979 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 1.0 
0 
21 1980 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 
1.0 0 
22 1981 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 
1.0 0 
23 1982 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 
1.0 0 
24 1983 . 5100 
1 . 1200 7.0 0 . 0600 
1.0 0 
25 1984 . 5100 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 
26 1985 . 5100 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 
27 1986 . 5100 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 
28 1987 . 5100 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 
29 1988 . 4800 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 
30 1989 . 4800 1 . 1500 6.0 0 
31 1990 . 4500 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 
32 1991 . 4500 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 
33 1992 . 4500 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
34 1993 . 4500 1 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
35 1994 . 4500 1 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 1.0 
0 
36 1995 . 4500 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 1.0 
0 
37 1996 . 3300 1 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
38 1997 . 3300 
1 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
39 1998 . 3300 1 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 1.0 
0 
, P 
1-1 
A: \iceland. sav 
bratel byearl bmethodl mincent bincent ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 . 0200 45.0 0 . 510 . 
1169 . 1251 . 1541 . 611 
2 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
3 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
4 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 
1169 . 1251 . 1541 . 611 
5 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 
1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
6 . 0200 
45.0 0 . 510 . 1169 . 
1251 . 1541 . 611 
7 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 1169 . 
1251 . 1541 . 611 
8 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
9 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
10 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
11 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
12 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
13 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
14 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
15 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
16 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 1169 . 
1251 . 1541 . 611 
17 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
18 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 
1251 . 1541 . 
611 
19 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
20 . 0200 
45.0 0 . 510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
21 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
22 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 
1169 . 1251 . 1541 . 
611 
23 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
24 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 510 . 1169 . 1251 . 
1541 . 611 
25 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1089 . 1251 . 
1541 . 600 
26 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1089 . 1251 . 1541 . 
600 
27 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1089 . 1251 . 1541 . 
600 
28 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
510 . 1089 . 1251 . 1541 . 
600 
29 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
480 . 1022 . 1166 . 
1423 . 571 
30 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
480 . 1022 . 1166 . 1423 . 
571 
31 . 0200 45.0 0 . 
450 . 0963 . 1091 . 1318 . 
541 
32 . 0200 45.0 
0 . 450 . 0963 . 1091 . 1318 . 541 
33 . 0200 50.0 
0 . 450 . 0888 . 1090 . 1318 . 
527 
34 . 0200 50.0 0 . 
450 . 0888 . 1090 . 1318 . 
527 
35 . 0200 50.0 
0 . 450 . 0888 . 1090 . 1318 . 
527 
36 . 0200 50.0 0 . 
450 . 0888 . 1090 . 1318 . 
527 
37 . 0200 50.0 0 . 
330 . 0734 . 0855 . 0993 . 
401 
38 . 0200 50.0 0 . 
330 . 0734 . 0855 . 0993 . 
401 
39 . 0200 50.0 0 . 
330 . 0734 . 0855 . 
0993 . 401 
ý, / 
A: \ireland. sav 
year ntax stax ctax ded Invent srelief mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 
1 1960 . 3500 . 3750 . 1000 1 1.00 . 0000 . 3250 1.0 0 . 1250 
2 1961 . 3167 . 3750 . 1500 1 1.00 . 0000 . 5250 1.0 0 . 1250 
3 1962 . 3167 . 3750 . 1500 1 1.00 . 0000 . 5250 1.0 0 . 1250 
4 1963 . 3167 . 3750 . 1500 1 1.00 . 0000 . 5250 1.0 0 . 1250 
5 1964 . 3167 . 3750 . 1500 1 1.00 . 0000 . 5250 1.0 0 . 1250 
6 1965 . 3167 . 3750 . 1500 1 1.00 . 0000 . 5250 1.0 0 . 1250 
7 1966 . 3167 . 3750 . 2300 1 1.00 . 0000 . 5250 1.0 0 . 1250 
8 1967 . 3500 . 4500 . 2300 1 1.00 . 0000 . 6250 1.0 0 . 1250 
9 1968 . 3500 . 4500 . 2300 1 1.00 . 0000 . 8750 1.0 0 . 1250 
10 1969 . 3500 . 4500 . 2300 1 1.00 . 0000 . 8750 1.0 0 . 1250 
11 1970 . 3500 . 4500 . 2300 
1 1.00 . 0000 . 8750 1.0 0 . 1250 
12 1971 . 3500 . 4500 . 2300 1 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
13 1972 . 3500 . 4500 . 2300 1 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
14 1973 . 3500 . 4500 . 2300 1 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
15 1974 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 
1.0000 1.0 0 
16 1975 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 
1.0000 1.0 0 
17 1976 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 
1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
18 1977 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 
1.0000 1.0 0 
19 1978 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
20 1979 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
21 1980 . 5000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
22 1981 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 
1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
23 1982 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 
1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
24 1983 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 
0 
25 1984 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0300 1.0000 1.0 0 
26 1985 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 
1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
27 1986 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
28 1987 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 
1.00 . 0000 1.0000 1.0 0 
29 1988 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 8750 1.0 0 . 
1250 
30 1989 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 6250 1.0 0 . 1250 
31 1990 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 6250 1.0 0 . 1250 
32 1991 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 3750 1.0 0 . 1250 
33 1992 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 
34 1993 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 
35 1994 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 
36 1995 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 
37 1996 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 
38 1997 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 1500 6.0 0 . 1000 
39 1998 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 1.00 . 0000 . 1500 6.0 
0 . 1000 
2 cl 
1-1 
A: Ureland. sav 
myear2 mmethod2 bratel byearl bmethodl brate2 byear2 bmethod2 brate3 byear3 bmethod3 
1 1 . 1200 1.0 0 . 0200 44.0 0 
2 1 . 1200 1.0 0 . 0200 44.0 0 
3 1 . 1200 1.0 0 . 0200 44.0 0 
4 1 . 1200 1.0 0 . 0200 44.0 0 
5 1 . 1200 1.0 0 . 0200 44.0 0 
6 1 . 1200 1.0 0 . 0200 44.0 0 
7 1 . 2200 1.0 0 . 0200 39.0 0 
8 1 . 5200 1.0 0 . 0200 24.0 
0 
9 1 . 7700 1.0 0 . 0200 11.0 
0 . 0100 1.0 0 
10 1 . 7700 1.0 0 . 0200 11.0 
0 . 0100 1.0 0 
11 1 . 7700 1.0 
0 . 0200 11.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
12 1.0000 1.0 0 
13 1.0000 1.0 0 
14 1.0000 1.0 0 
15 1.0000 1.0 0 
16 1.0000 1.0 0 
17 1.0000 1.0 0 
18 1.0000 1.0 0 
19 1.0000 1.0 0 
20 1.0000 1.0 0 
21 1.0000 1.0 0 
22 1.0000 1.0 0 
23 1.0000 1.0 0 
24 1.0000 1.0 0 
25 1.0000 1.0 0 
26 1.0000 1.0 0 
27 1.0000 1.0 0 
28 1.0000 1.0 0 
29 1 . 7900 1.0 
0 . 0400 5.0 0 
30 1 . 5400 1.0 0 . 0400 11.0 0 
31 1 . 5400 1.0 
0 . 0400 11.0 0 
32 1 . 2900 1.0 
0 . 0400 19.0 0 
33 1.0 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 
34 1.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
35 1.0 0 . 0400 25.0 0 
36 1.0 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 
37 1.0 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
38 1.0 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
39 1.0 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
... _ 
ý rý 
. _. ' 
1-2 
A: \ireland. sav 
mincent bincent ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 533 . 1282 . 
1226 . 1642 . 631 
2 . 520 . 
1049 . 1189 . 1584 . 
592 
3 . 520 . 
1049 . 1189 . 1584 . 
592 
4 . 520 . 
1049 . 1189 . 1584 . 
592 
5 . 520 . 
1049 . 1189 . 
1584 . 592 
6 . 520 . 
1049 . 1189 . 
1584 . 592 
7 . 565 . 1159 . 
1218 . 1800 . 626 
8 . 621 . 1184 . 
1002 . 2137 . 634 
9 . 621 . 0821 . 
0712 . 2137 . 552 
10 . 621 . 0821 . 
0712 . 2137 . 552 
11 . 621 . 0821 . 
0712 . 2137 . 552 
12 . 621 . 
0639 . 0571 . 
2137 . 496 
13 . 621 . 0639 . 
0571 . 2137 . 496 
14 . 621 . 0639 . 
0571 . 2137 . 
496 
15 . 500 . 
0585 . 0544 . 
1500 . 376 
16 . 500 . 
0585 . 0544 . 
1500 . 376 
17 . 500 . 0585 . 
0544 . 1500 . 
376 
18 . 500 . 
0585 . 0544 . 
1500 . 376 
19 . 500 . 
0585 . 0544 . 
1500 . 376 
20 . 500 . 0585 . 
0544 . 1500 . 
376 
21 . 500 . 
0585 . 0544 . 
1500 . 376 
22 . 100 . 
0509 . 0505 . 
0611 . 063 
23 . 100 . 
0509 . 0505 . 
0611 . 063 
24 . 100 . 
0509 . 0505 . 
0611 . 063 
25 . 100 . 0509 . 
0505 . 0610 . 062 
26 . 100 . 0509 . 
0505 . 0611 . 
063 
27 . 100 . 
0509 . 0505 . 
0611 . 063 
28 . 100 . 
0509 . 0505 . 
0611 . 063 
29 . 100 . 
0522 . 0510 . 
0611 . 075 
30 . 100 . 
0546 . 0524 . 
0611 . 100 
31 . 100 . 
0571 . 0524 . 
0611 . 118 
32 . 100 . 
0553 . 0546 . 0611 . 
116 
33 . 100 . 
0553 . 0563 . 
0611 . 124 
34 . 100 . 
0553 . 0563 . 
0611 . 124 
35 . 100 . 
0553 . 0563 . 0611 . 
124 
36 . 100 . 0553 . 
0563 . 0611 . 124 
37 . 100 . 
0553 . 0563 . 
0611 . 124 
38 . 100 . 
0553 . 0563 . 
0611 . 124 
39 . 100 . 0553 . 
0563 . 0611 . 
124 
1-3 
A: \italy. sav 
year ctax wtax dedl Itax ded2 stax invent mratel myearl mmethodt 
1 1960 . 1500 . 2000 1 . 0750 . 00 . 1000 0 . 2500 2.0 0 
2 1961 . 1500 . 2000 1 . 0750 . 00 . 1000 0 . 2500 2.0 0 
3 1962 . 1500 . 2400 1 . 0750 . 00 . 1000 0 . 2500 2.0 
0 
4 1963 . 1500 . 2400 1 . 0750 . 00 . 1000 0 . 2500 2.0 0 
5 1964 . 1500 . 2400 1 . 0750 . 00 . 1000 0 . 
2500 2.0 0 
6 1965 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 0750 . 00 . 1000 0 . 
2500 2.0 0 
7 1966 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 0750 . 00 . 1000 0 . 2500 2.0 
0 
8 1967 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 0750 . 00 . 2000 0 . 2500 2.0 
0 
9 1968 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 
0750 . 00 . 2000 0 . 2500 2.0 
0 
10 1969 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 0750 . 00 . 2000 0 . 
2500 2.0 0 
11 1970 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 0750 . 00 . 2000 0 . 
2500 2.0 0 
12 1971 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 
0750 . 00 . 2000 0 . 2500 2.0 
0 
13 1972 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 0750 . 00 . 2000 0 . 
2500 2.0 0 
14 1973 . 1500 . 2500 1 . 0750 . 00 . 2000 0 . 
2500 2.0 0 
15 1974 . 3500 . 0000 . 
1470 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
16 1975 . 3500 . 0000 . 
1470 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
17 1976 . 2500 . 0000 . 
1500 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
18 1977 . 2500 . 0000 . 
1500 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
19 1978 . 2500 . 0000 . 
1500 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
20 1979 . 2500 . 0000 . 
1500 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
21 1980 . 2500 . 0000 . 
1500 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
22 1981 . 2500 . 0000 . 
1500 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
23 1982 . 2700 . 0000 . 
1620 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 
0 
24 1983 . 3000 . 0000 . 
1620 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
25 1984 . 3600 . 0000 . 1620 1.00 0 . 2500 
3.0 0 
26 1985 . 3600 . 0000 . 
1620 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
27 1986 . 3600 . 0000 . 
1620 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 0 
28 1987 . 3600 . 0000 . 
1620 1.00 0 . 2500 3.0 
0 
29 1988 . 3600 . 0000 . 
1620 1.00 0 . 1250 1.0 0 
30 1989 . 3600 . 0000 . 
1620 1.00 0 . 1250 1.0 0 
31 1990 . 3600 . 0000 . 1620 
1.00 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
32 1991 . 3600 . 0000 . 
1620 . 75 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
33 1992 
. 3600 . 0000 . 
1620 . 75 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
34 1993 . 3600 . 0000 . 1620 . 00 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
35 1994 . 3800 . 0000 . 1620 . 00 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
36 1995 . 3700 . 0000 . 1620 . 00 0 . 1000 1.0 0 
37 1996 . 3700 . 0000 . 1620 . 00 0 . 1500 1.0 
0 
38 1997 
. 3700 . 0000 . 1620 . 00 0 . 1500 
1.0 L 0 
39 1998 . 3700 . 0000 . 1620 . 00 0 . 1500 
1.0 0 
ý_'r 
ýý 
1-1 
A: \Italy. sav 
mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 mrate3 myear3 mmethod3 mrate4 myear4 mmethod4 bratel byearl 
1 . 2000 1.0 0 . 1000 3.0 . 
0300 33.0 
2 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 1000 3.0 0 . 
0300 33.0 
3 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 1000 3.0 0 . 
0300 33.0 
4 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
1000 3.0 0 . 0300 33.0 
5 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 1000 3.0 0 . 
0300 33.0 
6 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 1000 3.0 0 . 
0300 33.0 
7 . 2000 
1.0 0 . 1000 3.0 0 . 
0300 33.0 
8 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 1000 3.0 0 . 
0300 33.0 
9 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 1000 
3.0 0 . 0300 33.0 
10 . 2000 1.0 0 . 1000 
3.0 0 . 0300 
33.0 
11 . 2000 1.0 0 . 1000 
3.0 0 . 0300 
33.0 
12 . 2000 1.0 0 . 1000 
3.0 0 . 0300 33.0 
13 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
1000 3.0 0 . 0300 33.0 
14 . 2000 1.0 0 . 1000 
3.0 0 . 0300 33.0 
15 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 
3.0 
16 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
17 . 1000 
2.0 0 . 0500 1.0 
0 . 1800 
3.0 
18 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
19 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
20 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
21 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
22 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
23 . 1000 2.0 0 . 
0500 1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
24 . 1000 2.0 0 . 0500 
1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
25 . 1000 2.0 0 . 0500 
1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
26 . 1000 2.0 0 . 0500 
1.0 0 . 1800 
3.0 
27 . 1000 2.0 0 . 0500 
1.0 0 . 1800 3.0 
28 . 1000 2.0 0 . 0500 
1.0 0 . 1800 
3.0 
29 . 2500 2.0 0 . 1000 
3.0 0 . 0750 
1.0 0 . 0375 
1.0 
30 . 2500 2.0 0 . 
1000 3.0 0 . 0750 1.0 0 . 0375 
1.0 
31 . 2000 2.0 0 . 
1000 5.0 0 . 0300 
1.0 
32 
. 2000 2.0 0 . 
1000 5.0 0 . 0300 
1.0 
33 
. 2000 2.0 0 . 
1000 5.0 0 . 0300 
1.0 
34 . 2000 2.0 0 . 
1000 5.0 0 . 0300 
1.0 
35 
. 2000 2.0 0 . 
1000 5.0 0 . 0300 1.0 
36 . 2000 2.0 0 . 1000 
5.0 0 . 0300 1.0 
37 
. 3000 2.0 0 . 
1000 2.0 0 . 0500 1.0 0 . 
0450 1.0 
38 . 3000 2.0 0 . 1000 
2.0 0 . 0500 1.0 0 . 
0450 1.0 
39 . 3000 2.0 0 . 1000 
2.0 0 . 0500 1.0 0 . 0450 
1.0 
-s < 
A: Utaly. sav 
bmethodl brate2 byear2 bmethod2 brate3 byear3 bmethod3 brate4 byear4 bmethod4 mincent 
1 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
2 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
3 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 
4 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
5 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
6 0 . 0100 1.0 
0 
7 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
8 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
9 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
10 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
11 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
12 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
13 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
14 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
15 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
16 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
17 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
18 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
19 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
20 0 . 0300 15.0 
0 . 0100 1.0 0 
21 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
22 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
23 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
24 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
25 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
26 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 0100 
1.0 0 
27 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
28 0 . 0300 15.0 0 . 
0100 1.0 0 
29 0 . 0750 2.0 0 . 
0300 27.0 0 . 0025 1.0 0 
30 0 . 0750 2.0 0 . 
0300 27.0 0 . 0025 1.0 0 
31 0 . 0600 2.0 
0 . 0300 28.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
32 0 . 0600 2.0 0 . 
0300 28.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
33 0 . 0600 2.0 
0 . 0300 28.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
34 0 . 0600 2.0 
0 . 0300 28.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
35 0 . 0600 2.0 
0 . 0300 28.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
36 0 . 0600 2.0 0 . 
0300 28.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 
37 0 . 0900 2.0 
0 . 0300 25.0 0 . 0250 1.0 0 
38 0 . 0900 2.0 0 . 
0300 25.0 0 . 0250 1.0 0 
39 0 . 0900 2.0 0 . 
0300 25.0 0 . 0250 1.0 
0 
ý4. ýýJ ýý 
1-3 
A: \italy. sav 
bincent ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 395 . 0727 . 0918 . 
0826 . 382 
2 . 395 . 0727 . 
0918 . 0826 . 382 
3 . 395 . 0727 . 
0918 . 0826 . 382 
4 . 429 . 
0762 . 0981 . 0876 . 416 
5 . 429 . 
0762 . 0981 . 0876 . 416 
6 . 438 . 
0771 . 0998 . 
0889 . 424 
7 . 438 . 0771 . 
0998 . 0889 . 
424 
8 . 438 . 0771 . 
0998 . 0889 . 424 
9 . 438 . 
0771 . 0998 . 
0889 . 424 
10 . 438 . 0771 . 
0998 . 0889 . 
424 
11 . 438 . 0771 . 0998 . 
0889 . 424 
12 . 438 . 0771 . 
0998 . 0889 . 424 
13 . 438 . 0771 . 
0998 . 0889 . 424 
14 . 438 . 0771 . 0998 . 
0889 . 424 
15 . 446 . 0766 . 
0760 . 0902 . 
373 
16 . 446 . 0766 . 
0760 . 0902 . 
373 
17 . 363 . 0688 . 
0684 . 0784 . 
297 
18 . 363 . 0688 . 
0684 . 0784 . 297 
19 . 363 . 0688 . 
0684 . 0784 . 
297 
20 . 363 . 0688 . 
0684 . 0784 . 
297 
21 . 363 . 0688 . 
0684 . 0784 . 
297 
22 . 363 . 0688 . 
0684 . 0784 . 
297 
23 . 388 . 0710 . 
0705 . 0817 . 320 
24 . 413 . 0733 . 
0728 . 0852 . 
343 
25 . 464 . 0786 . 
0780 . 0932 . 
391 
26 . 464 . 0786 . 
0780 . 0932 . 
391 
27 . 464 . 0786 . 
0780 . 0932 . 
391 
28 . 464 . 0786 . 
0780 . 0932 . 
391 
29 . 464 . 0863 . 
0992 . 0932 . 
456 
30 . 464 . 0863 . 
0992 . 0932 . 456 
31 . 464 . 0932 . 
1017 . 0932 . 
478 
32 . 478 . 0958 . 
1048 . 0958 . 
492 
33 . 478 . 
0958 . 1048 . 0958 . 
492 
34 . 522 . 1045 . 
1152 . 1046 . 536 
35 . 542 . 1091 . 
1207 . 1092 . 556 
36 . 532 . 
1068 . 1179 . 
1068 . 546 
37 . 532 . 
0902 . 1118 . 
1068 . 504 
38 . 532 . 
0902 . 1118 . 1068 . 
504 
39 . 532 . 0902 . 
1118 . 1068 . 504 
ýI (Zý 
1-4 
A: yapan. sav 
year ntax stax piitax miitax pictax mictax petax ded invent mratel 
1 1960 
. 
3800 . 
0000 
. 0000 . 
0000 
. 0620 . 
0970 . 1200 1 0 . 
2260 
2 1961 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0620 . 0970 . 1200 1 
0 . 2260 
3 1962 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0620 . 0970 . 1200 1 
0 . 2260 
4 1963 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0620 . 0970 . 
1200 1 0 . 2260 
5 1964 . 3800 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0620 . 0970 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
6 1965 . 3700 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0620 . 0970 . 
1200 1 0 . 2260 
7 1966 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0620 . 
1070 . 1200 1 0 . 
2260 
8 1967 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 0001 . 0620 . 1070 . 
1200 1 0 . 2260 
9 1968 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0001 . 0620 . 1070 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
10 1969 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 0001 . 0620 . 1070 . 
1200 1 0 . 2260 
11 1970 . 3675 . 0000 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0660 . 1070 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
12 1971 . 3675 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0001 . 0660 . 1070 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
13 1972 . 3675 . 0000 . 0000 . 0001 . 0660 . 1070 . 
1200 1 0 . 2260 
14 1973 . 3675 . 0000 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0660 . 1070 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
15 1974 . 4000 . 1000 . 0000 . 
0001 . 0660 . 1070 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
16 1975 . 4000 . 1000 . 0000 . 
0001 . 0660 . 1070 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
17 1976 . 4000 . 1000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
18 1977 . 4000 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
19 1978 . 4000 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
20 1979 . 4000 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
21 1980 . 4000 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
22 1981 . 4330 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
23 1982 . 4330 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
24 1983 . 4330 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0650 . 1450 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
25 1984 . 4330 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 
0 . 2260 
26 1985 . 4330 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 
1 0 . 2260 
27 1986 . 4330 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 
0 . 2260 
28 1987 . 4200 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 
0 . 2260 
29 1988 . 4200 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 
0 . 2260 
30 1989 . 4000 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 0 . 2260 
31 1990 . 3750 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 0 . 
2260 
32 1991 . 3750 . 0250 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 0 . 
2260 
33 1992 . 3750 . 0250 . 
0001 . 0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 0 . 
2260 
34 1993 . 3750 . 0250 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 0 . 
2260 
35 1994 . 3750 . 0250 . 
0001 . 0004 . 0600 . 1470 . 1320 1 0 . 
2260 
36 1995 . 3750 . 0000 . 0001 . 0004 . 
0600 . 1010 . 1200 1 0 . 
2260 
37 1996 . 3750 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1010 . 1200 
1 0 . 2260 
38 1997 
. 3750 . 0000 . 0001 . 
0004 . 0600 . 1010 . 1200 1 0 . 
2260 
39 1998 . 3750 . 0000 . 0001 . 0004 . 0600 . 
1010 . 1200 1 0 . 
2260 
"ý 
"'4'ýýý ýr`' 
1-1 
A: \apan. sav 
myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 bratel byearl bmethod1 brate2 byear2 bmethod2 
1 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
2 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
3 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 
'1 
. 0155 22.0 0 
4 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
5 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
6 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
7 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 
22.0 0 
8 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 
0155 22.0 0 
9 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 
0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
10 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 
0155 22.0 0 
11 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 
1 . 0155 22.0 0 
12 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
13 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 
0155 22.0 0 
14 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 
0155 22.0 0 
15 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
16 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
17 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 
0155 22.0 0 
18 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
19 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
20 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 
22.0 0 
21 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 
0155 22.0 0 
22 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
23 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
24 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
25 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
26 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
27 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
28 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
29 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
30 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
31 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
32 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
33 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
34 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
35 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
36 4.0 1 . 0720 
5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 0 
37 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
38 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 
0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 22.0 
0 
39 4.0 1 . 0720 5.0 0 . 0500 21.0 1 . 0155 
22.0 0 
ý'`, 
1-2 
A: yapan sav 
mincent bincent ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 553 . 1160 . 
1239 . 1119 . 
5740 
2 . 553 . 
1160 . 1239 . 
1119 . 5740 
3 . 553 . 
1160 . 1239 . 
1119 . 5740 
4 . 553 . 
1160 . 1239 . 
1119 . 5740 
5 . 553 . 
1160 . 1239 . 
1119 . 5740 
6 . 546 . 
1141 . 1218 . 
1101 . 5668 
7 . 538 . 
1121 . 1196 . 
1082 . 5590 
8 . 538 . 
1121 . 1196 . 
1082 . 5590 
9 . 538 . 
1121 . 1196 . 
1082 . 5590 
10 . 538 . 1121 . 
1196 . 1082 . 
5590 
11 . 553 . 1160 . 
1239 . 1118 . 
5738 
12 . 553 . 
1160 . 1239 . 
1118 . 5738 
13 . 553 . 
1160 . 1239 . 
1118 . 5738 
14 . 553 . 
1160 . 1239 . 
1118 . 5738 
15 . 604 . 
1315 . 1412 . 
1263 . 6243 
16 . 604 . 
1315 . 1412 . 
1263 . 6243 
17 . 625 . 
1390 . 1496 . 
1334 . 6448 
18 . 598 . 
1295 . 1390 . 
1245 . 6186 
19 . 598 . 
1295 . 1390 . 
1245 . 6186 
20 . 598 . 
1295 . 1390 . 
1245 . 6186 
21 . 598 . 
1295 . 1390 . 
1245 . 6186 
22 . 620 . 
1372 . 1477 . 
1317 . 6402 
23 . 620 . 
1372 . 1477 . 
1317 . 6402 
24 . 620 . 
1372 . 1477 . 
1317 . 6402 
25 . 
625 . 
1391 . 
1498 . 
1335 . 
6452 
26 . 625 . 
1391 . 1498 . 
1335 . 6452 
27 . 625 . 
1391 . 1498 . 
1335 . 6452 
28 . 617 . 
1360 . 1462 . 
1305 . 6368 
29 . 617 . 
1360 . 1462 . 
1305 . 6368 
30 . 
604 . 
1313 . 
1410 . 1262 . 
6239 
31 . 587 . 
1259 . 1350 . 
1211 . 6077 
32 . 593 . 
1279 . 1372 . 
1230 . 6138 
33 . 593 . 
1279 . 1372 . 
1230 . 6138 
34 . 593 . 
1279 . 1372 . 
1230 . 6138 
35 . 593 . 
1279 . 1372 . 
1230 . 6138 
36 . 551 . 
1155 . 1233 . 
1113 . 5719 
37 . 551 . 
1155 . 1233 . 
1113 . 5719 
38 . 551 . 
1155 . 1233 . 
1113 . 5719 
39 . 551 . 
1155 . 1233 . 
1113 . 5719 
ý. ', , 
`ý 
1-3 
A: Vuxembourg. sav 
year ntax stax Itax ded invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 
1 1960 . 4000 . 0100 . 0909 1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
2 1961 . 4000 . 0100 . 0909 1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
3 1962 . 4000 . 0100 . 0909 1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
4 1963 . 4000 . 0100 . 0909 1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
5 1964 . 4000 . 0100 . 0909 1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
6 1965 . 4000 . 0100 . 1071 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
7 1966 . 4000 . 0100 . 1071 1 1 . 3000 4.0 
1 . 0600 4.0 
8 1967 . 4000 . 0100 . 1228 1 1 . 3000 4.0 
1 . 0600 4.0 
9 1968 . 4000 . 0100 . 1228 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
10 1969 . 4000 . 0100 . 1228 1 1 . 3000 
4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
11 1970 . 4500 . 0100 . 1228 1 1 . 3000 4.0 
1 . 0600 
4.0 
12 1971 . 4000 . 0100 . 1228 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
13 1972 . 4000 . 0100 . 1228 1 
1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
14 1973 . 4000 . 0100 . 1289 1 
1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
15 1974 . 4000 . 0100 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
16 1975 . 4000 . 0100 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
17 1976 . 4000 . 0050 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 
1 . 0600 4.0 
18 1977 . 4000 . 0050 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
19 1978 . 4000 . 0050 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
20 1979 . 4000 . 0050 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
21 1980 . 4000 . 0050 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 
1 . 0600 4.0 
22 1981 . 4000 . 0050 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
23 1982 . 4000 . 0200 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
24 1983 . 4000 . 0200 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
25 1984 . 4000 . 0200 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
26 1985 . 4000 . 0200 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
27 1986 . 4000 . 0300 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
28 1987 . 3800 . 0300 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
29 1988 . 3600 . 0200 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
30 1989 . 3600 . 0200 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
31 1990 . 3600 . 0200 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
32 1991 . 3300 . 0100 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
33 1992 . 3300 . 0100 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
34 1993 . 3300 . 0100 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
35 1994 . 3300 . 0100 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 4.0 
36 1995 . 3300 . 0400 . 1289 
1 1 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
37 1996 
. 3200 . 0400 . 1289 
1 0 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
38 1997 
. 3100 . 0400 . 1289 
1 0 . 3000 4.0 1 . 0600 
4.0 
39 1998 . 3100 . 0400 . 1289 1 0 . 3000 4.0 
1 . 0600 
4.0 
1-1 
A: \Iuxembourg. sav 
mmethod2 bratel byearl bmethod1 mincent bincent ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 458 . 0719 . 0898 . 1346 . 4620 
2 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 458 . 0719 . 0898 . 
1346 . 4620 
3 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 458 . 0719 . 0898 . 1346 . 
4620 
4 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 458 . 0719 . 
0898 . 1346 . 4620 
5 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 458 . 
0719 . 0898 . 1346 . 4620 
6 0 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0900 . 468 . 0734 . 0914 . 
1379 . 4732 
7 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 0900 . 468 . 0734 . 0914 . 
1379 . 4732 
8 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 
477 . 0748 . 0930 . 1413 . 
4839 
9 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 477 . 0748 . 0930 . 1413 . 
4839 
10 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 477 . 0748 . 
0930 . 1413 . 4839 
11 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 521 . 0826 . 1013 . 
1590 . 5340 
12 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 477 . 0748 . 0930 . 1413 . 
4839 
13 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 477 . 0748 . 0930 . 1413 . 
4839 
14 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0900 . 
481 . 0754 . 
0936 . 1426 . 4881 
15 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 481 . 0754 . 0936 . 1426 . 
4881 
16 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 481 . 0754 . 0936 . 1426 . 
4881 
17 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 479 . 0751 . 
0933 . 1420 . 4861 
18 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 0900 . 479 . 0751 . 
0933 . 1420 . 4861 
19 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 479 . 0751 . 0933 . 1420 . 4861 
20 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 479 . 0751 . 0933 . 1420 . 4861 
21 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 479 . 0751 . 
0933 . 1420 . 4861 
22 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 479 . 0751 . 0933 . 1420 . 
4861 
23 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 484 . 0760 . 0942 . 1439 . 
4921 
24 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
0900 . 484 . 0760 . 0942 . 1439 . 
4921 
25 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 
484 . 0699 . 0942 . 
1439 . 4775 
26 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 
484 . 0699 . 0942 . 
1439 . 4775 
27 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 
488 . 0705 . 0949 . 1452 . 
4817 
28 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 
470 . 0676 . 0917 . 1386 . 
4602 
29 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 
449 . 0646 . 0883 . 1314 . 
4345 
30 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 
449 . 0646 . 0883 . 1314 . 
4345 
31 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 
449 . 0646 . 0883 . 1314 . 4345 
32 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 1200 . 
419 . 0607 . 0840 . 1222 . 
3979 
33 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 1200 . 419 . 0607 . 0840 . 1222 . 
3979 
34 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
1200 . 419 . 0607 . 0840 . 1222 . 3979 
35 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
1200 . 419 . 0607 . 0840 . 1222 . 3979 
36 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
1200 . 428 . 0618 . 0852 . 1248 . 4087 
37 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
1200 . 419 . 0606 . 0839 . 0860 . 
3240 
38 0 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 1200 . 410 . 0595 . 0827 . 0847 . 
3128 
39 0 . 0400 25.0 0 . 1200 . 410 . 0595 . 0827 . 0847 . 
3128 
A: \netherlands. sav 
year ntax stax ded invent srelief mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 
1 1960 . 4700 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
2 1961 . 4700 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
3 1962 . 4700 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
4 1963 . 4500 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
5 1964 . 4500 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
6 1965 . 4500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
7 1966 . 4700 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
8 1967 . 4600 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 
1 . 0791 4.0 
9 1968 . 4600 . 0000 0 . 
0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
10 1969 . 4600 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 
4.0 
11 1970 . 4600 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 
1 . 0791 4.0 
12 1971 . 4600 . 0300 0 . 
0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
13 1972 . 4600 . 0400 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 
4.0 
14 1973 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 
4.0 
15 1974 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 
4.0 
16 1975 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
17 1976 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 
2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
18 1977 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
19 1978 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
20 1979 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
21 1980 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
22 1981 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
23 1982 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
24 1983 . 4800 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
25 1984 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 0400 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
26 1985 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 0400 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
27 1986 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 0400 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
28 1987 . 4300 . 0000 
0 . 0400 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
29 1988 . 4200 . 0000 
0 . 0400 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
30 1989 . 4200 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
31 1990 . 3500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
32 1991 
. 3500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
33 1992 
. 3500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
34 1993 . 3500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
35 1994 . 3500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
36 1995 
. 3500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
37 1996 
. 3500 . 0000 
0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 4.0 
38 1997 . 3500 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 
4.0 
39 1998 . 3500 . 0000 0 . 0000 . 2500 4.0 1 . 0791 
4.0 
A: \netherlands. sav 
mmethod2 bratel byearl bmethodl bratet byear2 bmethod2 mallow ballow mincent bincent 
1 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 0283 13.0 
0 . 0955 . 0955 . 0000 . 0000 
2 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0955 . 0955 . 
0000 . 0000 
3 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0955 . 0955 . 
0000 . 0000 
4 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0955 . 
0955 . 0000 . 0000 
5 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0955 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 
6 0 . 0800 
12.0 1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0955 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
7 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0955 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
8 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
9 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
10 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 0283 
13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
11 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 0283 
13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
12 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
13 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
14 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 
15 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 
13.0 0 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
16 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 
13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
17 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 
18 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
19 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 1250 . 
1250 
20 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0000 . 0000 . 1250 . 1250 
21 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 
0000 . 1250 . 1250 
22 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 
0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1250 . 1250 
23 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0000 . 0000 . 1250 . 
1250 
24 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 
13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1250 . 1250 
25 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
1250 . 1250 
26 0 . 0800 12.0 1 . 
0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 
0000 ' . 1250 . 1250 
27 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0000 . 0000 . 1250 . 
1250 
28 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0000 . 0000 . 1250 . 
1250 
29 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 
0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
30 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
31 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
32 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 
33 0 
. 0800 
12.0 1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
34 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
35 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
36 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
37 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
38 0 . 0800 
12.0 1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
39 0 . 0800 12.0 
1 . 0283 13.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 
1-2 
A: \netheriands. sav 
ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 470 . 0646 . 0781 . 
0943 . 343 
2 . 470 . 0646 . 
0781 . 0943 . 343 
3 . 470 . 0646 . 
0781 . 0943 . 343 
4 . 450 . 0622 . 
0753 . 0909 . 318 
5 . 450 . 0622 . 
0901 . 0909 . 357 
6 . 450 . 0622 . 
0901 . 0909 . 
357 
7 . 470 . 0646 . 
0935 . 0943 . 380 
8 . 460 . 0928 . 
0918 . 0926 . 459 
9 . 460 . 0928 . 
0918 . 0926 . 
459 
10 . 460 . 0928 . 0918 . 
0926 . 459 
11 . 460 . 0928 . 
0918 . 0926 . 
459 
12 . 474 . 0952 . 
0941 . 0950 . 
473 
13 . 478 . 0961 . 0950 . 
0959 . 477 
14 . 480 . 0964 . 0953 . 
0962 . 479 
15 . 480 . 0964 . 
0953 . 0962 . 
479 
16 . 480 . 0964 . 0953 . 
0962 . 479 
17 . 480 . 0964 . 0953 . 
0962 . 479 
18 . 480 . 0964 . 0953 . 
0962 . 479 
19 . 480 . 0707 . 0794 . 
0962 . 373 
20 . 480 . 0707 . 0794 . 
0962 . 373 
21 . 480 . 0707 . 0794 . 
0962 . 373 
22 . 480 . 
0707 . 0794 . 
0962 . 373 
23 . 480 . 0707 . 
0794 . 0962 . 
373 
24 . 480 . 0707 . 0794 . 
0962 . 373 
25 . 430 . 0631 . 0721 . 
0877 . 305 
26 . 430 . 0631 . 0721 . 
0971 . 327 
27 . 430 . 0631 . 0721 . 
0877 . 305 
28 . 430 . 0631 . 0721 . 
0877 . 305 
29 . 420 . 0864 . 0855 . 
0862 . 419 
30 . 420 . 0864 . 0855 . 
0862 . 419 
31 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
32 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
33 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
34 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
35 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
36 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
37 
. 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
38 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
39 . 350 . 0771 . 0764 . 
0769 . 349 
ý_ 
A: \Newzealand. sav 
year ntax Itax ded Invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 mmethod2 
1 1960 . 4250 1 . 1600 1.0 1 . 1500 
1.0 1 
2 1961 . 4250 1 . 1600 1.0 
1 . 1500 1.0 1 
3 1962 . 4250 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 1500 
1.0 1 
4 1963 . 4250 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 1500 1.0 
1 
5 1964 . 4250 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 1500 
1.0 1 
6 1965 . 4250 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 
1500 1.0 1 
7 1966 . 4250 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 1500 
1.0 1 
8 1967 . 4250 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 1500 
1.0 1 
9 1968 . 4250 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 
1500 1.0 1 
10 1969 . 5000 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 
1500 1.0 1 
11 1970 . 5000 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 
1500 1.0 1 
12 1971 . 4500 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 1500 
1.0 1 
13 1972 . 4500 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 1500 
1.0 1 
14 1973 . 4500 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 
1500 1.0 1 
15 1974 . 4500 
1 . 2000 1.0 1 . 
1500 1.0 1 
16 1975 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 
1000 
17 1976 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 
1 . 1000 
1 
18 1977 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 
1000 
19 1978 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 1000 
1 
20 1979 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 
1000 
21 1980 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 
1000 
22 1981 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 
1000 1 
23 1982 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 
1000 1 
24 1983 . 4500 
1 . 2500 1.0 1 . 1000 
1 
25 1984 . 4500 
1 . 1000 1 
26 1985 . 4500 
1 . 1000 1 
27 1986 . 4500 
1 . 1000 1 
28 1987 . 4500 
1 . 1000 1 
29 1988 . 2800 
1 . 1000 1 
30 1989 . 3300 
1 . 1000 1 
31 1990 . 3300 
1 . 1000 1 
32 1991 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
33 1992 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
34 1993 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
35 1994 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
36 1995 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
37 1996 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
38 1997 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
39 1998 . 3300 
1 . 1250 1 
_; ý,, ý: 
A: \Newzealand. sav 
mrate3 myear3 mmethod3 mrate4 myear4 mmethod mrate5 myear5 mmethod5 mrate6 myear6 
1 . 1400 1.0 1 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 
2 . 1400 1.0 1 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 
3 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 1 
4 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 1 
5 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 1 
6 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 1 
7 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 1 
8 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 
1 
9 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 
1.0 1 . 1000 1 
10 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 1 
11 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 
1 . 1000 1 
12 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 
1 
13 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 1 . 1000 
1 
14 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 1.0 
1 . 1000 1 
15 . 1300 1.0 1 . 1200 
1.0 1 . 1000 1 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
L}-ý" 
A: \Newzealand. sav 
mmethod6 bratet byearl bmethodl mallow bellow ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 1 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 425 . 1132 . 1099 . 1239 . 
5647 
2 1 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 425 . 
1132 . 1099 . 1239 . 5647 
3 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 425 . 
1111 . 1099 . 1239 . 5611 
4 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 1000 . 425 . 0821 . 
1099 . 1239 . 5045 
5 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
1000 . 425 . 0821 . 1099 . 
1239 . 5045 
6 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 1000 . 
425 . 0821 . 1099 . 
1239 . 5045 
7 . 0100 
100.0 0 . 1000 . 425 . 
0821 . 1099 . 1239 . 
5045 
8 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
0000 . 425 . 1111 . 1099 . 
1239 . 5611 
9 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
425 . 1111 . 1099 . 
1239 . 5611 
10 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
0000 . 500 . 1327 . 
1310 . 1500 . 6337 
11 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
0000 . 500 . 1327 . 
1310 . 1500 . 
6337 
12 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
0000 . 450 . 1176 . 1163 . 
1318 . 5860 
13 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
0000 . 450 . 1176 . 1163 . 
1318 . 5860 
14 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
0000 . 450 . 1176 . 
1163 . 1318 . 5860 
15 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
450 . 1176 . 1163 . 
1318 . 5860 
16 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 2000 . 
450 . 0497 . 
1163 . 1318 . 4458 
17 . 0100 
100.0 0 . 2000 . 
450 . 0497 . 
1163 . 1318 . 4458 
18 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 2000 . 
450 . 0497 . 
1163 . 1318 . 4458 
19 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 2000 . 
450 . 0497 . 
1163 . 1318 . 4458 
20 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 2000 . 
450 . 0497 . 1163 . 
1318 . 4458 
21 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 2000 . 
450 . 0497 . 
1163 . 1318 . 4458 
22 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
450 . 1103 . 
1163 . 1318 . 5744 
23 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
450 . 1103 . 
1163 . 1318 . 5744 
24 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
450 . 1103 . 1163 . 
1318 . 5744 
25 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 4000 . 450 . 
0005 . 1163 . 1318 . 
2652 
26 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 4000 . 450 . 
0005 . 1163 . 1318 . 
2652 
27 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 4000 . 450 . 
0005 . 1163 . 1318 . 
2652 
28 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 4000 . 
450 . 0005 . 1163 . 
1318 . 2652 
29 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 4000 . 
280 -. 0085 . 0815 . 0889 . 
4083 
30 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 330 . 0931 . 
0899 . 0993 . 4662 
31 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
330 . 0931 . 0899 . 
0993 . 4662 
32 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
330 . 0883 . 
0899 . 0993 . 4537 
33 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 330 . 
0883 . 0899 . 0993 . 4537 
34 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 330 . 
0883 . 0899 . 0993 . 4537 
35 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 330 . 0883 . 
0899 . 0993 . 4537 
36 . 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 
330 . 0883 . 0899 . 
0993 . 4537 
37 
. 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 330 . 
0883 . 0899 . 0993 . 
4537 
38 
. 0100 100.0 
0 . 0000 . 330 . 0883 . 
0899 . 0993 . 
4537 
39 . 0100 100.0 0 . 
0000 . 330 . 0883 . 
0899 . 0993 . 4537 
ýý. -ý 
1-3 
A: \norway. sav 
year ntax tax dedi etax ded2 sdtax Invent mratel myearl mmethodl 
1 1960 . 3000 . 1800 
0 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
2 1961 . 3000 . 1800 
0 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 0 
3 1962 . 3000 . 
1800 0 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 
0 
4 1963 . 3000 . 
1900 0 . 0000 
1 . 1250 8.0 
0 
5 1964 . 3000 . 
1900 0 . 0500 0 
1 . 1250 8.0 
0 
6 1965 . 3000 . 
1900 0 . 0500 
0 1 . 1250 8.0 
0 
7 1966 . 3000 . 
1900 0 . 0500 
0 . 0025 
1 . 1250 8.0 
0 
8 1967 . 3000 . 1900 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0025 1 . 
4500 5.0 1 
9 1968 . 3000 . 1900 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0025 1 . 
4500 5.0 1 
10 1969 . 3000 . 1900 0 . 
0500 0 . 0050 1 . 
4500 5.0 1 
11 1970 . 2650 . 2000 0 . 
0300 0 . 0100 
1 . 4500 5.0 
1 
12 1971 . 2650 . 2000 
0 . 0300 
0 . 0100 1 . 
4500 5.0 1 
13 1972 . 2650 . 2000 
0 . 0300 
0 . 0100 1 . 
4500 5.0 1 
14 1973 . 2650 . 2000 
0 . 0170 
0 . 0130 1 . 
4500 5.0 1 
15 1974 . 2650 . 2000 
0 . 0170 
0 1 . 4500 5.0 
1 
16 1975 . 2650 . 2000 
0 . 0170 
0 1 . 4500 5.0 
1 
17 1976 . 2650 . 
2000 0 . 0170 
0 1 . 4500 5.0 
1 
18 1977 . 2780 . 2200 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 4500 
5.0 1 
19 1978 . 2780 . 2200 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 4500 5.0 
1 
20 1979 . 2780 . 2100 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 4500 5.0 
1 
21 1980 . 2780 . 2100 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 3000 
1 
22 1981 . 2780 . 2100 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 3000 
1 
23 1982 . 2780 . 2100 
0 . 0100 0 
1 . 3000 
24 1983 . 2780 . 2100 
0 . 0100 
0 1 . 3000 
1 
25 1984 . 2780 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
1 
26 1985 . 2780 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
1 
27 1986 . 2780 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
28 1987 . 2780 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
1 
29 1988 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
1 
30 1989 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
31 1990 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
1 
32 1991 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
33 1992 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
34 1993 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
1 
35 1994 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
36 1995 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
37 1996 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
38 1997 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
39 1998 . 2800 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 2000 
(4 ýý, 
A: \norway. sav 
mrate2 myea2 mmethod2 bratel byearl bmethodl brate2 byear2 bmethod2 mincent bincnet 
1 . 0400 25.0 0 
2 . 0400 25.0 0 
3 . 0400 25.0 0 . 
4 . 0400 25.0 0 
5 . 0400 25.0 0 
6 . 0400 25.0 
0 
7 . 0400 25.0 0 
8 . 3000 1 . 0875 5.0 
1 . 0700 1 
9 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 1 
10 . 3000 1 . 0875 5.0 
1 . 0700 1 
11 . 3000 1 . 0875 5.0 
1 . 0700 1 
12 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 1 
13 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 1 
14 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 
1 
15 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 1 
16 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 1 
17 . 3000 1 . 0875 5.0 
1 . 0700 
1 
18 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 
1 
19 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 1 
20 . 3000 1 . 0875 
5.0 1 . 0700 
1 
21 . 0700 
1 
22 . 0700 
1 
23 . 0700 
1 
24 . 0700 
1 
25 . 0500 
1 
26 . 0500 
1 
27 
. 0500 
1 
28 
. 0500 
1 
29 
. 0500 
1 
30 
. 0500 
1 
31 . 0500 
1 
32 . 0500 
1 
33 . 0500 
1 
34 . 0500 
1 
35 . 0500 1 
36 
. 0500 1 
37 
. 0500 
1 
38 
. 0500 
1 . 
39 
. 0500 
1 
ýýý 
A: \norway. sav 
ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 480 . 1003 . 
1026 . 1423 . 5516 
2 . 480 . 1003 . 
1026 . 1423 . 5516 
3 . 480 . 
1003 . 1026 . 
1423 . 5516 
4 . 490 . 
1024 . 1047 . 
1461 . 5615 
5 . 540 . 
1140 . 1169 . 
1674 . 6100 
6 . 540 . 
1140 . 1169 . 
1674 . 6100 
7 . 540 . 
1140 . 1169 . 
1674 . 6100 
8 . 540 . 
0933 . 1086 . 
1674 . 5704 
9 . 540 . 
0933 . 1086 . 
1674 . 5704 
10 . 540 . 
0933 . 1086 . 1674 . 
5704 
11 . 495 . 
0861 . 0989 . 1480 . 
5258 
12 . 495 . 
0861 . 0989 . 
1480 . 5258 
13 . 495 . 0861 . 
0989 . 1480 . 
5258 
14 . 482 . 0843 . 
0964 . 1431 . 
5128 
15 . 482 . 
0843 . 0964 . 
1431 . 5128 
16 . 482 . 
0843 . 0964 . 
1431 . 5128 
17 . 482 . 
0843 . 0964 . 
1431 . 5128 
18 . 508 . 
0881 . 1015 . 
1533 . 5387 
19 . 508 . 
0881 . 1015 . 
1533 . 5387 
20 . 498 . 0866 . 
0995 . 1492 . 
5288 
21 . 498 . 
0934 . 1025 . 
1492 . 5458 
22 . 498 . 
0934 . 1025 . 
1492 . 5458 
23 . 498 . 
0934 . 1025 . 
1492 . 5458 
24 . 498 . 0934 . 
1025 . 1492 . 
5458 
25 . 278 . 
0725 . 0731 . 
0885 . 3478 
26 . 278 . 
0725 . 0731 . 
0885 . 3478 
27 . 278 . 0725 . 
0731 . 0885 . 
3478 
28 . 278 . 0725 . 
0731 . 0885 . 
3478 
29 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . 0889 . 
3501 
30 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . 0889 . 
3501 
31 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . 0889 . 
3501 
32 . 280 . 
0727 . 0733 . 
0889 . 3501 
33 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . 0889 . 
3501 
34 . 280 . 
0727 . 0733 . 
0889 . 3501 
35 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . 0889 . 
3501 
36 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . 0889 . 
3501 
37 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . 0889 . 
3501 
38 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 . - - - - . 
3501 
39 . 280 . 0727 . 
0733 0 88 9 . 3501 
1 
1-3 
A: \portugal. sav 
year indtax stax catax stax2 comtax stax3 allstax Itax ded Invent 
1 1960 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
2 1961 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
3 1962 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
4 1963 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
5 1964 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
6 1965 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 
1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
7 1966 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
8 1967 . 1500 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 
0 
9 1968 . 1800 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 
0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
10 1969 . 1800 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 
0 
11 1970 . 1800 . 7200 . 1500 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 
0 
12 1971 . 1500 . 7500 . 1800 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 
0 
13 1972 . 1500 . 7500 . 1800 . 1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
14 1973 . 1500 . 7500 . 1800 . 1200 . 
0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
15 1974 . 1800 . 7500 . 1500 . 
1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
16 1975 . 1800 . 7500 . 1500 . 
1200 . 0800 . 2500 . 0000 0 
17 1976 . 2000 . 7500 . 1500 . 
1200 . 1200 . 2500 . 1000 0 
18 1977 . 2000 . 7500 . 2200 . 
1200 . 1200 . 1500 . 1500 0 
19 1978 . 2000 . 7500 . 2200 . 
1200 . 1200 . 1500 . 1500 0 
20 1979 . 2000 . 7500 . 2200 . 
1200 . 1200 . 1500 . 0000 0 
21 1980 . 2000 . 7500 . 
2200 . 1200 . 1200 . 1500 . 0000 0 
22 1981 . 2000 . 7500 . 2200 . 
1200 . 1200 . 1500 . 0000 0 
23 1982 . 2000 . 7500 . 
2200 . 1200 . 1200 . 1500 . 0000 
0 
24 1983 . 2000 . 7500 . 2200 . 
1200 . 1200 . 1500 . 0000 0 
25 1984 . 4000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0750 0 0 
26 1985 . 4000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0750 0 0 
27 1986 . 4000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0750 0 0 
28 1987 . 4000 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0750 0 
0 
29 1988 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0750 0 0 
30 1989 . 3600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0750 0 0 
31 1990 
. 3600 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0750 0 0 
32 1991 
. 3600 . 1000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
33 1992 . 3600 . 1000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
34 1993 . 3600 . 1000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
35 1994 . 3600 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
36 1995 . 3600 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
37 1996 . 3400 . 1000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
38 1997 . 3400 . 1000 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
39 1998 . 3400 . 1000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 0 
1_1 -k---> 
A: \portugal. sav 
mratel myearl mmethodt bratel byearl bmethodl mincent bincent ttax mp bp 
1 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 1009 
2 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 1009 
3 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 1009 
4 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 1009 
5 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 1009 
6 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 1009 
7 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 1009 
8 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 472 . 0879 . 
1009 
9 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 519 . 0958 . 1116 
10 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 . 519 . 0958 . 1116 
11 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 519 . 0958 . 
1116 
12 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 507 . 0936 . 
1086 
13 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 . 507 . 0936 . 
1086 
14 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 . 507 . 0936 . 1086 
15 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 524 . 0968 . 
1128 
16 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 524 . 0968 . 1128 
17 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 633 . 1233 . 1484 
18 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 742 . 1717 . 
2134 
19 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 . 742 . 1717 . 2134 
20 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 645 . 1270 . 1534 
21 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 645 . 1270 . 1534 
22 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 645 . 1270 . 1534 
23 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 645 . 1270 . 1534 
24 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 645 . 1270 . 1534 
25 . 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 0 . 0000 . 400 . 0783 . 0880 
26 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0000 . 400 . 0783 . 0880 
27 
. 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 1000 . 400 . 0594 . 0880 
28 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0800 . 400 . 0631 . 0880 
29 . 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0600 . 350 . 0618 . 0807 
30 
. 3125 1 . 0400 
25.0 0 . 0400 . 360 . 0664 . 0820 
31 
. 3125 1 . 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 . 360 . 0739 . 0820 
32 
. 3125 1 . 0500 
20.0 0 . 0000 . 396 . 0778 . 0835 
33 
. 3125 1 . 0500 
20.0 0 . 0000 . 396 . 0778 . 0835 
34 . 3125 1 . 0500 20.0 0 . 0000 . 396 . 0778 . 0835 
35 . 3125 1 . 0500 20.0 0 . 0000 . 396 . 0778 . 0835 
36 
. 3125 1 . 0500 20.0 0 . 0000 . 396 . 0778 . 0835 
37 
. 3125 1 . 0500 
20.0 0 . 0000 . 374 . 0753 . 0805 
38 
. 3125 1 . 0500 
20.0 0 . 0000 . 374 . 0753 . 0805 
39 . 3125 1 . 0500 20.0 0 . 0000 374 . . 0753 . 0805 
' Ct 
1-2 
A: \portugal. sav 
ip metr 
1 . 0947 . 4652 
2 . 0947 . 
4652 
3 . 0947 . 
4652 
4 . 0947 . 
4652 
5 . 0947 . 4652 
6 . 0947 . 
4652 
7 . 0947 . 4652 
8 . 0947 . 
4652 
9 . 1040 . 5127 
10 . 1040 . 5127 
11 . 1040 . 5127 
12 . 1014 . 
5003 
13 . 1014 . 
5003 
14 . 1014 . 5003 
15 . 1051 . 
5177 
16 . 1051 . 5177 
17 . 1364 . 
6272 
18 . 1935 . 
7364 
19 . 1935 . 7364 
20 . 1408 . 
6387 
21 . 1408 . 
6387 
22 . 1408 . 
6387 
23 . 1408 . 
6387 
24 . 1408 . 6387 
25 . 0833 . 
3936 
26 . 0833 . 3936 
27 . 0833 . 
3238 
28 . 0833 . 3390 
29 . 0769 . 2980 
30 . 0781 . 3247 
31 . 0781 . 3538 
32 . 0828 . 
3809 
33 . 0828 . 3809 
34 . 0828 . 3809 
35 . 0828 . 3809 
36 . 0828 . 3809 
37 . 0799 . 3592 
38 . 0799 . 3592 
39 . 0799 . 
3592 
1-3 
`ý 
ý 
Fý- 
A: 'spain. sav 
year ntax atax stax chtax ded Invent mratel myearl mmethodl bratel 
1 1960 . 3000 . 0400 . 0150 . 0000 1 . 3000 1 . 
0300 
2 1961 . 3000 . 0400 . 
0150 . 0000 1 . 3000 1 . 0300 
3 1962 . 3000 . 0400 . 
0150 . 0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
4 1963 . 3000 . 0400 . 0150 . 0000 
1 . 3000 1 . 0300 
5 1964 . 3000 . 0400 . 0150 . 0000 
1 . 3000 1 . 
0300 
6 1965 . 3000 . 0400 . 
0000 . 0000 
1 . 3000 1 . 
0300 
7 1966 . 3000 . 0400 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 1 . 
0300 
8 1967 . 3000 . 0400 . 0000 . 0000 
1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
9 1968 . 3000 . 0400 . 1000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 1 . 
0300 
10 1969 . 3000 . 0400 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
11 1970 . 3300 . 0400 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
12 1971 . 3000 . 0400 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
13 1972 . 3000 . 0400 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
14 1973 . 3000 . 0400 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
15 1974 . 3000 . 0400 . 0000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
16 1975 . 3000 . 0400 . 1000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 1 . 
0300 
17 1976 . 3200 . 0400 . 
1000 . 0000 
1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
18 1977 . 3200 . 0400 . 
1000 . 0000 1 . 3000 
1 . 0300 
19 1978 . 3200 . 0400 . 1000 . 
0000 1 . 3000 1 . 
0300 
20 1979 . 3300 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0150 
1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
21 1980 . 3300 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0150 1 
1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
22 1981 . 3300 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0150 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
23 1982 . 3300 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0150 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
24 1983 . 3300 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0150 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
25 1984 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0200 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
26 1985 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0200 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
27 1986 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0200 1 1 . 1600 1 . 
0600 
28 1987 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0200 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
29 1988 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0200 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
30 1989 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0200 1 1 . 1600 
1 . 0600 
31 1990 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0200 1 1 . 2000 1 . 
0750 
32 1991 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0200 1 0 . 2000 1 . 
0750 
33 1992 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0200 1 0 . 2000 1 . 
0750 
34 1993 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0150 1 0 . 2400 1 . 
0750 
35 1994 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0150 1 0 . 2400 1 . 0750 
36 1995 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0100 1 0 . 2400 1 . 
0750 
37 1996 . 3500 . 0000 . 
0000 . 0100 1 0 . 
2400 1 . 0750 
38 1997 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 
0080 1 0 . 2400 1 . 
0750 
39 1998 . 3500 . 0000 . 0000 . 0075 
1 0 . 2400 1 . 
0750 
ýr ý',. 
1_1 
A: \spain. sav 
byearl bmethodl mincent bincent ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 344 . 0508 . 0696 . 1026 . 2792 
2 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 344 . 0508 . 0696 . 1026 . 2792 
3 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 344 . 0508 . 0696 . 1026 . 
2792 
4 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 344 . 0508 . 0696 . 1026 . 
2792 
5 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 344 . 
0508 . 0696 . 1026 . 2792 
6 33.3 0 . 1200 . 
1200 . 340 . 0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 
2727 
7 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 340 . 
0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 2727 
8 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 340 . 
0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 2727 
9 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
370 . 0532 . 0731 . 1087 . 3158 
10 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 340 . 
0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 2727 
11 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
370 . 0532 . 0731 . 1087 . 
3156 
12 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
340 . 0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 2727 
13 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
340 . 0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 2727 
14 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
340 . 0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 
2727 
15 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
340 . 0504 . 0690 . 1015 . 
2727 
16 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
370 . 0532 . 0731 . 1087 . 
3156 
17 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
392 . 0555 . 0764 . 1145 . 
3464 
18 33.3 0 . 1200 . 
1200 . 392 . 0555 . 0764 . 1145 . 
3464 
19 33.3 0 . 1200 . 1200 . 
392 . 0555 . 0764 . 1145 . 3464 
20 1 . 1200 . 
1200 . 340 . 0611 . 
0655 . 1015 . 3104 
21 1 . 1200 . 
1200 . 340 . 0611 . 
0655 . 1015 . 3104 
22 1 . 1200 . 
1200 . 340 . 
0611 . 0655 . 1015 . 3104 
23 1 . 1200 . 
1200 . 340 . 0611 . 0655 . 1015 . 
3104 
24 1 . 1200 . 1200 . 
340 . 0611 . 0655 . 1015 . 3104 
25 1 . 1200 . 1200 . 
363 . 0643 . 0682 . 1070 . 3436 
26 1 . 1500 . 1500 . 
363 . 0583 . 0648 . 1070 . 3097 
27 1 . 1500 . 
1500 . 363 . 
0583 . 0648 . 1070 . 3097 
28 1 . 1500 . 1500 . 
363 . 0583 . 0648 . 1070 . 
3097 
29 1 . 1500 . 1500 . 
363 . 0583 . 0648 . 1070 . 
3097 
30 1 . 1000 . 
1000 . 363 . 0683 . 0705 . 1070 . 3644 
31 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 
363 . 0735 . 0737 . 1070 . 3897 
32 1 . 0500 . 
0500 . 363 . 0735 . 0737 . 0785 . 
3316 
33 1 . 0500 . 
0500 . 363 . 0735 . 0737 . 0785 . 3316 
34 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 
360 . 0694 . 0733 . 0781 . 
3126 
35 1 . 0500 . 
0500 . 360 . 0694 . 0733 . 0781 . 3126 
36 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 
357 . 0690 . 0729 . 0777 . 3089 
37 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 
357 . 0690 . 0729 . 0777 . 3089 
38 1 . 0500 . 
0500 . 355 . 0688 . 0728 . 0775 . 3074 
39 1 . 0500 . 0500 . 
355 . 0688 . 0727 . 0775 . 3070 
.... ý ý 1-2 
A: \sweden. sav 
year ntax Itax ded invent srelief mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 
1 1960 . 4000 . 1600 1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
2 1961 . 4000 . 1600 1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
3 1962 . 4000 . 1600 1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
4 1963 . 4000 . 1600 
1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
5 1964 . 4000 . 1600 1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 
1 . 1430 1.0 
6 1965 . 4000 . 1600 1 1.0 . 000 . 
3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
7 1966 . 4000 . 1600 1 1.0 . 000 . 
3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
8 1967 . 4000 . 0290 1 1.0 . 
000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
9 1968 . 4000 . 0290 1 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
10 1969 . 4000 . 0290 1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
11 1970 . 4000 . 0290 1 1.0 . 
000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
12 1971 . 4000 . 0290 
1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
13 1972 . 4000 . 0290 1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 
1 . 1430 1.0 
14 1973 . 4000 . 0290 1 1.0 . 000 . 
3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
15 1974 . 4000 . 0290 
1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 
1430 1.0 
16 1975 . 4000 . 0290 
1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
17 1976 . 4000 . 0290 
1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
18 1977 . 4000 . 0290 
1 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
19 1978 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
20 1979 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
21 1980 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 600 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
22 1981 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 600 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
23 1982 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 600 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
24 1983 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 600 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
25 1984 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 600 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
26 1985 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 500 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
27 1986 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 500 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
28 1987 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 500 . 3000 3.0 1 . 
1430 1.0 
29 1988 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 500 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
30 1989 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 500 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
31 1990 . 5200 . 0000 
1.0 . 500 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
32 1991 
. 3000 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
33 1992 . 3000 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
34 1993 . 3000 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
35 1994 
. 2800 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
36 1995 . 2800 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 
1.0 
37 1996 
. 2800 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
38 1997 
. 2800 . 0000 
1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
39 1998 . 2800 . 0000 1.0 . 000 . 3000 3.0 1 . 1430 1.0 
1-t 
A: \sweden. sav 
mmethod2 mrate3 myear3 mmethod3 bratel byearl bmethodl bratet byear2 bmethod2 mincent 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 0357 28.0 0 
2 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 0357 28.0 
0 
3 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 0357 28.0 
0 
4 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0357 28.0 0 
5 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0357 28.0 0 
6 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0357 28.0 0 
7 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0357 28.0 0 
8 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 0357 
28.0 0 
9 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0357 28.0 0 
10 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0357 28.0 0 
11 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0557 5.0 0 . 0357 20.0 
0 
12 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0557 5.0 0 . 0357 20.0 
0 
13 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0557 5.0 0 . 0357 20.0 0 
14 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0557 5.0 0 . 0357 20.0 0 
15 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0557 5.0 0 . 0357 20.0 0 
16 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0557 5.0 0 . 0357 
20.0 0 
17 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0557 5.0 0 . 0357 20.0 0 
18 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0557 5.0 0 . 0357 
20.0 0 
19 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0557 5.0 0 . 0357 
20.0 0 
20 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0557 5.0 0 . 0357 
20.0 0 
21 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0557 5.0 0 . 0357 
20.0 0 
22 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0557 5.0 0 . 0357 
20.0 0 
23 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0557 5.0 0 . 0357 
20.0 0 
24 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0557 5.0 0 . 0357 20.0 
0 
25 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0400 25.0 0 
26 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0400 25.0 0 
27 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
28 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 
25.0 0 
29 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0400 25.0 0 
30 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
31 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
32 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
33 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
34 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
35 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
36 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
37 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
38 0 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 25.0 0 
39 0 . 2000 1.0 0 . 
0400 25.0 0 
-'+'ý 
j 'ý 
A: \sweden. sav 
bincent ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 496 . 0926 . 
1089 . 1484 . 551 
2 . 496 . 0926 . 
1089 . 1484 . 551 
3 . 496 . 0926 . 
1089 . 1484 . 551 
4 . 496 . 0926 . 
1089 . 1484 . 551 
5 . 496 . 0926 . 
1089 . 1484 . 551 
6 . 496 . 0926 . 
1089 . 1484 . 551 
7 . 496 . 0926 . 
1089 . 1484 . 551 
8 . 417 . 0810 . 0929 . 
1216 . 472 
9 . 417 . 0810 . 
0929 . 1216 . 
472 
10 . 417 . 0810 . 0929 . 
1216 . 472 
11 . 417 . 0810 . 0883 . 
1216 . 464 
12 . 417 . 0810 . 0883 . 
1216 . 464 
13 . 417 . 0810 . 0883 . 
1216 . 464 
14 . 417 . 0810 . 0883 . 
1216 . 464 
15 . 417 . 0810 . 
0883 . 1216 . 464 
16 . 417 . 0810 . 
0883 . 1216 . 464 
17 . 417 . 0810 . 
0883 . 1216 . 464 
18 . 417 . 0810 . 
0883 . 1216 . 464 
19 . 520 . 0969 . 
1079 . 1583 . 
567 
20 . 520 . 0969 . 
1079 . 1583 . 567 
21 . 520 . 0969 . 
1079 . 1274 . 
536 
22 . 520 . 0969 . 
1079 . 1274 . 536 
23 . 520 . 0969 . 
1079 . 1274 . 536 
24 . 520 . 0969 . 
1079 . 1274 . 536 
25 . 520 . 0969 . 
1117 . 1274 . 
541 
26 . 520 . 0969 . 
1117 . 1326 . 
547 
27 . 520 . 0969 . 
1117 . 1326 . 547 
28 . 520 . 0969 . 
1117 . 1326 . 
547 
29 . 520 . 0969 . 
1117 . 1326 . 547 
30 . 520 . 0969 . 
1117 . 1326 . 547 
31 . 520 . 0969 . 
1117 . 1326 . 
547 
32 . 300 . 0686 . 
0744 . 0929 . 
345 
33 . 300 . 0686 . 
0744 . 0929 . 345 
34 . 300 . 0686 . 
0744 . 0929 . 345 
35 . 280 . 0668 . 
0721 . 0889 . 324 
36 . 280 . 0668 . 0721 . 
0889 . 324 
37 
. 280 . 0668 . 
0721 . 0889 . 
324 
38 
. 280 . 0668 . 
0721 . 0889 . 324 
39 . 280 . 0668 . 0721 . 
0889 , 324 
I-- 
A: \switzerland. sav 
year ntax Itax ded srelief Invent mratel myearl mmethodl bratet byearl 
1 1960 . 0800 . 2813 
0 . 00 1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
2 1961 . 0800 . 2790 
0 . 00 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
3 1962 . 0800 . 2775 
0 . 00 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
4 1963 . 0800 . 2790 
0 . 00 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
5 1964 . 0800 . 3240 
0 . 00 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
6 1965 . 0800 . 
3270 0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
7 1966 . 0800 . 3300 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
8 1967 . 0800 . 
3390 0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
9 1968 . 0800 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
10 1969 . 0800 . 3420 0 . 
00 1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
11 1970 . 0800 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
12 1971 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
13 1972 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
14 1973 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
15 1974 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
16 1975 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
17 1976 . 0980 . 
3420 0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
18 1977 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
19 1978 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
20 1979 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
21 1980 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
22 1981 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
23 1982 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
24 1983 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 00 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
25 1984 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
26 1985 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
27 1986 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
28 1987 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
29 1988 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
30 1989 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
31 1990 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 
1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
32 1991 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
33 1992 . 0980 . 
3420 0 . 33 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
34 1993 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
35 1994 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
36 1995 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 2500 
1 . 0800 
37 1996 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
38 1997 . 0980 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
39 1998 . 0783 . 3420 
0 . 33 1 . 
2500 1 . 0800 
. 
ýý. ý,. 
A: \switzedand. sav 
bmethodl mincent bincent ttax mp bp Ip metr 
1 1 . 361 . 0783 . 0783 . 1066 . 4142 
2 1 . 359 . 0780 . 0780 . 1060 . 4118 
3 1 . 358 . 0778 . 0778 . 1056 . 4102 
4 1 . 359 . 0780 . 0780 . 1060 . 4118 
5 1 . 404 . 0839 . 0839 . 1178 . 4587 
6 1 . 407 . 0843 . 
0843 . 1186 . 4618 
7 1 . 410 . 0847 . 
0847 . 1195 . 4649 
8 1 . 419 . 0861 . 
0861 . 1221 . 4741 
9 1 . 422 . 0865 . 
0865 . 1230 . 4772 
10 1 . 422 . 0865 . 
0865 . 1230 . 4772 
11 1 . 422 . 0865 . 
0865 . 1230 . 4772 
12 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1286 . 4955 
13 1 . 440 . 0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
14 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1286 . 4955 
15 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
16 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
17 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1286 . 4955 
18 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
19 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1286 . 4955 
20 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
21 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1286 . 4955 
22 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
23 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
24 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1286 . 4955 
25 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1162 . 4793 
26 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1162 . 4793 
27 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1162 . 4793 
28 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1162 . 4793 
29 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1162 . 4793 
30 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1162 . 4793 
31 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1162 . 4793 
32 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1162 . 4793 
33 1 . 440 . 0893 . 
0893 . 1162 . 4793 
34 1 . 440 . 0893 . 0893 . 1162 . 4793 
35 1 . 440 . 0893 . 0893 . 1162 . 4793 
36 1 . 440 . 0893 . 0893 . 1162 . 4793 
37 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1162 . 4793 
38 1 . 440 . 
0893 . 0893 . 1162 . 4793 
39 1 . 420 . 0863 . 0863 . 1111 . 4593 
ý ý, ýý `', 
A: \turkey. sav 
year Max ntax ded stax Invent mratel myeart mmethodl mrate2 myear2 
1 1960 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 2.0 
2 1961 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 1 . 4000 3.0 
1 . 1080 2.0 
3 1962 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 1 . 4000 
3.0 1 . 1080 2.0 
4 1963 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 2.0 
5 1964 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 1 . 4000 
3.0 1 . 1080 2.0 
6 1965 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
7 1966 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 
1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
8 1967 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 
1 . 4000 3.0 
1 . 1080 2.0 
9 1968 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 2.0 
10 1969 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 
1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
11 1970 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 
1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
12 1971 . 0000 . 4000 . 0600 
1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
13 1972 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
14 1973 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
15 1974 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 
1 . 1080 
2.0 
16 1975 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
17 1976 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
18 1977 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 
1 . 1080 2.0 
19 1978 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
20 1979 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 2.0 
21 1980 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
22 1981 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 
1080 2.0 
23 1982 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 4000 3.0 
1 . 1080 2.0 
24 1983 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 
2.0 
25 1984 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 
2.0 
26 1985 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 5000 2.0 
1 . 1250 2.0 
27 1986 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 
2.0 
28 1987 . 0000 . 4000 . 
0600 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 
2.0 
29 1988 . 0000 . 4600 . 
0600 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 
2.0 
30 1989 . 0000 . 4600 . 0600 
1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 2.0 
31 1990 . 0000 . 4600 . 
0600 1 . 5000 2.0 
1 . 1250 2.0 
32 1991 . 0000 . 4600 . 
0700 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 
2.0 
33 1992 . 0000 . 4600 . 
1000 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 2.0 
34 1993 . 0000 . 4600 . 
1000 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 
2.0 
35 1994 . 2000 . 2500 
1 . 0000 1 . 5000 2.0 1 . 1250 2.0 
36 1995 . 2000 . 2500 1 . 
0000 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 2.0 
37 1996 . 2000 . 2500 
1 . 0000 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 
1080 2.0 
38 1997 . 2000 . 2500 1 . 
0000 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
39 1998 . 2000 . 2500 1 . 
0000 1 . 4000 3.0 1 . 1080 
2.0 
t' 1-1 - 
A: \turkey. sav 
mmethod2 bratel byearl bmethod1 brate2 byear2 bmethod2 mincent bincent ttax mp 
1 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 0282 12.0 
0 . 424 . 0801 
2 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
3 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
4 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
5 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
424 . 0801 
6 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
7 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
8 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
9 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
10 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
11 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
12 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
13 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
14 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
15 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
424 . 0801 
16 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
17 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
18 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 
0 . 424 . 
0801 
19 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 0801 
20 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
424 . 0801 
21 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
424 . 0801 
22 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
424 . 0801 
23 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 
AN . 0801 
24 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0799 
25 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
424 . 0799 
26 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 424 . 0799 
27 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
424 . 0799 
28 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 424 . 
0799 
29 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
488 . 0887 
30 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 488 . 
0887 
31 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
488 . 0887 
32 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 492 . 
0894 
33 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 506 . 
0916 
34 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 
506 . 0916 
35 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 400 . 
0771 
36 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 12.0 0 . 400 . 
0772 
37 0 . 0800 13.0 
1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 400 . 0772 
38 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 
0282 12.0 0 . 400 . 0772 
39 0 . 0800 13.0 1 . 0282 
12.0 0 . 400 . 0772 
t ýý 
l 
w 
A: \turkey. sav 
bp ip metr 
1 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
2 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
3 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
4 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
5 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
6 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
7 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
8 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
9 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
10 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
11 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
12 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
13 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
14 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
15 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
16 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
17 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
18 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
19 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
20 . 0861 . 
1236 . 4610 
21 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
22 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4610 
23 . 0861 . 1236 . 4610 
24 . 0861 . 1236 . 4605 
25 . 0861 . 1236 . 4605 
26 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4605 
27 . 0861 . 1236 . 
4605 
28 . 0861 . 1236 . 4605 
29 . 0966 . 1452 . 5246 
30 . 0966 . 1452 . 
5246 
31 . 0966 . 1452 . 5246 
32 . 0975 . 1469 . 
5292 
33 . 1002 . 1524 . 5429 
34 . 1002 . 1524 . 5429 
35 . 0827 . 1167 . 
4360 
36 . 0827 . 1167 . 
4365 
37 . 0827 . 1167 . 
4365 
38 . 0827 . 1167 . 
4365 
39 . 0827 . 1167 . 
4365 
1-3 
A: \uk. sav 
year ntax flax ded srelief Invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 
1 1960 . 5063 . 00 1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
2 1961 . 5313 . 00 1 . 3000 
1.0 1 . 2500 
3 1962 . 5375 . 00 
1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
4 1963 . 5375 . 00 1 . 
3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
5 1964 . 5625 . 00 
1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
6 1965 . 4000 . 
00 1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
7 1966 . 4000 . 
00 1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
8 1967 . 4250 . 
00 1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
9 1968 . 4250 . 
00 1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
10 1969 . 4250 . 00 
1 . 3000 1.0 1 . 2500 
11 1970 . 4000 . 
00 1 . 8500 1.0 1 . 2500 
12 1971 . 4000 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
13 1972 . 4000 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
14 1973 . 5200 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
15 1974 . 5200 
1.00 0 1.0000 1.0 1 
16 1975 . 5200 
1.00 0 1.0000 1.0 1 
17 1976 . 5200 
1.00 0 1.0000 1.0 1 
18 1977 . 5200 
1.00 0 1.0000 1.0 1 
19 1978 . 5200 
1.00 0 1.0000 1.0 1 
20 1979 . 5200 
1.00 0 1.0000 1.0 1 
21 1980 . 5200 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
22 1981 . 5200 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
23 1982 . 5200 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
24 1983 . 5000 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
25 1984 . 4500 . 
00 1 1.0000 1.0 1 
26 1985 . 4000 . 
00 1 . 7500 1.0 1 . 2500 
27 1986 . 3500 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
28 1987 . 3500 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
29 1988 . 3500 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
30 1989 . 3500 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
31 1990 . 3400 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
32 1991 . 3300 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
33 1992 . 3300 . 
00 1 . 6500 1.0 
1 . 2500 
34 1993 . 3300 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
35 1994 . 3300 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
36 1995 . 3300 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
37 1996 . 3300 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
38 1997 . 3100 . 
00 1 . 2500 1 
39 1998 . 3100 . 00 1 . 2500 
1 
1-1 
4--::,:, 
A: \uk. sav 
mmethod2 bratet byearl bmethod1 brate2 byear2 bmethod2 brate3 byear3 bmethod3 mcash 
1 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 21.0 0 . 0000 
2 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 21.0 0 . 0000 
3 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 21.0 0 . 0000 
4 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 21.0 0 . 
0000 
5 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 21.0 
0 . 0000 
6 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 
0400 21.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 0000 
7 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 
21.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 2000 
8 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 
21.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 
2000 
9 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 
0400 21.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 2000 
10 1 . 1500 1.0 0 . 0400 
21.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 2000 
11 1 . 3000 1.0 0 . 
0400 17.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 2000 
12 . 3000 1.0 0 . 
0400 17.0 0 . 0100 1.0 0 . 0000 
13 . 4000 1.0 0 . 
0400 15.0 0 . 0000 
14 . 4000 1.0 0 . 
0400 15.0 0 . 0000 
15 
. 5000 1.0 
0 . 0400 
12.0 0 . 0200 1.0 0 . 
0000 
16 . 5000 1.0 
0 . 0400 12.0 0 . 0200 
1.0 0 . 0000 
17 . 5000 1.0 
0 . 0400 
12.0 0 . 0200 1.0 0 . 0000 
18 . 5000 1.0 0 . 
0400 12.0 0 . 0200 
1.0 0 . 0000 
19 . 5000 1.0 
0 . 0400 12.0 0 . 0200 
1.0 0 . 0000 
20 . 5000 1.0 
0 . 0400 12.0 0 . 0200 
1.0 0 . 0000 
21 
. 5000 1.0 
0 . 0400 12.0 0 . 0200 
1.0 0 . 0000 
22 
. 7500 1.0 
0 . 0400 6.0 0 . 0100 1.0 
0 . 0000 
23 . 7500 1.0 
0 . 0400 6.0 0 . 0100 
1.0 0 . 0000 
24 
. 7500 1.0 
0 . 0400 6.0 0 . 0100 1.0 
0 . 0000 
25 . 5000 1.0 
0 . 0400 12.0 0 . 0200 1.0 
0 . 0000 
26 1 . 2500 1.0 0 . 
0400 18.0 0 . 0300 1.0 0 . 
0000 
27 
. 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 
28 
. 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 
29 
. 0400 25.0 0 . 
0000 
30 
. 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 
31 
. 0400 25.0 0 . 
0000 
32 
. 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 
33 1 . 2000 1.0 
0 . 0400 20.0 0 . 0000 
34 
. 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 
35 
. 0400 25.0 
0 . 0000 
36 
. 0400 25.0 0 . 
0000 
37 
. 0400 25.0 0 . 
0000 
38 
. 0400 25.0 0 . 
0000 
39 
. 0400 25.0 0 . 
0000 
1ý71 
A: \uk. sav 
bcash ttax mp bp ip metr 
1 . 0000 . 506 . 0966 . 0997 . 1525 . 5517 
2 . 0000 . 531 . 1016 . 1049 . 1633 . 5763 
3 . 0000 . 538 . 1029 . 1063 . 1662 . 5825 
4 . 0000 . 538 . 1029 . 1063 . 1662 . 5825 
5 . 0000 . 563 . 1085 . 1123 . 1786 . 6068 
6 
. 0000 . 400 . 0803 . 0823 . 1167 . 4445 
7 . 2000 . 400 . 0393 . 0579 . 1167 . 2211 
8 . 2000 . 425 . 0419 . 0607 . 1239 . 2651 
9 
. 2000 . 425 . 0419 . 0607 . 1239 . 
2651 
10 . 2000 . 425 . 0419 . 0607 . 1239 . 2651 
11 . 2000 . 400 . 0237 . 0519 . 1167 . 
0981 
12 . 0000 . 400 . 0606 . 0749 . 1167 . 3664 
13 . 0000 . 400 . 0606 . 0703 . 1167 . 3551 
14 . 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 0830 . 1583 . 
4722 
15 
. 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 0759 . 
0526 . 2446 
16 
. 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 0759 . 
0526 . 2446 
17 . 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 0759 . 0526 . 2446 
18 
. 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 
0759 . 0526 . 2446 
19 . 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 0759 . 
0526 . 2446 
20 . 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 0759 . 
0526 . 2446 
21 . 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 
0759 . 1583 . 4602 
22 . 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 
0615 . 1583 . 4337 
23 
. 0000 . 520 . 0672 . 
0615 . 1583 . 4337 
24 . 0000 . 500 . 0659 . 0606 . 
1500 . 4142 
25 . 0000 . 450 . 0630 . 0696 . 
1318 . 3917 
26 . 0000 . 400 . 0645 . 0773 . 
1167 . 3856 
27 . 0000 . 350 . 0769 . 0807 . 
1038 . 4102 
28 
. 0000 . 350 . 0769 . 0807 . 
1038 . 4102 
29 . 0000 . 350 . 0769 . 0807 . 
1038 . 4102 
30 
. 0000 . 350 . 0769 . 0807 . 
1038 . 4102 
31 
. 0000 . 340 . 0758 . 0793 . 
1015 . 3996 
32 
. 0000 . 330 . 0746 . 
0781 . 0993 . 3888 
33 
. 0000 . 330 . 0633 . 
0720 . 0993 . 3324 
34 
. 0000 . 330 . 0746 . 0781 . 0993 . 
3888 
35 . 0000 . 330 . 0746 . 
0781 . 0993 . 3888 
36 
. 0000 . 330 . 0746 . 0781 . 
0993 . 3888 
37 
. 0000 . 330 . 0746 . 0781 . 
0993 . 3888 
38 
. 0000 . 310 . 0725 . 0756 . 
0949 . 3672 
39 . 0000 . 310 . 0725 . 0756 . 0949 . 3672 
1-3 
A: \usa. sav 
year ntax stax Itax ded Invent mratel myearl mmethodl mrate2 myear2 
1 1960 . 5200 . 0000 . 0660 1 0 . 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 1.0 
2 1961 . 5200 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 1.0 
3 1962 . 5200 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 1.0 
4 1963 . 5200 . 0000 . 0660 1 0 . 1250 1.0 
1 . 2500 1.0 
5 1964 . 5000 . 0000 . 0660 1 0 . 
1250 1.0 1 . 2500 1.0 
6 1965 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 1.0 
7 1966 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 1.0 
8 1967 . 4800 . 1000 . 0660 1 
0 . 1250 1.0 
1 . 2500 1.0 
9 1968 . 4800 . 1000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 
1.0 
10 1969 . 4800 . 0500 . 0660 
1 0 . 1250 1.0 1 . 2500 
1.0 
11 1970 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 
1.0 
12 1971 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 
1.0 
13 1972 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 1.0 
14 1973 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 
1.0 
15 1974 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 
1.0 
16 1975 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 1.0 
17 1976 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 1.0 
18 1977 . 4800 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 
2857 1.0 
19 1978 . 4800 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 1.0 
20 1979 . 4600 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 
1.0 
21 1980 . 4600 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 1429 1.0 1 . 2857 
1.0 
22 1981 . 4600 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 
2.0 
23 1982 . 4600 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 1500 1.0 1 . 
3000 2.0 
24 1983 . 4600 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 
2.0 
25 1984 . 4600 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 2.0 
26 1985 . 4600 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 1500 1.0 1 . 3000 2.0 
27 1986 . 3400 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
28 1987 . 3400 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 
2.0 
29 1988 . 3400 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 
2.0 
30 1989 . 3400 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
31 1990 . 3400 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 
1 . 4000 2.0 
32 1991 . 3400 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
33 1992 . 3400 . 0000 . 
0660 1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
34 1993 . 3500 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
35 1994 . 3500 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
36 1995 . 3500 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
37 1996 . 3500 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
38 1997 . 3500 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 
2.0 
39 1998 . 3500 . 0000 . 0660 
1 0 . 2000 1.0 1 . 4000 2.0 
- 
"=ý Fý 
1-1 
A: \usa. sav 
mmethod2 mrate3 myear3 mmethod3 mrate4 myear4 mmthod4 bratel byearl bmethodI brate2 
1 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
2 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
3 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
4 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
5 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
6 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
7 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
8 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
9 1 6.0 2 
. 0400 1.0 1 . 0800 
10 1 6.0 2 
. 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
11 1 5.0 2 . 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
12 1 5.0 2 
. 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
13 1 5.0 2 
. 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
14 1 5.0 2 . 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
15 1 5.0 2 
. 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
16 1 5.0 2 
. 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
17 1 5.0 2 
. 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
18 1 5.0 2 . 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
19 1 5.0 2 . 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
20 1 5.0 2 
. 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
21 1 5.0 2 . 0300 1.0 1 . 0600 
22 1 . 1666 2.0 0 . 0833 1.0 0 . 0583 1.0 1 . 1166 
23 1 . 1666 2.0 0 . 0833 1.0 0 . 0583 1.0 1 . 1166 
24 1 . 1666 2.0 0 . 0833 1.0 0 . 0583 1.0 1 . 1166 
25 1 . 1666 2.0 0 . 0833 1.0 0 . 0583 1.0 1 . 1166 
26 1 . 1666 2.0 0 . 0833 1.0 0 . 0583 1.0 1 . 1166 
27 1 . 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0167 1.0 0 . 0333 
28 1 
. 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0167 1.0 0 . 0333 
29 1 . 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0167 1.0 0 . 0333 
30 1 . 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0167 1.0 0 . 0333 
31 1 . 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0167 1.0 0 . 0333 
32 1 
. 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0167 1.0 0 . 0333 
33 1 
. 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0167 1.0 0 . 0333 
34 1 . 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0128 1.0 0 . 0256 
35 1 
. 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0128 1.0 0 . 0256 
36 1 
. 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0128 1.0 0 . 0256 
37 1 
. 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0128 1.0 0 . 0256 
38 1 
. 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0128 1.0 0 . 0256 
39 1 . 1152 2.0 0 . 0576 1.0 0 . 0128 1.0 0 . 0256 
1-2 
A: \usa. sav 
byear2 bmethod2 brate3 byear3 bmethod3 mcash bcash ttax mp bp Ip 
1 12.0 1 . 0294 12.0 
0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
552 . 1050 . 1203 . 1115 
2 12.0 1 . 0294 
12.0 0 . 0000 . 0000 . 
552 . 1050 . 1203 . 1115 
3 12.0 1 . 0294 12.0 
0 . 0700 . 0000 . 
552 . 0790 . 1203 . 1115 
4 12.0 1 . 0294 
12.0 0 . 0700 . 0000 . 552 . 
0790 . 1203 . 1269 
5 12.0 1 . 0294 12.0 
0 . 0700 . 0000 . 
533 . 0760 . 1152 . 
1071 
6 12.0 1 . 0294 
12.0 0 . 0700 . 0000 . 
514 . 0733 . 1105 . 
1029 
7 12.0 1 . 0294 
12.0 0 . 0700 . 0000 . 
514 . 0733 . 1105 . 
1029 
8 12.0 1 . 0294 12.0 
0 . 0700 . 0000 . 
559 . 0802 . 
1225 . 1134 
9 12.0 1 . 0294 12.0 
0 . 0000 . 0000 . 559 . 
1066 . 1225 . 
1134 
10 8.0 1 . 3696 16.0 
0 . 0000 . 0000 . 537 . 
1017 . 1198 . 
1079 
11 8.0 1 . 3696 16.0 
0 . 0000 . 0000 . 514 . 
0891 . 1138 . 1029 
12 8.0 1 . 3696 16.0 
0 . 0700 . 0000 . 514 . 0651 . 
1138 . 1029 
13 8.0 1 . 3696 16.0 
0 . 0700 . 0000 . 514 . 
0651 . 1138 . 1029 
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